Gutowski v. McKesson Corporation et al

Filing 26

ORDER by Judge Claudia Wilken Granting 22 Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs. (ndr, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 6/25/2013)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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JASON T. GUTOWSKI,

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No. C 12-6056 CW

Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR ATTORNEYS'
FEES AND COSTS

v.
MCKESSON CORP. and ELI LILLY &
CO.,
Defendants.
________________________________/

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

In its Order of February 25, 2013, the Court granted
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Plaintiff Jason Gutowski’s Motion to Remand and Motion for
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Attorney's Fees.

However, Plaintiff had failed to produce any

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billing records, affidavits or other documentation supporting his
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motion for fees and costs.

The Court ordered Plaintiff to submit

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a supplemental brief with supporting documentation to address his
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requests for fees and costs.

Plaintiff now moves for an award of

$6,774.40 in fees and costs.

Defendant Eli Lilly & Company

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opposes the motion.

Having considered the papers filed by the

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parties, the Court takes the matter under submission on the papers
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and GRANTS Plaintiff's motion.
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LEGAL STANDARD
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In the Ninth Circuit, reasonable attorneys' fees are
determined by first calculating the "lodestar."

Jordan v.

Multnomah County, 815 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1987).

"The

'lodestar' is calculated by multiplying the number of hours the
prevailing party reasonably expended on the litigation by a

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reasonable hourly rate."

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359, 363 (9th Cir. 1996).

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Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d

"The party seeking an award of fees should submit evidence

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supporting the hours worked and rates claimed."

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Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).

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hours down if it believes the documentation to be inadequate, if

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the hours were duplicative, or if the hours were either excessive

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or unnecessary.

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1210 (9th Cir. 1986).

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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Hensley v.

The court may adjust these

Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205,

In establishing the reasonable hourly rate, the district

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court should take into account (1) the novelty and complexity of

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the issues, (2) the special skill and experience of counsel,

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(3) the quality of representation, (4) the results obtained and

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(5) the contingent nature of the fee agreement.

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Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562–63 (1992).

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are subsumed in the initial lodestar calculation, and should not

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serve as independent bases for adjusting fee awards.

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F.3d at 363–64.

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according to the prevailing market rates in the forum district.

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Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1405 (9th Cir. 1992).

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City of
These factors

Morales, 96

Reasonable fees are generally calculated

The Supreme Court has recognized that, while it is

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appropriate for the district court to exercise its discretion in

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determining an award of attorney's fees, it remains important for

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the court to provide "a concise but clear explanation of its

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reasons for the fee award."

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Bolger, 768 F.2d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 1985) (in computing an

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award, the district court should provide a "detailed account of

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how it arrives at appropriate figures for 'the number of hours

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437; Hall v.

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reasonably expended' and 'a reasonable hourly rate'") (quoting

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Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 898 (1984)).

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The party seeking an award of attorneys' fees bears the

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burden of producing "satisfactory evidence -- in addition to the

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attorney's own affidavits -- that the requested rates are in line

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with those prevailing in the community for similar services by

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lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and

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reputation."

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(9th Cir. 2008).

Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 980

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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DISCUSSION
I.

Reasonable Hours
The parties dispute the hours claimed by Plaintiff's counsel,

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attorney Andrew S. Williams.

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manually documented his time and expended a total of 11.6 hours

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researching, writing and filing the three pleadings.

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Aff. ¶ 10.

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included in a lodestar calculation, the district court should

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exclude hours "that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise

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unnecessary."

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amount of hours Plaintiff is seeking is excessive and asserts that

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4.15 hours would be more reasonable.

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Plaintiff states that Williams

Williams

In determining the appropriate number of hours to be

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434.

Defendant argues the

Def. Opp. 1:22-23,3:3.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff spent an excessive amount of

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time researching rulings that were not essential to Plaintiff's

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motions.

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assume that an attorney would diligently research relevant case

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law and that not all cases would ultimately be cited.

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also argues without citation that Plaintiff's counsel excessively

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billed administrative work for Plaintiff's Motion to Remand and

Def. Opp. 1:26-27,2:1-3.

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However, it is reasonable to

Defendant

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Reply Brief.

