Chadam et al v. Palo Alto Unified School District

Filing 32

ORDER by Judge Claudia Wilken GRANTING 18 MOTION TO DISMISS. (ndr, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 1/29/2014)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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JAMES CHADAM and JENNIFER CHADAM,
individually and on behalf of
their minor children A.C. and
C.C.,

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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No. C 13-4129 CW
ORDER GRANTING
MOTION TO DISMISS
(Docket No. 18)

Plaintiffs,
v.
PALO ALTO UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT, a governmental entity
created and existing under the
laws of the State of California,
Defendants,
________________________________/

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Defendant Palo Alto Unified School District (PAUSD) moves to
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dismiss Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint (1AC).

Plaintiffs

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James Chadam and Jennifer Chadam, individually and on behalf of
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their minor children A.C. and C.C., oppose the motion.

Having

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considered the papers submitted, the Court GRANTS PAUSD’s motion
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to dismiss, but permits Plaintiffs to amend their complaint.
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND
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The following facts are alleged in the complaint and taken as
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true for the purposes of this motion.
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James and Jennifer Chadam reside in Palo Alto, California
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with A.C. and C.C., their minor children.

1AC ¶ 1.

On July 22,

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2012, Jennifer Chadam enrolled her sons A.C. and C.C. in a middle
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school owned and operated by PAUSD.

Id. ¶ 6.

She completed forms

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for enrollment, including a “Report of Health Examination for
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School Entry” regarding C.C.

Id. ¶ 7.

This form included

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“private, personal and privileged medical information.”
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Id.

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PAUSD assigned both children to attend the middle school closest

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to their home.

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2012, the Chadams provided additional medical information

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regarding C.C.

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attending their assigned middle school.

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Id. ¶ 8.

Id. ¶ 9.

Between August 2, 2012, and August 16,

On August 16, 2012, A.C. and C.C. began
Id. ¶ 10.

On or about September 11, 2012, during a parent-teacher

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conference, one of C.C.’s teachers disclosed C.C.’s private

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medical information to parents of another student attending the

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middle school (Mr. and Mrs. X).

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10
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Id. ¶ 11.

The teacher did so

with no prior permission or notice from the Chadams.

Id.

On September 11, 2012, PAUSD arranged for the Chadams to

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attend a meeting with Gregory Barnes, the middle school’s

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principal, along with the PAUSD District Nurse and Grant Althouse,

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the Vice Principal and Administrator of sixth grade.

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At the meeting, the Chadams were told that the children of Mr. and

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Mrs. X had an active disease and that Mr. and Mrs. X had

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“discovered C.C.’s ‘condition.’”

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Id. ¶ 12.

Id.

On September 17, 2012, the Chadams received a call from Mr.

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Barnes informing them that, based on Mr. and Mrs. X’s demands, and

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based on C.C.’s private medical information, PAUSD intended to

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prohibit C.C. from attending the middle school he was enrolled at

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and to transfer him to another PAUSD middle school.

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October 1, 2012, the Chadams received a letter from Charles Young,

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PAUSD Assistant Superintendent, ordering the transfer of C.C. to

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another middle school.

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Id. ¶ 13.

On

Id. ¶ 14.

On October 12, 2012, the Chadams brought suit in California

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state court seeking to enjoin PAUSD from transferring C.C. to

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another middle school.

Id. ¶ 16.

The parties settled the case,
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with PAUSD agreeing to permit C.C. to stay at the same middle

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school.

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Id.

On September 6, 2013, Plaintiffs brought the present suit in

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federal court, alleging (1) violation of the Americans with

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Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., (the ADA), through 42

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U.S.C. § 1983; (2) violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1972, 29

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U.S.C. § 794 et seq., through 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (3) violation

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of the federal right to privacy conferred by the First Amendment.

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LEGAL STANDARDS

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the

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claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

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Civ. P. 8(a).

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claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

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Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

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Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

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“when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court

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to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

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the misconduct alleged.”

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Fed. R.

The plaintiff must proffer “enough facts to state a
Ashcroft v.

A claim is facially plausible

Id.

In considering whether the complaint is sufficient to state a

20

claim, the court will take all material allegations as true and

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construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

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Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1061

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(9th Cir. 2008).

