Chadam et al v. Palo Alto Unified School District
Filing
50
ORDER by Judge Claudia Wilken GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 43 MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT. (ndr, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 11/4/2014)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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JAMES CHADAM and JENNIFER CHADAM,
individually and on behalf of
their minor children A.C. and
C.C.,
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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO DISMISS SECOND
AMENDED COMPLAINT
(Docket No. 43)
Plaintiffs,
v.
PALO ALTO UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT, a governmental entity
created and existing under the
laws of the State of California,
Defendant.
________________________________/
Defendant Palo Alto Unified School District (PAUSD) moves to
dismiss Plaintiffs' second amended complaint (2AC).
Plaintiffs
James Chadam and Jennifer Chadam, individually and on behalf of
their minor children A.C. and C.C., oppose the motion.
Chadam was appointed guardian ad litem.
opposition, and PAUSD has filed a reply.
Jennifer
Plaintiffs have filed an
Having considered the
papers, the Court GRANTS PAUSD's motion to dismiss.
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No. C 13-4129 CW
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following facts are alleged in the complaint and taken as
true for the purposes of this motion.
James and Jennifer Chadam (the Chadams or Plaintiffs) reside
in Palo Alto, California with A.C. and C.C., their minor children.
2AC ¶ 1.
As a newborn, C.C. underwent genetic screening following
cardiac surgery.
2AC ¶ 5.
The screening indicated that C.C. had
genetic markers for cystic fibrosis (CF), but further testing
revealed he did not have CF.
2AC ¶ 5.
On July 22, 2012, Jennifer Chadam enrolled her sons A.C. and
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C.C. in a middle school owned and operated by PAUSD.
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On August 1, 2012, Jennifer Chadam completed and returned several
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forms for enrollment, including a "Report of Health Examination
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for School Entry" regarding C.C.
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"private, personal and privileged medical information."
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PAUSD assigned both children to attend Jordan Middle School.
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¶ 13.
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provided additional medical information regarding C.C.
Id. ¶ 12.
Id. ¶ 11.
This form included
Id.
Id.
Between August 2, 2012, and August 16, 2012, the Chadams
Id. ¶ 14.
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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On August 16, 2012, A.C. and C.C. began attending their assigned
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middle school.
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Id. ¶ 15.
On August 22, one of C.C.'s teachers contacted the Chadams
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regarding C.C.'s medical condition.
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September 11, 2012, during a parent-teacher conference, one of
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C.C.'s teachers disclosed C.C.'s private medical information to
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parents of another student attending the middle school (Mr. and
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Mrs. X).
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that C.C. had CF.
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permission or notice from the Chadams.
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Id. ¶ 17.
Id. ¶ 16.
On or about
Specifically, the teacher told Mr. and Mrs. X
Id. ¶ 17.
The teacher did so with no prior
Id.
On September 11, 2012, PAUSD arranged for the Chadams to
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attend a meeting with Gregory Barnes, the middle school's
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principal, along with Linda Lenoir, PAUSD Nurse, and Grant
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Althouse, the Vice Principal and Administrator of sixth grade.
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Id. ¶ 18.
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of Mr. and Mrs. X had active CF and that Mr. and Mrs. X had
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"discovered C.C.'s condition."
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Chadams informed those in attendance at the meeting that C.C. did
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not, in fact, have cystic fibrosis.
At the meeting, the Chadams were told that the children
Id. ¶ 19.
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At that time, the
Id. ¶ 20.
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On or about September 13, 2012, Dr. Carlos Milla sent a
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letter to PAUSD regarding the medical issues raised by C.C.'s
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presence at Jordan Middle School.
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recommended that C.C. be removed from Jordan Middle School for the
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safety of Mr. and Mrs. X's children.
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Milla's identity and connection to the case are not disclosed.
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Id. ¶ 23.
Id.
Dr. Milla's letter
Details about Dr.
On September 14, Jennifer Chadam informed Mr. Barnes that she
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did not want C.C. to be transferred out of Jordan Middle School.
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Id. ¶ 25.
Mr. Barnes informed Jennifer Chadam that Mr. and Mrs. X
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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had decided to remove their children from the school, so there was
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no need "to make any changes" at that time.
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Id.
On September 16, 2012, Mrs. X sent a letter to Ms. Lenoir
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requesting that C.C. be removed from Jordan Middle School so that
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her children could return to school.
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2012, Dr. Milla sent another letter, this time recommending that
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children with CF must not be in the same school together.
