Loggins v. Pacific Maritime Association et al

Filing 22

ORDER by Judge Hamilton finding as moot 9 Motion to Dismiss; granting 14 Motion to Remand (pjhlc2, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 4/22/2013)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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DEBRA M. LOGGINS,
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Plaintiff,

No. C 13-0530 PJH

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v.
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ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
REMAND

PACIFIC MARITIME ASSOCIATION, et al.,
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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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Defendants.
_______________________________/

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Before the court are plaintiff’s motion to remand and defendant Pacific Maritime

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Association’s motion to dismiss. The motions came on for hearing before this court on April

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17, 2013. Plaintiff Debra Loggins (“plaintiff”) appeared through her counsel, John Ota.

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Defendant Pacific Maritime Association (“PMA”) appeared through its counsel, Megan

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Borovicka. Defendant International Longshore & Warehouse Union, Local 10 (“ILWU”)

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(together with PMA, “defendants”) appeared through its counsel, Robert Remar. Having

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read the papers filed in conjunction with the motions and carefully considered the

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arguments and the relevant legal authority, and good cause appearing, the court hereby

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GRANTS plaintiff’s motion to remand as follows.

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This case arises out of plaintiff’s failure to be hired for a casual longshore position at

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the port of Oakland. Plaintiff alleges that she applied for the position, received a sequence

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number, and was told that she would be hired when her sequence number was called, as

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long as she met all requirements and passed all tests. Claiming that she was still not hired

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despite meeting all requirements and passing all tests, plaintiff filed suit in state court on

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October 15, 2012, asserting five causes of action: (1) employment discrimination based on

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sex; (2) employment discrimination based on race; (3) employment discrimination based on

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age; (4) breach of contract; and (5) negligence. Defendants removed this case to federal

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court on February 6, 2013, claiming that plaintiff’s claims require interpretation of the terms

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of a collective bargaining agreement, making them preempted by section 301 of the Labor

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Management Relations Act and thus subject to federal subject matter jurisdiction. In

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support of their argument, defendants point to plaintiff’s employment application, which

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states that “[c]asual work performed and employment will be governed by the Agreement

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between the International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union and Pacific

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Maritime Association covering longshoremen and clerks on the Pacific Coast, and by the

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rules of determinations of the Joint Port Labor Relations Committee under such
Agreement,” and that “[a]ny grievances regarding casual employment shall be filed under

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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the grievance machinery set forth in the PCLCD and PCCCD.” Dkt. 17, Ex. L at 4. Based

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on that language, defendants argue that plaintiff agreed to have any employment-related

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claims governed by the procedures set forth in the collectively bargained agreements.

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However, the plain language of the application states only that actual “employment” and

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actual “work performed” would be governed by the CBA procedures. Because plaintiff was

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never hired, there was no “employment” or “work performed,” and thus no trigger of these

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CBA procedures.

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Defendants then make a second attempt to apply CBA procedures to plaintiff’s

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claims. They point to a completely separate document, called the “Memorandum of

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Coastwise Rules Covering Registration/Deregistration of Longshoremen and Clerks” (also

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referred to as the “Coastwise Rules”), which states that CBA grievance procedures shall

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apply to all disputes between the union and “any person or persons working or seeking to

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work under this agreement.” Dkt. 17, Ex. M at 17. However, there is no indication that

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plaintiff was given notice of the Coastwise Rules. In fact, while plaintiff’s employment

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application specifically states that she received “a copy of the ILWU-PMA Joint Port Labor

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Committee Procedures and Rules Applicable to Non-registered Casuals,” it makes no

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mention of the Coastwise Rules. Because defendants have not shown that plaintiff was

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made aware of the Coastwise Rules, they cannot show that she was bound to their terms.
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Thus, in the absence of any agreement to have her claims governed by CBA

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procedures, the court looks to the face of plaintiff’s complaint to determine whether her

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claims are “substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement.”

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Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 394 (1987) (internal citations omitted).

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Defendants concede that plaintiffs’ first three causes of action (for discrimination under

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FEHA) do not involve interpretation of the CBA. However, they do argue that plaintiff’s

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fourth cause of action (for breach of contract) requires interpretation of various collectively-

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bargained documents to determine the meaning of “sequence number” and “all

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requirements.” Defendants also argue that plaintiff’s fifth cause of action (for negligence) is
actually a disguised claim for breach of the duty of fair representation. The court

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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disagrees. Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim is not based on any collectively bargained

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documents, and in fact, is not based on any documents at all. Instead, plaintiff alleges that

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she and defendants had an agreement that was “implied by and based on the conduct” of

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the parties. Complaint, Dkt. 1, Ex. C at ¶ 32. As in Caterpillar, plaintiff’s claim “does not

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rely upon the collective agreement indirectly, nor does it address the relationship between

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the individual contracts and the collective agreement.” 482 U.S. at 395. As to plaintiff’s

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negligence cause of action, the court first notes that plaintiff was never a member of any

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union, and defendants do not present authority establishing that a non-member of a union

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can bring a claim for breach of the duty of fair representation. Regardless, even if plaintiff

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had been a union member (as were the Caterpillar plaintiffs), she has the right as “master[]

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of the complaint” to choose to bring suit based on rights that exist outside of the collective

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agreements. Id.

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The Caterpillar case is especially instructive here. The Caterpillar plaintiffs were

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one-time union employees who were promoted to managerial or weekly salaried positions,

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thus taking them outside the coverage of the collective bargaining agreement. 482 U.S. at

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388. Caterpillar allegedly made written and oral promises to these employees that they

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could “look forward to indefinite and lasting employment with the corporation.” Id. Plaintiffs

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were eventually laid off, and brought suit for breach of contract. Caterpillar removed the
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action to federal court, making the same argument that defendants make in this case, that

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the breach of contract claim was preempted by section 301 of the LMRA. The Supreme

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Court disagreed, finding that “Caterpillar’s basic error is its failure to recognize that a

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plaintiff covered by a collective-bargaining agreement is permitted to assert legal rights

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independent of that agreement, including state-law contract rights, so long as the contract

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relied upon is not a collective-bargaining agreement.” Id. at 396 (emphasis in original). It

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appears that, in this case, defendants have made the same “basic error.” In fact, this case

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presents an even stronger basis for remand, because unlike the Caterpillar plaintiffs,

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plaintiff Loggins was never a union employee, and thus was never “covered by a collectivebargaining agreement.” Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion to remand is GRANTED. PMA’s

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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motion to dismiss is denied as moot. The case is REMANDED to the Superior Court for the

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County of Alameda.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 22, 2013
______________________________
PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON
United States District Judge

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