Brandywine Communications Technologies, LLC v. AT&T Corp. et al

Filing 197

ORDER by Judge Claudia Wilken CONSTRUING CLAIMS; GRANTING 149 MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND INFRINGEMENT CONTENTIONS; DENYING 128 MOTION TO STRIKE INFRINGMENT CONTENTIONS. Plaintiff is required to E-FILE the amended document. (ndr, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 4/18/2014)

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1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 4 5 BRANDYWINE COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES, LLC, Plaintiff, 6 7 8 9 No. C 12-2494 CW v. AT&T CORP., et al., Defendants. ________________________________/ United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 ORDER CONSTRUING CLAIMS; GRANTING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND INFRINGEMENT CONTENTIONS; DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE INFRINGMENT CONTENTIONS (Docket Nos. 68, 128, 149) Plaintiff Brandywine Communications Technologies, LLC brought 12 this action against Defendants AT&T Corporation and SBC Internet 13 Services, Inc. for patent infringement. 14 meaning of sixteen claim terms in five of Brandywine’s patents: 15 U.S. Patent Nos. 5,251,328 (‘328 patent), 5,812,537 (‘537 patent), 16 6,970,501 (‘501 patent), 7,894,472 (‘472 patent), and 5,828,657 17 (‘657 patent). 18 oral argument, the Court construes the disputed terms as set forth 19 below. 20 leave to amend its infringement contentions and denies Defendants’ 21 motion to strike. 22 23 1 The parties dispute the After considering the parties’ submissions and In addition, the Court grants Brandywine’s motion for BACKGROUND This case is one of over forty lawsuits that Brandywine has 24 filed around the country over the past two years alleging 25 “infringement of six patents that generally relate to networking 26 protocols, techniques, and systems for use in the provision of 27 1 28 The parties represent that they do not dispute the meaning of any claims in the sixth patent in suit, U.S. Patent No. 5,206,854. Internet connectivity via digital subscriber line (DSL) 2 technology.” 3 Litig., 959 F. Supp. 2d 1377, 1378 (J.P.M.L. 2013). 4 actions have been voluntarily dismissed pursuant to settlement 5 agreements. 6 cases to reach the claim construction stage. 7 construction order regarding these patents was issued by a court 8 in the Middle District of Florida in April 2013. 9 Commc’ns Technologies, LLC v. CenturyTel Broadband Servs., LLC, 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 1 Civil Case No. 12-0286, Docket No. 96 (M.D. Fla. April 17, 2013) 11 (CenturyTel).2 12 In re Brandywine Commc’ns Techs., LLC, Patent Id. Most of these As a result, this is only the second of these The first claim Brandywine The parties in this action originally filed their motions for 13 claim construction in April and May 2013. 14 were pending, however, Brandywine filed a motion for 15 centralization of its various patent infringement actions with the 16 Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. 17 motion, this Court vacated the scheduled claim construction 18 hearing and stayed the present action pending a decision by the 19 Panel on whether to centralize these cases. 20 Panel denied Brandywine’s motion. 21 various actions were “being litigated in a manner that is likely 22 to lead to their resolution, whether through settlement or other 23 means, within a relatively short period of time” and thus 24 concluded that “centralization of this litigation might hinder the 25 orderly and efficient resolution of these cases.” While those motions In light of that In August 2013, the It noted that Brandywine’s In re 26 27 28 2 Brandywine has submitted a copy of the CenturyTel court’s unpublished claim construction order as Exhibit F to the Declaration of Lei Sun. See Docket No. 68-7. 2 1 Brandywine Commc’ns Techs., LLC, Patent Litig., 959 F. Supp. 2d at 2 1378. 3 for claim construction in September 2013. 4 This Court lifted the stay and heard the parties’ motions Four months later, in January 2014, Brandywine served 5 Defendants with supplemental infringement contentions. 6 promptly moved to strike those supplemental infringement 7 contentions on the grounds that Brandywine had failed to obtain 8 leave of the Court, as required by this Court’s Local Rules. 9 Brandywine moved for leave to amend its infringement contentions United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 shortly thereafter. 11 12 Defendants DISCUSSION I. Claim Construction 13 A. 14 The construction of a patent is a matter of law for the Legal Standard 15 Court. 16 (1996). 17 claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is 18 entitled the right to exclude.’” 19 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Innova/Pure Water, 20 Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 21 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 22 Court first looks to the words of the claims. 23 Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 24 Generally, the court ascribes the words of a claim their ordinary 25 and customary meaning. 26 “the ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning 27 that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art 28 in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 “It is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d Accordingly, in construing disputed terms, the Id. Vitronics Corp. v. The Federal Circuit instructs that 3 1 effective filing date of the patent application.” 2 F.3d at 1313. 3 assist in determining the meaning of a claim term. 4 “Because claim terms are normally used consistently throughout the 5 patent, the usage of a term in one claim can often illuminate the 6 meaning of the same term in other claims.” 7 Phillips, 415 Other claims of the patent in question can also Id. at 1314. Id. The Federal Circuit also instructs that claims “must be read 8 in view of the specification, of which they are a part.” 9 1315 (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, Id. at United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)). 11 description of the invention that is clear and complete enough to 12 enable those of ordinary skill in the art to make and use it, and 13 thus the specification is “always highly relevant” to the Court’s 14 claim construction analysis. 15 “Usually, [the specification] is dispositive; it is the single 16 best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” 17 cases, the specification may reveal that the patentee has given a 18 special definition to a claim term that differs from its ordinary 19 meaning; in such cases, “the inventor’s lexicography controls.” 20 Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316. 21 patentee’s intentional disclaimer or disavowal of claim scope. 22 “In that instance as well, the inventor has dictated the correct 23 claim scope, and the inventor’s intention, as expressed in the 24 specification, is regarded as dispositive.” 25 are not limited to the preferred embodiment described in the 26 specification. 27 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc; plurality opinion). The specification must contain a Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582. Id. In some The specification also may reveal the Id. However, claims See SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 28 4 1 While emphasizing the importance of intrinsic evidence in 2 claim construction, the Federal Circuit has authorized courts to 3 rely on extrinsic evidence, which consists of “all evidence 4 external to the patent and prosecution history, including expert 5 and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises.” 6 Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (quoting Markman, 52 F.3d at 980). 7 While extrinsic evidence may be useful to the Court, it is less 8 significant than intrinsic evidence in determining the legally 9 operative meaning of claim language. