Cornell v. State of California

Filing 10

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S IFP APPLICATION 2 AND DISMISSING CASE. Signed by Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu on 1/27/2012. (dmrlc2, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 1/27/2012)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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THERESA CORNELL,

No. C-11-05431 (DMR)

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Plaintiff(s),
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v.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S IFP
APPLICATION AND DISMISSING
CASE FOR FAILURE TO STATE A
CLAIM

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Defendant(s).
___________________________________/

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Plaintiff filed this case, in conjunction with an Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis, on
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November 9, 2011. [Docket Nos. 1-2.] Her complaint alleges that a California state judge acted
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unethically during her criminal trial. Specifically, she asserts that, upon conviction, he gave her a
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more stringent sentence than others who had committed more egregious crimes; that he failed to
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properly disqualify an allegedly biased juror; that he improperly influenced the jury’s behavior; that
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he refused to recuse himself upon her request; that he tampered with her legal documents to deprive
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her of an appeal; and that when she appealed, her case again appeared before this judge.
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After reviewing Plaintiff’s IFP Application, the court determines that Plaintiff meets the
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financial requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The court therefore GRANTS the application. The
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court nevertheless must dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), because it fails
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to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Even taking into account the court’s duty to
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construe pro se pleadings liberally, see Bernhardt v. L.A. Cnty., 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir.2003),
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the court cannot discern a valid legal claim. Judges and “individuals necessary to the judicial
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process” at the state and federal levels, Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 923 (9th Cir.
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2004) (citations and quotation marks omitted), are “generally immune from civil liability.” Meek v.
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(1991)). This policy reflects the “‘general principle of the highest importance to the proper

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administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising authority vested in him, shall be free to

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act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.’” Olsen,

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363 F.3d 916 at 922 (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 347 (1871)). This rule remains

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sacrosanct “[a]lthough unfairness and injustice to a litigant may result on occasion.” Meek, 183 F.3d

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at 965 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Thus, a judge receives immunity even if “he takes

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actions which are in error, are done maliciously, or are in excess of his authority.” Id. (citing Stump

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v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978)). The law will strip a judge of immunity only if he acts

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“‘in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.’” Sadoski v. Mosley, 435 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 2006)

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(quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57) (quotation marks omitted).

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The facts proffered in Plaintiff’s amended complaint concern her objections to the actions of

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a judge in his official capacity, and nothing before the court suggests that the judge acted in a clear

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absence of jurisdiction. Under these circumstances, the law mandates that the judge receive

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immunity from suit. The court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice.1
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R NIA

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Judge D

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Dated: January 27, 2012

NO

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IT IS S

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ISTRIC
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IT IS SO ORDERED.

UNIT
ED

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RT
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For the Northern District of California

Cnty. of Riverside, 183 F.3d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-10

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United States District Court

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C

DONNA N DIRYUT OF
M. S T RIC
United States Magistrate Judge

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A magistrate judge generally must obtain the consent of the parties to enter dispositive
rulings and judgments in a civil case. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). However, in cases such as this
one, where the plaintiff has consented but not served the defendants, “all parties have consented
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1),” and a magistrate judge therefore “‘may conduct any or all
proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case.’” Gaddy v.
McDonald, No. 11-CV-8271, 2011 WL 5515505, at *1 n.2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2011) (not reported in
F. Supp. 2d) (quoting § 636(c)(1)) (citing United States v. Real Property, 135 F.3d 1312, 1317 (9th
Cir. 1995)); Third World Media, LLC v. Doe, No. C-10-4470 LB, 2011 WL 4344160, at *3 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 15, 2011)); see also Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir.1995) (holding that
magistrate judge had jurisdiction to dismiss . . . action . . . as frivolous without consent of defendants
because defendants not yet served and therefore not parties).

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