Thoreson v. Grounds
Filing
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ORDER DISMISSING PETITION; DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY, ***Civil Case Terminated. Signed by Judge Phyllis J. Hamilton on 4/2/13. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate/Proof of Service)(nah, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 4/2/2013)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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OAKLAND DIVISION
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STEVEN A. THORESON,
Petitioner,
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vs.
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ORDER DISMISSING
PETITION; DENYING
CERTIFICATE OF
APPEALABILITY
RANDY GROUNDS Warden,
Respondent.
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For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
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No. C 12-4782 PJH (PR)
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Petitioner, a California prisoner currently incarcerated at the Correctional Training
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Facility has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
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Petitioner was convicted in Sonoma County, which is in this district, so venue is proper
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here. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d). The original petition was dismissed with leave to amend
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and petitioner has filed an amended petition.
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BACKGROUND
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Petitioner was found guilty at trial of continuous sexual abuse of a child and was
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sentenced to twelve years in prison. He says he has exhausted the claims he raises in this
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petition.
DISCUSSION
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A.
Standard of Review
This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus "in behalf of a person in
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custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody
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in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. §
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2254(a); Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975). Habeas corpus petitions must meet
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heightened pleading requirements. McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994). An
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application for a federal writ of habeas corpus filed by a prisoner who is in state custody
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pursuant to a judgment of a state court must “specify all the grounds for relief available to
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the petitioner ... [and] state the facts supporting each ground.” Rule 2(c) of the Rules
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Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. “‘[N]otice’ pleading is not sufficient, for the
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petition is expected to state facts that point to a ‘real possibility of constitutional error.’”
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Rule 4 Advisory Committee Notes (quoting Aubut v. Maine, 431 F.2d 688, 689 (1st Cir.
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1970)). “Habeas petitions which appear on their face to be legally insufficient are subject to
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summary dismissal.” Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Nicolaus), 98 F.3d 1102, 1108
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(9th Cir. 1996) (Schroeder, J., concurring).
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For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
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B.
Legal Claims
As grounds for federal habeas relief, petitioner asserts that he has been denied pre-
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sentence credits pursuant to California Penal Code § 4019. Petitioner was sentenced on
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April 24, 2006. Petitioner states that a new pre-sentence credit law was enacted in 2010
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and he wants it to be applied retroactively to him.
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Generally, a claim of state sentencing error does not raise a federal constitutional
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question cognizable on federal habeas review. See Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 783
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(1990). If, however, the state arbitrarily deprives the petitioner of a state law entitlement in
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sentencing him, such as denying him credits, he may be able to state a claim under the due
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process clause. See Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 346 (1980). Thus, if California law
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mandated that a prisoner be given certain credits in a given situation, the arbitrary denial of
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those credits may constitute a due process violation. Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350,
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1355-58 (9th Cir. 1985).
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California Penal Code § 4019 offers prisoners in local custody the opportunity to
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earn “conduct credit” against their sentences for good behavior. People v. Brown, 54 Cal.
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4th 314, 317 (2012). For eight months during 2010, a now-superseded version of § 4019
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that was enacted during a state fiscal emergency temporarily increased the rate at which
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local prisoners could earn conduct credits. Id. at 317–18. It appears that petitioner argues
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he is entitled to conduct credits under the now-superseded version of § 4019.
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On June 12, 2012, the California Supreme Court decided that the now-superseded
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version of § 4019 does not apply retroactively to prisoners who served time in local custody
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before January 25, 2010, i.e., the date the on which the now-superseded version of § 4019
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became effective. People v. Brown, 54 Cal.4th 314, 318 (2012). The California Supreme
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Court held that the now-superseded version of § 4019 applies prospectively to qualified
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prisoners in local custody on the statute's operative date. Id. Because it does not appear
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that petitioner was in local custody on the statute's operative date, as petitioner was
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sentenced on April 24, 2006, he is not entitled to credits pursuant to the now-superseded
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version of § 4019. If this is in fact petitioner’s argument, it is based on an alleged violation
of state law and would not set forth a federal habeas claim.
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For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
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Petitioner also argues a violation of the equal protection clause as he alleges that
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those convicted of misdemeanors receive pre-sentence credits while felons are denied the
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credits. The Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause “is essentially a direction
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that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
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Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). Thus, equal protection does not require that things that
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are different in fact be treated the same in law. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 79
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(1981). Rather, to raise an equal protection violation, a criminal defendant must allege he
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was similarly situated to others who received preferential treatment, Cleburne, 473 U.S. at
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439, and also must allege discriminatory motive or intent. McLean v. Crabtree, 173 F.3d
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1176, 1185 (9th Cir. 1999). As those convicted of misdemeanors and felonies are not
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similarly situated, there is no constitutional violation, nor has he demonstrated
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discriminatory motive or intent.
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CONCLUSION
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The petition is DISMISSED for the reasons set out above. Because reasonable
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jurists would not find the result here debatable, a certificate of appealability (“COA”) is
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DENIED. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484-85 (2000) (standard for COA). The
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clerk shall close the file.
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///
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:
April 2, 2013.
PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON
United States District Judge
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For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
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