Cruz v. Sky Chefs, Inc. et al
Filing
96
Order by Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu GRANTING MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT 91 ; GRANTING IN PART MOTION FOR INCENTIVE AWARD 92 ; GRANTING IN PART MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS 93 . Plaintiff's motion for f inal approval of a class action settlement is granted. The court also awards Plaintiff $300,000 in attorneys fees and $12,764.72 in costs, and court awards Plaintiff $7,000 as an incentive award.(dmrlc2, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 12/19/2014)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
11
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
10
12
13
CESAR CRUZ,
14
15
No. C-12-02705 DMR
Plaintiff(s),
v.
16
17
18
SKY CHEFS, INC. ET.AL.,
Defendant(s).
___________________________________/
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR
FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION
SETTLEMENT; GRANTING IN PART
MOTION FOR INCENTIVE AWARD;
GRANTING IN PART MOTION FOR
ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS
[DOCKET NOS. 91, 92, 93]
19
20
Plaintiff Cesar Cruz moves for final approval of a class action settlement, an incentive award
21
for the named Plaintiff, and attorneys’ fees. [Docket Nos. 91, 92, 93.] Defendant Sky Chefs, Inc.
22
does not oppose the motion. The court conducted a Final Approval Hearing on this matter on
23
December 18, 2014. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s motion for final approval of the class
24
action settlement is granted, and Plaintiff’s motions for an incentive award and for attorneys’ fees
25
are granted in part and denied in part.
26
27
28
I. BACKGROUND
A.
Litigation History
1
Sky Chefs, a business which provides in-flight food and beverage catering services to
1996 as an assembler. Murray Decl. [Docket No. 38-1] at ¶¶ 2, 6. Plaintiff filed this putative class
4
action on March 16, 2012 in Alameda County Superior Court. [See Docket No. 1 at 2.] On May 23,
5
2012, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint stating nine California state law causes of action against
6
Defendant and LSG Lufthansa Service Holding AG, dba LSG Sky Chefs.1 On May 25, 2012, Sky
7
Chefs removed the case to federal court, basing federal jurisdiction on the Class Action Fairness
8
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). Notice of Removal [Docket No. 1]. On October 5, 2012, Defendant
9
moved to dismiss the amended complaint; the court denied the motion to dismiss on December 21,
10
2012. [Docket Nos. 20, 30.] On January 16, 2013, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint. On
11
For the Northern District of California
numerous airline carriers within the United States, hired Plaintiff Cesar Cruz (“Plaintiff”) in July
3
United States District Court
2
February 21, 2013, Defendant moved to dismiss the second amended complaint; the court denied the
12
motion to dismiss on May 6, 2013. [Docket Nos. 38, 50.]
13
Plaintiff filed a third amended complaint (“TAC”). [Docket No. 72.] The TAC, which is the
14
operative complaint, brings ten causes of action against Defendant: (1) failure to pay wages for
15
compensable work at minimum wage pursuant to California Labor Code §§ 1194 and 1197, (2)
16
failure to pay earned wages for compensable time in violation of California Labor Code § 204, (3)
17
failure to pay overtime wages at the proper rate under California Labor Code §§ 510 and 1194 and
18
California Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order 9-2001 (the “wage order”), (4) failure to
19
provide required meal periods pursuant to California Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512 and the wage
20
order, (5) failure to provide timely meal periods in violation of California Labor Code §§ 226.7 and
21
512 and the wage order, (6) failure to provide more than two rest periods in violation of California
22
Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512 and the wage order, (7) failure to provide complete and accurate wage
23
statements in violation of California Labor Code § 226, (8) failure to pay all wages timely upon
24
separation of employment in accordance with California Labor Code §§ 201 and 202, (9) unfair
25
competition in violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200, and (10) a request for
26
civil penalties under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (“PAGA”), California
27
1
28
LSG Lufthansa Service Holding AG dba LSG Sky Chefs has since been dismissed from this
action. See Docket No. 49.