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takes out of context the statement that Plaintiff "spent a great

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deal of time formatting, and filing documents."

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Def. Opp. 2:14-16.

The Court disagrees.

Defendant

Def. Opp. 2:3-4.

Further, Defendant contends that Plaintiff's counsel should

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not be entitled to fees incurred with respect to work done on the

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fee motion.

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held that "time spent in establishing the entitlement to and

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amount of the fee is compensable."

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Here, the Court granted Plaintiff's fee motion and required

Def. Opp. 2:10-16.

However, the Ninth Circuit has

Camacho, 523 F.3d at 981.

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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Plaintiff to submit supplemental briefings.

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Plaintiff is entitled to compensation for all reasonable time

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expended on the supplemental briefing.

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The Court finds that

The Court finds that the time of 11.6 hours requested by the
Plaintiff's counsel is not unreasonable.
II.

Reasonable Hourly Rate

The parties dispute the reasonable hourly rate for the

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services of Plaintiff's counsel.

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'market rate' for the services of a lawyer is inherently

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difficult."

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standard when determining a reasonable hourly rate is the "rate

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prevailing in the community for similar work performed by

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attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and reputation."

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Barjon v. Dalton, 132 F.3d 496, 502 (9th Cir. 1997).

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the relevant community is the forum in which the district court

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sits."

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"relevant community" is the Northern District of California.

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"Determining an appropriate

Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n. 11.

Id. at 500.

The established

"Generally,

For purposes of Plaintiff's Fee Motion, the

Plaintiff's counsel does not bill clients by the hour.
Williams Aff. ¶ 8.

However, to determine an appropriate hourly
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rate, Plaintiff's counsel consulted numerous sources and gauged an

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appropriate fee by taking into account his experience and firm

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size, the location of the proceeding and the nature of the

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proceeding to establish an equitable hourly fee.

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¶ 8.

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reasonable market rate for attorneys with like experience from

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comparable firms in San Francisco.

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submits the affidavit of counsel, a 2012 survey of hourly rates

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charged by attorneys in a variety of categories as reported by a

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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legal recruiting firm, and a 2008 National Law Journal survey of

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select law firms' hourly billing rates.

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According to the 2012 survey relied upon by Plaintiff, in 2012 the

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average hourly billing rate for attorneys practicing in San

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Francisco was $622 and the average billing rate for partners with

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twenty years of experience was $602.

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figures are higher than the $584 hourly rate requested by

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Plaintiff.

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Williams Aff.

Plaintiff asserts that an hourly rate of $584 is a

In support of this, Plaintiff

Williams Aff. ¶ 9.

Williams Aff. ¶ 9.

Both

Defendant argues that the trial experience of Plaintiff's

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counsel should not be factored in determining an hourly rate for

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his services because his experience is immaterial to drafting the

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Motion to Remand and Reply Brief.

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finds Defendant's argument unpersuasive and Defendant does not

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provide any legal guidance in support of this contention.

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Defendant also argues that in the 2012 survey that Plaintiff

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provided, the average billing rate for a firm the size of

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Plaintiff's counsel is $442 per hour.

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Defendant believes that this $442 billing rate is excessive for

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the nature of Plaintiff's work in general, but for the purposes of

Def. Opp. 2:19-20.

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The Court

Def. Opp. 2:22-24.

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Plaintiff's fee motion, Defendant views it to be more reasonable

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than Plaintiff's $584 requested hourly billing rate.

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2:24-27.

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The Court disagrees.

Def. Opp.

Defendant's analysis only focuses on a

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single factor while Plaintiff takes an inclusive approach

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factoring in counsel's experience and firm size, and the location

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and nature of the proceeding.

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the latter method to be more useful in determining an hourly rate

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for attorneys of comparable skill in the relevant community and

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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Williams Aff. ¶ 8.

The Court finds

finds Plaintiff's $584 requested rate to be reasonable.

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CONCLUSION

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For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's

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Motion for Attorney's Fees and awards Plaintiff $6,774.40 ($584 x

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11.6 hours) in fees and costs incurred.

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amount forthwith.

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Defendant shall pay this

The Clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: 6/25/2013

CLAUDIA WILKEN
United States District Judge

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