Olivier v. Cate et al

Filing 13

ORDER OF DISMISSAL. Signed by Judge Saundra Brown Armstrong on 2/12/2014. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate/Proof of Service)(ndr, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/14/2014)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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MAURICE P. OLIVIER,

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Plaintiff,

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ORDER OF DISMISSAL

v.
MATTHEW CATE, et al.,

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Defendants.

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INTRODUCTION

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

No. C 12-04558 SBA (PR)

Plaintiff, a state prisoner, has filed a pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

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§ 1983. He alleges that various officials at the Correctional Training Facility ("CTF")

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conspired to find him guilty in a disciplinary matter. Plaintiff names California Department

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of Corrections and Rehabilitation Director Matthew Cate as well as the following CTF prison

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officials: R. White; C. B. Tucker; D. M. Dunstan; C. A. Freeman; Cox; A. Seidlitz; and R. A.

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Ruano. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. Venue is proper because the events giving rise to

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the claim are alleged to have occurred at CTF, which is located in this judicial district. See

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28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

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DISCUSSION
I.

Standard of Review
A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner

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seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.

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28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and

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dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may

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be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id.

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§ 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica

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Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988).

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To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential
elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was

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violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color

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of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

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II.

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Background
On March 23, 2012, Defendant Ruano informed Plaintiff that he needed to prepare or

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"trans-pack" his property because he was being transferred to another institution. Plaintiff

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informed Defendant Ruano that he had a valid medical hold, and refused to obey the order to

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prepared to the transfer. As a result, on March 24, 2012, Defendant Ruano issued a Rules

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Violation Report ("RVR") against Plaintiff charging him with Willfully Delaying or

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Obstructing a Peace Officer in the Performance of His Duty.

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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On March 27, 2012, Plaintiff appeared for his disciplinary hearing on the RVR. He

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pled not guilty and did not request witnesses at the hearing. Thereafter, Plaintiff was found

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guilty of the aforementioned charge and assessed ninety days forfeiture of credit and placed

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on Privilege Group C-status ("C-status") for ninety days.

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Plaintiff then submitted a 602 inmate appeal challenging the guilty finding, claiming

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that he had a valid medical hold and should not have been on the transfer list. He requested

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that the guilty finding on his disciplinary record be expunged, that his forfeited credit be

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restored, that his confiscated entertainment appliances be returned, and that he be returned to

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daily yard access.

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At the second level of review, the reviewer partially granted his 602 appeal.

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Specifically, the reviewer vacated and dismissed the guilty finding because Plaintiff in fact

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had a valid medical hold and should not have been on the transfer list. The reviewer further

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granted Plaintiff's requests to expunge the guilty finding from his disciplinary record, to

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restore any forfeiture of credits, and to return his entertainment appliances. Plaintiff's request

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to be returned to daily yard access was denied due to "current operational procedures in

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which yard access is determined by an inmate[']s assigned Work Group/Privilege Group."

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Compl., Ex. 2.

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Plaintiff claims that as a result of the "unlawful" guilty finding, he was placed on Cstatus for forty-nine days, which resulted in a loss of daily yard access during that time.
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III.

Legal Claims
In the instant action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants conspired to have him found

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guilty at the March 27, 2012 disciplinary hearing. A civil conspiracy is a combination of two

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or more persons who, by some concerted action, intend to accomplish some unlawful

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objective for the purpose of harming another which results in damage. Gilbrook v. City of

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Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 856 (9th Cir. 1999). To prove a civil conspiracy, the plaintiff

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must show that the conspiring parties reached a unity of purpose or common design and

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understanding, or a meeting of the minds in an unlawful agreement. Id.

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Here, Plaintiff’s allegations of conspiracy are entirely conclusory, and he has failed to

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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otherwise establish any nexus between the named Defendants and any constitutional

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violation. The mere fact that Defendants were involved with the disciplinary process fails to

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demonstrate they conspired with the others. Accordingly, Plaintiff's conspiracy claim is

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DISMISSED for failure to state a claim for relief.

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Even if Plaintiff had alleged facts sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a

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conspiracy, his allegations fail to show any constitutional violations. Plaintiff alleges that his

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due process rights were violated because he suffered a forty-nine-day loss of daily yard

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access as a result of this "unlawful" guilty finding. Interests protected by the Due Process

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Clause may arise from two sources -- the Due Process Clause itself and laws of the states.

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See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976). Changes in conditions so severe as to

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affect the sentence imposed in an unexpected manner implicate the Due Process Clause itself,

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whether or not they are authorized by state law. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484

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(1995). Deprivations that are authorized by state law and are less severe or more closely

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related to the expected terms of confinement may also amount to deprivations of a

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procedurally protected liberty interest, provided that (1) state statutes or regulations narrowly

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restrict the power of prison officials to impose the deprivation, i.e., give the inmate a kind of

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right to avoid it, and (2) the liberty in question is one of "real substance." See id. at 477-87.

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Generally, "real substance" will be limited to freedom from (1) a restraint that imposes

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"atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison
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life," id. at 484, or (2) state action that "will inevitably affect the duration of [a] sentence," id.

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at 487.

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The hardship associated with administrative segregation (or in this case being placed

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on C-status), such as loss of recreational and rehabilitative programs or confinement to one's

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cell for a lengthy period of time, is not so severe as to violate the Due Process Clause. See

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Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying Hewitt v. Helms,

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459 U.S. 460 (1983)), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069 (1987). Here, Plaintiff's alleged

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deprivation of forty-nine days of yard access does not give rise to a cognizable due process

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claim. Accordingly, Plaintiff's due process claim is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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for relief.
CONCLUSION

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For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED for failure to state a

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claim upon which relief may be granted. Since further amendment to the pleadings would be

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futile, said dismissal is without leave to amend.

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Further, this Court CERTIFIES that any motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis

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("IFP") on appeal from this Order would not be taken "in good faith" pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1915(a)(3). See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962); Gardner v. Pogue,

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558 F.2d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 1977) (indigent appellant is permitted to proceed IFP on appeal

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only if appeal would not be frivolous).

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Plaintiff's motion for an updated status report on this case is GRANTED. Dkt. 10.

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The Clerk of the Court shall send Plaintiff a copy of the docket sheet with his copy of this

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Order. The Clerk shall enter judgment, terminate all remaining pending motions as moot

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(Dkt. 11), and close the file.

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This Order terminates Docket Nos. 10 and 11.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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DATED:

2/12/2014

SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG
United States District Judge

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