Kranson v. Federal Express Corporation

Filing 205

ORDER by Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers granting 199 Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment and Waiver of Requirement to post Supersedeas Bond. (kk, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 12/31/2013)

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1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 6 7 TIM KRANSON, 8 Plaintiff, 9 vs. 10 Northern District of California United States District Court 11 Case No.: 11-cv-05826-YGR ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR ORDER STAYING EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT AND WAIVER OF REQUIREMENT TO POST SUPERSEDEAS BOND FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION, Defendant. 12 13 Pending before the Court is Defendant Federal Express Corporation’s (“FedEx”) Motion for 14 15 Order Staying Execution of Judgment and Waiver of Requirement to Post Supersedeas Bond 16 (“Motion”). (Dkt. No. 199.) Plaintiff Tim Kranson has opposed the Motion (Dkt. No. 203), and 17 FedEx filed a reply in turn (Dkt. No. 204). 18 Having carefully considered the papers submitted and the pleadings in this action, the 19 arguments of counsel, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court hereby GRANTS FedEx’s request 20 for an order staying execution of the judgment pending appeal and waiving the requirement of a 21 supersedeas bond under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(d).1 22 I. DISCUSSION Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(d) provides that where an appeal is taken, an “appellant 23 24 may obtain a stay [of proceedings to enforce the judgment] by supersedeas bond . . . The bond may be 25 given upon or after filing the notice of appeal or after obtaining the order allowing the appeal. The 26 stay takes effect when the court approves the bond.” 27 1 28 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b) and Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court finds this motion appropriate for decision without oral argument. Accordingly, the Court VACATES the hearing set for January 21, 2014. FedEx argues that this Court should exercise its discretion to waive the bond requirement 1 2 “because FedEx’s ability to pay the $382,197 judgment is so plain[,] the expense of the bond would 3 be a waste of money.” (Motion at 3; see id. at 4 (reporting FedEx’s assets and net income based on 4 Form 10-K).) In support of this argument, FedEx relies primarily on two out-of-circuit cases: Dillon 5 v. City of Chicago, 866 F.2d 902, 904 (7th Cir. 1988) and Arban v. West Publishing Corp., 345 F.3d 6 390, 409 (6th Cir. 2003). In Dillon, the Seventh Circuit explained that when determining whether to 7 waive the bond requirement, a district court may look to the following factors: 8 (1) the complexity of the collection process; (2) the amount of time required to obtain a judgment after it is affirmed on appeal; (3) the degree of confidence that the district court has in the availability of funds to pay the judgment; (4) whether the defendant’s ability to pay the judgment is so plain that the cost of a bond would be a waste of money; and (5) whether the defendant is in such a precarious financial situation that the requirement to post a bond would place other creditors of the defendant in an insecure position. 9 10 Northern District of California United States District Court 11 12 13 14 15 866 F.2d at 904–05 (internal quotations, citations, and parentheticals omitted). Courts in the Ninth Circuit regularly use the Dillon factors in determining whether to waive the bond requirement. See Cotton ex rel. McClure v. City of Eureka, Cal., 860 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1028 (N.D. Cal. 2012).2 As noted above, FedEx’s primary argument relates to the fourth Dillon factor—that its ability 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 to pay the judgment is so plain that the cost of the bond would be a waste of money. FedEx also states that “once a completed payment request is submitted, it takes less than 30 days . . . to issue payment” (Motion at 4), which relates to the second Dillon factor. While FedEx does not speak directly to the complexity of the collection process (the first Dillon factor), counsel attests that in his experience, payments are issued after submitting a completed payment request. (See Declaration of Charles W. Matheis, Jr. [Dkt. No. 199] ¶ 5.) Based on FedEx’s arguments and counsel’s declaration, the Court is confident that FedEx has 23 24 25 26 27 28 available funds to ultimately pay the judgment to Kranson (the third Dillon factor).3 In sum, the Court finds that the Dillon factors weigh in favor of waiving the bond requirement required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(d). Accordingly, the Court exercises its discretion to waive the requirement of a bond in this 2 In Arban, the Sixth Circuit appeared to focus primarily on only one of the Dillon factors. 3 The Court finds that the fifth Dillon factor is not applicable here. 2 1 case pending FedEx’s appeal to the Ninth Circuit. 2 II. 3 4 CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS FedEx’s Motion for Order Staying Execution of Judgment and Waiver of Requirement to Post Supersedeas Bond. 5 This Order terminates Dkt. No. 199. 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 8 9 Dated: December 31, 2013 _______________________________________ YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 10 Northern District of California United States District Court 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 3

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