Continental Insurance Company, The et al v. Hexcel Corporation

Filing 36

ORDER by Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers granting 22 Motion to Dismiss Action. (fs, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 4/10/2013)

Download PDF
1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 6 7 8 9 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 THE CONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY, CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY, COLUMBIA CASUALTY COMPANY and NATIONAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF HARTFORD, as successor by merger to Transcontinental Insurance Company, 14 15 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT HEXCEL CORPORATION’S MOTION TO DISMISS OR STAY Plaintiffs, 12 13 Case No.: 12-cv-05352-YGR vs. HEXCEL CORPORATION, Defendant. 16 17 Plaintiffs, The Continental Insurance Company, Continental Casualty Company, Columbia 18 Casualty Company, and National Fire Insurance Company of Hartford (collectively, the 19 “Companies” or “Plaintiffs”), filed this declaratory relief action against Defendant Hexcel 20 Corporation (“Hexcel” or “Defendant”) on October 17, 2012. (See Compl. [Dkt. No. 1].) 21 Plaintiffs, who have issued ten insurance policies to Hexcel, seek a judicial declaration that they 22 have no obligation to defend or indemnify Hexcel in connection with claims of environmental 23 property damage and contamination at a site in New Jersey. (Compl. ¶¶ 37–51.) Hexcel initiated 24 its own action in the Superior Court of New Jersey seeking a declaratory judgment against all 25 eighteen of its insurers, including all four Plaintiffs (“New Jersey Action”); Hexcel also alleges 26 breach of contract against thirteen of those insurers, including all four Plaintiffs, and seeks money 27 damages. (Declaration of Rodney P. Jenks in Support of Hexcel Corporation’s Motion to Stay or 28 1 Dismiss, Ex. A (Hexcel Corporation v. Allianz Underwriters Ins. Co., Complaint [“New Jersey 2 Action Compl.”]) ¶¶ 2, 45–58 [Dkt. Nos. 23-1–23-2].) Hexcel has filed a Motion to Dismiss or Stay this action in favor of the New Jersey Action 3 4 based on the abstention doctrines set forth in Wilton v. Seven Falls Co. and Brillhart v. Excess 5 Insurance Co. of America (sometimes referred to as the “Wilton/Brillhart Abstention Doctrine”). 6 (“Motion” or “Mot.” [Dkt. No. 23] at 2.) Plaintiffs have filed an Opposition to Motion to Dismiss 7 or Stay. (“Opposition” or “Opp.” [Dkt. No. 24].) Defendant filed a reply in turn. (“Reply” [Dkt. 8 No. 25].) The Court held oral argument on the Motion on March 5, 2013. (Dkt. No. 28.) Pursuant to the Court’s request, the parties jointly filed a copy of the Transcript of Hearing 9 in the New Jersey Action that occurred on March 4, 2013. (Dkt. No. 30.) With the transcript, 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 Plaintiffs filed a Request for Supplemental Briefing, which Defendant opposes. (Dkt. Nos. 31 & 12 32.) Having carefully considered the papers submitted and the pleadings in this action, the 13 14 arguments of counsel, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court hereby GRANTS Hexcel’s 15 Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs’ Request for Supplemental Briefing is DENIED. 16 I. 17 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Hexcel owns or operates a variety of chemical and manufacturing facilities throughout New 18 Jersey. (Compl. ¶¶ 9–13.) The allegations in the Complaint stem from contamination that 19 originated from a site currently owned by Hexcel in Lodi, New Jersey (“Hexcel Site”). (Id. ¶ 9.) 20 At least fifty-one insurance policies, issued by more than eighteen insurers (including the 21 Companies), may be obligated to defend or indemnify Hexcel in connection with claims of 22 contamination at the Hexcel Site. (Mot. at 1, 8.) In the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Hexcel has 23 been subject to state and federal investigation and remediation orders and requirements arising from 24 contamination that migrated beyond the Hexcel Site itself, including the Saddle River, Lower 25 Passaic River, and other adjacent areas. (Compl. ¶ 14.) This includes orders issued by the New 26 27 28 Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (“Department”). (Id. ¶ 15.) Plaintiffs allege that Hexcel notified the Companies of the Department’s mandate to investigate and remediate the Hexcel Site, but they “determined that they had no coverage obligation, and declined to fund such 2 1 an investigation and remediation.” (Id. ¶ 16; see id. ¶ 18.) The Department filed suit against 2 various third-party companies for the hazardous substances discharged on those properties which 3 have migrated throughout rivers and other waters in New Jersey, and have sought reimbursement 4 for investigation, cleanup, and removal costs incurred. (Id. ¶ 19.) These third-party companies 5 have, in turn, sued Hexcel and others for contribution. (Id. ¶ 20.) 