Young et al v. Bank of America, N.A.

Filing 25

ORDER by Judge Hamilton denying motion to dismiss and granting motion to stay (pjhlc2, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/7/2013)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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CRAIG A. YOUNG, et al.,
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Plaintiffs,

No. C 12-5514 PJH

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v.
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BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.,

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
DISMISS AND GRANTING MOTION
TO STAY

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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Defendant.
_______________________________/

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Defendant’s motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, to stay came on for hearing

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before this court on March 6, 2013. Plaintiffs Craig Young and Michelle Ezell-Young

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(“plaintiffs”) appeared through their counsel, Jason Buckingham and L. Timothy Fisher.

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Defendant Bank of America, N.A. appeared through its counsel, David Reidy. Having read

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the papers filed in conjunction with the motion and carefully considered the arguments and

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the relevant legal authority, and good cause appearing, the court hereby DENIES

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defendant’s motion to dismiss and GRANTS defendant’s motion to stay, for the reasons

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stated at the hearing, and summarized as follows.

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Defendant moves to dismiss, or stay, based on the first-to-file rule, which “permits a

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district court to decline jurisdiction over an action when a complaint involving the same

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parties and issues has already been filed in another district.” Pacesetter Sys., Inc. v.

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Medtronic, Inc., 678 F.2d 93, 94-95 (9th Cir. 1982). Defendant points to five earlier-filed

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class action cases, which have gone through coordinated mediation, and argues that this

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case should at least be stayed pending a disposition on the tentative class settlement in

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those cases. A preliminary approval hearing is scheduled for May 17, 2013 before Judge

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Davila in the Northern District of California.

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Plaintiffs argue that this case is not sufficiently similar to those five cases such that

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the first-to-file rule should be triggered. Specifically, they emphasize that they have no

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ongoing business relationship with defendant Bank of America, unlike the plaintiffs in the

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earlier-filed cases. They also emphasize that their complaint asserts claims under

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California’s Rosenthal Act, while the other cases involve only claims under the federal

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Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”).

plaintiffs will be included in the putative settlement class, because the plaintiffs in those

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cases defined the putative class broadly. While a global class definition has not yet been

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finalized, the class definitions in the individual cases make clear that plaintiffs (along with

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For the Northern District of California

While plaintiffs are correct about these points of distinction, the fact remains that

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United States District Court

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most, if not all of the putative class members in the present case) would be included. For

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instance, two of the cases define the putative class as “all persons within the United States

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who received a non-emergency telephone call from defendant/defendants to a cellular

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telephone through the use of an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or

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prerecorded voice and who did not provide prior express consent for such calls . . .” See

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Dkt. 19-1, Ex. A (complaint in Duke v. Bank of America); Ex. I (complaint in Ramirez v.

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Bank of America). As the class definitions make clear, the existence of an ongoing

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business relationship is not required for membership in the putative settlement class.

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Indeed, the Youngs do not appear to dispute their inclusion in the putative settlement class,

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they merely seek to preserve the right to pursue their own resolution of their TCPA and

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Rosenthal Act claims.

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While the Youngs (and other putative class members) may opt out of the proposed

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settlement, preserving their rights under both the TCPA and the Rosenthal Act, many

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members of the putative class may not choose to opt out, and will have all of their claims

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extinguished by the settlement. Thus, it would be inefficient to allow the present case to go

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forward, while knowing that many of the putative class members will have their claims

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extinguished by the settlement (if approved) in the earlier-filed cases. Accordingly, the

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court STAYS the present action pending the outcome of the proposed settlement in Duke,

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Ramirez, and the other cases involved in the mediated settlement. As noted above, the

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parties are scheduled to appear at a preliminary approval hearing on May 17, 2013. Within

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7 days of that hearing, the parties shall submit a status report regarding the result and the

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setting of any final settlement approval hearing.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 7, 2013
______________________________
PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON
United States District Judge

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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