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317- United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 18; see also C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 388 F.3d 858, 11 862 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 12 to lead to a reliable interpretation of claim language unless 13 considered in the context of the intrinsic evidence. 14 415 F.3d at 1319. Furthermore, extrinsic evidence is unlikely Phillips, 15 B. 16 When a signal is transmitted through a communications ‘328 Patent 17 channel, its waveform or amplitude may be altered during the 18 transmission process. 19 as “distortions.” 20 (4th ed. 1999) (defining a “distortion” as the “undesirable change 21 in the waveform of a signal”). 22 technique for compensating for distortion introduced in a portion 23 of a communications channel.” 24 Undesirable alterations are typically known See generally Microsoft Computer Dictionary 146 The ‘328 patent discloses “a ‘328 patent col. 1:7-:10. The parties dispute four of the ‘328 patent’s claim terms. 25 Claim 2 illustrates the patent’s usage of two of these terms, both 26 of which are highlighted in bold below: 27 28 A method for use in a transceiver of a communications system wherein a communications channel through which a 5 signal is transmitted introduces amplitude distortion, said method comprising the steps of determining less than all of the amplitude distortion introduced within said communications channel in response to a signal received from said communications channel using apparatus [sic] designed to determine less than all of the amplitude distortion introduced within said communications channel; and predistorting a transmitted signal from said transceiver in response to said determined amplitude distortion. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 ‘328 patent col. 6:6-:18. 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Claim 15 illustrates how the other two disputed terms are used: A method for use in a communications system wherein a signal is transmitted from a transmitter through a communications channel to a receiver, said communications channel including a plurality of serially connected channel sections which introduce amplitude distortion into a transmitted signal including the section adjacent said receiver, said method comprising the steps of receiving a training sequence including at least one a priori known signal and determining the amplitude distortion introduced only in the communications channel section adjacent said receiver in response to said received training sequence. 21 ‘328 patent col. 7:8-:21. 22 3, 15, and 21 of the patent. The disputed terms appear in claims 2, 23 24 25 26 27 28 6 1. 1 2 3 “Communications Channel Including a Plurality of Serially Connected Channel Sections Which Introduce Amplitude Distortion into a Transmitted Signal” (Claims 3, 15)3 The parties dispute whether every section of the 4 “communications channel” described in this term must introduce 5 distortion into the transmitted signal. 6 every “section” of the communications channel must introduce 7 distortion because the subject of the verb “introduce” appears to 8 be “sections” rather than “plurality.” 9 argues that the term may describe any communications channel in Defendants argue that Brandywine, in contrast, United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 which “at least one” section introduces distortion. 11 CenturyTel court adopted Defendants’ proposed construction. 12 Decl., Ex. F, April 2013 CenturyTel Order, at 14 (holding that 13 “the grammatical construction of the sentence forecloses the 14 possibility that just one channel section can introduce amplitude 15 distortion”). 16 The Sun The Court finds that Defendants’ proposed construction is 17 overly restrictive because it effectively construes the word 18 “plurality” to mean “all” rather than simply “a large number,” 19 which is its ordinary meaning. 20 International Dictionary 1745 (Philip Babcok Gove ed. 1993). 21 assuming that “sections” is the intended subject of “introduce,” 22 as Defendants contend, 23 distortion is still constrained by the word “plurality.” 24 25 26 27 28 4 See Webster’s Third New Even the number of “sections” that introduce 3 The term, “sections,” as it is used in this and other claims from the ‘328 patent, is construed separately below. 4 While Defendants are correct that “plurality” is a singular noun -- and, as such, cannot correctly be the subject of “introduce” -native English writers frequently treat collective nouns like “plurality” as though they are plural. See Valerie Krishna, “The Syntax of Error,” 1 J. Basic Writing 43, 44 (1975) (observing that collective nouns are a common source of grammatical error). 7 1 The Court therefore adopts Brandywine’s proposed construction 2 for this claim term, which reads as follows: “communications 3 channel including a plurality of serially connected channel 4 sections, at least one of which introduces amplitude distortion 5 into a transmitted signal.” 6 7 2. “Determining” claims (Claims 2, 15, 21) The ‘328 patent specification discloses a method for 8 “determining the distortion introduced within a portion of a 9 communications channel” and then using that determination “to United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 predistort the signal transmitted by that transceiver to 11 compensate for all or a part of the determined amplitude 12 distortion.” 13 claims use the term “determining” to describe the first part of 14 this process, during which the level of amplitude distortion is 15 initially determined. 16 ‘328 patent col. 2:9-:15. Three of the patent’s The parties dispute whether the “determining” steps can be 17 performed by analyzing a signal that has traveled through only 18 part of the communications channel, rather than the entire 19 channel. 20 the entire channel. 21 invention described in the specification requires both the 22 transmission and receipt of “known signals” (sometimes called a 23 “training sequence”) through a given communications channel in 24 order to determine the level of amplitude distortion introduced by 25 that communications channel. 26 that this description shows that the “determining” steps require 27 an examination of a “training sequence” that has been transmitted 28 through the entire communications channel. Defendants contend that the signal must travel through They note that a preferred embodiment of the Id. col. 2:17-:20. 8 Defendants argue Two of the disputed 1 claims, however, do not contain this limitation and Defendants 2 have not identified anything in the prosecution history to suggest 3 that the “determining” steps should be construed so narrowly. 4 Moreover, several of the patent’s other claims disclose a specific 5 apparatus that uses a “training sequence” to determine the 6 amplitude distortion. 7 the “determining” steps in the three disputed claims -- two of 8 which do not refer specifically to any “training sequence” -- were 9 not meant to be construed as narrowly as Defendants suggest. United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 See id. col. 8:14-:25. This suggests that 5 Thus, because Defendants’ proposed limitation is based on a 11 preferred embodiment of the invention, their argument that the 12 “determining” claims require a known signal to traverse the entire 13 communications channel must be rejected. 14 Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 15 1985) (en banc; plurality opinion) (recognizing that preferred 16 embodiments in the specification should not be used to limit claim 17 language). 18 in its claim construction order. 19 20 See SRI Int’l v. The CenturyTel court likewise rejected this argument See CenturyTel Order 14-17. The Court therefore adopts the following constructions of the “determining” terms in claims 2, 15, and 21. 6 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 5 Defendants note that Brandywine misapplied the doctrine of claim differentiation when it raised this argument in its opening brief because claim 19 is not dependent on any of the specific claims in dispute here. Even if the doctrine is inapplicable here, however, the underlying logic of Brandywine’s argument remains correct: the inventor’s use of a more specific term -- “training sequence” -- in the undisputed claims suggests that he deliberately omitted that term from the disputed claims. 