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¶ 29.
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Id. ¶ 28.
On September 17,
Id.
On September 17, 2012, the Chadams received a call from Mr.
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Barnes informing them that, based on Mr. and Mrs. X's demands, and
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based on C.C.'s private medical information, PAUSD intended to
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prohibit C.C. from attending Jordan Middle School and to transfer
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him to another PAUSD middle school.
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Chadams emailed Assistant Superintendent Charles Young, demanding
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that he provide the documentation upon which the district relied
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to transfer C.C. out of Jordan Middle School.
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day, the Chadams made the same demand to Mr. Young, this time in
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person.
Id.
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Id. ¶ 30.
That same day, the
Id. ¶ 31.
The next
On September 20, the Chadams provided a letter from Dr. John
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Morton, explaining that C.C. did not have any signs of CF.
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¶ 32.
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that "this boy is any risk whatsoever to other children with
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[cystic fibrosis] even if they were using the same classroom."
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Id.
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Lenoir.
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C.C. did not have, nor had he ever had, CF.
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allege that Mr. Young informed them that the decision to remove
In this letter, Dr. Morton stated that he did not think
Also on September 20, the Chadams met with Mr. Young and Ms.
Id. ¶ 33.
At this meeting, the Chadams reiterated that
Id.
The Chadams
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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
Id.
C.C. from Jordan Middle School was based on a letter from a
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Stanford doctor.
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Id.
On September 24, 2012, Jennifer Chadam offered to provide Mr.
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Young more medical evidence that C.C. was not a risk to any other
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child.
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Chadams, by telephone and in writing, that C.C. was going to be
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transferred out of Jordan Middle School.
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Id. ¶ 34.
On September 28, Mr. Young informed the
Id. ¶¶ 35-36.
On October 10, C.C. was removed from his classroom at Jordan
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Middle School and told it was his last day at the school.
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¶ 37.
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October 12, 2012, the Chadams brought suit in a California state
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court seeking to enjoin PAUSD from transferring C.C. to another
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middle school.
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case, the parties "settled the matter" and C.C. was permitted to
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stay at Jordan Middle School.
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Id.
C.C. did not attend school for approximately two weeks.
Id. ¶ 38.
On
Prior to a hearing on the merits of the
Id.
On September 6, 2013, the Chadams brought this suit in
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federal court, alleging (1) violation of Title II of the Americans
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with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., through 42
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U.S.C. § 1983; (2) violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1972 (RA
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or § 504), 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq., through 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and
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(3) violation of the federal right to privacy conferred by the
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First Amendment.
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which this Court granted with leave to amend.
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Unified Sch. Dist., Docket No. 32, Order Granting Mot. Dismiss
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First Am. Compl., Jan. 29, 2014.
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PAUSD filed a motion to dismiss the complaint,
Chadam v. Palo Alto
The Chadams' second amended complaint alleges four causes of
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action: (1) violation of the ADA; (2) violation of § 504;
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(3) violation of the First Amendment; and (4) negligence.
LEGAL STANDARDS
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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A complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the
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claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."
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Civ. P. 8(a).
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claim to relief that is plausible on its face."
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Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
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Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
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"when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
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to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
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the misconduct alleged."
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Fed. R.
The plaintiff must proffer "enough facts to state a
Ashcroft v.
A claim is facially plausible
Id.
In considering whether the complaint is sufficient to state a
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claim, the court will take all material allegations as true and
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construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
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Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1061
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(9th Cir. 2008).
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complaint, materials incorporated into the complaint by reference,
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and facts of which the court may take judicial notice.
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1061.
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including "threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
The court's review is limited to the face of the
Id. at
However, the court need not accept legal conclusions,
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action, supported by mere conclusory statements."
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Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
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When granting a motion to dismiss, the court is generally
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required to grant the plaintiff leave to amend, even if no request
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to amend the pleading was made, unless amendment would be futile.
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Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv. Inc., 911
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F.2d 242, 246-47 (9th Cir. 1990).
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amendment would be futile, the court examines whether the
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complaint could be amended to cure the defect requiring dismissal
In determining whether
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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"without contradicting any of the allegations of [the] original
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complaint."
Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th
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Cir. 1990).
However, where a court has previously granted a
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plaintiff an opportunity to amend its complaint after a motion to
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dismiss, and the amended complaint still fails to state claims
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with the required particularity, the court may grant a motion to
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dismiss without granting the plaintiff leave to amend.
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Chattem, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1081 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
DISCUSSION
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Arroyo v.