6 On October 17, 2012, Plaintiffs filed this declaratory relief action under 28 U.S.C. section 7 2201 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 57. (Compl. ¶ 8.) Plaintiffs seek a judicial declaration 8 that they have no obligation to defend or indemnify Hexcel under ten insurance policies relating to 9 the New Jersey environmental claims. (Id. ¶¶ 37–51.) The specific policies at issue are policy numbers: L4418090; RDU 9756696; RDU 1863061; RDU 3652978; RDU 3653521; SXP 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 3584336; UMB 8450070; SXP 3584368; UMB 1631386; SXP 3584405. (Id. ¶¶ 23–32.) The 12 Companies allege that Hexcel had knowledge of the contamination at the Hexcel Site and that the 13 contamination was migrating off-site through industrial drains and storm sewers, into groundwater, 14 and onto third-party property. (Id. ¶ 34.) 15 On October 25, 2012, Hexcel filed a lawsuit in New Jersey in which it seeks declaratory 16 relief, breach of contract, and damages from the Companies, in addition to fourteen other insurers. 17 (New Jersey Action Compl. ¶¶ 1–9, 45–58 & Attachment A.) In that action, Hexcel seeks a 18 declaration with respect to liabilities, losses and expenses it has or may incur due to: “certain 19 ‘natural resource damage’ claims” asserted against Hexcel by federal regulatory agencies in 20 connection with the Passaic River and response costs; a contribution claim asserted against Hexcel; 21 and liabilities “resulting from environmental conditions existing at and about a former 22 manufacturing facility in Lodi, New Jersey.” (Id. ¶¶ 2–3; see id. ¶¶ 12–38.) Nine of the ten 23 insurance policies at issue in this action are at issue in the New Jersey Action. (New Jersey Action 24 Compl., Attachment A.) At least forty other policies from other insurers are also at issue in that 25 action. (Id.) The contamination of locations at issue in the New Jersey Action constitutes what is 26 27 28 3 1 likely “the largest pollution site that affects property in New Jersey.” (Joint Filing Of Transcript 2 And Order In New Jersey Action, Ex. A [Dkt. No. 30] at 80:13–16.)1 3 II. DISCUSSION 4 A. Wilton/Brillhart Abstention Doctrine and Relevant Ninth Circuit Factors 5 Title 28 U.S.C section 2201, known as the Declaratory Judgment Act, is permissive in 6 nature. It provides that “any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, 7 may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, 8 whether or not further relief is or could be sought.” (Emphasis supplied.) Based on its permissive 9 nature, the Supreme Court has held: “a district court has discretion to dismiss a federal declaratory judgment action when ‘the questions in controversy . . . can better be settled in’ a pending state 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 court proceeding.” R.R. St. & Co. Inc. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 656 F.3d 966, 975 (9th Cir. 2011) 12 (quoting Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491, 495 (1942)); see Wilton v. 13 Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 288 (1995) (a district court may decline to entertain a federal 14 declaratory judgment action when “parallel proceedings[] present[] opportunity for ventilation of 15 the same state law issues[ that are] underway in state court”). “[T]here is no presumption in favor of abstention in declaratory actions generally, nor in 16 17 insurance coverage actions specifically.” Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Dizol, 133 F.3d 1220, 1225 (9th 18 Cir. 1998) (en banc) (“Dizol”). In Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1225 n.5, the Ninth Circuit held that where an 19 insurer sues its insured for a declaratory judgment of no coverage, a court should consider the 20 factors from Brillhart and American States Insurance Co. v. Kearns, 15 F.3d 142 (9th Cir. 1994) 21 (“Kearns”). The three Brillhart factors are the “philosophic touchstone” of the Wilton/Brillhart analysis. 