2
1
Labor Code § 2698 et seq. TAC at ¶¶ 37-112. The fifth and sixth claims were not in the previous
2
complaint and apparently were added during the settlement negotiations.
3
B. Discovery and Mediation
4
The parties have engaged in formal and informal discovery. Lavi Decl. [Docket No. 91-1] ¶¶
5
6-7. Plaintiff propounded written discovery. Id. at ¶ 7. In response, Defendant produced
6
information regarding class data, including putative Class Members’ payroll records, timesheets, and
7
other payroll information. Id. Defendant also disclosed policies and procedures related to meal and
8
rest breaks, work time, recording time, and other workplace policies applicable to Plaintiff’s class
9
claims. Id. Plaintiff’s counsel interviewed Plaintiff, reviewed documents, and reviewed and
analyzed the provided policies, procedures, and data. Id. at ¶ 8. The parties also agreed to conduct
11
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
10
informal discovery wherein Defendant provided Plaintiff with a random sampling of class members’
12
timecards during the class period. Lavi Decl. Second Prelim. Approval [Docket No. 83] at ¶¶ 7-8.
13
After a period of discovery, the parties participated in a day-long mediation on June 5, 2013,
14
before Jeff Krivis, Esq. Lavi Decl. at ¶ 6. The parties were not able to reach a settlement at the
15
mediation. Id. After the mediation, the parties continued to negotiate, with the assistance of the
16
mediator, and agreed to the terms of the settlement approximately ten weeks after the mediation. Id.
17
Plaintiff then filed his first unopposed motion for preliminary approval of a class action settlement,
18
which the court denied. See Docket Nos. 65, 81. Plaintiff subsequently filed a second unopposed
19
motion for preliminary approval of a class action settlement, which the court granted. See Docket
20
Nos. 82, 90.
21
22
II. THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
The complete terms of the proposed settlement agreement are set forth in the Stipulation and
23
Settlement Agreement (“Agreement”). See Lavi Decl. Second Prelim. Approval Ex. 1. The
24
Agreement provides for a principal settlement class defined as follows:
25
26
27
“Class” or “Class Member” or “Class Members” means any current or former hourly, nonexempt employee of Sky Chefs who performed paid work for Sky Chefs in California from
March 16, 2008 up to December 12, 2013, or if such person is incompetent or deceased, the
person’s guardian, executor, heir or successor in interest.
28
3
1
Agreement at 3.
2
A. Settlement Amount and Release of Claims
3
Under the terms of the settlement, in exchange for a release of claims against Defendant,
4
Defendant will pay a Gross Settlement Amount of $1,750,000. The Gross Settlement Amount is
5
non-reversionary2 and shall include participating Class Members’ claims and payroll taxes, Class
6
Counsel Fees and Costs, Enhancement Payment to Class Representative Plaintiff, payment to the
7
Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) for PAGA penalties, and Settlement
8
Administration Costs. Agreement at 18:4-21:16.
9
The total portion of the Gross Settlement Amount to be paid to “Authorized Claimants,” or
Class Members who file a valid and timely Claim Form with the Settlement Administrator to
11
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
10
register their claim for a Settlement Payment,3 will be equal to the Gross Settlement Amount less (1)
12
Class Counsel Fees and Costs, (2) Enhancement Payment, (3) LWDA Payment, and (4) Settlement
13
Administration Costs, which would result in a total class payout of approximately $1,156,5004
14
(“Distributable Amount”). Agreement at 2:17-19, 19:1-8. Each of these deductions is explained in
15
greater detail below.
16
1.
17
The Agreement states that Class Counsel will request payment of $525,000 for Class
Class Counsel Fees and Costs: $525,000
18
Counsel Fees and an amount not to exceed $13,000.00 for Class Counsel Costs. Agreement at
19
21:25-22:5. As discussed below, Plaintiff’s counsel actually seeks less in attorneys’ fees ($437,500)
20
than stated in the Agreement.