I. Status of State Court Litigation
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In its previous order, this Court required that, in any
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amended complaint, the Chadams were to "provide the status of the
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state court action involving the same events and explain why this
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action is not barred by the state court action due to either res
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judicata or release of claims."
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23.
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continued attendance at Jordan Middle School was settled, the
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Chadams' current claims are barred by res judicata.
Order Grant. Mot. Dismiss 17:20-
PAUSD argues that because the dispute regarding C.C.'s
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The doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, prohibits
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the re-litigation of any claims that were raised or could have
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been raised in a prior action.
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Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 322 F.3d 1064, 1077 (9th Cir. 2003).
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The purpose of the doctrine is to "relieve parties of the cost and
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vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and,
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by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on
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adjudication."
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590, 594 (9th Cir. 1985) (quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90,
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v.
Marin v. HEW, Health Care Fin. Agency, 769 F.2d
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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94 (1980)).
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when doing so does not raise any disputed issues of fact.
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v. Kuhlmann, 746 F.2d 1377, 1378 (9th Cir. 1984).
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must be present in order for res judicata to apply: (1) an
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identity of claims; (2) a final judgment on the merits; and
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(3) the same parties or their privies.
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Res judicata may be raised on a motion to dismiss
Scott
Three elements
Allen, 449 U.S. at 94.
The Chadams allege that, prior to a state court hearing on
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the merits, the "parties settled the matter and C.C. has continued
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to attend Jordan Middle School."
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has filed a Request For Judicial Notice (RFJN) which states that
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on March 27, 2014, he filed a request to have the state court
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action dismissed without prejudice.
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indication that the Superior Court has granted the request.
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2AC ¶ 38.
The Chadams' counsel
RFJN, Ex. A.
There is no
In any case, the Chadams allege that the state court suit has
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not been tried on its merits, and PAUSD does not dispute that
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allegation.
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judgment in the state court suit, or a dismissal with prejudice.
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As a result, PAUSD has not shown that res judicata applies.
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does not move to dismiss because it obtained a release in the
PAUSD has failed to show that there has been a final
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PAUSD
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settlement of the state court case.
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declines to dismiss the complaint on the basis of res judicata or
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a release of claims.
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other reasons.
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II.
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Accordingly, the Court
However, the case must be dismissed for
First Cause of Action: Violation of Title II of the Americans
with Disabilities Act
The Chadams allege that PAUSD violated Title II of the ADA by
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depriving C.C. of certain alleged rights on the basis of a
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perceived disability.
PAUSD argues that this cause of action
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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fails for several reasons.
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the Chadams' claim is barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity.
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As a threshold matter, it argues that
Second, it argues that C.C. is not disabled or perceived as
disabled under the ADA, nor was he denied the benefit of a public
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program or deprived of any other rights.
Third, it argues that
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its alleged conduct is expressly permitted by law, and hence "non-
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actionable."
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allege intent to discriminate on the basis of a disability or
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perceived disability, they are not entitled to seek monetary
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damages, which is all they seek in the complaint.
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Fourth, it argues that because the Chadams do not
Lastly, it
argues that Plaintiffs James Chadam, Jennifer Chadam and A.C. do
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not have standing to bring individual claims.
A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
PAUSD argues that it is shielded from ADA Title II liability
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by the Eleventh Amendment.
In the January 29, 2014 Order Granting
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Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint, this
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Court suggested that in order to bring a proper Title II claim
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that is not barred by PAUSD's Eleventh Amendment immunity, the
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Chadams would have to allege that PAUSD's Title II violation
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deprived C.C. of a fundamental right.
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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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After examining the history of disability discrimination in
the provision of public services such as education,
transportation, health services and voting, the Supreme Court
concluded that Congress acted within its [Fourteenth
Amendment section five] powers in abrogating state immunity
for ADA Title II, at least regarding the protection of
certain fundamental rights guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause, such as access to the courts. . . . Although the
Ninth Circuit has not ruled on this particular issue, the
district courts and other circuit courts have interpreted
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004), to mean that courts
must engage in a case-by-case analysis of whether an ADA
Title II case involves "fundamental rights" to determine
whether Congress rightfully abrogated state immunity with
respect to it.
Order Grant. Mot. Dismiss 10:7-11:2.
While the Chadams' privacy claim arguably implicates a
fundamental right, the Chadams have not alleged any authority for
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the proposition that school choice or freedom from being
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stigmatized is a fundamental right.