22 23 R.R. St. & Co. Inc., 656 F.3d at 975. A district court should: (1) avoid “needless determination of 24 state law issues”; (2) discourage “forum shopping”; and (3) avoid “duplicative litigation.” R.R. St. 25 & Co. Inc., 656 F.3d at 975 (citing Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1225); Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 494–95. 26 Additionally, a district court may consider: (4) whether the declaratory action will settle all aspects 27 28 1 The Joint Filing Of Transcript And Order In New Jersey Action (Dkt. No. 30) consists of a Transcript of Hearing (attached as Exhibit A) and Order (attached as Exhibit B). The Court will refer to these respective documents as the “New Jersey Transcript” and “New Jersey Order.” 4 1 of the controversy; (5) whether the declaratory action will serve a useful purpose in clarifying the 2 legal relations at issue; (6) whether the declaratory action is being sought merely for the purposes 3 of procedural fencing or to obtain a res judicata advantage; (7) whether the use of a declaratory 4 action will result in entanglement between the federal and state court systems; (8) the convenience 5 of the parties; and (9) the availability of and relative convenience of other remedies. Dizol, 133 6 F.3d at 1225 n.5 (citing Kearns, 15 F.3d at 145 (J. Garth, concurring)). “Essentially, the district 7 court must balance concerns of judicial administration, comity, and fairness to the litigants.” 8 Kearns, 15 F.3d at 144; see also Principal Life Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 394 F.3d 665, 672 (9th Cir. 9 2005) (quoting the same). B. 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 Analysis The decision whether to dismiss or stay this action brought under 28 U.S.C section 2201 12 rests in the discretion of this Court. Wilton, 515 U.S. at 288; Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 494; R.R. St. & 13 Co. Inc., 656 F.3d at 975. For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that this action should 14 be dismissed in light of the more comprehensive New Jersey Action. 15 1. Avoiding Needless Determination of State Law Issues 16 If this action entails determinations of unsettled issues of state law, a stay or 17 dismissal is favored. Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1225. This relates to unsettled issues of law generally, not 18 unsettled issues of fact in the specific action. See Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Robsac Indus., 947 F.2d 1367, 19 1371 (9th Cir. 1991) (overruled in part on other grounds by Dizol). A stay is warranted if “[t]he 20 precise state law issues at stake in the present case are the subject of a parallel proceeding in state 21 court.” Id. 22 Plaintiffs here seek a declaration regarding the scope of insurance coverage, which is 23 governed solely by applicable state law. There are no issues of federal law in this action. To the 24 extent that the parties dispute which state’s law applies: if California law applies, this Court may be 25 better suited than a New Jersey court to determine these issues. However, the converse is also 26 27 true—if New Jersey law applies, a New Jersey court may be better suited to resolve the issues. At this point, the Court is not in a position to determine which state’s law applies to the insurance 28 5 1 contracts at issue, and in any event, the law is not “unsettled” merely because there is a dispute over 2 the applicable law. This factor favors neither party. 3 2. Avoiding Duplicative Litigation 4 If the declaratory judgment action is duplicative of the issues being litigated in the 5 state action, a stay or dismissal is favored. Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1225; see R.R. Street, 656 F.3d at 6 975. Defendants emphasize that the Companies are parties to both actions and both actions seek a 7 declaration regarding the same coverage responsibilities under nine of the Companies’ policies. 8 (Mot. at 11.) Plaintiffs do not dispute this fact, but point to other reasons why the Court should 9 retain this action. (Opp. at 3–5.) 