6 The Court rejects the alternative constructions proposed by Defendants in their supplemental post-hearing brief because all of their alternative constructions use a grammatical structure that is likely to cause confusion. 9 1 Claim 2: “determining less than all of the amplitude 2 distortion introduced within said communications channel in 3 response to a signal received from said communications channel” is 4 construed as “determining less than all of the amplitude 5 distortion introduced within said communications channel in 6 response to a signal which was received from said communications 7 channel and traveled through all or part of that communications 8 channel.” 9 Claim 15: “determining the amplitude distortion introduced United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 only in the communications channel section adjacent said receiver 11 in response to said received training sequence” is construed as 12 “determining the amplitude distortion introduced only in the 13 communications channel section adjacent said receiver in response 14 to said received training sequence, which traveled through all or 15 part of that communications channel.” 16 Claim 21: “determining the amplitude distortion introduced 17 within only one of said communications channel sections in 18 response to a signal received from said communications channel” is 19 construed as “determining the amplitude distortion introduced 20 within only one of said communications channel sections in 21 response to a signal which was received from said communications 22 channel and traveled through all or part of that communications 23 channel.” 24 25 26 27 28 3. “Predistorting a Transmitted Signal from Said Transceiver” (Claims 2, 21) The parties’ disagreement concerning the meaning of the “predistorting” terms has two parts. First, they dispute whether the “predistorting” step disclosed in claims 2 and 21 requires 10 1 that the predistortion be based on the “inverse of the amplitude 2 distortion.” 3 whether the “predistorting” steps in these claims must be 4 performed by the same transceiver that performs the “determining” 5 steps discussed above. 6 Defs.’ Claim Constr. Brief 23. Second, they dispute Regarding the first dispute, Defendants argue that the 7 specification expressly requires that the “predistorting” steps be 8 based on an “inverse of the amplitude distortion.” 9 they cite language from the specification which states, “In For support, United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 certain system applications, it is desirable to predistort the 11 transmitted signal from transceiver 102 based on the exact inverse 12 of the determined distortion characteristic.” 13 5:1-:18 (emphasis added). 14 is misplaced, however, because the sentence’s prefatory clause -- 15 “In certain applications” -- makes clear that it is only 16 describing a preferred embodiment of the invention. 17 added). 18 proposed limitation into the “predistorting” steps. 19 CenturyTel court reached the same conclusion. 20 11-13. 21 ‘328 patent col. Defendants’ reliance on this sentence Id. (emphasis The claims themselves do not incorporate Defendants’ The CenturyTel Order Regarding the parties’ second dispute, the Court finds that 22 the “determining” and “predistorting” steps must both be performed 23 by the same transceiver. 24 construction because it refers only to one transceiver. 25 discloses a “method for use in a transceiver” for “determining 26 less than all of the amplitude distortion introduced” by a given 27 communications channel. 28 added). The language of claim 2 supports this Claim 2 ‘328 patent col. 6:6-:11 (emphasis The same claim discloses a method for “predistorting a 11 1 transmitted signal from said transceiver in response to said 2 determined amplitude distortion.” 3 added). 4 single transceiver. 5 6 7 8 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 Id. col. 6:16-:18 (emphasis This suggests that the two steps are performed by a This interpretation is consistent with the specification’s “Summary of the Invention,” which states, the present invention covers the notion of determining the distortion introduced within a portion of a communications channel between two signal transceivers by processing the received signal at a transceiver and then using the results of this processing to predistort the signal transmitted by that transceiver to compensate for all or a part of the determined amplitude distortion. 12 Id. col. 2:8-:15 (emphasis added). 13 the “predistorting” step is performed by the same transceiver that 14 performs the “determining” step. 15 reached a different conclusion, it did not explain its reasoning. 16 The Court therefore adopts the following construction, which This language indicates that Although the CenturyTel court 17 omits Defendants’ proposed limitation and makes clear that the 18 “predistorting” and “determining” steps are performed by the same 19 transceiver: “adjusting a signal, to be transmitted from the same 20 transceiver that determined the amplitude distortion, to 21 compensate for amplitude distortion before the introduction of the 22 amplitude distortion.” 23 4. “Section(s)” (Claims 15, 21) 24 The parties dispute whether the term “section(s)” should be 25 construed as “subscriber loops,” as Defendants contend, or given 26 its plain and ordinary meaning, as Brandywine contends. 27 CenturyTel court did not discuss this term in its claim 28 construction order. 12 The 1 Because the patent claims clearly distinguish between 2 “section(s)” and “subscriber loops,” Defendants’ proposed 3 construction must be rejected. 4 specifically to a communications channel that “includes two 5 subscriber loops and the communications channel section adjacent 6 said apparatus is a subscriber loop.” 7 If “section” were construed to mean “subscriber loop,” as 8 Defendants have proposed, then this claim language would be 9 redundant. United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 Claim 6 of the patent refers ‘328 patent col. 6:44-:46. The Court therefore finds that this term should be construed according to its plain and ordinary meaning. 12 C. 13 When a signal is transmitted over a communications channel, ‘537 Patent 14 an unwanted “echo” of that signal is sometimes transmitted back to 15 the sender. 16 and apparatus” intended to reduce these unwanted signals. 17 patent col 1:66. 18 used in this patent and the ‘657 patent, means “a reflected signal 19 that is transmitted by one receiver, reflected by something on the 20 transmission line, and then received by the same transceiver.” 21 The ‘537 patent discloses an “echo canceling method ‘537 The parties agree that the term “echo,” as it is The parties dispute four of the ‘537 patent’s claim terms. 22 All four of these terms appear in claim 1 of the patent, which 23 reads as follows: 24 25 26 27 28 Data communications equipment apparatus comprising: an echo canceler for processing an echocorrupted signal to provide an echocanceled signal, wherein the echo canceler has a set of tap coefficients, each tap coefficient having an initial value determined during a half-duplex portion of a training sequence; 13 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 circuitry for detecting the presence of a residual echo signal in the echo-canceled signal during full-duplex transmission that is subsequent to said half-duplex portion of the training sequence; and a processor, coupled to the circuitry, for adjusting each initial value of each tap coefficient by a fixed amount when the detected residual echo signal during full duplex transmission is greater than a predetermined amount. ‘537 patent col. 7:40-:55. The disputed claim terms also appear in claims 2, 6, 7, 12, 13, and 19. 