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of action fails for other reasons as described below, the Court
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need not decide whether PAUSD would enjoy Eleventh Amendment
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immunity for their ADA Title II claims in this case.
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B.
However, because this cause
Sufficiency of ADA Cause of Action
Title II applies to all "public entities," including schools.
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42 U.S.C. § 12131; see also Lane, 541 U.S. at 525.
"To prove that
a public program or service violated Title II of the ADA, a
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plaintiff must show: (1) he is a 'qualified individual with a
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disability'; (2) he was either excluded from participation in or
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denied the benefits of a public entity's services, programs, or
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activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public
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entity; and (3) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or
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discrimination was by reason of his disability."
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of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1135 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted);
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Duvall v. Cnty.
see also 42 U.S.C. § 12132 ("no qualified individual with a
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from
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participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to
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discrimination by any such entity.")
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PAUSD argues that, even if the Chadams' Title II claim did
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not fail due to Eleventh Amendment immunity, it fails because they
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do not state facts sufficient to support a cause of action for a
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violation of the ADA.
Specifically, it argues that C.C. is
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neither disabled nor perceived as having a disability, nor was he
denied the benefit of a public program.
It also argues that the
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Chadams have failed to allege "that defendant took improper action
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by reason of the plaintiff's disability."
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Lastly, it argues that the Chadams have failed to allege the
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discriminatory intent required to state a claim for monetary
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damages.
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Docket No. 43 at 18.
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1. "Regarded as" disabled
To be considered disabled under Title II, a plaintiff must
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show: (1) a physical or mental impairment1 that substantially
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limits one or more of his or her major life activities; (2) a
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record of such an impairment; or (3) that he or she is regarded as
having such an impairment.
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 630
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(1998).
For claims arising after the ADA Amendments Act of 2009,
the "regarded as" prong provides that "[a]n individual meets the
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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requirement of 'being regarded as having such an impairment' if
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the individual establishes that he or she has been subjected to an
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action prohibited under this chapter because of an actual or
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perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the
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impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity."
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42 U.S.C. § 12102.
"The phrase 'is regarded as having an
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impairment' means -- (1) Has a physical or mental impairment that
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does not substantially limit major life activities but that is
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treated by a public entity as constituting such a limitation;
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(2) Has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
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major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others
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toward such impairment; or (3) Has none of the impairments defined
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"The phrase physical or mental impairment includes, but is
not limited to, such contagious and noncontagious diseases and
conditions as orthopedic, visual, speech and hearing impairments,
cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis,
cancer, heart disease, diabetes, mental retardation, emotional
illness, specific learning disabilities, HIV disease (whether
symptomatic or asymptomatic), tuberculosis, drug addiction, and
alcoholism." 28 C.F.R. § 35.104.
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in paragraph (1) of this definition but is treated by a public
entity as having such an impairment."2
Id.
While the Ninth Circuit has not specifically designated
cystic fibrosis as a disability under the ADA, other district
courts have.
See, e.g., Save Our Summers v. Wash. State Dep't of
Ecology, 132 F. Supp. 2d 896, 907 (E.D. Wash. 1999).3
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However, the Chadams allege that PAUSD knew C.C. did not
actually have cystic fibrosis but only had a genetic marker for
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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the disease.
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had a physical impairment.
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The question is whether PAUSD treated C.C. as if he
The Chadams allege that, as a result of PAUSD's mistaken
belief about the danger C.C. posed to other students, PAUSD
disclosed his personal information to another family, attempted to
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This definition represents a change from the previous
standard. Under that standard, the Ninth Circuit "required that a
plaintiff alleging a 'regarded as' claim [under Title I, with
regards to employment] 'provide evidence of the employer's
misperception, or subjective belief that the plaintiff is
substantially impaired.' A plaintiff who does not have direct
evidence of the employer's subjective belief that the plaintiff is
substantially limited in a major life activity must provide
evidence that the impairment imputed to the plaintiff is,
objectively, a substantially limiting impairment." Scott v.
Napolitano, 717 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1086-87 (S.D. Cal. 2010)
(citations omitted).
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Cystic fibrosis is "a hereditary disease . . . that appears
usually in early childhood, is inherited as an autosomal recessive
monogenic trait, involves functional disorder of the exocrine
glands, and is marked especially by faulty digestion due to a
deficiency of pancreatic enzymes, by difficulty in breathing due
to mucus accumulation in airways, and by excessive loss of salt in
the sweat." Cystic Fibrosis, MedlinePlus: Merriam-Webster,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/medlineplus/cystic%20fibrosis (last
visited Oct. 22, 2014).
