Anderson v. Jamba Juice Company
Filing
44
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART THE MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND re 23 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Jamba Juice Company. Signed by Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers on 8/24/12. (fs, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 8/24/2012) Modified on 8/27/2012 (fs, COURT STAFF).
1
2
3
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
4
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
5
6
7
8
KEVIN ANDERSON, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated,
9
Plaintiff,
10
United States District Court
Northern District of California
11
12
13
Case No.: 12-CV-01213 YGR
ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTION OF
DEFENDANT JAMBA JUICE COMPANY WITH
LEAVE TO AMEND
vs.
JAMBA JUICE COMPANY,
Defendant.
14
15
Plaintiff filed this putative class action against Defendant Jamba Juice Company (“Jamba
16
Juice”), alleging that it falsely represented that its smoothie kits are “All Natural,” when they are
17
not. Plaintiff brings four claims, alleging violations of: (1) California’s Unfair Competition Law,
18
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq. (“UCL”); (2) California’s False Advertising Law, Cal.
19
Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17500 et seq. (“FAL”); (3) the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act,
20
Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1750 et seq. (“CLRA”); and (4) the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
21
2301 et seq. (“MMWA”).
22
Jamba Juice has filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, (Dkt. No.
23
22 (“FAC”)), on two grounds: First, Plaintiff’s Fourth Cause of Action, under the MMWA, fails
24
because the “All Natural” statement on the smoothie kits did not establish a written warranty.
25
Second, Plaintiff only purchased the smoothie kits in two of the five flavors, and therefore, he lacks
26
standing to bring claims based on products he never purchased.
27
28
Having carefully considered the papers submitted and the pleadings in this action, and for
the reasons set forth below, the Court hereby GRANTS IN PART the Motion to Dismiss, and
1
DISM
MISSES Plain
ntiff’s Fourth Cause of Action WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.1
h
A
H
2
I.
BACKG
GROUND
3
Jamba Ju is a lead
uice
ding health food and bev
f
verage retaile (FAC ¶ 2 It has retail locations
er.
2).
4
that offer fruit smoothies, fr
resh squeezed juices, tea
as/lattes, and snacks. (Id ¶¶ 2, 13.) Jamba Juice
d
d.
e
5
also offers consu
o
umer at-hom products, including fr
me
rozen novelt bars and a
ty
at-home smo
oothie kits
6
(“sm
moothie kits” (Id. ¶¶ 2, 14.) Defen
”).
,
ndant’s smoo
othie kits are at issue in t case. (I ¶ 2.)
e
this
Id.
Jamba Ju
uice’s smoot kits are prominently labeled as “
thie
y
“All Natural and are av
l,”
vailable in
7
five flavors: Ma
ango-a-go-g Strawberr Wild, Caribbean Pas
go,
ries
ssion, Orang Dream M
ge
Machine, and
9
Razzmatazz. (Id ¶ 12.) By labeling its smoothie ki as “All N
d.
y
its
Natural,” Jam Juice has been able
mba
s
10
to ch
harge a price premium for its smooth kits, whi cost abou $4.39 each (Id. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff
e
f
hie
ich
ut
h.
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
8
alleg that the smoothie kit are not “A Natural,” and contain the followin unnatural
ges
s
ts
All
n
ng
lly
12
proc
cessed, synth
hetic and/or non-natural ingredients: ascorbic ac steviol g
:
cid,
glycosides, x
xanthan gum
m,
13
and citric acid. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 21-24.)
2
14
In Decem
mber 2011, Plaintiff Kev Anderson purchased Jamba Juice Mango-a
P
vin
n
d
e’s
a-go-go and
15
Razzmatazz smo
oothie kits. (Id. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff relie on the rep
P
ed
presentations that the sm
moothie kits
16
were “All Natur when he made his pu
e
ral”
e
urchase. Th “All Natur represen
he
ral”
ntation was m
material to
17
Plaintiff’s decision to buy th smoothie kits, and he paid a price premium fo the Jamba Juice
he
e
or
a
18
smo
oothie kits th he would not have pa had the tr facts bee disclosed to him. (Id.) Plaintiff
hat
aid
rue
en
19
filed this action on behalf of himself and a class of c
d
f
d
consumers w purchased one or mo of
who
ore
20
Defe
fendant’s smoothie kits, which Plaint alleges w
w
tiff
were falsely labeled as “A Natural” despite the
All
”
21
inclu
usion of the unnaturally processed, synthetic sub
s
bstances, or substances c
created via c
chemical
22
proc
cessing.