1. “Fixed Amount” (Claims 1, 6, 12, 19) Defendants contend that this term should be construed as “predefined, non-variable amount.” Brandywine, in contrast, contends that it should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. The Court finds that this term should be given its plain and ordinary meaning because, as the CenturyTel court explained, the term “does not have a technical meaning that would cause jury confusion.” CenturyTel Order 18; see also Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314 (“In some cases, the ordinary meaning of claim language as understood by a person of skill in the art may be readily apparent even to lay judges, and claim construction in such cases involves little more than the application of the widely accepted meaning of commonly understood words.”). 2. “Predetermined Amount” (Claims 1, 19) Defendants contend that this term should be construed as “threshold error level determined before training to indicate incorrect training.” Brandywine asserts that it should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. The CenturyTel court did not discuss this term in its claim construction order. 28 14 1 Because this term does not have a technical meaning that is 2 likely to cause confusion, the Court finds that this term should 3 be construed according to its plain and ordinary meaning. 4 Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. 5 6 3. “Residual Echo” (Claims 1, 2, 6, 7, 12, 13) Defendants contend that the term should be construed as 7 “uncanceled echo resulting from a non-linear condition during 8 half-duplex training not present during full-duplex training” 9 while Brandywine contends that it should be construed as “portion 7 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 of an echo that remains after filtering.” 11 did not discuss this term in its claim construction order. 12 The CenturyTel court Defendants’ proposed construction would improperly limit the 13 meaning of the disputed term by requiring that the residual echo 14 result from “a non-linear condition.” 15 any compelling reasons to impose such a limitation here. 16 Furthermore, Defendants’ proposed construction would add confusing 17 and redundant language to the disputed claims by attempting to 18 describe the residual echo’s relationship to the training 19 sequences. 20 See, e.g., ‘328 patent col. 7:47-:50 (claiming “circuitry for 21 detecting the presence of a residual echo signal in the echo- 22 canceled signal during full-duplex transmission that is subsequent 23 to said half-duplex portion of the training sequence”). Defendants have not offered The disputed claims already contain similar language. Thus, 24 7 25 26 27 28 Brandywine originally proposed that this term be construed according to its plain and ordinary meaning. At the hearing, however, the Court noted that many jurors would not be familiar with the plain and ordinary meaning of “residual echo” and directed the parties to propose an alternative construction for this term. Brandywine thus proposed a new construction in a supplemental brief that it submitted jointly with Defendants after the hearing. The Court considers Brandywine’s alternative proposed construction here. 15 1 because Defendants’ proposed construction is unjustifiably narrow 2 and likely to confuse the jury, it must be rejected. 3 Brandywine’s proposed construction, unlike Defendants’, does 4 not impose any improper limitations on the scope of the disputed 5 term. 6 because it uses the word “filtering,” which does not appear in any 7 of the patent’s other claims. 8 adopts a modified version of Brandywine’s proposal and construes 9 the disputed term as follows: “portion of an echo that remains United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 It still has the potential to cause confusion, however, To address this problem, the Court after an echo-cancelation process.” 11 4. 12 13 “Adjusting the Initial Value of (Each One of the Set of) Tap Coefficient (of the Echo Canceler) by a Fixed Amount” (Claims 1, 12, 15, 19, 22) Defendants contend that the “adjusting” process described in 14 these claims is “distinct from the continued adaptation of the 15 echo canceler.” 16 that this construction improperly limits the scope of the disputed 17 term. 18 this term should be construed according to its plain and ordinary 19 meaning. 20 Computing Corp., 626 F.3d 1197, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). 21 Defs.’ Claim Constr. Resp. 31. Brandywine argues The CenturyTel court agreed with Brandywine and found that CenturyTel Order 19 (citing Finjan, Inc. v. Secure This Court rejects Defendants’ proposed construction for the 22 same reasons as the CenturyTel court. 23 cautioned against narrowing the scope of a claim when the 24 “additional negative limitation finds no anchor in the explicit 25 claim language.” 26 1314, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 27 negative limitation to a claim unless it finds an “express 28 disclaimer or independent lexicography in the written description The Federal Circuit has Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d A court, therefore, should not add a 16 1 [of the invention] that would justify adding that negative 2 limitation.” 3 such justification here. 4 specification stating that the process of adaptive adjustment is 5 costly and difficult to implement. 6 (“Full-duplex training of the echo canceler, while theoretically 7 possible, is not practical from a price/performance viewpoint in 8 the design of data communications equipment.”). 9 language does not rise to the level of an “express disclaimer” and Id. at 1323. Defendants have not identified any Instead, they point to a sentence in the See ‘537 patent col. 3:16-:20 This broad United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 therefore does not support the limitation Defendants seek to 11 impose. 12 language in the patent specification suggesting that the invention 13 is capable of adaptive adjustment. 14 inventive concept is also applicable to an echo canceler that 15 adapts in the data phase, since, typically, the echo canceler 16 adapts too slowly to the changes in the echo signal.”). 17 Defendants’ proposed construction must be rejected. 18 Indeed, this limitation would conflict with other See id. col. 7:33-:36 (“[T]he Thus, The Court finds that this term should be construed according 19 to its plain and ordinary meaning. 20 understanding of the plain and ordinary meaning of this term, 21 however, the Court adopts the parties’ agreed upon definition of 22 “tap coefficients”: “settings that define the operating 23 characteristics of the echo canceler.” To facilitate the jury’s 24 D. 25 Like the ‘537 patent, the ‘657 patent also relates to echo ‘657 Patent 26 cancellation technology. 27 from this patent: namely, “pilot signal,” which appears in claims The parties dispute only one claim term 28 17 1 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6. 2 the patent: 3 Data communications equipment apparatus comprising: an echo canceler that is trained during an echo-canceler training phase of a half duplex training sequence with a far-end data communications equipment while the communication channel is operating in a linear mode; and a filter that filters a received signal during the echo-canceler training phase to remove a pilot signal transmitted by the far-end data communications equipment before application of the received signal to the echo canceler to train the echo canceler on an echo signal component thereof. 4 5 6 7 8 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 12 Claim 1 illustrates how the term is used in ‘657 patent col. 8:8-:21. The parties here dispute whether this “pilot signal”8 must 13 cause “linear operation of the communications channel.” 14 Claim Const. Brief 16. 15 required by the specification, which states, “This pilot tone is 16 of a high enough signal level to cause the above-mentioned 17 compander to achieve its linear range.” 18 Brandywine argues that the term should be construed as “a signal 19 wave transmitted over the system to indicate control or its 20 characteristics.” 