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transfer C.C. out of his assigned middle school and subjected him
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to ridicule and humiliation.
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facts to support the inference that PAUSD acted on the basis of a
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mistaken belief about C.C.'s status as a genetic carrier for CF
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and, hence, regarded him as disabled.
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The Chadams have alleged sufficient
2. Service, program or activity
In determining what constitutes a service, program or
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activity, the Ninth Circuit "construe[s] 'the ADA's broad language
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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as bringing within its scope anything a public entity does.'"
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Cal. Council of the Blind v. Cnty. of Alameda, 985 F. Supp. 2d
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1229, 1235 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (citation omitted).
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history of the ADA . . . supports construing the language
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generously, providing that Title II . . . 'simply extends the
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"The legislative
anti-discrimination prohibition embodied in section 504 to all
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actions of state and local governments.'"
Barden v. City of
Sacramento, 292 F.3d 1073, 1077 (9th Cir. 2002).
The Chadams allege that, because it regarded C.C. as a person
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with a disability, PAUSD deprived him of "fundamental and
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substantial rights under the law" including the right to attend
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the school closest to his home, to have his medical information
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remain confidential, and not to be subjected to ridicule and
harassment.
As stated above, while his privacy claim arguably
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implicates a fundamental right, the Chadams do not provide
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authority for the proposition that any of the rights or benefits
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denied to C.C., including privacy, are either "fundamental" or
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"substantial."
They may, however, state facts sufficient to
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support the inference that attendance at the school closest to
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one's home, the confidentiality of medical information, or freedom
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from ridicule and embarrassment are services, programs or
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activities encompassed under the definition stated in Cal. Council
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of the Blind and Barton.
Be that as it may, because this claim
must be dismissed on other grounds, the Court need not decide if
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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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C.C. was deprived of services, programs and activities within the
meaning of the ADA.
3. Exclusion from or denial of a service, program or
activity
PAUSD argues that none of the rights deprivations the Chadams
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cite in their complaint rises to the level of a denial of a
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service, program or activity because its conduct is expressly
permitted by statute.
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Title II does
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not require a public entity to permit an individual to
participate in or benefit from the services, programs, or
activities of that public entity when that individual poses a
direct threat to the health or safety of others. . . . In
determining whether an individual poses a direct threat to
the health or safety of others, a public entity must make an
individualized assessment, based on reasonable judgment that
relies on current medical knowledge or on the best available
objective evidence, to ascertain: the nature, duration, and
severity of the risk; the probability that the potential
injury will actually occur; and whether reasonable
modifications of policies, practices, or procedures or the
provision of auxiliary aids or services will mitigate the
risk.
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28 C.F.R. § 35.139.
Further, a public entity "may impose
legitimate safety requirements necessary for the safe operation of
its services, programs, or activities.
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However, the public entity
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must ensure that its safety requirements are based on actual
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risks, not on mere speculation, stereotypes, or generalizations
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about individuals with disabilities."
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Id. at § 35.130.
The Ninth Circuit has held that "it is clear that ultimately
the entity asserting a 'direct threat' as a basis for excluding an
individual bears a heavy burden of demonstrating that the
individual poses a significant risk to the health and safety of
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others."
Lockett v. Catalina Channel Exp., Inc., 496 F.3d 1061,
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
10
1066 (9th Cir. 2007).
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on a reasonable judgment of the risks involved may be acceptable.
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Id. (holding that a ferry operator's one-time exclusion of a
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service animal from a lounge where another passenger purportedly
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had an animal dander allergy was a reasonable judgment under 28
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C.F.R. § 36.208).
On the other hand, one-time exclusion based
However, an ongoing policy of exclusion may
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well violate the ADA even when a one-time exclusion does not.
Id.
The Chadams have not alleged any facts to support the
19
inference that PAUSD did not act in an effort to preserve the safe
20
operation of the school.
21
support the inference that PAUSD's brief exclusion of C.C. from
22
the school closest to his home, in light of the risk involved, was
23
24
Nor have they alleged any facts to
not reasonable given the information PAUSD had.
In fact, they
allege that PAUSD told them it was basing its decision on medical
25
26
evidence provided both by Dr. Milla and a "top Stanford doctor."
27
They state that PAUSD made its decisions on the basis of its
28
belief that C.C.'s presence in the school was a serious threat to
15
1
other students.
