Kranson v. Federal Express Corporation

Filing 205

ORDER by Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers granting 199 Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment and Waiver of Requirement to post Supersedeas Bond. (kk, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 12/31/2013)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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TIM KRANSON,

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Plaintiff,

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vs.

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Northern District of California

United States District Court

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Case No.: 11-cv-05826-YGR
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION
FOR ORDER STAYING EXECUTION OF
JUDGMENT AND WAIVER OF REQUIREMENT
TO POST SUPERSEDEAS BOND

FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION,
Defendant.

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Pending before the Court is Defendant Federal Express Corporation’s (“FedEx”) Motion for

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Order Staying Execution of Judgment and Waiver of Requirement to Post Supersedeas Bond

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(“Motion”). (Dkt. No. 199.) Plaintiff Tim Kranson has opposed the Motion (Dkt. No. 203), and

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FedEx filed a reply in turn (Dkt. No. 204).

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Having carefully considered the papers submitted and the pleadings in this action, the

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arguments of counsel, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court hereby GRANTS FedEx’s request

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for an order staying execution of the judgment pending appeal and waiving the requirement of a

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supersedeas bond under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(d).1

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I.

DISCUSSION
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(d) provides that where an appeal is taken, an “appellant

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may obtain a stay [of proceedings to enforce the judgment] by supersedeas bond . . . The bond may be

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given upon or after filing the notice of appeal or after obtaining the order allowing the appeal. The

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stay takes effect when the court approves the bond.”

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Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b) and Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court finds this
motion appropriate for decision without oral argument. Accordingly, the Court VACATES the hearing
set for January 21, 2014.

FedEx argues that this Court should exercise its discretion to waive the bond requirement

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“because FedEx’s ability to pay the $382,197 judgment is so plain[,] the expense of the bond would

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be a waste of money.” (Motion at 3; see id. at 4 (reporting FedEx’s assets and net income based on

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Form 10-K).) In support of this argument, FedEx relies primarily on two out-of-circuit cases: Dillon

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v. City of Chicago, 866 F.2d 902, 904 (7th Cir. 1988) and Arban v. West Publishing Corp., 345 F.3d

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390, 409 (6th Cir. 2003). In Dillon, the Seventh Circuit explained that when determining whether to

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waive the bond requirement, a district court may look to the following factors:

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(1) the complexity of the collection process; (2) the amount of time required to obtain
a judgment after it is affirmed on appeal; (3) the degree of confidence that the district
court has in the availability of funds to pay the judgment; (4) whether the defendant’s
ability to pay the judgment is so plain that the cost of a bond would be a waste of
money; and (5) whether the defendant is in such a precarious financial situation that
the requirement to post a bond would place other creditors of the defendant in an
insecure position.

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Northern District of California

United States District Court

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866 F.2d at 904–05 (internal quotations, citations, and parentheticals omitted). Courts in the Ninth
Circuit regularly use the Dillon factors in determining whether to waive the bond requirement. See
Cotton ex rel. McClure v. City of Eureka, Cal., 860 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1028 (N.D. Cal. 2012).2
As noted above, FedEx’s primary argument relates to the fourth Dillon factor—that its ability

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to pay the judgment is so plain that the cost of the bond would be a waste of money. FedEx also
states that “once a completed payment request is submitted, it takes less than 30 days . . . to issue
payment” (Motion at 4), which relates to the second Dillon factor. While FedEx does not speak
directly to the complexity of the collection process (the first Dillon factor), counsel attests that in his
experience, payments are issued after submitting a completed payment request. (See Declaration of
Charles W. Matheis, Jr. [Dkt. No. 199] ¶ 5.)
Based on FedEx’s arguments and counsel’s declaration, the Court is confident that FedEx has

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available funds to ultimately pay the judgment to Kranson (the third Dillon factor).3 In sum, the Court
finds that the Dillon factors weigh in favor of waiving the bond requirement required by Fed. R. Civ.
P. 62(d). Accordingly, the Court exercises its discretion to waive the requirement of a bond in this
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In Arban, the Sixth Circuit appeared to focus primarily on only one of the Dillon factors.

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The Court finds that the fifth Dillon factor is not applicable here.
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case pending FedEx’s appeal to the Ninth Circuit.

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II.

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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS FedEx’s Motion for Order Staying

Execution of Judgment and Waiver of Requirement to Post Supersedeas Bond.

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This Order terminates Dkt. No. 199.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: December 31, 2013

_______________________________________
YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

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Northern District of California

United States District Court

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