23
II.
LEGAL STANDAR
L
RD
24
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tes the legal s
n
sts
sufficiency o the claims alleged in
of
s
25
the complaint. Ileto v. Gloc Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1
c
I
ck,
1199-1200 (
(9th Cir. 200
03). “Dismis can be
ssal
26
base on the lac of a cogni
ed
ck
izable legal theory or the absence of sufficient fa alleged under a
t
e
f
acts
27
1
28
Pur
rsuant to Fede Rule of Civil Procedu 78(b) and Civil Local R 7-1(b), th Court finds this motion
eral
C
ure
Rule
he
appr
ropriate for de
ecision withou oral argum
ut
ment. Accordi
ingly, the Cou VACATES the hearing s for Augus
urt
S
set
st
28, 2012.
2
2
1
cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).
2
All allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the
3
plaintiff. Johnson v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 653 F.3d 1000, 1010 (9th Cir. 2011). To survive a motion
4
to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
5
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
6
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)).
7
Review is generally limited to the contents of the complaint and documents attached
8
thereto. Allarcom Pay Television. Ltd. v. Gen. Instrument Corp., 69 F.3d 381, 385 (9th Cir. 1995).
9
The Court may also consider a matter that is properly the subject of judicial notice without
converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Lee v. City of Los Angeles,
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2001). Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, a court may take
12
judicial notice of a fact not subject to reasonable dispute because it is generally known within the
13
trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose
14
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b).
15
The parties have requested the Court take judicial notice of the First Amended Complaint
16
filed in this lawsuit, (Dkt. No. 22); the First Amended Complaint filed in Hairston v. South Beach
17
Beverage Co., Inc., CV 12-1429-JFW (C.D. Cal. May 1, 2012), (see Dkt. Nos. 23-2 & 39); an
18
exemplar of the Jamba Juice smoothie kits’ packaging at issue in this case; and a guidance
19
document from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s (“FDA”) website, titled “FDA Basics-
20
Did you know that a store can sell food past the expiration date?” (see Dkt. Nos. 36-1 & 36-2). The
21
Court will take judicial notice of the court filings and the FDA Guidance Document. See Reyn’s
22
Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006) (courts “may take
23
judicial notice of court filings and other matters of public record.”). Additionally, because neither
24
party contests the authenticity of the pictures of the Jamba Juice smoothie kits’ packaging, and
25
because these food product labels form the basis for Plaintiff’s allegations in the FAC, the Court
26
takes judicial notice of these materials. See Wright v. Gen’l Mills, Inc., 2009 WL 3247148 (S.D.
27
Cal. Sept. 30, 2009).
28
3
1
III.
2
3
DISCUS
SSION
A.
WHETHER “ALL NATUR ” LANGU
RAL
UAGE ON PR
RODUCT PAC
CKAGING CO
ONSTITUTES
A WRITTEN WARRANTY UNDER TH MAGNUSO MOSS WARRANTY ACT?
Y
HE
ON
Plaintiff Fourth Ca
f’s
ause of Actio alleges th Jamba Ju
on
hat
uice’s represe
entations tha its
at
4
smo
oothie kits ar “All Natur violates the Magnus Moss W
re
ral”
son
Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et
,
§§
5
seq., which prov
vides a consu
umer remedy for breach of a written warranty m
y
h
n
made in conn
nection with
6
the sale of a con
s
nsumer produ Accord
uct.
ding to the FA labeling the smooth kits as “A Natural”
AC,
g
hie
All
7
crea a written warranty th the ingre
ated
n
hat
edients in the smoothie k were free of a particu type of
e
kits
e
ular
8
defe (i.e., that they were not synthetic, artificial an
ect
n
,
nd/or otherw non-natu
wise
ural). FAC ¶ 64. In
9
Plaintiff’s view, by failing to provide sm
,
moothie kits that contain only “All Natural” in
ned
ngredients,
mba
eached this written warra
w
anty (i.e., the smoothie k contained unnaturally processed,
e
kits
d
Jam Juice bre
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
synt
thetic and/or non-natural ingredients and therefo were no defect free Id. ¶ 65.
r
l
s,
ore,
ot
e).
