Public Storage v. Sobayo et al

Filing 17

ORDER REMANDING CASE., ***Civil Case Terminated.. Signed by Judge ARMSTRONG on 1/15/13. (lrc, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 1/15/2013)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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OAKLAND DIVISION

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8 PUBLIC STORAGE, a Maryland REIT
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qualified to do business in California,

ORDER GRANTING
MOTION TO REMAND

Plaintiff,

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Case No: C 12-05263 SBA

Docket 7
v.
DOROTHY SOBAYO; NATHANIEL

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NATHANIEL BASOLA SOBAYO,
Defendants.

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On August 27, 2012, Plaintiff Public Storage ("Plaintiff") commenced a small claims
court action against Defendants Dorothy Sobayo and Nathaniel Sobayo, and a small claims
court action against Defendant Kingsway Capital - Nathaniel Basola Sobayo in the Superior
Court of California, County of San Mateo. See Notice of Removal, Exhs. 1-A & 1-B, Dkt.
1.1 In these actions, Plaintiff seeks to recover unpaid rent. See id. On October 11, 2012,
Defendant Nathaniel Sobayo, acting pro se, filed a notice of removal based on federal
question jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction. See id. The parties are presently before the
Court on Plaintiff's motion to remand. Dkt. 7. Defendants Dorothy Sobayo and Nathaniel
Sobayo (collectively, "Defendants") oppose the motion. Dkt. 12. Having read and
considered the papers filed in connection with this matter and being fully informed, the
Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiff's motion to remand, for the reasons stated below. The

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Plaintiff initiated the small claims court actions by filing documents entitled
"Plaintiff's Claim and ORDER to Go to Small Claims Court." Notice of Removal, Exhs. 128 A & 1-B The Court will refer to these documents as complaints.

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Court, in its discretion, finds this matter suitable for resolution without oral argument. See
Fed.R.Civ.P. 78(b); N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b).
I.

DISCUSSION
A.

Federal Question Jurisdiction

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), "any civil action brought in a State court of which the
district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the
defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States. . . ." 28 U.S.C. §
1441(a). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, district courts "have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Federal
question jurisdiction is presumed to be absent unless the removing party which seeks to
invoke the Court's jurisdiction shows that plaintiff has alleged: (1) a federal cause of
action, Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916) ("a suit
arises under the law that creates the action"); (2) a state cause of action that turns on a
substantial dispositive issue of federal law, Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers
Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9 (1983); Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S.
180, 199 (1921); or (3) a state cause of action that Congress has transformed into an
inherently federal cause of action by completely preempting the field of its subject matter,
Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557, 560 (1968).
A federal court must satisfy itself of its jurisdiction over the subject matter before
proceeding to the merits of the case. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 577,
583 (1999). In the case of a removed action, a district court must remand the case to state
court "if at any time before the final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir.
1992). "The presumption against removal means that the defendant always has the burden
of establishing that removal is proper." Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d
1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009). "[R]emoval statutes are strictly construed against removal."
Luther v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP, 533 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 2008).

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As such, any doubts regarding the propriety of removal favor remanding the case. See
Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566.
Here, the notice of removal alleges that Plaintiff has violated the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. ("FDCPA") and the Fourth Amendment
of the United States Constitution. See Notice of Removal ¶¶ 3, 8-11. The notice of
removal also alleges that a separate, yet related, "FEDERAL TITLE 42 CASE MAY BE
PREPARED AND WILL BE FILED AGAINST ALL CO-CONSPIRATORS, AND
THESE PLAINTIFFS AS SOON AS FEASIBLE." Id. ¶ 4. The notice of removal states
that "Defendants's [sic] cross-complaint and evolving title 42 CIVIL ACTION for FDCPA
is an action to enforce Plaintiffs's [sic] liability created by violations of Defendants's [sic]
rights under FDCPA." Id. ¶ 11.
Federal subject matter jurisdiction must be apparent from the face of the complaint,
and cannot lie in anticipated defenses. Specifically, federal courts have jurisdiction over
cases in which a "well-pleaded complaint" establishes that federal law creates the cause of
action. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. at 27-28. Defensive matters are not considered to
confer federal question jurisdiction for removal purposes. Id. at 10 ("[A] defendant may
not remove a case to federal court unless the plaintiff’s complaint establishes that the case
'arises under' federal law.") (emphasis in original). In reviewing the underlying complaints,
it is readily apparent that this case does not satisfy the jurisdictional requirements for
federal subject matter jurisdiction. The complaints filed by Plaintiff do not assert a federal
claim. Thus, it is facially apparent that this case does not meet the requirements of 28
U.S.C. § 1331 for federal subject matter jurisdiction.
B.

Diversity Jurisdiction

The notice of removal alleges, without elaboration, that "DIVERSITY OF
CITIZENSHIP EXISTS BETWEEN THE PARTIES." Notice of Removal ¶ 4. Given
Defendants' pro se status, the Court will construe the notice of removal as alleging that
removal is appropriate based on diversity jurisdiction. Having reviewed the notice of
removal, the Court finds that Defendants have failed to sustain their burden to demonstrate
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that diversity jurisdiction is proper. Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. The underlying complaints
both seek to recover $642.55 in unpaid rent. See Notice of Removal, Exhs. 1-A & 1-B.
This amount is far below the $75,000 minimum required to establish diversity jurisdiction
over a civil action. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).2
C.

Attorney Fees and Costs

Plaintiff moves for an order requiring Defendants to pay for the costs and expenses,
including attorney fees, it incurred as a result of the improper removal. Pl.'s Mtn. at 9-10,
Dkt. 7. Specifically, Plaintiff requests an order awarding it costs and expenses in the
amount of $6,000. Id. at 10. Where a case is improperly removed, the Court "may require
payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result
of the removal." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The Court has "wide discretion" to award attorney
fees and costs under § 1447(c). Moore v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc., 981 F.2d 443,
447 (9th Cir. 1992). However, "[a]bsent unusual circumstances, courts may award
attorney's fees under § 1447(c) only where the removing party lacked an objectively
reasonable basis for seeking removal." Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141
(2005).
Here, it is clear that this action was improperly removed because it does not involve
a federal question and the amount sought in the underlying complaints is far below the
$75,000 minimum required to establish diversity jurisdiction. However, in view of
Defendants' pro se status, the Court declines to award Plaintiff the costs and expenses it
incurred as a result of the improper removal. Defendants may have genuinely believed that
asserting federal statutes in defense of the small claims court actions presented a basis for
removal. As such, the Court does not find that the attempted removal was objectively
unreasonable under the circumstances such that an award of costs and expenses is
appropriate.

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In light of the Court's conclusion that Defendants have failed to sustain their
burden to demonstrate that federal question or diversity jurisdiction exists, the Court will
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II.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
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Plaintiff's motion to remand is GRANTED.

2.

The hearing currently scheduled for January 22, 2013 is VACATED.

3.

The instant action is REMANDED to the Superior Court of California,

County of San Mateo.
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The Clerk shall close the file and terminate all pending matters.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: 1/15/13

_______________________________
SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG
United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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PUBLIC STORAGE,
Plaintiff,

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v.
DOROTHY SOBAYO et al,
Defendant.
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Case Number: CV12-05263 SBA

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

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I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District
Court, Northern District of California.
That on January 15, 2013, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said
copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing
said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle
located in the Clerk's office.

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Dorothy Sobayo
2148 University Avenue
East Palo Alto, CA 94303

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Dated: January 15, 2013
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Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

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By: Lisa Clark, Deputy Clerk

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