21 proposed construction, finding that Brandywine’s proposed Defs.’ Defendants contend that this limitation is ‘657 patent col. 2:7-:9. The CenturyTel court rejected Defendants’ 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 8 According to the General Service Administration’s (GSA) Glossary of Telecommunications Terms, a pilot signal is a “signal, usually a single frequency, transmitted over a communications system for supervisory, control, equalization, continuity, synchronization, or reference purposes.” GSA, Telecommunications: Glossary of Telecommunications Terms (1996), http://www.its.bldrdoc.gov/fs-1037/fs1037c.htm (last visited April 14, 2014, 4:00 p.m.). Federal courts routinely use the GSA Glossary to aid in their construction of patents issued in the telecommunications field. See, e.g., Northpoint Tech., Ltd. v. MDS Am., Inc., 413 F.3d 1301, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing glossary for claim construction purposes). 18 1 construction was closer to the term’s plain and ordinary meaning. 2 See CenturyTel Order 19-21. 3 This Court likewise rejects Defendants’ proposed construction. 5 for support applies only to an embodiment of the invention which 6 is designed specifically to address situations where the compander 7 is “not linear in the signal range of the returned far-end echo 8 signal during the half-duplex training phase.” 9 While the pilot signal might cause “linear operation of the 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 4 communication channel” in this embodiment, the claims do not 11 require that it does so in every embodiment of the invention. 12 Accordingly, Defendants’ proposed construction is too narrow and 13 must be rejected. 14 The “pilot tone” description that Defendants cite Id. col. 4:3-:4. The Court therefore adopts the following construction of 15 “pilot signal,” which is a modified version of Brandywine’s 16 proposed construction: “a signal transmitted over the system for 17 control or reference purposes.” 18 E. 19 When multiple communications providers share a common ‘501 Patent 20 communication channel -- for instance, when two telephone 21 companies share a single telephone wire -- those providers 22 typically use different ranges of the frequency spectrum to avoid 23 interfering with each other’s transmissions. 24 1:23-:41. 25 different frequency ranges is known as “spectrum management.” 26 ‘501 patent relates generally to “spectrum management” technology. 27 Id. ‘501 patent col. The process by which such providers select and use 28 19 The 1 The parties dispute four of the ‘501 patent’s claim terms. 2 Three of these disputed terms appear in claim 1 of the patent, 3 which reads as follows: 4 5 6 7 8 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 An apparatus comprising: a modem connected to a subscriber loop, the modem being capable of operating in one or more modes that are compatible with one or more spectrum management classes defined by a standard, each spectrum management class defining power spectral density (PSD) requirements, the modem being configured to automatically select a mode that is compatible with at least one of the spectrum management classes; a plurality of transceivers, each transceiver corresponding to one of the modes, wherein the modem electrically couples a corresponding transceiver to the subscriber loop upon selecting one of the modes; a selector, the selector selecting one of the transceivers to be electrically coupled to the subscriber loop; and an Automatic Class Measurement device in communication with the selector, the Automatic Class Measurement device being configured to automatically select a mode that is compatible with at least one of the spectrum management classes and to cause the selector to select one of the transceivers to be electrically coupled to the subscriber loop. ‘501 patent col. 11:65-12:18. The fourth disputed claim term appears in claim 12, which is quoted and discussed below. Every claim of the ‘501 patent contains one or more disputed terms. 1. “A Plurality of Transceivers (Each Transceiver Corresponding to One of the Modes)” (Claims 1, 5, 12) Brandywine contends that the phrase “a plurality of transceivers,” as it is used in this term, means “two or more 27 28 20 1 hardware and/or software transceivers.”9 2 “plurality of transceivers” means “two or more hardware 3 transceivers.” 4 construction because it found that a “transceiver” is a piece of 5 physical hardware. 6 to read additional possibilities into the claim language that 7 negate the clear language and intent of the claim.”). 8 similarly concludes that a “plurality of transceivers” means “two 9 or more hardware transceivers.” United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 Defendants argue that The CenturyTel court adopted Defendants’ proposed CenturyTel Order 6-7 (“The Court is unwilling This Court Brandywine contends that the CenturyTel court’s reasoning is 11 flawed because its construction was based on a dictionary 12 definition of “transceiver,” rather than intrinsic evidence in the 13 patent and the prosecution history. 14 Newton, Newton’s Telecom Dictionary (11th ed. 1996)). 15 CenturyTel court’s reliance on the dictionary definition, however, 16 was entirely proper because it relied on the definition for a 17 limited purpose -- namely, to determine whether a transceiver 18 constituted a “physical device” -- and the definition it cited did 19 not conflict with any intrinsic evidence. 20 F.3d at 1584 n.6 (“Judges are free to consult [extrinsic evidence] 21 at any time in order to better understand the underlying 22 technology and may also rely on dictionary definitions when 23 construing claim terms, so long as the dictionary definition does 24 not contradict any definition found in or ascertained by a reading 25 of the patent documents.”). See id. at 7 (citing Harry The Vitronics Corp., 90 The CenturyTel court also noted that, 26 9 27 28 After the claim construction hearing, Brandywine revised its proposed construction of this term. Its revised proposal must be rejected for the same reasons that its original proposal must be rejected. 21 1 at the hearing in that case, “Plaintiff appeared to concede . . . 2 that a transceiver is a physical device.” 3 CenturyTel Order 7 n.3. Accordingly, the Court adopts Defendants’ proposed 4 construction of the disputed term: “two or more hardware 5 transceivers available for connection, one at a time, to the 6 subscriber line.” 7 2. 8 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 10 “Automatic Class Measurement Device” (Claims 1, 5, 12) This term refers to a device that is part of a larger apparatus claimed by the ‘501 patent. scope of the device’s capabilities. The parties dispute the Brandywine asserts that the device is “capable of performing tests to determine which transceiver should be connected to a subscriber line.” Claim Constr. Brief 23. Pl.’s Defendants contend that the device is merely capable of “identifying allowable spectrum management classes based on line tests.” Defs.’ Claim Constr. Brief 6. The CenturyTel court did not discuss this term in its claim construction order. The plain language of the disputed claims illustrates that Brandywine’s proposed construction is overbroad. Claims 1, 5, and 12 all expressly state that the “Automatic Class Measurement device” is “configured to automatically select a mode that is compatible with at least one of the spectrum management classes.” ‘501 patent col. 12:16-:17, 12:55-:58, 14:16-:19 (emphasis added). In light of this language, Brandywine’s proposed construction, 26 27 10 28 Both parties agreed to the second part of this construction, beginning with the word “available.” 22 1 which omits any reference to “spectrum management classes,” must 2 be rejected. 3 Similarly, Defendants’ proposal to add the limitation, “based 4 on line tests,” to this term must also be rejected. 