12
Jamba Ju argues that Plaintiff MMWA claim must b dismissed because th phrase
uice
t
f’s
be
d
he
13
“All Natural” do not fit within the stat
l
oes
w
tute’s definit
tion of a “wr
ritten warran
nty.” The M
MMWA
14
defines a written warranty as follows:
n
a
15
any writt affirmati of fact or written pro
ten
ion
omise made in connectio with the s
on
sale
of a cons
sumer produ by a supp
uct
plier to a buy which relates to the n
yer
nature of the
e
material or workman
nship and aff
ffirms or prom
mises that su material or workman
uch
l
nship
is defect free or will meet a spec
t
cified level o performan over a sp
of
nce
pecified perio of
od
time.
16
17
18
15 U.S.C. § 230
U
01(6)(A).
Plaintiff maintains th the langu
f
hat
uage “All Na
atural” on th smoothie k
he
kits’ labels “
“relates to
19
20
the nature of the material” and is a writt affirmati of fact or promise as to the qualit and
n
e
a
ten
ion
r
ty
21
cont
tents of the product–that the smoothie kits are “d
p
t
defect free.”2 Relying u
”
upon court de
ecisions
22
inter
rpreting the California Commercial Code, Plaint argues th courts ha found tha the
C
tiff
hat
ave
at
23
lang
guage “All Natural” can create a war
N
rranty. See P Opp’n 6 (citing V
Pl’s
6-7
Vicuna v. Alex Foods,
xia
24
Inc., Case No. C-11-6119 PJH, 2012 WL 1497507, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 27 2012); In re Ferrero
C
W
7,
25
g.,
upp.
7
2
Jamba Juice points out, these cases a
e
are
Litig 794 F. Su 2d 1107 (S.D. Cal. 2011)). As J
26
2
27
28
The Court agree with Plaintiff that “defec free” and “
es
ct
“specified leve of perform
el
mance over a s
specified
perio of time” ar separate ba to establi a written w
od
re
ases
ish
warranty unde the MMWA. Because P
er
Plaintiff’s
claim is under the “defect free” theory, the representation does not ne a tempora element to e
m
e
n
eed
al
establish a
writt warranty.
ten
4
1
inapposite because Plaintiff’s warranty claim is under the MMWA, which defines written warranty
2
differently than does California state law.3 Jamba Juice argues that the language “All Natural” on
3
the smoothie kits’ labels does not constitute a written warranty within the meaning of the MMWA.
4
The Court agrees.
District Courts have held consistently that labeling a product “All Natural” is not a “written
5
warranty” under the MMWA. See Astiana v. Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc., C-11-2910 EMC,
7
2012 WL 2990766 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 20, 2012) (claim that food product is “natural” describes product
8
but does not give assurance that product is defect free and therefore does not create warranty);
9
Littlehale v. Trader Joe’s Co., C-11-6342 PJH, Dkt. No. 48, (N.D. Cal. Jul. 2, 2012) (statements
10
“Pure Natural” and “All Natural” are “mere product descriptions,” not “affirmations or promises
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
6
that the products are defect free”); Larsen v. Nonni’s Foods, LLC, C-11-05188 SI, Dkt. No. 41
12
(N.D. Cal. Jun. 14, 2012) (“All Natural” and “100% Natural” are not written warranties promising
13
that food products are defect free because “this Court is not persuaded that being ‘synthetic’ or
14
‘artificial’ is a ‘defect.’”); Hairston v. South Beach Beverage Co., Inc., 2012 WL 1893818 (C.D.
15
Cal. May 18, 2012) (representations that beverage was “all natural with vitamins” “are product
16
descriptions rather than promises that Lifewater is defect-free or guarantees of specific performance
17
levels.”). The Court finds the reasoning in these cases persuasive.
The statement “All Natural” is a general product description rather than a promise that the
18
19
product is defect free. See Larsen, supra, C-11-05188 SI, Dkt. No. 41 (N.D. Cal. Jun. 14, 2012)
20
(rejecting claim that the use of synthetic ingredients in food labeled “all natural” rendered that food
21
defective, reasoning the “deliberate use of [synthetic] ingredients does not comport with the plain
22
meaning of the word ‘defect.’”). A product description does not constitute a written warranty under
23
the MMWA. See Littlehale, supra, C-11-6342 PJH, Dkt. No. 48, (N.D. Cal. Jul. 2, 2012) (“To
24
accept plaintiffs’ argument [that the statement “All Natural” promises the product is defect free]
25
would be to transform most, if not all, product descriptions into warranties against a defect, and
26
3
27
28
Plaintiff also cites In re McDonald’s French Fries Litig., 503 F. Supp. 2d 953, 958 (N.D. Ill. 2007), which
did involve a breach of written warranty claim under the MMWA. That case, however, addressed only
whether privity of contract is required for a warranty claim under the MMWA. The district court did not
address whether advertising french fries as safe for consumption by individuals with food allergies created a
warranty.