Furthermore, C.C. was allowed, within two weeks,
2
to return to the school closest to his home, indicating that PAUSD
3
had changed its policy with regard to C.C.
4
5
6
7
In short, the Chadams admit that PAUSD believed the risk to
other children was real and based on medical evidence.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS PAUSD's motion to dismiss the
Chadams' Title II cause of action.
8
4. Compliance with the Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act (FERPA) and the California Education
Code
9
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
10
11
PAUSD argues that, even if the Chadams' Title II cause of
12
action did not fail for the reasons stated above, its compliance
13
with both the California Education Code and the Family Educational
14
Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) shields it from ADA liability.
15
PAUSD argues that California Education Code section 49451 obliges
16
it to "exclude students for which the school has good reason to
17
believe have an infectious disease."
Docket No. 43 at 16-17.
If
18
19
20
that is true, then C.C. likely did not have a right to attend a
school with another child with cystic fibrosis during the time
21
period PAUSD needed to ascertain whether or not C.C. posed a risk
22
to another child.
23
itself provides for a defense based on the safe operations of a
24
public entity's programs, it need not decide whether adherence to
25
26
However, because the Court finds that Title II
the California Education Code is a defense to an ADA Title II
claim.
27
28
16
1
PAUSD also argues that, under FERPA and the California
2
Education Code, it is allowed to disclose student information
3
without consent "to protect the health/safety of students."
4
Docket No. 43 at 17.
5
Education Code expressly allow for the "disclosure of information
6
7
It argues that when FERPA and the California
to protect the health and safety of students," the information
disclosed is "rendered not confidential."
Docket No. 49 at 6.
8
9
Because this cause of action must be dismissed for other
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
10
reasons, the Court need not decide whether compliance with FERPA
11
and the Education Code is a defense to the Chadams' Title II
12
claim.
13
C. Monetary Damages
14
Lastly, PAUSD argues that, even if the Chadams' Title II
15
cause of action did not fail for the reasons discussed above,
16
17
18
19
their claims, which are for money damages, would fail because they
have not alleged the requisite intent.
In Ferguson v. City of Phoenix, 157 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 1998),
20
the Ninth Circuit considered the circumstances under which
21
compensatory damages are available for violations of Title II and
22
§ 504.
23
24
"By statute, the remedies for violations of the ADA and
the Rehabilitation Act are co-extensive with each other, . . . and
are linked to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. . . .
25
26
These statutes require that ADA and Rehabilitation Act remedies be
27
construed the same as remedies under Title VI."
28
(citations omitted).
Id. at 673
Under Title VI, "compensatory damages are
17
1
2
3
not available . . . absent a showing of discriminatory intent."
Id. at 674.
While the Chadams accuse PAUSD of conduct that was "intended
4
to cause harm and injury to plaintiffs," they do not allege any
5
facts to support that accusation.
6
7
Even if this claim were not
dismissed for other reasons, it would not support a request for
monetary damages.
The Chadams admit that PAUSD's actions resulted
8
9
from its belief that student safety was at risk.
Money damages
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
10
are the only relief the Chadams seek; they did not seek injunctive
11
relief, which would be moot in any event, because C.C. is
12
currently attending the school closest to his home.
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
D. Plaintiffs James Chadam, Jennifer Chadam, and A.C. cannot
assert individual claims under the ADA and Section 504
In its previous order, the Court stated:
While parents may assert ADA and § 504 claims on behalf of
their child, they may not assert claims based on their own
injury arising from violations of their child's rights under
those laws. C.C.'s parents are only proper plaintiffs
"insofar as [they are] asserting and enforcing the rights of
[their] son and incurring expenses for his benefit." This
does not include their own "severe past, present and future
emotional distress," "humiliation," "embarrassment,"
"disruption in family life," or other damages if they
themselves were not denied benefits due to disability.
Plaintiffs James Chadam, Jennifer Chadam, and A.C. plead no
additional facts or legal authority that would enable them to
recover. Accordingly, their individual claims for relief
must fail.
Order Granting Mot. Dismiss 16:26-17:15. (citations omitted).
In their 2AC, the Chadams and A.C. have not alleged any
25
additional facts to support their individual claims.
26
these individual claims must fail.
27
28
18
Accordingly,
1
E. ADA Title II Cause of Action: Conclusion
2
The Chadams have not alleged facts sufficient to support
3
4
their claim for a violation of Title II of the ADA.