21
2. Settlement Administration Costs: $33,000
22
The parties selected CPT Group, Inc., to act as Settlement Administrator in this action. The
23
2
24
25
26
27
The settlement is “non-reversionary” because the entire Distributable Amount will be
distributed to only Authorized Claimants and any settlement checks remaining un-cashed 180 calendar
days after issuance will be void and escheated to the State of California pursuant to the California Code
of Civil Procedure Section 1513. Agreement at 23:23-26.
3
“Settlement Payment” refers to the payment to any Authorized Claimant pursuant to the terms
of the Agreement. Agreement at 9:11-9:12.
4
28
Since, as discussed below, Class Counsel seeks a smaller amount of attorneys’ fees than it
initially anticipated, the Distributable Amount as calculated by Plaintiffs is approximately $1,244,000.
4
1
Agreement contemplates an amount not to exceed $33,000 to compensate all reasonable costs
2
incurred by the Settlement Administrator in the administration of the Agreement.
3
3. Representative Plaintiff Enhancement: $15,000
4
Plaintiff has made an application for $15,000 as an enhancement for his time and effort in
5
prosecuting the matter, as well as compensation for his general release pursuant to California Civil
6
Code Section 1542.
7
4. LWDA Payment: $10,000
8
Under the Agreement, $10,000 is allocated to penalties paid to the LWDA in satisfaction of
9
claims for penalties owed to the agency under the PAGA, with 25% of the amount to be distributed
11
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
10
12
13
14
15
16
17
to the Class Members. Agreement at 18:21-18:24; see also Cal. Labor Code § 2699(i).
The calculation of the Distributable Amount is summarized below:
Gross Settlement Amount: $1,750,000.00
(minus) Class Counsel Fees: $437,500.00
(minus) Class Counsel Costs: $13,000.00
(minus) Estimated Settlement Administration Costs: $33,000.00
(minus) Enhancement Payment: $15,000.00
(minus) 75 % of LWDA Payment: $7,500.00
= Estimated Amount Distributable to Class: $1,244,000
B. Formula for Determining Individual Settlement Payments
18
The Settlement Payment for individual class members is based on each employee’s amount
19
of “Qualifying Gross Wages,” which is adjusted based on whether the Class Member received lead
20
pay or shift differential pay. The Qualifying Gross Wages is calculated differently depending on
21
whether the Class Member received lead pay or shift differential pay.
22
For Class Members who received lead pay or shift differential pay, the Qualifying Gross
23
Wages is the total gross W-2 wages earned by that Class Member for hourly, non-exempt work
24
during the Class Period as reflected by Defendant’s payroll records.
25
However, to account for the more tenuous claim based on payment of lead or shift
26
differential pay, any Class Member who did not receive lead pay or shift differential pay during the
27
Class Period will have their total gross W-2 wages multiplied by two to derive that individual’s
28
Qualifying Gross Wages.
5
1
The Settlement Administrator calculated the total Qualifying Gross Wages earned during the
2
Class Period by all Authorized Claimants. Each Authorized Claimant’s Settlement Payment is
3
based on their individual Qualifying Gross Wage amount divided by the total Qualifying Gross
4
Wages for all Authorized Claimants multiplied by the Distributable Amount. Eighty percent will be
5
designated as wages, to be reported on an IRS W-2 Form with legally required tax deductions, and
6
twenty percent will be designated as interest reportable on IRS Form 1099.
7
Any and all employer and/or employee taxes arising from any payment to the Class shall be
8
calculated and paid from the Distributable Amount by the Settlement Administrator. Each Class
9
Member shall be responsible for any tax consequences of the Settlement or payment of funds
pursuant to this Agreement, including the payment of any applicable tax deductions or obligation as
11
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
10
if paying through payroll.