5
1
plain
ntiffs have not articulate any limiting principle to convince the court ot
n
ed
e
e
therwise.”). Therefore,
2
the language “A Natural” on the smoothie kits’ lab did not c
l
All
o
bels
create a writ warranty within the
tten
y
3
mea
aning of the MMWA.
M
4
Based on the foregoi analysis, the Court G RANTS the motion to di
n
ing
,
ismiss Plain
ntiff’s claim
5
for breach of wr
b
ritten warran under the Magnuson Moss Warra
nty
e
anty Act WI LEAVE TO AMEND
ITH
6
to th extent som other bas may exist for this clai
he
me
sis
t
im.
7
B.
8
WHETHER PLAINTIFF HAS STANDIN TO BRING CLAIMS ON BEHALF OF
NG
G
PURCHASERS OF FLAVO PLAINTI DID NOT BUY?
ORS
IFF
T
Standing under Artic III and th UCL, FAL and CLRA requires th a plaintif has
g
cle
he
L,
A
hat
ff
9
suff
fered an injur
ry-in-fact. Lujan v. Defe
L
fenders of Wi
Wildlife, 504 U 555, 56 (1992); Bo
U.S.
60
ower v.
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
AT& Mobility, LLC, 196 Cal. App. 4th 1545, 1554
&T
C
h
4-56 (Cal. Ct App. 2011 4 In additi to the
t.
1).
ion
12
inju
ury-in-fact re
equirement, standing und the UCL, FAL and C
s
der
,
CLRA, requires that a pla
aintiff “has
13
lost money or pr
roperty” as a result of th defendant ’s alleged co
he
onduct. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code
14
§§ 17204, 17535 Cal. Civ. Code § 1780
1
5;
0(a).
Jamba Ju argues that Plaintiff does not ha standing to bring cla
uice
t
f
ave
g
aims on beha of
alf
15
16
purc
chasers of sm
moothie kit flavors he did not buy: S
f
Strawberries Wild, Carib
bbean Passion and
n,
17
Oran Dream Machine. (F
nge
M
FAC ¶ 28.) Plaintiff only alleges tha he purchas Mango-a
P
y
at
sed
a-go-go and
18
Razzmatazz smo
oothie kits. (Id. ¶ 12.) Thus, Jamba Juice argue that Plaint
T
a
es
tiff’s claims as to the
19
awberries Wi Caribbea Passion, and Orange D
ild,
an
a
Dream Machine smooth kits shoul be
hie
ld
Stra
20
dism
missed for la of jurisdi
ack
iction and fo failure to s
or
state a claim because Pla
m
aintiff has fa
ailed to
21
alleg that he pu
ge
urchased tho three smo
ose
oothie kit pro
oducts, let a
alone that he suffered any injury
y
22
from them.
m
ties
ze
ct
this
have diverged on the issu of whether
d
ue
The part recogniz that distric courts in t circuit h
23
24
a pla
aintiff has st
tanding to br
ring claims on behalf of consumers w purchas similar, b not
o
who
sed
but
25
iden
ntical produc See Don
cts.
nohue v. App Inc., ― F Supp. 2d ―, 11-CV-0
ple,
F.
05337 RMW 2012 WL
W,
26
1657
7119, at *6 (N.D. Cal. May 10, 2012 (noting di
(
M
2)
ivergence an collecting cases). Pla
nd
g
aintiff argues
s
27
4
28
To establish Art
ticle III standing, a plaintif must satisfy three eleme
ff
y
ents: (1) injury
y-in-fact; (2) causation;
and (3) redressability. Lujan, supra, 504 U.S. at 560-61 .
s
U
6
1
that he has standing to represent a class of consumers with regard to a product he did not purchase
2
so long as his claims are based on the “‘same core factual allegations and causes of action.’” Pl’s
3
Opp’n 10.5 Defendant argues that this case is more similar to the Johns v. Bayer Corp., No. 09-
4
1935 DMS, 2010 WL 476688 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2010) (purchaser of One A Day Men’s Health
5
Formula vitamin product lacks standing to sue on behalf of purchasers of One A Day Men’s 50+
6
Advantage vitamin product), which held that a plaintiff “cannot expand the scope of his claims to
7
include a product he did not purchase.”