Specifically,
they have not alleged facts sufficient to support the accusation
5
6
7
that PAUSD excluded C.C. from, or denied him access to, any
service, program or activity because it regarded him as disabled,
8
rather than because it believed, based on medical evidence, that
9
his condition imposed a health risk to other students.
Nor do
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
10
they allege facts sufficient to support the accusation that PAUSD
11
acted with the intent to discriminate or with the deliberate
12
indifference that would entitle them to monetary damages.
13
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS PAUSD's motion to dismiss this cause
14
15
of action.
Because the Chadams have already been granted an
16
opportunity to amend this claim, it is now dismissed with
17
prejudice.
18
II.
Second Cause of Action: Violation of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973
19
20
21
The Chadams' cause of action for a violation of the
Rehabilitation Act (§ 504) is based on the same allegations as
22
their ADA Title II cause of action.
PAUSD raises the same
23
arguments in its motion to dismiss this cause of action.
24
A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
25
As it argued with regard to the ADA cause of action, PAUSD
26
argues that, pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, it is immune from
27
28
19
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
causes of actions brought under § 504.
As explained in the
Court's previous order, however,
The Ninth Circuit ruled that California waived state immunity
under the Rehabilitation Act. The . . . Rehabilitation Act's
statutory language manifests "a clear intention to condition
participation in the programs funded under the Act on a
State's consent to waive its constitutional immunity." By
accepting federal funds under the Act, California waived its
state immunity regarding the Act and consented to be sued.
The Eleventh Amendment therefore will not bar a direct
Rehabilitation Act claim by Plaintiffs against PAUSD.
8
Order Granting Mot. Dismiss 12:3-14 (citations omitted).
9
Accordingly, the Court declines to dismiss this cause of action on
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
10
11
12
the basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity.
B.
Sufficiency of § 504 Cause of Action
PAUSD argues that even if the Chadams' § 504 claim does not
13
14
fail due to Eleventh Amendment immunity, it fails because they do
15
not state facts sufficient to support a cause of action for a
16
violation of § 504.
17
in opposition to the Chadams' Title II claim.
18
19
20
PAUSD relies on the same arguments presented
The only difference between an ADA Title II cause of action
and a cause of action pursuant to § 504 is that a plaintiff must
allege that the benefits program receives federal financial
21
22
23
assistance.
Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1135.
disputed by the parties.
That element is not
Nonetheless, the Chadams' cause of
24
action under § 504 fails for the same reasons their Title II cause
25
of action fails.
26
dismiss this cause of action.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS PAUSD's motion to
Because the Chadams have already
27
28
20
1
been granted an opportunity to amend this claim, it is now
2
dismissed with prejudice.
3
III. Third Cause of Action: Violation of the Federal
Constitutional Right to Privacy
4
The Chadams allege that, through the unauthorized disclosure
5
of C.C.'s medical information, PAUSD violated "C.C.'s
6
constitutional right to privacy conferred upon him by the First
7
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States."
8
9
2AC ¶ 50.
"Technically, the First Amendment only restricts actions by
the federal government.
First Amendment rights against state
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
10
actors derive from the Fourteenth Amendment and must be brought
11
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983."
12
WL 3341039, at *8 (E.D. Cal.).
13
Qualls v. Regents, Univ. of Cal., 2013
In its previous order, the Court stated, "As a California
14
school district, PAUSD is a state agency equivalent to the state
15
itself.
16
§ 1983, and so Plaintiffs' [claim for a First Amendment violation
17
of privacy] is barred."
18
Court went on to note that the Chadams could bring a cause of
19
action against individual state officials in their personal
20
capacity.
21
PAUSD therefore is not a 'person' within the meaning of
Id., fn.1.
Order Granting Mot. Dismiss 7:23-26.
The Chadams have not done so in their 2AC.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS PAUSD's motion to dismiss this
22
cause of action.
23
opportunity to amend this claim, it is now dismissed with
24
prejudice.
25
IV.
26
The
Because the Chadams have already been granted an
Fourth Cause of Action: Negligence
The Chadams allege that PAUSD "owed [them] a duty of care
27
28
21
1
. . . not to allow the unlawful and improper disclosure of
2
personal, confidential, private medical information."
3
They allege that PAUSD breached its duty of care by "allowing one
4
of its teachers to disclose" C.C.'s medical information to Mr. and
5
Mrs. X.
6
"willful, deliberate and intended to cause harm and injury."
7
PAUSD argues that the Chadams' negligence claim fails to comply
8
with the California Tort Claims Act and to include a statutory
9
basis.
