Lee v. Phillips et al

Filing 9

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO AMEND AND DENYING MOTION FOR EXTENSION by Judge Phyllis J. Hamilton finding as moot 5 Motion for Extension of Time to File (Attachments: # 1 Certificate/Proof of Service) (nah, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/13/2013)

Download PDF
1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 OAKLAND DIVISION 6 7 FRANK LEE, Plaintiff, 8 vs. 9 ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO AMEND AND DENYING MOTION FOR EXTENSION OFFICER M. PHILLIPS, et. al., 11 For the Northern District of California 10 United States District Court No. C 13-3367 PJH (PR) Defendant. / 12 Plaintiff, an inmate at R.J. Donovan Correctional Facility, has filed a pro se civil 13 rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He has been granted leave to proceed in forma 14 pauperis. 15 DISCUSSION 16 A. Standard of Review 17 Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners 18 seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 19 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and 20 dismiss any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may 21 be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at 22 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 23 Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 24 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of 25 the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." "Specific facts are not necessary; 26 the statement need only '"give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim is and the 27 grounds upon which it rests."'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations 28 omitted). Although in order to state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed factual 1 allegations, . . . a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds’ of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' 2 requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 3 cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief 4 above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) 5 (citations omitted). A complaint must proffer "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 6 plausible on its face." Id. at 570. The United States Supreme Court has recently explained 7 the “plausible on its face” standard of Twombly: “While legal conclusions can provide the 8 framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are 9 well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 1937, 1950 (2009). 12 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 13 elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 14 violated, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the 15 color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 16 B. 17 Legal Claims Plaintiff alleges that while at Salinas Valley State Prison his due process rights were 18 violated, as his investigative employee never interviewed him when he was issued a rules 19 violation report and then placed in Administrative Segregation (“Ad. Seg.”). 20 In order to recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or 21 imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a 22 conviction or sentence invalid, a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or 23 sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared 24 invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by 25 a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 26 486-487 (1994). Heck also bars a claim for using the wrong procedures in a disciplinary 27 hearing that resulted in the deprivation of time credits if "the nature of the challenge to the 28 procedures [is] such as necessarily to imply the invalidity of the judgment." Edwards v. 2 1 2 Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 645 (1997). Interests that are procedurally protected by the Due Process Clause may arise from 3 two sources – the Due Process Clause itself and laws of the states. See Meachum v. 4 Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976). In the prison context, these interests are generally 5 ones pertaining to liberty. Changes in conditions so severe as to affect the sentence 6 imposed in an unexpected manner implicate the Due Process Clause itself, whether or not 7 they are authorized by state law. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). A state 8 may not impose such changes without complying with minimum requirements of procedural 9 due process. See id. at 484. Deprivations that are authorized by state law and are less severe or more closely 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 related to the expected terms of confinement may also amount to deprivations of a 12 procedurally protected liberty interest, provided that (1) state statutes or regulations 13 narrowly restrict the power of prison officials to impose the deprivation, i.e., give the inmate 14 a kind of right to avoid it, and (2) the liberty in question is one of "real substance." See id. 15 at 477-87. Generally, "real substance" will be limited to freedom from (1) a restraint that 16 imposes "atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents 17 of prison life," id. at 484, or (2) state action that "will inevitably affect the duration of [a] 18 sentence," id. at 487. 19 Assuming there was an atypical and significant hardship, the Supreme Court 20 established five procedural requirements for disciplinary hearings. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 21 418 U.S. 539 (1974). First, "written notice of the charges must be given to the 22 disciplinary-action defendant in order to inform him of the charges and to enable him to 23 marshal the facts and prepare a defense." Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564. Second, "at least a brief 24 period of time after the notice, no less than 24 hours, should be allowed to the inmate to 25 prepare for the appearance before the [disciplinary committee]." Id. Third, "there must be 26 a 'written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons' for the 27 disciplinary action." Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972)). Fourth, 28 "the inmate facing disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to call witnesses and present 3 1 documentary evidence in his defense when permitting him to do so will not be unduly 2 hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals." Id. at 566. Fifth, "[w]here an 3 illiterate inmate is involved . . . or where the complexity of the issues makes it unlikely that 4 the inmate will be able to collect and present the evidence necessary for an adequate 5 comprehension of the case, he should be free to seek the aid of a fellow inmate, or . . . to 6 have adequate substitute aid . . . from the staff or from a[n] . . . inmate designated by the 7 staff." Id. at 570. The Court specifically held that the Due Process Clause does not require 8 that prisons allow inmates to cross-examine their accusers, see id. at 567-68, and does not 9 give rise to a right to counsel in the proceedings, see id. at 569-70. Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed with leave to amend to provide additional 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 information. It is not clear from the complaint if plaintiff was deprived time credits due to the 12 rules violation report. If time credits were deprived then plaintiff must demonstrate that the 13 rules violation report was reversed or expunged. Assuming that no time credits were 14 deprived, plaintiff has still failed to state a claim. Other than stating he was placed in Ad. 15 Seg., plaintiff provides no description of any hardships associated with his placement or 16 even how long he was there. Assuming there was a valid hardship plaintiff must also 17 provide more information how the Wolff procedural requirements were not met. Simply 18 stating that he was never interviewed by his investigative employee is insufficient. 19 CONCLUSION 20 1. The complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend in accordance with the 21 standards set forth above. The amended complaint must be filed no later than October 14, 22 2013, and must include the caption and civil case number used in this order and the words 23 AMENDED COMPLAINT on the first page. Because an amended complaint completely 24 replaces the original complaint, plaintiff must include in it all the claims he wishes to 25 present. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). He may not 26 incorporate material from the original complaint by reference. Failure to amend within the 27 designated time will result in the dismissal of these claims. 28 2. Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time to file an IFP application (Docket No. 5) 4 1 2 is DENIED as moot as IFP status has been granted. 3. It is the plaintiff's responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the 3 court informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the clerk headed 4 “Notice of Change of Address,” and must comply with the court's orders in a timely fashion. 5 Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to 6 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 Dated: September 13, 2013. PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON United States District Judge 9 G:\PRO-SE\PJH\CR.13\Lee3367.dwlta.wpd 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 5

Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.


Why Is My Information Online?