12
C. Class Notice and Claims Procedure
13
14
15
Class Members received notice pursuant to the court’s order granting preliminary approval
of the class action settlement. [Docket No. 90.] The claims process is now complete.
Plaintiff’s motion for final approval of the settlement agreement includes a declaration from
16
the class action claims administrator. See Shirinian Decl. [Docket No. 91-1]. On August 28 and
17
September 3, 2014, the claims administrator received the class list from Defendant. Id. at ¶ 5. On
18
September 10, 2014, the claims administrator performed a National Change of Address search, and
19
on September 18, 2014, mailed the Notice packages to all 2,995 class members. Id. at ¶ 7. On
20
October 31, 2014, the claims administrator mailed reminder postcards to the 2,388 Class Members
21
who had not yet submitted a response. Id. at ¶ 8. As of November 24, 2014, there were no
22
objections, four Requests for Exclusions, and fourteen deficient claims caused by submission of
23
incomplete Claim Forms. Id. at ¶¶ 12, 17, 18. The claims administrator mailed out deficiency
24
letters to these Class Members with instructions on how to cure the deficiencies. Id. at ¶ 14.
25
Assuming the deficient claims are cured, a total of 896 Class Members have elected to
26
participate in the settlement, representing 52.19% of the net Settlement Amount and 29.92% of the
27
total Class Members (296 out of 2995). Id. at ¶ 18.
28
The average settlement payment per valid claimant is $1,290.74. Id. at ¶ 19. The highest
6
1
estimated settlement payment is $5,040.62.5 Id.
2
3
III. DISCUSSION
A. Class Certification
4
For the reasons set forth in the court’s earlier order, the court finds that the proposed
5
settlement class meets the requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3). See
6
Docket No. 81 at 8-11.
7
B. Final Approval of Class Action Settlement
8
1.
9
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) provides that a class action may not be settled without
Legal Standard
court approval. “If the proposal would bind class members, the court may approve it only after a
11
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
10
hearing and on a finding that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). Approval
12
under Rule 23 involves a two-step process: (1) preliminary approval of the settlement; and (2) final
13
approval of the settlement at a fairness hearing following notice to the class. See Nat’l Rural
14
Telecomm. Coop. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 221 F.R.D. 523, 525 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
15
The primary concern of Rule 23(e) is “the protection of those class members, including the
16
named plaintiffs, whose rights may not have been given due regard by the negotiating parties.”
17
Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of the City &Cnty. of San Francisco, 688 F.2d 615, 624
18
(9th Cir. 1982). To assess a proposed settlement, courts balance the following factors: “(1) the
19
strength of the plaintiffs’ case; (2) the risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further
20
litigation; (3) the risk of maintaining class action status throughout the trial; (4) the amount offered
21
in settlement; (5) the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings; (6) the
22
experience and views of counsel; (7) the presence of a governmental participant; and (8) the reaction
23
of class members to the proposed settlement.” Churchill Village LLC v. Gen. Elec., 361 F.3d 566,
24
575 (9th Cir. 2004). Not all of these factors will apply to every class action settlement, and in
25
certain circumstances, “one factor alone may prove determinative in finding sufficient grounds for
26
27
28
5
At the hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel provided updated figures regarding the claims rate and value
of the payments. According to counsel, there are still four opt-outs and no objections. In addition,
seven of the deficient claims have been resolved, bringing the total number of valid claims to 903.
7
Power Co., 8 F.3d 1370, 1376 (9th Cir. 1993)). [Find cite that says that pre-class cert approval is
3
more rigorous than post] The district court’s role in evaluating a proposed settlement is limited to
4
the extent necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the product of fraud or
5
collusion between the negotiating parties, and that the settlement is fair as a whole. See Rodriguez v.
6
West Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 965 (9th Cir. 2009). It is neither for the court to reach any
7
ultimate conclusions regarding the merits of the dispute, nor to second guess the settlement terms.