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
Id.
2AC ¶ 53.
They further allege that PAUSD's conduct was
Id.
A. California Tort Claims Act, California Government Code
section 810 et seq.
"Under the Tort Claims Act, a plaintiff may not maintain an
action for money or damages against a public entity unless first a
written claim has been presented to the public entity and rejected
in whole or in part.
Failure to timely present a claim for money
or damages to a public entity bars a plaintiff from filing a
lawsuit against that entity.
Before a cause of action may be
stated, a plaintiff must allege either compliance with this
procedure or circumstances excusing compliance."
Connelly v.
Cnty. of Fresno, 146 Cal. App. 4th 29, 36-37 (2006) (citations
omitted).
"[I]n considering whether a claim substantially
complies with the Government Tort Claims Act, the claim should be
viewed in its entirety and a determination made as to whether the
claim is susceptible to an interpretation that reasonably enables
the public entity to make an adequate investigation and settle the
claim."
Id. at 40.
"Timely claim presentation is not merely a
procedural requirement, but rather, a condition precedent to a
plaintiff's maintaining an action against a defendant, and thus,
28
22
1
an element of the plaintiff's cause of action."
Belinda K. v.
2
Cnty. of Alameda, 2011 WL 2690356, at *11 (N.D. Cal.).
3
to allege facts in a complaint demonstrating or excusing
4
compliance with the Tort Claims Act subjects the complaint to a
5
motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action."
"Failure
Id.
6
Plaintiffs allege that they substantially complied with the
7
TCA through the "pleadings, allegations, documents, declarations
8
and exhibits filed in the now dismissed state court injunctive
9
relief action."
Docket No. 47 at 18.
However, the TCA requires a
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
10
"written claim [to be] presented to the public entity and rejected
11
in whole or in part."
12
submitted a written claim for money damages to PAUSD, nor do they
13
allege that the claim was rejected, either in whole or in part.
14
They have not complied with the Tort Claims Act because they did
15
not give to PAUSD, prior to filing this lawsuit, written notice of
16
their allegations, causes of action, and claim for damages.
17
Without such notice, they are barred from bringing this state law
18
cause of action against PAUSD.
19
The Chadams do not allege that they
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS PAUSD's motion to dismiss this
20
cause of action for failure to comply with the Tort Claims Act.
21
The dismissal is without prejudice to Plaintiffs re-filing the
22
claim in state court if they can remedy this deficiency.
23
all federal claims are dismissed, this Court will not retain
24
supplemental jurisdiction over the state claim.
Because
25
B. Failure to Allege Statutory Basis for Negligence
26
Notwithstanding the Tort Claims Act issue, PAUSD argues that
27
the Chadams' negligence claim also fails because they do not state
28
a statutory basis for the claim.
23
1
California Government Code section 815.2 provides:
2
(a) A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused
by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity
within the scope of his employment if the act or omission
would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of
action against that employee or his personal representative.
(b) Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public entity
is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission
of an employee of the public entity where the employee is
immune from liability.
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Furthermore, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, a public
employee is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or
omission where the act or omission was the result of the exercise
of the discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be
abused."
Cal. Gov't Code § 820.2.
"Nevertheless, [t]he fact that
a [public] employee normally engages in discretionary activity is
irrelevant if, in a given case, the employee did not [actually]
render a considered decision."
Walsh v. Tehachapi Unified Sch.
Dist., 827 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1122 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (citations
omitted).
Therefore, to bring an action for negligence against PAUSD,
the Chadams would need to allege that the teacher who disclosed
C.C.'s medical information without consent is also liable
personally.
If they cannot do so, then they must allege a
statutory exception by which PAUSD can be found liable for actions
for which the employee is immune.
The Chadams can allege that the
teacher is personally liable only by claiming that the teacher's
conduct was not the result of the discretion vested in his or her
authority.
The Chadams have not made any allegations to support any of
these theories upon which a negligence claim against PAUSD could
24
1
rest.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS PAUSD's motion to dismiss the
2
claim for this reason as well.
3
dismissed without prejudice to filing in state court if its
4
deficiencies can be remedied.
As discussed above, this claim is
5
CONCLUSION
6
For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS PAUSD's
7
motion to dismiss (Docket No. 43).
8
are dismissed with prejudice; their state claims are dismissed
9
without prejudice to re-filing in state court.
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
10
11
12
The Chadams' federal claims
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:
November 4, 2014
CLAUDIA WILKEN
United States District Judge
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