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complaint, materials incorporated into the complaint by reference,

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and facts of which the court may take judicial notice.

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1061.

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including “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

The court’s review is limited to the face of the

Id. at

However, the court need not accept legal conclusions,

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3

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action, supported by mere conclusory statements.”

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at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

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Iqbal, 556 U.S.

When granting a motion to dismiss, the court is generally

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required to grant the plaintiff leave to amend, even if no request

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to amend the pleading was made, unless amendment would be futile.

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Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv. Inc., 911

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F.2d 242, 246-47 (9th Cir. 1990).

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amendment would be futile, the court examines whether the

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complaint could be amended to cure the defect requiring dismissal

In determining whether

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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“without contradicting any of the allegations of [the] original

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complaint.”

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(9th Cir. 1990).

Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296

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DISCUSSION
I.

Section 1983
PAUSD argues that it is a state agency and therefore not a

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“person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

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all three of their claims under § 1983, purportedly to vindicate

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the rights set forth in Title II of the ADA, § 504 of the

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Plaintiffs bring

Rehabilitation Act, and federal privacy rights as provided by the

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First Amendment.
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As a preliminary matter, Plaintiffs may not bring their Title

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II and Rehabilitation Act claims under the guise of a § 1983

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claim.

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gives individuals a private cause of action to enforce other

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rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution and other

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Section 1983 does not confer any substantive rights, but

federal law.

Buckley v. City of Redding, 66 F.3d 188, 190 (9th

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4

1

Cir. 1995).

But federal law may not be vindicated under § 1983

2

if, among other things, “Congress has foreclosed citizen

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enforcement in the enactment [of the law] itself, either

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explicitly, or implicitly by imbuing it with its own comprehensive

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remedial scheme.”

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Id.

The Ninth Circuit has ruled that, because

Congress provided a comprehensive remedial scheme for individual

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suits under both Title II and the Rehabilitation Act, it intended
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to preclude suits seeking to enforce Title II rights through

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

§ 1983.

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As a result, Plaintiffs cannot bring their first two claims under

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§ 1983 and they must be dismissed.

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vindicate rights provided by Title II and the Rehabilitation Act,

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Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1155 (9th Cir. 2002).

If Plaintiffs wish to

they must sue under those statutes directly.

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The only claim which Plaintiffs properly brought under § 1983
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was their federal right to privacy claim.

Azul-Pacifico, Inc. v.

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City of Los Angeles, 973 F.2d 704, 705 (9th Cir. 1992).

Regarding

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this third claim, the question of whether PAUSD is a “person”

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within the meaning of § 1983 still remains.

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Section 1983 provides that every “person” who, under color of
any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any state
deprives any person of any federally protected rights, privileges,

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or immunities shall be civilly liable to the injured person.

It

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is well-established that neither the state, nor a state official

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acting in his or her official capacity, is a “person” under §

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1983.

Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65
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(1989).

Reading the language of the statute and examining

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Congress’ purpose in enacting the statute, the Will Court

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concluded that Congress had not manifested a clear intention to

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hold states liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

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Court also ruled that a suit against a state official in his or

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Id. at 65-66, 68.

The

her official capacity is essentially against the state itself, and

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so such suits are also barred for the same reason.

Id. at 71.

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Plaintiffs contend that PAUSD is not a state, but a local

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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governmental unit or municipality that can be sued as a “person”

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under § 1983.

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1995) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York,

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436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978)).

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See Hervey v. Estes, 65 F.3d 784, 791 (9th Cir.

Plaintiffs are incorrect; PAUSD is

instead a state agency warranting the same protections as a state.

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To determine whether an entity is an “arm of the state,” courts in
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the Ninth Circuit apply a multi-factor balancing test: (1) whether
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a money judgment would be satisfied from state funds, (2) whether

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the entity performs central governmental functions, (3) whether

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the entity may sue or be sued in its own name, (4) whether the

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entity has power to take property in its own name or only in the

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name of the state, and (5) the corporate status of the entity.

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Mitchell v. Los Angeles Cmty. Coll. Dist., 861 F.2d 198, 201 (9th

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Cir. 1988).

Of the five factors of the Mitchell test, the first

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is predominant.

Belanger v. Madera Unified Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d

248, 251 (9th Cir. 1992).