8
Officers for Justice, 688 F.2d at 625; see also Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th
9
Cir. 1998) (“Neither the district court nor this court ha[s] the ability to delete, modify or substitute
10
certain provisions. The settlement must stand or fall in its entirety.”). “[T]he decision to approve or
11
For the Northern District of California
court approval.” Nat’l Rural Telecomm. Coop., 221 F.R.D. at 525 (citing Torrisi v. Tucson Elec.
2
United States District Court
1
reject a settlement is committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge because [the judge] is
12
exposed to the litigants and their strategies, positions, and proof.” Id. (citation and quotation marks
13
omitted). “It is the settlement taken as a whole, rather than the individual component parts, that
14
must be examined for overall fairness." Officers for Justice, 688 F.2d at 625.
15
2.
16
The court has evaluated the proposed settlement for overall fairness under the relevant
Balancing of Factors
17
factors and concludes that settlement is appropriate. The parties reached the proposed settlement
18
after more than two and a half years of litigation, with some formal and informal discovery
19
completed. The $1,750,000 gross settlement amount, which represents 8.6% of the maximum
20
potential recovery from the class claims, fairly reflects the risks in going forward on those claims.
21
See Lavi Decl. Second Prelim. Approval at ¶¶ 23-27 (explaining how settlement in contemporaneous
22
case and Defendant’s potential preemption arguments and other defenses lowered value of class
23
claims and raised risks of going forward). The amount offered in settlement provides real benefits to
24
the class on a much shorter time frame than otherwise would be possible. The parties benefitted
25
from the assistance of an experienced mediator.
26
Further, the reaction of class members to the proposed settlement favors approval. The class
27
notice was delivered to 2,995 email addresses and no class members objected. There were only four
28
opt-outs. A court may appropriately infer that a class action settlement is fair, adequate, and
8
1
reasonable when few class members object to it. See, e.g., Churchill Village, 361 F.3d at 577
2
(upholding district court’s approval of class settlement with 45 objections and 500 opt-outs from a
3
class of 150,000). The relatively robust response rate to the settlement of approximately 30%
4
suggests that the settlement, as a whole, is not fair, reasonable, and adequate. See, e.g., Moore v.
5
Verizon Commc’n Inc., No. C 09-1823 SBA, 2013 WL 4610764, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2013)
6
(granting final approval of class action settlement with 3% claims rate). As class members’ overall
7
view of the settlement appears to be positive, on balance, the court concludes that the relevant
8
factors weigh in favor of a finding that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. The court
9
therefore grants final approval of the settlement.
11
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
10
12
13
C.
Plaintiff’s Incentive Award
Along with his motion for final approval of the settlement of this matter, Plaintiff moves for
a $15,000 incentive award. [Docket No. 92.] Defendant does not object.
The incentive award Plaintiff requests is triple the amount which is presumptively reasonable
14
in this District. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Cal. State Auto. Ass’n Inter-Ins. Bureau, No. C 07-0362 MHP,
15
2009 WL 3562871, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2009) (rejecting a request for a $25,000 incentive
16
payment as “quite high for this district, in which a $5,000 payment is presumptively reasonable.”).
17
Plaintiff’s declaration states that he has “actively participated in this lawsuit for the last 36
18
months” by (1) visiting in the Employment Development Department in San Francisco, (2)
19
contacting the Department of Industrial Relations, and the United States Equal Employment
20
Opportunity Commission, (3) attending a workshop at a consulate in San Francisco regarding his
21
wage claims, and (4) meeting with different representatives of his local union. None of these
22
activities, which took approximately 26 hours, resulted in contacts that were able to assist Plaintiff
23
in his claims. Cruz Decl. [Docket No. 91-1] at ¶ 8.
24
Plaintiff then searched for and met with different attorneys before hiring his current counsel.