10 The Court notes that although the New Jersey Action seeks declaratory relief, that relief United States District Court Northern District of California 11 pertains to many more insurers’ responsibilities. Additionally, breach of contract is affirmatively 12 alleged against thirteen insurers, including the Companies. That action will proceed with the 13 Companies as defendants. (New Jersey Transcript at 82:22–25 (denying motion to stay or dismiss 14 against “CNA defendants,” who are the Plaintiffs here); New Jersey Order at 2 (same).) Absent a 15 dismissal or stay, the state and federal proceedings will undoubtedly continue in parallel, involving 16 similar, if not identical, factual and legal issues regarding the Companies’ insurance policies. (See 17 New Jersey Transcript at 68:4–17 (accepting that the two cases are substantially similar).) Because 18 the New Jersey Action will determine the issues of the Companies’ coverage responsibilities to 19 Hexcel and is likely to comprehensively resolve the issue of all insurers’ coverage responsibilities 20 stemming from the same underlying incidents, maintaining this action separately will result in 21 duplicative litigation. This factor weighs strongly in favor of dismissal or a stay. 22 3. Avoiding Forum Shopping 23 Both parties accuse the other of engaging in forum shopping. Courts have defined 24 improper forum shopping to encompass situations where the action is “reactive” or “defensive.” 25 Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1225; Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, Pennsylvania v. Krieger, 181 F.3d 1113, 1119 26 27 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Krieger”) (an insurer should be discouraged from filing a federal court declaratory action to see if it might fare better in federal court while also engaged in a state court action). 28 6 1 It cannot be disputed that the two actions were filed eight days apart. The Companies argue 2 (and Hexcel does not dispute) that Hexcel immediately filed the New Jersey Action in response to 3 being served in this action. However, Hexcel claims the Companies engaged in forum shopping by 4 pretending to be engaged in a claim investigation and discussion of coverage issues, while secretly 5 preparing a preemptive federal court filing. (Mot. at 16.) 6 7 At this time and on this record, the Court does not take a position regarding whether either side acted improperly and/or engaged in forum shopping. Thus, this factor is neutral. 8 4. 9 As a matter of judicial economy, a district court should not entertain a declaratory Whether This Action Will Settle All Aspects of the Controversy action when the result would be to try a particular controversy piecemeal, or to try particular issues 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 without settling the entire controversy. See Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1225 n.5. Plaintiffs argue that only 12 this action will settle all aspects of the controversy as between the Companies and Hexcel because 13 this action seeks declaratory relief “to adjudicate the interpretation and application of the settlement 14 agreement as to the 1973 primary policy as respects the Contamination Claims.” (Opp. at 19.) 15 Hexcel responds that the New Jersey Action will determine the broad scope of the Companies’ 16 defenses to coverage, and that those determinations will apply to all policies at issue. (Reply at 5– 17 6.) Moreover, Hexcel stated at oral argument that the settlement agreement is, in fact, at issue in 18 the New Jersey Action with respect to other parties. 19 On balance, and despite the Companies’ argument regarding the settlement agreement, far 20 more judicial efficiency stands to be achieved by deferring to the New Jersey Action. That action 21 will comprehensively determine all insurers’ obligations to Hexcel, including nine of the ten 22 policies at issue here. Further, the court in New Jersey is just as capable to determine the issue 23 regarding the settlement agreement as this Court is. Because substantially more of the controversy 24 relating to the Hexcel Site can be determined by the New Jersey Action, along with the vast 25 majority of issues here, this factor weighs strongly in favor of dismissal or a stay. 26 5. 27 A stay or dismissal is favored if the instant declaratory relief action will not resolve 28 Whether This Action Will Clarify Legal Relations any legal relationship between the parties. Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1225 n.5. By and large, the 7 1 resolution of either action is likely to clarify the legal relations between the Companies and Hexcel 2 regarding coverage under the relevant policies. While there may be discrete issues regarding the 3 Companies’ and Hexcel’s relationship that may not be fully resolved by the other action, this factor 4 generally weighs against dismissal or a stay. 5 6. 