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6

Applying the Mitchell test to the California school system,

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the Ninth Circuit held in Belanger that California school

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districts are state agencies.

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California Supreme Court decisions regarding public school

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financing and Proposition 13 property tax limitations, California

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Id. at 254. As a result of

maintains “strict state control of public school funding.”

Id. at

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252.

Moreover, California treats public education as a central

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governmental function by heavily regulating schools.

Id. at 253.

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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Following Belanger, courts in this district have repeatedly

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dismissed suits against California public school districts for

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this reason.

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Dist., 2013 WL 812425, at *5 n.5 (N.D. Cal.) (dismissing § 1983

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See, e.g., Jianjun Xie v. Oakland Unified Sch.

claims against Oakland Unified School District because it is a

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state agency); O.H. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 2000 WL
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33376299, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal.) (same); Scott v. San Francisco
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Unified Sch. Dist., 2013 WL 6185598, at *5 (N.D. Cal.) (following

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the Belanger court’s holding that California school districts are

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“arms of the state” for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment); Doe

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ex rel. Kristen D. v. Willits Unified Sch. Dist., 2010 WL 890158,

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at *3 (N.D. Cal.) (same).

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As a California school district, PAUSD

is a state agency equivalent to the state itself.

PAUSD therefore

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is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983, and so Plaintiffs’
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third claim is barred.1

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1

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Plaintiffs could avoid this barrier by suing, for damages,
the state officials who caused the injury, in their personal
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II.

Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Having already concluded that Plaintiffs improperly brought

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their first two claims under § 1983, and that Plaintiffs’ third

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claim fails because PAUSD is not a “person” under § 1983, the

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Court could dismiss the complaint in its entirety and end its

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analysis there.

But because Plaintiffs could amend their

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complaint to sue PAUSD directly under Title II and the
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Rehabilitation Act, in the interest of providing Plaintiffs with

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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comprehensive guidance, the Court explores the effect of the

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Eleventh Amendment on Title II and Rehabilitation Act claims.

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The Eleventh Amendment provides, “The Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law
or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United

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States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
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any Foreign State.”

Courts have interpreted this to prohibit

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18

suits against the states and their agencies, whether brought by

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the state’s own citizens or citizens of other states.

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v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 517 (2004).

Tennessee

State immunity is not

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25
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27
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capacities. “Personal-capacity suits [] seek to impose individual
liability upon a government officer for actions taken under color
of state law,” where they caused “deprivation of a federal right.”
Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). The Eleventh Amendment
also does not act as a barrier to a suit against state officials
in their individual capacities. Id. at 30-31. Qualified immunity
may be raised as a defense. See id. at 31; see also Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 227 (2009) (holding that qualified
immunity applies when at the time of the purported violation, it
was not “clearly established” that the conduct was
unconstitutional).
8

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absolute, however, with three exceptions to the rule:

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(1) Congress may abrogate that immunity pursuant to its lawmaking

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powers conferred by the United States Constitution; (2) the state

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may waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity; or (3) under the Ex

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Parte Young doctrine, immunity does not apply when the plaintiff

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chooses to sue a state official in his or her official capacity

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for prospective injunctive relief.

Douglas v. California Dept. of

8
9

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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Youth Authority, 271 F.3d 812, 817-18 (9th Cir. 2001).
The Court first considers whether an exception exists for a

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potential Title II claim.

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abrogated the state’s immunity in Title II cases, the Supreme

13

Court set forth a two-part test: “first, whether Congress

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To determine whether Congress validly

unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate that immunity; and

15
second, if it did, whether Congress acted pursuant to a valid
16
grant of constitutional authority.”

Lane, 541 U.S. at 517.

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18

Regarding the first question, it is clear from the text of the ADA

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that Congress intended to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity

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because Congress explicitly said so.

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provides, “A state shall not be immune under the eleventh

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amendment . . . for a violation of this chapter.”).

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Id. at 518 (the Act

As to the

second question, whether Congress could abrogate state immunity

24
depends on if it did so pursuant to a valid exercise of its power
25
26

under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Id.

The Supreme Court

27

found in Lane that § 5 power is broad and includes the “authority

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both to remedy and to deter violation of [the] rights guaranteed
9

1

by the Fourteenth Amendment by prohibiting a somewhat broader

2

swath of conduct, including that which is not prohibited by the

3

Amendment’s text,” but is necessary to “prevent and deter

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unconstitutional conduct.”