25
After hiring his attorneys, he collected and gathered documents and information (including the union
26
agreement, paychecks, wage statements, and pay stubs), explained the information, regularly
27
communicated with his attorneys “to find out about developments in this matter,” and traveled from
28
the Bay Area to Southern California at least three times to explain Defendant’s policies and
9
1
procedures to his attorneys. Plaintiff notes that because English is his second language, many of the
2
documents and conversations had to be translated, which caused Plaintiff to spend more time on the
3
case. Id. at ¶ 9. These tasks took approximately 78 hours. Plaintiff estimates that he has spent, in
4
total, 104 hours on this matter.
5
In addition, Plaintiff undertook a financial risk that, in the event of judgment in favor of
6
Defendant, he may have been personally responsible for any costs awarded to Defendant. Id. at ¶
7
11. See also Pierce v. Rosetta Stone, Ltd., No. C 11-01283 SBA, 2013 WL 5402120, at *7 (N.D.
8
Cal. Sept. 26, 2013). Plaintiff also provided Defendant with a general release of, inter alia, any age
9
discrimination claims that Plaintiff may have had since speaking with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, and agree to a no rehire provision. Cruz Decl. at ¶ 11. Plaintiff’s counsel
11
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
10
also argues that Plaintiff’s requested incentive award is reasonable in light of the fact that on average
12
the class members will receive $1,290.74.6 Lavi Decl. at ¶ 25. See also Wren v. RGIS Inventory
13
Specialists, No. C-06-05778 JCS, 2011 WL 1230826, at *37 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2011) (considering
14
“whether the incentive payments are proportional to the Settlement Amount.”).
15
Although Plaintiff has explained how he provided assistance to his counsel and contributed
16
to achieving this result for class members, the court is not persuaded that Plaintiff’s efforts warrant
17
the $15,000 incentive award he seeks. Some of the work he put into the case appears to have been
18
aimed at developing his own claims. As to the rest, the tasks, sacrifices, and risks that Plaintiff
19
describes are typical of those for a plaintiff in a similar class action lawsuit. Plaintiff was not
20
deposed and did not attend the mediation because he could not be absent from work. The court finds
21
that the record supports an incentive payment of $7,000 to Plaintiff.
22
D.
Motion for Attorneys’ Fees
23
1.
24
Rule 23(h) provides that “[i]n a certified class action, the court may award reasonable
25
attorneys’ fees and nontaxable costs that are authorized by law or by the parties’ agreement.” Fed. R.
26
Civ. P. 23(h). However, courts “have an independent obligation to ensure that the award, like the
Request for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
27
28
6
Plaintiff is projected to receive $926 for his claim.
10
1
settlement itself, is reasonable, even if the parties have already agreed to an amount.” In re
2
Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 941 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). Where,
3
as here, the settlement of a class action creates a common fund, the court has discretion to award
4
attorneys’ fees using either the lodestar method or the percentage of the fund approach. Vizcaino v.
5
Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1047 (9th Cir. 2002). The percentage of the fund is the typical
6
method of calculating class fund fees. See id. at 1050 (noting “the primary basis of the fee award
7
remains the percentage method”). The Ninth Circuit has established 25% of the common fund as the
8
“benchmark” for attorneys’ fees, with 20-30% as the usual range. Id. at 1047. However, the
9
“benchmark percentage should be adjusted, or replaced by a lodestar calculation, when special
circumstances indicate that the percentage recovery would be either too small or too large in light of
11
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
10
the hours devoted to the case or other relevant factors.” Six Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus
12
Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1311 (9th Cir. 1990).
13
Even when applying the percentage method, the court should use the lodestar method as a
14
cross-check to determine the fairness of the fee award. Vizcaino, 290 F.3d at 1050. “The lodestar
15
cross-check calculation need entail neither mathematical precision nor bean counting . . . . [courts]
16
may rely on summaries submitted by the attorneys and need not review actual billing records.” In re
17
Rite Aid Corp. Sec. Litig., 396 F.3d 294, 306-07 (3d Cir. 2005) (footnote and citation omitted). The
18
court’s selection of the benchmark or any other rate must be supported by findings that take into
19
account all of the circumstances of the case, including the result achieved, the risk involved in the
20
litigation, the skill required and quality of work by counsel, the contingent nature of the fee, awards
21
made in similar cases, and the lodestar cross-check. Vizcaino, 290 F.3d at 1048-50.