6 7 8 9 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 12 13 14 15 16 Whether This Action Is Being Sought For Procedural Fencing or Res Judicata A stay or dismissal is favored if this declaratory relief action is commenced with the intent of obtaining a procedural or res judicata advantage. Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1225 n.5. Both parties argue, for reasons similar to the issue of forum shopping, that the other seeks to gain a procedural advantage or res judicata effect. (Opp. at 15–16; Mot. 22–23.) As noted above, the Court does not take a position regarding whether either side seeks an improper advantage on this record. Thus, this factor is neutral. 7. Avoiding Federal-State Court Entanglement A stay or dismissal is favored if the issues at stake in the state court proceeding are indistinguishable from issues in the federal action. Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1225 n.5. As discussed above, this action is effectively encompassed within the New Jersey Action with the exception of one policy. Plaintiffs argue that issues of California law make this Court the more appropriate 17 forum to determine coverage issues as to the Companies and Hexcel. (Opp. at 14, 20–21.) 18 On the other hand, New Jersey has an intense and unambiguous interest in maintaining 19 jurisdiction over insurance disputes involving environmental sites within its borders. Sensient 20 Colors, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 193 N.J. 373, 394 (2008). In Sensient, the New Jersey Supreme 21 Court affirmed the appellate court’s reinstatement of a New Jersey environmental coverage action 22 where the site of the alleged environmental contamination was in New Jersey. Id. (reinstating 23 action even though the New Jersey Action was filed months after duplicative action in New York). 24 As the Honorable Sebastian P. Lombardi made clear, “the most important special equity for not 25 deferring to the first [to file] -- rule is New Jersey’s strong public policy interest in remediation or 26 environmental contamination within its borders. That interest includes insuring that insurance 27 28 8 1 policy holder is not wrongly denied funds for the cleanup of the hazardous . . . waste [] site.” (New 2 Jersey Transcript at 73:16–18.)2 Furthermore, Judge Lombardi noted that “[t]his case touches not just on property, but on the 3 4 health and safety of New Jersey’s residents.” (New Jersey Transcript at 73:20–21.) Therefore, 5 citing Sensient and New Jersey’s overwhelming policy in retaining jurisdiction over cases 6 involving the remediation of environmental contamination within its borders, the New Jersey court 7 denied the Companies’ motion to dismiss or stay the New Jersey Action. (New Jersey Transcript at 8 80:8–12 (noting “New Jersey[’s] strong [] interest and the governmental interest to protect New 9 Jersey policy holders and the victims of pollution and protect the New Jersey environment”) & 82:15–21 (disagreeing that “issues of forum non-conveniens or [the] interest of California 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 outweigh[] the special equity that New Jersey has in making sure [its] lands and waterways are 12 cleaned up[.] . . . [I]ssues concerning availability of insurance to contribute towards that should be 13 here in New Jersey.”).) In light of the above, there is a strong risk of entanglement between the federal and state 14 15 courts. In particular, each court may be called upon to interpret the effect of the rulings or findings 16 of the other, given that similar, if not identical, factual and legal determinations must be made. If 17 the courts disagree, then entanglement ensues. If the courts agree, duplicative efforts will still have 18 been made for one court to determine the same issue that the other court has decided. Because of 19 Judge Lombardi’s explicit statements of the importance of maintaining the action against the 20 Companies in New Jersey, judicial efficiency dictates that he should be the judge determining the 21 issues in the first instance. 22 2 23 24 25 26 27 28 Plaintiffs argue the Wilton/Brillhart Abstention Doctrine is entirely inapplicable because no state court action was pending when they first-filed this federal action. (Opp. at 6–8.) By limiting Wilton/Brillhart to situations where the federal action is filed second, Plaintiffs argue this comports with the “first-to-file rule,” promoting efficiency, judicial economy, and the interests of the first plaintiff in choosing a forum. (Id. at 9.) However, in Krieger, the Ninth Circuit held that “the [district] court was entitled to evaluate the motion to dismiss under the circumstances that existed at the time the [jurisdictional] issue was raised rather than at the time of filing [of the federal action].” 