5 patent claims nor the specification requires that the “Automatic 6 Class Measurement device” rely exclusively on “line tests” to 7 identify spectrum management classes or select an appropriate 8 mode. 9 Neither the The Court therefore adopts the following construction of this United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 term: “a device capable of identifying allowable spectrum 11 management classes to determine which transceiver should be 12 connected to a subscriber line.” 13 3. 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 “Spectrum Management Classes (Defined by a Standard)” (Claims 1-13) The parties dispute whether or not the term “spectrum management classes” is indefinite. Defendants contend that the term is indefinite because, when the ‘501 patent was issued, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) had not yet finalized its “deployment rules for identifying the available Spectrum Management Class or Classes.” ‘501 patent col. 6:31-:32. Further, the patent itself acknowledges that these rules “even once finalized, are always subject to change.” Id. col. 6:32-:33. Thus, Defendants argue, because these spectrum management rules lacked a stable and unchanging definition at the time the patent was issued, the claims that refer to “spectrum management classes” must be found indefinite. The CenturyTel court rejected this argument and found that this term was not indefinite. Order 4-6. 23 CenturyTel 1 The Federal Circuit has held that claims should only be 2 deemed indefinite if they are “insolubly ambiguous, and no 3 narrowing construction can properly be adopted.” 4 Engineering Co. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 5 2001). 6 to make them operable or to sustain their validity.” 7 Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 358 F.3d 1371, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 8 9 Exxon Research & At the same time, “courts may not redraft claims, whether Chef Am., Here, the claims that use the term “spectrum management classes” are not indefinite. The specification expressly outlines United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 the purpose of these spectrum management classes, noting that they 11 would be defined by a set of standards designed to “minimiz[e] the 12 potential for cross-talk interference in twisted pair subscriber 13 loop cables that are shared by multiple service providers.” 14 patent col. 1:31-:34. 15 these standards would be based on criteria such as “(1) transmit 16 signal power spectral density (PSD) requirements, (2) transmit 17 signal average power requirements, (3) transverse balance 18 requirements, (4) deployment restrictions based upon the 19 subscriber loop characteristics, and (5) loop assignment 20 guidelines.” 21 management classes” is sufficient to illustrate the term’s meaning 22 to a person of ordinary skill in the art. 23 ‘501 The specification further explains that Id. col. 1:42-:47. This discussion of “spectrum While Defendants note that the FCC’s specific spectrum 24 management standards are subject to change, this variability in 25 the official standards does not render the patent claims 26 indefinite. 27 would not be considered indefinite merely because they refer to 28 state speed limits that are subject to change. By way of analogy, the claims of a radar-gun patent 24 As noted above, 1 the ‘501 patent identifies a clear set of measurable criteria on 2 which the “spectrum management classes” are based and the claimed 3 invention purports to have the capacity to distinguish among those 4 classes. 5 based on the same criteria identified in the patent, the claims 6 referring to “spectrum management classes” are sufficiently 7 definite. 8 9 Thus, as long as the “spectrum management classes” are Defendants’ efforts to analogize this case to Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2005), are United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 not persuasive. 11 term “aesthetically pleasing” was indefinite because aesthetic 12 value is not measurable. 13 ‘501 patent identifies a specific set of measurable criteria, 14 outlined above, incorporated into the term “spectrum management 15 classes.” 16 In Datamize, the Federal Circuit held that the Id. at 1347. Here, in contrast, the Accordingly, the Court rejects Defendants’ argument that 17 “spectrum management classes” is indefinite and adopts the 18 following construction of this term, which Brandywine proposed in 19 the parties’ post-hearing brief: “requirements for data 20 transmission equipment designed to minimize interference with 21 other nearby data transmitters.” 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 4. “The Modem Electrically Couples” (Claim 12) The parties dispute whether this term renders claim 12 of the patent indefinite. Claim 12 reads, in relevant part, as follows: A system for communicating over a subscriber loop, the system comprising: a first modem located at a subscriber premise, the first modem being capable of operating in one or more modes that are compatible with one or more spectrum management classes defined by a standard, each 25 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 spectrum management class defining power spectral density (PSD) requirements; a second modem located at a central office, the second modem being capable of operating in one or more modes that are compatible with one or more of the spectrum management classes; a subscriber loop electrically coupling the first modem to the second modem wherein the first and second modems cooperate with each other to determine which of the spectrum management classes are compatible with the subscriber loop; a plurality of transceivers, each transceiver corresponding to one of the compatible modes, wherein the modem electrically couples a corresponding transceiver to the subscriber loop upon selecting one of the modes; . . . . ‘501 patent col. 13:25-14:14. Defendants contend that this claim is indefinite because it fails to identify whether the term “the modem electrically couples” refers to the first or second modem mentioned in this claim. The CenturyTel court agreed and concluded that “the meaning of this term is not ascertainable by one of ordinary skill in the art and is thus indefinite.” CenturyTel Order 9. As noted above, claims should only be deemed indefinite if they are “insolubly ambiguous.” 265 F.3d at 1375. Exxon Research & Engineering Co., Brandywine contends that the disputed claim is not “insolubly ambiguous” because it can simply be construed to refer to each of the two modems mentioned earlier in the claim. For support, it points to language from the prosecution history suggesting that claim 12 -- which combined three previously asserted claims -- was supposed to contain a preamble that read: “The system of [another claim], wherein each of the first and second modems further comprises . . . .” 2004 Claim Amendments, at 8. Sun Decl., Ex. T, March According to Brandywine, the patent 26 1 applicant “left off the preamble” in the process of amending these 2 claims. 3 CenturyTel court did not have the benefit of this aspect of the 4 prosecution history when it issued its claim construction order. 5 Pl.’s Claim Constr. Brief 28. Brandywine notes that the Brandywine’s analysis of the prosecution history does not 6 support its proposed construction because it does not explain why 7 the preamble was omitted and why it should now be read back into 8 the claim. 9 preamble was omitted due to error by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Brandywine does not assert, for instance, that the United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 Office (PTO). 11 350 F.3d 1348, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that, in certain 12 circumstances, a “district court can act to correct an error in a 13 patent by interpretation of the patent where no certificate of 14 correction has been issued”). 15 made such an allegation, this Court would only be permitted to 16 correct the error if it was “evident from the face of the patent.” 17 Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 407 F.3d 1297, 1303 (Fed. 18 Cir. 2005). 