The “critical inquiry [in these cases] seems to be whether there is sufficient similarity
8
9
between the products purchased and not purchased.” Astiana, supra, C-11-2910 EMC, 2012 WL
2990766, at *11 (different flavors of ice cream carried under different brand names, Edy’s/Dreyer’s
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
and Haagen-Daz, sufficiently similar where same wrongful conduct applied).6 If there is a
12
sufficient similarity between the products, any concerns regarding material differences in the
13
products can be addressed at the class certification stage. Id.; Donohue, supra, 2012 WL 1657119,
14
at *6 (allowing plaintiff to represent a class of persons who purchased different but similar products
15
reasoning that “questions of whether common issues predominate and whether plaintiff can
16
adequately represent absent class members, [are] issues that are better resolved at the class
17
certification stage.”).
Here, Plaintiff is challenging the “All Natural” labeling of Jamba Juice at-home smoothie
18
19
kits, which comes in a variety of flavors―Mango-a-go-go, Strawberries Wild, Caribbean Passion,
20
Orange Dream Machine, and Razzmatazz. There is sufficient similarity between the products
21
5
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Plaintiff cites Wang v. OCZ Techn. Group, Inc., 276 F.R.D. 618, 632-33 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (denying motion
to strike claims with respect to computer models plaintiffs did not purchase; more appropriate to resolve
issue on Rule 12(b) motion or on class certification motion); Carideo v. Dell Inc., 706 F. Supp. 2d 1122,
1134 (W.D. Wash. 2010) (standing under Washington state law for products not purchased where causes of
action and factual allegations were the same); and Hewlett-Packard v. Super. Ct., 167 Cal. App. 4th 87, 8991 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (denying writ to vacate order certifying class of computer purchasers for lack of
community of interest where class included models of computers plaintiff had not purchased).
6
Compare with Carrea v. Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc., C-10-01044 JSW, 2011 WL 159380 (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 10, 2011), aff’d, 2012 WL 1131526 (9th Cir. Apr. 5, 2012) (plaintiff had standing to bring claim as to
Defendant’s Original Vanilla Drumstick ice cream product he purchased but not as to the Dibs products
because he did not allege that he purchased Dibs or otherwise suffered any injury or lost money or property
with respect to those products); Larsen, supra, C-11-05188 SI, Dkt. No. 41 (purchasers of cookies, juices,
cinnamon rolls, and biscuits did not have standing to bring claims as to crescent rolls they did not purchase).
7
1
purc
chased (Man
ngo-a-go-go and Razzma
atazz smooth kits) and the products not purcha
hie
ased
2
(Strawberries Wild, Caribbe Passion, and Orange Dream Mac
W
ean
e
chine smoothie kits) bec
cause the
3
sam alleged mi
me
isrepresentat
tion was on all of the sm
moothie kit re
egardless of flavor; all sm
f
moothie kits
s
4
are labeled “All Natural,” an all smoot kits cont
l
nd
thie
tain allegedl non-natural ingredient (xanthan
ly
ts
5
gum ascorbic acid and steviol gycoside Therefor the Court finds that P
m,
es).
re,
t
Plaintiff has standing, to
6
brin claims on behalf of pu
ng
urchasers of smoothie kit flavors he did not buy, and the Cou has
t
urt
7
subj matter ju
ject
urisdiction over such cla
o
aims.
Based on the foregoi analysis, the Court DENIES the M
n
ing
,
Motion to Di
ismiss for la of
ack
8
9
10
stan
nding.
IV.
CONCL
LUSION
United States District Court
Northern District of California
11
For the reasons set forth above, the Court GR
r
fo
t
RANTS IN PA
ART the Mot
tion to Dism
miss.
12
Plaintiff Fourth Ca
f’s
ause of Actio for breach of warrant under the Magnuson M
on
h
ty
Moss
13
14
15
War
rranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301 et seq is DISMIS SED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.
1
q.,
No later than Septem
mber 14, 2012, Plaintiff shall file eit
f
ther (i) a sec
cond amende complaint
ed
t
or (i a notice th he intend to proceed on the Firs Amended Complaint.
ii)
hat
ds
d
st
16
Within 21 days of th filing of th above, De
2
he
he
efendant sha file a resp
all
ponse.
17
IT IS SO ORDERED.
18
19
Date: August 24, 2012
2
__
__________
___________
__________
__________
YVON GONZAL ROGERS
NNE
LEZ
UNITED ST
TATES DISTR
RICT COURT JUDGE
T
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
8
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