22
Plaintiff seeks 25% of the gross settlement amount, or $437,500. Plaintiff contends that 25%
23
of the common fund is the benchmark for attorneys’ fees awards in this district. This amount is
24
significantly higher than Plaintiff’s lodestar figure of $269,275.
25
Plaintiff initially sought preliminary approval of the proposed settlement in November 2013
26
on a record that this court called “sparse and largely conclusory.” In its order denying Plaintiff’s
27
first motion for preliminary approval of the settlement, the court noted several specific deficiencies
28
in Plaintiff’s valuation of the claims. The court stated:
11
1
2
The court is not finding that the proposed settlement is unfair. This class recovery may turn
out to be fair in the end analysis. But, as the court admonished class counsel when it ordered
supplemental briefing, class counsel must provide more information for the court to review
in order to determine whether absent class members would be receiving a reasonable
settlement in view of the risks and rewards of continuing litigation. The court cannot make
that determination on the current sparse and largely conclusory record. This is especially true
in light of what appears to be the last minute addition of two class claims during the
settlement process that were not subject to vigorous discovery and analysis.
3
4
5
6
7
Docket No. 81 at 13-14 (citations omitted). After the court denied preliminary approval, Plaintiff
8
filed a second motion for preliminary approval that added a modicum of additional detail to
9
Plaintiff’s analysis. Notwithstanding the court’s eventual approval of the settlement, the court
remains concerned with the quality and thoroughness of counsel’s efforts in this matter. Rather than
11
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
10
provide new analysis or argument to address the court’s concerns, Plaintiff’s motion simply recycles
12
his analysis from Plaintiff’s motions for conditional approval of the class settlement. At the hearing,
13
Plaintiff’s counsel stated that Plaintiff’s attorneys avoided discovery in order to minimize the risk of
14
providing evidence for Defendant’s potential preemption arguments, thus admitting that it was
15
counsel’s strategic decision to leave the facts undeveloped through limited discovery. The court’s
16
unanswered concerns about the amount of work Plaintiff’s counsel put into this litigation to obtain a
17
fair deal for the class, and the fact that the requested attorneys’ fees award is 1.63 times the lodestar
18
amount constitute circumstances that persuade the court that the request for a 25% benchmark award
19
is not justified. Accordingly, the court awards class counsel $300,000 in attorneys’ fees, which
20
reflects a 1.12 multiplier on the lodestar, and represents 17% of the total class recovery.
21
In addition, the court awards class counsel $12,764.72 in costs incurred as of December 2,
22
2014. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h); Van Vranken v. Atl. Richfield Co., 901 F. Supp. 294, 299 (N.D. Cal.
23
1995) (approving reasonable costs in class action settlement).
24
//
25
//
26
//
27
//
28
//
12
1
2
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s motion for final approval of a class action settlement
3
is granted. The court also awards Plaintiff $300,000 in attorneys’ fees and $12,764.72 in costs.
4
Finally, the court awards Plaintiff $7,000 as an incentive award.7
5
6
S
onna
Judge D
DONNA M. RYU
12
M. Ryu
R NIA
Dated: December 19, 2014
RT
United States Magistrate Judge
ER
13
14
A
H
For the Northern District of California
11
NO
United States District Court
10
FO
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DERED
O OR
IT IS S
LI
9
UNIT
ED
8
RT
U
O
7
S DISTRICT
TE
C
TA
N
D IS T IC T
R
OF
C
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
7
28
The difference between the requested and actual fee award shall be added to the gross
settlement amount for distribution to class members pursuant to the formula set forth in the Agreement.
13
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?