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under § 5 includes the ability to enact “prophylactic” legislation

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Id.

In other words, Congress’ power

prohibiting practices that are discriminatory in effect.

Id. at

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520.

After examining the history of disability discrimination in

8
9

the provision of public services such as education,

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

transportation, health services, and voting, the Supreme Court

11

concluded that Congress acted within its § 5 powers in abrogating

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state immunity for ADA Title II, at least regarding the protection

13

of certain fundamental rights guaranteed by the Due Process

14

Clause, such as access to the courts.

See id. at 528-34.

The

15
Supreme Court distinguished its decision in Garrett, which held
16
that Congress did not have the power to abrogate state immunity in
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18

ADA Title I cases, because Garrett sought to enforce the rights

19

under the Equal Protection Clause based on a classification

20

subject to only rational-basis review.

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Supreme Court declined to consider whether Congress rightfully

22

abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity from Title II’s applications

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Id. at 528.

to public benefits such as state-owned hockey rinks.

In Lane, the

Id. at 531.

24
Although the Ninth Circuit has not ruled on this particular issue,
25
26

the district courts and other circuit courts have interpreted Lane

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to mean that courts must engage in a case-by-case analysis of

28

whether an ADA Title II case involves “fundamental rights” to
10

1

determine whether Congress rightfully abrogated state immunity

2

with respect to it.

3

California, 2013 WL 4102202, at *4 (S.D. Cal.) (holding that

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participation in recreational programs open to the public did not

5

implicate a fundamental constitutional right); Klingler v. Dir.,

6

See Talevski v. Regents of the Univ. of

Dep't of Revenue, State of Mo., 455 F.3d 888, 894 (8th Cir. 2006)

7
(ruling that Missouri’s discriminatory parking placard fee did not
8
9

significantly impair any fundamental rights such as those at issue

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

in Lane).

11

F.3d 791, 793 (9th Cir. 2004) (O’Scannlain, J., concurring) (“A

12

State may well retain its Eleventh Amendment immunity where a

13

plaintiff premises a Title II claim solely upon an alleged equal

14

See also Phiffer v. Columbia River Corr. Inst., 384

protection violation and has not suffered the deprivation of any

15
other constitutional right.”).
16
Not having a direct Title II claim against PAUSD before it,
17
18

the Court cannot decide at this time whether this case involves a

19

fundamental right.

20

Title II claim is especially unclear because, at oral argument,

21

Plaintiffs could not articulate exactly what right they sought to

22

protect.

23

The scope of Plaintiffs’ potential direct

Plaintiffs oscillated between claiming only a

constitutional right to privacy, a right to education, or a

24
combination of both.

The Court therefore cannot make a meaningful

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26
27
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determination as to whether such a right is fundamental.
The Court next considers whether there is an exception to
Eleventh Amendment immunity regarding a potential Rehabilitation
11

1

Act claim.

Although Congress likely did not have the authority to

2

abrogate state immunity regarding the Rehabilitation Act, see

3

Vinson, 288 F.3d at 1158 n.2, the Ninth Circuit ruled that

4

California waived state immunity under the Rehabilitation Act.

5

Douglas, 271 F.3d at 819.

6

The language of the Rehabilitation Act

statutory language manifests “a clear intention to condition

7
participation in the programs funded under the Act on a State’s
8
9

consent to waive its constitutional immunity.”

Id.

By accepting

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

federal funds under the Act, California waived its state immunity

11

regarding the Act and consented to be sued.

12

Amendment therefore will not bar a direct Rehabilitation Act claim

13

by Plaintiffs against PAUSD.

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15
16

Id.

The Eleventh

III. Plaintiffs’ ADA and Section 504 claims are insufficiently
plead
“To prove that a public program or service violated Title II

17

of the ADA, a plaintiff must show: (1) he is a ‘qualified

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individual with a disability’; (2) he was either excluded from

19

participation in or denied the benefits of a public entity's

20

services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated

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against by the public entity; and (3) such exclusion, denial of

22

benefits, or discrimination was by reason of his disability.”

23

Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1135 (9th Cir. 2001).