19 that claim 12 is missing the omitted preamble that Defendants 20 cite; claim 12 has a preamble. 21 reincorporate that language into the claim, the Court finds that 22 claim 12 is indefinite. 23 See, e.g., Novo Indus., L.P. v. Micro Molds Corp., Further, even if Brandywine had Here, it is not evident from the face of the patent Because it would be improper to Although Brandywine asserts that it is premature to rule on 24 indefiniteness at the claim construction stage, the Federal 25 Circuit has made clear that indefiniteness is a legal question 26 that district courts may decide prior to trial. 27 Media Commc’ns, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 161 F.3d 696, 705 (Fed. 28 Cir. 1998) (“A determination of claim indefiniteness is a legal 27 Personalized 1 conclusion that is drawn from the court’s performance of its duty 2 as the construer of patent claims.”). 3 district have recognized that “it is appropriate for [district 4 courts] to address indefiniteness issues at the claim construction 5 stage.” 6 938511, at *3 (N.D. Cal.). 7 factual disputes sufficient to preclude the Court from finding 8 that claim 12 indefinite at this stage. 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 F. Other courts in this Eon Corp. IP Holdings LLC v. Aruba Networks Inc., 2014 WL Brandywine has not identified any ‘472 Patent The ‘472 patent, like the ‘501 patent, relates to spectrum 11 management technology. 12 specifications. 13 The two patents share nearly identical The parties dispute three of the ‘472 patent’s claim terms. 14 All three disputed terms appear in claim 1, which reads as 15 follows: 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 A method comprising: measuring subscriber loop characteristics; identifying a first allowable class corresponding to the measured subscriber loop characteristics, where the allowable class is chosen from a group of predefined spectrum management classes; selecting an operating transceiver from a group of transceivers within a device, where each transceiver is configured to communicate in a respective at least one [sic] of the predefined spectrum management classes, and where the selected operating transceiver is configured to communicate in the first allowable class; and enabling the operating transceiver. 25 ‘472 patent col. 11:60-12:5. 26 claims 6, 8-11, 15, 17-19, and 22. The disputed terms also appear in 27 28 28 1. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 “(Enabling the / Selecting an) Operating Transceiver (from a Group of Transceivers Within a Device)” (Claims 1, 8) The parties dispute whether the “enabling”/“selecting” steps described by this term must be “automated.” Defendants contend that these steps must be automated because the patent’s title and abstract both use the words “automatic” and “automatically” to describe generally how the invention operates. court rejected this argument. 11 The CenturyTel See CenturyTel Order 11 (“Upon consideration of the arguments presented, the Court finds that Defendants’ proposed construction would require the Court to inappropriately limit the words of the method steps more than necessary.”). This Court, too, rejects Defendants’ proposed construction of these terms. The use of the words “automatic” and “automatically” in the title and abstract is not sufficient to justify the “automated” limitation that Defendants propose. These sections of the patent describe the invention in general terms without reference to the individual steps disclosed in the disputed claims. The language of claims 8 and 13 further suggests that Defendants’ suggested limitation is improper. Claim 8 discloses a “computer-readable medium containing a program designed to perform the steps of: . . . selecting an operating transceiver from the group of transceivers . . .; and enabling the operating transceiver.” ‘472 patent col. 12:28-:43. 11 See ‘472 patent, Title (“Method selection and operation of a subscriber (emphasis added)), Abstract (“The modem operation that is compliant with one or Classes.” (emphasis added)). 29 Claim 13, which is and apparatus for automatic line spectrum class technology” automatically selects a mode of more of the Spectrum Management 12 1 dependent on claim 8, 2 “program” is “further designed to perform the step of 3 automatically selecting, based on the measured characteristics, 4 one of the transceivers that is compatible with at least one of 5 the spectrum management classes.” 6 under the doctrine of claim differentiation, it would be improper 7 to construe claim 8 (the independent claim) as limited by the word 8 “automatically,” which appears in claim 13 (the dependent claim). 9 The Court therefore construes these terms according to their discloses a process wherein the same Id. col. 12:57-:61. Thus, 13 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 plain and ordinary meaning, without Defendants’ proposed addition. 11 It construes “enabling the operating transceiver” as “enabling the 12 operating hardware transceiver.” 13 “selecting an operating transceiver from a group of transceivers 14 within a device” as “selecting an operating hardware transceiver 15 from a group of transceivers within a device.” 16 2. 17 18 19 Similarly, it construes 14 “Measuring Subscriber Loop Characteristics” (Claims 1, 6) The parties dispute whether this term requires that the “measuring” step in claims 1 and 6 be performed by “analyzing a 20 21 12 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Technically, claim 13 is dependent on claim 12, which is in turn dependent on claim 8. This distinction is irrelevant since all of these claims refer to the same computer “program.” 13 Defendants argue that, if these steps are not performed in an “automated” manner, these claims would be invalid because they would not be directed to patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Because the parties only addressed this issue cursorily in their claim construction briefs, the Court reserves judgment on this question until the parties have briefed the issue more fully. 14 Brandywine’s proposed constructions for these terms referred to “software” transceivers. The Court has therefore added the word “hardware” to these constructions to make clear that, as previously explained, the word “transceiver” refers to a piece of physical hardware in this context. 30 1 test signal.” 2 by an excerpt from the specification that states: 3 Defendants argue that this limitation is required Measurement of loop reach may be accomplished by transmitting from one end of the loop, such as from the CO 2, a signal with a known spectral content and measuring at the other end, such as at the DEC, the level at various frequencies across the frequency band of interest. 4 5 6 7 ‘472 patent col. 7:52-:63. 8 be construed as “determining subscriber loop characteristics.” 9 The CenturyTel court adopted Brandywine’s proposed construction. United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 Brandywine argues that the term should CenturyTel Order 9-10. This Court finds that each party’s proposed construction is 12 inadequate here. 13 because the excerpt they cite for support is permissive rather 14 than mandatory and, as such, does not justify the limitation they 15 have proposed. 16 loop reach may be accomplished . . . .” (emphasis added)). 17 Because they fail to identify any other language from the patent 18 to support this limitation, their proposed construction must be 19 rejected. 20 Defendants’ proposed construction is not tenable See ‘472 patent col. 7:52-:63 (“Measurement of Brandywine’s proposed construction -- which replaces 21 “measuring” with “determining” -- must also be rejected. 22 Brandywine asserts that “measuring” and “determining” mean the 23 same thing, it has not adequately justified the need for this 24 substitution. 