Lee v. Phillips et al
Filing
9
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO AMEND AND DENYING MOTION FOR EXTENSION by Judge Phyllis J. Hamilton finding as moot 5 Motion for Extension of Time to File (Attachments: # 1 Certificate/Proof of Service) (nah, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/13/2013)
1
2
3
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
4
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
5
OAKLAND DIVISION
6
7
FRANK LEE,
Plaintiff,
8
vs.
9
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH
LEAVE TO AMEND AND
DENYING MOTION FOR
EXTENSION
OFFICER M. PHILLIPS, et. al.,
11
For the Northern District of California
10
United States District Court
No. C 13-3367 PJH (PR)
Defendant.
/
12
Plaintiff, an inmate at R.J. Donovan Correctional Facility, has filed a pro se civil
13
rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He has been granted leave to proceed in forma
14
pauperis.
15
DISCUSSION
16
A.
Standard of Review
17
Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners
18
seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
19
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and
20
dismiss any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may
21
be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at
22
1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police
23
Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).
24
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of
25
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." "Specific facts are not necessary;
26
the statement need only '"give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim is and the
27
grounds upon which it rests."'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations
28
omitted). Although in order to state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed factual
1
allegations, . . . a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds’ of his 'entitle[ment] to relief'
2
requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
3
cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
4
above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
5
(citations omitted). A complaint must proffer "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
6
plausible on its face." Id. at 570. The United States Supreme Court has recently explained
7
the “plausible on its face” standard of Twombly: “While legal conclusions can provide the
8
framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are
9
well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine
whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct.
11
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
10
1937, 1950 (2009).
12
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential
13
elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was
14
violated, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the
15
color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
16
B.
17
Legal Claims
Plaintiff alleges that while at Salinas Valley State Prison his due process rights were
18
violated, as his investigative employee never interviewed him when he was issued a rules
19
violation report and then placed in Administrative Segregation (“Ad. Seg.”).
20
In order to recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
21
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a
22
conviction or sentence invalid, a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or
23
sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared
24
invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by
25
a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,
26
486-487 (1994). Heck also bars a claim for using the wrong procedures in a disciplinary
27
hearing that resulted in the deprivation of time credits if "the nature of the challenge to the
28
procedures [is] such as necessarily to imply the invalidity of the judgment." Edwards v.
2
1
2
Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 645 (1997).
Interests that are procedurally protected by the Due Process Clause may arise from
3
two sources – the Due Process Clause itself and laws of the states. See Meachum v.
4
Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976). In the prison context, these interests are generally
5
ones pertaining to liberty. Changes in conditions so severe as to affect the sentence
6
imposed in an unexpected manner implicate the Due Process Clause itself, whether or not
7
they are authorized by state law. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). A state
8
may not impose such changes without complying with minimum requirements of procedural
9
due process. See id. at 484.
Deprivations that are authorized by state law and are less severe or more closely
11
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
10
related to the expected terms of confinement may also amount to deprivations of a
12
procedurally protected liberty interest, provided that (1) state statutes or regulations
13
narrowly restrict the power of prison officials to impose the deprivation, i.e., give the inmate
14
a kind of right to avoid it, and (2) the liberty in question is one of "real substance." See id.
15
at 477-87. Generally, "real substance" will be limited to freedom from (1) a restraint that
16
imposes "atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents
17
of prison life," id. at 484, or (2) state action that "will inevitably affect the duration of [a]
18
sentence," id. at 487.
19
Assuming there was an atypical and significant hardship, the Supreme Court
20
established five procedural requirements for disciplinary hearings. See Wolff v. McDonnell,
21
418 U.S. 539 (1974). First, "written notice of the charges must be given to the
22
disciplinary-action defendant in order to inform him of the charges and to enable him to
23
marshal the facts and prepare a defense." Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564. Second, "at least a brief
24
period of time after the notice, no less than 24 hours, should be allowed to the inmate to
25
prepare for the appearance before the [disciplinary committee]." Id. Third, "there must be
26
a 'written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons' for the
27
disciplinary action." Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972)). Fourth,
28
"the inmate facing disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to call witnesses and present
3
1
documentary evidence in his defense when permitting him to do so will not be unduly
2
hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals." Id. at 566. Fifth, "[w]here an
3
illiterate inmate is involved . . . or where the complexity of the issues makes it unlikely that
4
the inmate will be able to collect and present the evidence necessary for an adequate
5
comprehension of the case, he should be free to seek the aid of a fellow inmate, or . . . to
6
have adequate substitute aid . . . from the staff or from a[n] . . . inmate designated by the
7
staff." Id. at 570. The Court specifically held that the Due Process Clause does not require
8
that prisons allow inmates to cross-examine their accusers, see id. at 567-68, and does not
9
give rise to a right to counsel in the proceedings, see id. at 569-70.
Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed with leave to amend to provide additional
11
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
10
information. It is not clear from the complaint if plaintiff was deprived time credits due to the
12
rules violation report. If time credits were deprived then plaintiff must demonstrate that the
13
rules violation report was reversed or expunged. Assuming that no time credits were
14
deprived, plaintiff has still failed to state a claim. Other than stating he was placed in Ad.
15
Seg., plaintiff provides no description of any hardships associated with his placement or
16
even how long he was there. Assuming there was a valid hardship plaintiff must also
17
provide more information how the Wolff procedural requirements were not met. Simply
18
stating that he was never interviewed by his investigative employee is insufficient.
19
CONCLUSION
20
1. The complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend in accordance with the
21
standards set forth above. The amended complaint must be filed no later than October 14,
22
2013, and must include the caption and civil case number used in this order and the words
23
AMENDED COMPLAINT on the first page. Because an amended complaint completely
24
replaces the original complaint, plaintiff must include in it all the claims he wishes to
25
present. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). He may not
26
incorporate material from the original complaint by reference. Failure to amend within the
27
designated time will result in the dismissal of these claims.
28
2. Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time to file an IFP application (Docket No. 5)
4
1
2
is DENIED as moot as IFP status has been granted.
3. It is the plaintiff's responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the
3
court informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the clerk headed
4
“Notice of Change of Address,” and must comply with the court's orders in a timely fashion.
5
Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to
6
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).
7
IT IS SO ORDERED.
8
Dated: September 13, 2013.
PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON
United States District Judge
9
G:\PRO-SE\PJH\CR.13\Lee3367.dwlta.wpd
11
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
10
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
5
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?