24

To plead a claim under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, after

25

which the ADA was modeled, a plaintiff must prove similar

26

elements: (1) that he has a disability; (2) that he is otherwise

27

qualified to receive the benefit in question; (3) that he was

28

denied those benefits solely because of his disability; and
12

1

(4) that the benefits program receives federal financial

2

assistance.

3

Id.

Under either of these claims, Plaintiffs fail to provide

4

enough facts to make a violation of the statute plausible.

5

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

6

alleged wrongs by PAUSD: the unauthorized disclosure of C.C.’s

7

private health information and the attempt to transfer C.C. to

8

another middle school.

9

the elements of Title II and the Rehabilitation Act.

See

In their complaint, Plaintiffs target two

Plaintiffs then make a bare recitation of
Plaintiffs

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

do not provide any facts or explanation as to how C.C. qualifies

11

as a protected individual under either statute.

12

allude to C.C.’s “condition,” they do not disclose what condition

13

he has or how it qualifies as a disability under either statute.2

14

The potentially sensitive nature of the information does not

15

excuse Plaintiffs’ duty to apprise the Court of the facts

16

underlying their case.

17

information in a publicly-filed complaint, they may file a motion

18

to seal that information.

19

Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 2006); Civ. L.R. 79-5.

20

move to seal sensitive information successfully, Plaintiffs must

21

make a particularized showing that compelling reasons exist for

While Plaintiffs

If Plaintiffs do not wish to disclose such

See Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of
To

22
23
24
25
26
27

2

To be disabled under the ADA, a plaintiff must show: (A) a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of his or her major life activities; (B) a record of such an
impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 630 (1998). The standard for
disability under the Rehabilitation Act is almost identical.
See id. at 631.

28
13

1

sealing the information, for example, that the information would

2

become a “vehicle for improper purposes, such as . . . to gratify

3

private spite, promote public scandal, circulate libelous

4

statements, or release trade secrets”).

5

1179.

6

be sealable.

7

“maintain the secrecy” of the documents at issue); Apple Inc. v.

8

Psystar Corp., 2012 WL 10852, at *2 (N.D. Cal.) (“There is no

9

compelling reason to justify sealing the documents if the

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10
11

Kamakana, 447 F.3d at

By definition, information that is readily available cannot
See id. at 1180 (motions to seal are aimed to

information is already available to the public.”).
Additionally, Plaintiffs fail to spell out what benefits or

12

programs C.C. was denied due to his disability.

13

Plaintiffs at one point suggested the theory of the case was that

14

C.C. was denied only the “benefit” of having his genetic condition

15

kept private, then later said C.C. was also denied the right to go

16

to school.

17

theories, at the very least Plaintiffs must state on the face of

18

their complaint the theory upon which they intend to rely.

19

At oral argument,

Without passing judgment as to the adequacy of these

To recover monetary damages under Title II or the

20

Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must further prove either

21

intentional discrimination or at least deliberate indifference.

22

Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1138-1141 (finding evidence that county

23

officials acted with deliberate indifference in denying the

24

hearing-impaired plaintiff the use of a videotext display at his

25

trial).

26

Barnes informed them that, based on the demands of Mr. and Mrs. X

27

after learning of C.C.’s condition, “PAUSD intended to prohibit

28

C.C. from further attending the middle school.”

Plaintiffs cite their complaint, which states that Mr.

14

1AC ¶ 13.

1

Although the paragraph identified does use the word “intended,” it

2

does not allege that PAUSD tried to transfer C.C. with the intent

3

to discriminate against him due to his disability, or with

4

deliberate indifference to such discrimination.

5

no intent to discriminate based on disability alleged for the

6

disclosure of C.C.’s medical information.

7
8
9

IV.

Further, there is

The entire complaint is “covered” by FERPA

PAUSD additionally challenges that the confidentiality of
student records is protected under the Federal Education Rights

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

and Privacy Act (FERPA), 12 U.S.C. § 1232(g), not the ADA and

11

§ 504.

12

because the facts fit a FERPA claim rather than the claims

13

Plaintiffs have chosen to assert.

14

of their own complaint and are free to assert whichever claims

15

they choose and eschew others.

16

Sec., Inc., 813 F.2d 1368, 1371 (9th Cir. 1987).