25 and the fact that the patent claims use “determining” and 26 “measuring” in different contexts suggests that the inventor may 27 have understood the two words to have different meanings in the 28 context of the patent. Although The word “measuring” is not complex or technical 31 1 Thus, because this term uses straightforward language, the 2 Court finds that “measuring subscriber loop characteristics” 3 should be construed according to its plain and ordinary meaning. 4 Neither party has presented compelling reasons for adopting a 5 different construction for this term. 6 3. 7 The parties’ dispute regarding this term mirrors their 8 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 dispute regarding the same term from the ‘501 patent. adopt the same construction for this term that it adopted for the term “spectrum management classes” in the ‘501 patent: “requirements for data transmission equipment designed to minimize interference with other nearby data transmitters.” II. Brandywine’s Amended Infringement Contentions A. of good cause and by order of the Court. (a) a claim construction by the Court different from that proposed by the party seeking amendment; (b) recent discovery of material, prior art despite earlier diligent search; and (c) recent discovery of nonpublic information about the Accused Instrumentality which was not discovered, despite diligent efforts, before the service of the Infringement Contentions. 23 24 28 Patent L.R. 3–6. Examples of good cause include 22 27 Legal Standard A party may amend its infringement contentions upon a showing 21 26 For the reasons outlined above, see supra Section I.E.3, the Court will 20 25 “(Predefined) Spectrum Management Classes” (Claims 1, 8-11, 15, 17-19, 22) Patent L.R. 3-6. Patent Local Rule 3–6 “serves to balance the parties’ rights to develop new information in discovery along with the need for certainty in legal theories at the start of the case.” Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 2012 WL 5632618, 32 1 at *2 (N.D. Cal.) (citing O2 Micro Int’l, Ltd. v. Monolithic Power 2 Sys., Inc., 467 F.3d 1355, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). 3 The good cause inquiry considers first whether “the party 4 seeking leave to amend acted with diligence in promptly moving to 5 amend when new evidence [was] released.” 6 1363. 7 question is whether the party ‘could have discovered [the new 8 information] earlier had it acted with the requisite diligence.’” 9 Apple, 2012 WL 5632618, at *6 (citing Google, Inc. v. Netlist, O2 Micro, 467 F.3d at “In considering the party’s diligence, the critical United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 2010 WL 1838693, at *2 (N.D. Cal.)). 11 party to show diligence. 12 party was not diligent in amending its infringement contentions, 13 it does not need to consider the question of prejudice to the non- 14 moving party. 15 district court’s decision refusing leave to amend upon finding the 16 moving party was not diligent, without considering the question of 17 prejudice to the non-moving party). 18 was arguably not diligent, the court retains discretion to grant 19 leave to amend. 20 amend infringement contentions, even though court found plaintiff 21 failed to establish diligence, because of lack of prejudice to 22 defendant). Id. The burden is on the moving If the court finds that the moving See 02 Micro, 467 F.3d at 1368 (affirming the However, even if the movant Apple, 2012 WL 5632618, at *6 (granting leave to 23 B. 24 Brandywine originally filed its infringement contentions in Analysis 25 October 2012 and served its supplemental infringement contentions 26 on Defendants in January 2014, just over a week before the close 27 of fact discovery. 28 flesh out a handful of theories set forth in its original Its supplemental infringement contentions 33 1 infringement contentions and add a new theory based on induced 2 infringement. 3 leave to amend its infringement contentions, it eventually filed a 4 motion for leave to amend in February 2014, soon after Defendants 5 filed their motion to strike the supplemental infringement 6 contentions. 7 Although Brandywine initially failed to move for Brandywine contends that it served its supplemental 8 infringement contentions on Defendants at the earliest possible 9 opportunity and that its failure to move promptly for leave to United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 amend was inadvertent. 11 infringement contentions are based on information that it 12 discovered less than two weeks before it served its supplemental 13 contentions on Defendants. 14 infringement theories were based on information that it obtained 15 from third-party depositions and 38,000 pages of documents that 16 Defendants produced in January 2014. 17 According to Brandywine, its supplemental Specifically, it asserts, its amended Because Brandywine’s supplemental infringement contentions 18 appear to be based at least in part on newly discovered 19 information, the Court finds that it acted diligently in serving 20 its amended infringement contentions in January 2014 and seeking 21 leave to amend shortly thereafter. 22 that Brandywine could have obtained this information sooner had it 23 acted with greater diligence during discovery, the record does not 24 support this argument. 25 subpoenas at a relatively early stage of discovery but was 26 ultimately delayed in taking depositions of the relevant third 27 parties because this action was stayed only a few days after those 28 subpoenas were issued. Although Defendants contend Brandywine served its third-party 34 1 In any event, even if Brandywine was arguably not diligent in 2 seeking to amend its infringement contentions, the Court may still 3 grant it leave to amend because Defendants have not suffered undue 4 prejudice here. 5 Brandywine’s supplemental contentions essentially expand on its 6 previous infringement contentions and do not add any new patent 7 claims or products. 8 Brandywine asserted -- the theory that Defendants induced 9 infringement by competitive local exchange carriers -- was Apple, 2012 WL 5632618, at *5. As noted above, The only new infringement theory that United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 subsequently abandoned because it was not raised or discussed in 11 Brandywine’s expert report. 12 amendments to its infringement contentions were limited in scope. 13 Furthermore, Brandywine proposed these amendments at a relatively 14 early stage in the case, well before Defendants’ expert reports 15 were due and eight months before trial was set to begin. 16 extent that Defendants needed additional time to take discovery or 17 otherwise respond to Brandywine’s proposed changes, they could 18 have sought a stipulation to amend the case management schedule, 19 as they had previously done when they required additional time for 20 discovery. 21 They did not do so and have not shown that they suffered prejudice 22 as a result of their inability to take additional discovery. 23 Accordingly, Brandywine is granted leave to file its supplemental 24 infringement contentions. 25 Hewlett-Packard Co., 2013 WL 5955548, at *2 (N.D. Cal.) (granting 26 motion for leave to amend infringement contentions where the 27 plaintiff’s “proposed amendments to its infringement contentions 28 do not add new patent claims or new products” and the defendants Thus, Brandywine’s proposed To the See Docket No. 97, Stipulation to Amend Case Schedule. See Linex Technologies, Inc. v. 35 1 had “sufficient time to review [the] amended infringement 2 contentions”). 3 CONCLUSION 4 For the reasons set forth above, the Court construes the 5 disputed claim language in the manner explained; GRANTS 6 Brandywine’s motion for leave to amend its infringement 7 contentions (Docket No. 149); and DENIES Defendants’ motion to 8 strike Brandywine’s supplemental infringement contentions (Docket 9 No. 128). United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 12 The Court will hear all dispositive motions and Daubert motions on June 5, 2014 at 2:00 p.m. IT IS SO ORDERED. 13 14 15 Dated: 4/18/2014 CLAUDIA WILKEN United States District Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 36

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