181 F.3d at 1119 (citing Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1224). Moreover, “[t]iming is only one consideration when deciding whether to entertain a declaratory judgment action, and the Wilton/Brillhart factors sometimes compel a court to decline to entertain an earlier-filed action in favor of a later-filed action.” R.R. St. & Co., 656 F.3d at 976; see also Wilton, 515 U.S. at 280–82 (affirming dismissal of a federal action in light of a later-filed state action); Huth v. Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest, 298 F.3d 800, 802–04 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming dismissal of an earlier-filed declaratory action but remanding a laterfiled one). Moreover, the Court notes that 28 U.S.C. section 2201, upon which this action is brought, is permissive in the first place. 9 1 2 For these reasons, this factor weighs strongly in favor of dismissal or a stay in favor of the New Jersey Action. 3 8. Convenience of the Parties 4 A stay or dismissal is favored if it would avoid undue hardship for a party. Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1225 n.5. Defendant argues that New Jersey is the more convenient forum because the 6 environmental damage is confined to New Jersey and witnesses relating to the underlying 7 environmental damage are located there. (Mot. at 24.) Additionally, witnesses with knowledge 8 relating to the insurance policies at issue are likely to be found at the Companies’ offices —all 9 located in Chicago, Illinois—and Hexcel’s offices in Stamford, Connecticut. (Id.) Plaintiffs argue 10 that the convenience of the parties is neutral. (Opp. at 21.) They argue that this action concerns the 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 5 interpretation of a settlement agreement and insurance contracts. (Id.) Thus, any witnesses would 12 be deposed were they reside, regardless of the forum of the coverage litigation. (Id.) 13 The Court finds that neither party would suffer undue hardship or substantial prejudice if 14 this action were to proceed in California, although it acknowledges that with respect to the 15 environmental issues, not the contract issues, the location of documents, witnesses, and the 16 contamination sites slightly favor New Jersey. This is in accord with Judge Lombardi, who noted 17 that “none of the forum non-convenience or other factors weigh strongly one way or the other.” 18 (New Jersey Transcript at 79:2–5; see id. at 77:3–79:5 (finding that the clean-up of the 19 contaminated site in New Jersey to be the only dominant and dispositive factor). Therefore, the 20 convenience factor is neutral. 21 9. Availability of and Relative Convenience of Other Remedies 22 The final prudential consideration in determining whether to exercise jurisdiction is 23 “the convenience of the parties, and the availability and relative convenience of other remedies.” 24 Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1225 n. 5. Neither party argues the availability of and relative convenience of 25 other remedies. Therefore, the Court finds that this factor is neutral. 26 27 28 10 1 2 III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that under the Wilton/Brillhart Abstention 3 Doctrine, it should exercise discretion and defer the resolution of these matters to the ongoing, 4 more comprehensive New Jersey Action. The Court hereby DECLINES to exercise jurisdiction over 5 the instant action. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201. Because the Court believes that the New Jersey court is 6 fully capable of resolving the controversies alleged in this action, the Court elects to DISMISS rather 7 than stay pending the conclusion of that action. Accordingly, Hexcel Corporation’s Motion to 8 Dismiss this action is GRANTED. As stated above, Plaintiffs’ Request for Supplemental Briefing is 9 DENIED. This Order terminates Dkt. Nos. 22 & 31. 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 Date: April 10, 2013 13 14 _______________________________________ YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 11

Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.


Why Is My Information Online?