17

evaluates Plaintiffs’ claims as plead, not as they have been

18

recast by PAUSD.

19

PAUSD argues that Plaintiffs cannot assert their claims

But Plaintiffs are the masters

See Sullivan v. First Affiliated
The Court

The Eastern District of Michigan case cited by PAUSD, O’Neal

20

v. Remus, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35566 (E.D. Mich.), does not

21

provide anything to the contrary.

22

ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, the district court noted that

23

the plaintiff had not “identified any public service, program, or

24

activity provided by the Detroit Board of Education that he claims

25

to have been denied” and accordingly dismissed those claims.

26

at *13-14.

27

circumstances giving rise to a FERPA claim could not also give

28

rise to an ADA or Rehabilitation Act claim, but instead found the

In analyzing the plaintiff’s

Id.

The court did not summarily conclude that

15

1

plaintiff’s allegations insufficient under the ADA and

2

Rehabilitation Act themselves.

3

identify a benefit or program to which C.C. was denied access.

4

Disclosure of information alone is unlikely to satisfy this

5

requirement, but the correct analysis is under the claims

6

asserted, not FERPA.

7

Id.

To be sure, Plaintiffs must

PAUSD attempts to make a similar, but slightly different

8

argument that, because its conduct was expressly permitted under

9

FERPA, Plaintiffs cannot sue based on this conduct.

Under FERPA,

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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student information may be disclosed, without consent, to protect

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the health or safety of students.

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Because neither party has provided the nature of C.C.’s condition

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and the reasons for the school’s disclosure, the Court cannot at

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this time determine if PAUSD’s defense is legitimate.

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example, it is not clear that PAUSD disclosed the information for

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the purpose of protecting C.C. or another student or both.

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Additionally, PAUSD cites no law stating that, so long as it is

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compliant with FERPA, it cannot be liable under the ADA, § 504, or

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constitutional law claims for the challenged conduct.

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V.

See 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(10).

For

Plaintiffs James Chadam, Jennifer Chadam, and A.C. cannot
assert individual claims under the ADA and Section 504

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PAUSD argues that only C.C. was allegedly denied benefits due

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to disability, and so the other Plaintiffs may not recover because

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they personally were not subject to a violation of any of the

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rights at issue.

While parents may assert ADA and § 504 claims on

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behalf of their child, they may not assert claims based on their
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own injury arising from violations of their child’s rights under
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those laws.

See Blanchard v. Morton Sch. Dist., 509 F.3d 934, 938

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(9th Cir. 2007).

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“insofar as [they are] asserting and enforcing the rights of

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[their] son and incurring expenses for his benefit.”

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does not include their own “severe past, present and future

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C.C.’s parents are only proper plaintiffs

Id.

This

emotional distress,” “humiliation,” “embarrassment,” “disruption

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in family life,” or other damages if they themselves were not
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denied benefits due to disability.

See D.K. ex rel. G.M. v.

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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Solano Cnty. Office of Educ., 667 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1193-94 (E.D.

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Cal. 2009).

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plead no additional facts or legal authority that would enable

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them to recover.

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Plaintiffs James Chadam, Jennifer Chadam, and A.C.

Accordingly, their individual claims for relief

must fail.

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CONCLUSION

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The Court GRANTS PAUSD’s motion to dismiss.

As ordered at

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the January 16, 2014 hearing, Plaintiffs may file an amended

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complaint no later than February 16, 2014.

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complaint, Plaintiffs should provide the status of the state court

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action involving the same events and explain why this action is

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not barred by the state court action due to either res judicata or

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release of claims.

In the amended

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By the same date, Plaintiffs must submit a petition for

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appointment of a person without a conflict of interest to serve as

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a guardian ad litem for C.C.

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PAUSD shall answer or move to dismiss within twenty-one days
of the filing of the amended complaint.
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If PAUSD moves to

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dismiss, Plaintiffs’ opposition will be due fourteen days later.

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PAUSD’s reply will be due seven days later.

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decided on the papers.

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management conference will be held, unless vacated, on April 16,

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2014 at 2:00 PM.

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will be due one week in advance.

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As noted at the motion hearing, a case

A joint case management conference statement

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

1/29/2014

CLAUDIA WILKEN
United States District Judge

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

The motion will be

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