Adamson v. City of San Francisco et al

Filing 154

PRETRIAL ORDER. Signed by Judge Donna M. Ryu on 11/6/2015. (dmrlc3, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 11/6/2015)

1
2
3
4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

6
7

LORENZO ADAMSON,

Case No. 13-cv-05233-DMR

Plaintiff,

8
v.

9
10

FINAL PRETRIAL ORDER

United States District Court
Northern District of California

11

CHRISTOPHER O’BRIEN, DANIEL

12

DUDLEY, and BRIAN STANSBURY,
Defendants.

13
14
15
16

Following two pretrial conferences held on October 29, 2015 and November 5, 2015, the
court sets forth its pretrial rulings below.

17
I.
18

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The court will use the parties’ stipulated Statement of the Case to describe this matter to

19
the jury:
20
21

“Plaintiff Lorenzo Adamson and Defendants Sgt. Brian Stansbury and Officers Daniel
Dudley and Christopher O’Brien are all San Francisco Police Officers. Plaintiff alleges that

22
Defendants subjected him to excessive force following a traffic stop. Plaintiff also alleges that
23
Defendants committed a violent act against him on the basis of his race. Defendants deny these
24
claims, and allege that they used reasonable force to protect themselves and to take Plaintiff into
25
custody.”
26
27
28

The case shall be captioned Lorenzo Adamson v. Christopher O’Brien, Daniel Dudley, and
Brian Stansbury. The parties and the court shall refer to Defendants’ counsel without making

1

reference to the City and County of San Francisco or the San Francisco City Attorney’s Office.

2
II.
3

MOTIONS IN LIMINE

Plaintiff’s Motions in Limine Nos. 1 and 2 [Docket No. 96]

4
Plaintiff moves to exclude previous instances of Plaintiff driving without license plates and
5
previous encounters with uniformed officers.
6

Except as described below, Defendants may not introduce evidence about Plaintiff’s prior

7
traffic stops or encounters with law enforcement because such facts are irrelevant. Therefore,
8
9
10

Defendants may not elicit any testimony about Plaintiff’s license plates, other than that his vehicle
did not have plates on the night in question. Defendants may not elicit testimony about Plaintiff’s
“attitude” or “interactions” with officers during other encounters.

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

Defendants may introduce facts about prior traffic stops only to the extent such evidence
12

explores the credibility of Plaintiff’s testimony about why he did not identify himself as an officer

13
at an earlier opportunity in the encounter at issue in this case. However, in so doing, Defendants
14

shall not elicit other details about the prior incidents. For example, Defendants may ask “you have

15
been pulled over in traffic stops before. On those occasions, you identified yourself as an armed
16
17

officer right away, before you exited the car, didn’t you?” Defendants may ask follow-up
questions about the details regarding Plaintiff’s actions and reasons for identifying himself as an

18
officer in a particular encounter, but shall not otherwise elicit detailed descriptions about each
19
such encounter. Defendants shall not make reference to alleged profanities used by Plaintiff in
20
prior stops. Defendants may not make any reference to the Leland incident, as it is dissimilar and
21
therefore irrelevant. The motion is GRANTED IN PART.
22
23

Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine No. 3 [Docket No. 96]
Plaintiff moves to exclude the portions of the testimony of Defendants’ expert witness, Mr.

24
Cameron, which appear to state legal conclusions about ultimate issues in this case. This motion
25
is GRANTED as discussed below. The motion is DENIED AS MOOT as to testimony regarding
26
probable cause. Mr. Cameron may not testify about the existence of probable cause for the traffic
27
stop, because that issue has been decided and is no longer relevant to the case.
28
2

1

Neither Mr. Cameron nor Plaintiff’s police practices rebuttal expert may testify using any

2

language suggestive of ultimate legal questions. For example, the expert may not testify as to

3

whether the use of force was “reasonable” or “excessive.” However, the expert may opine on

4

whether the use of force was or was not acceptable according to the standard practices in the

5

industry. Similarly, the expert may not testify about whether conduct violated any particular law

6

or right, or whether the SFPD policies are lawful or in compliance with the law.

7

Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine No. 4 [Docket No. 96]

8

Plaintiff moves to exclude evidence relating to the Internal Affairs investigation into

9

Adamson’s truthfulness and credibility. The motion is GRANTED AS UNOPPOSED.
Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine No. 5 [Docket No. 96]

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

10

Plaintiff moves to exclude memoranda authored by twelve SFPD officers in connection

12

with the Internal Affairs investigation into this incident. Defendants generally do not oppose this

13

motion and represented at the hearing that they do not intend to introduce these memoranda into

14

evidence in their case in chief. Defendants assert that they may attempt to use the documents to

15

refresh recollection pursuant to Rule 803(5). Defendants also assert that if Plaintiff offers

16

testimony about what happened after the use of force, Defendants may attempt to lay a foundation

17

to introduce the memoranda as business records.

18

Defendants may only attempt to use these documents as represented to the court. The

19

court RESERVES RULING on this motion pending Plaintiff’s evidence at trial regarding events

20

following the use of force.

21

Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine No. 6 [Docket No. 96]

22

Plaintiff moves to exclude the transcripts of Plaintiff’s interviews from the Internal Affairs

23

investigation. Defendants intend to use these transcripts for impeachment. As represented to the

24

court, if defense counsel intends to introduce material from these documents as party admissions,

25

defense counsel shall identify the excerpts to the court and Plaintiff’s counsel before the jury

26

enters for the day. To the extent Defendants intend to use this material to introduce a prior

27

inconsistent statement, by no later than November 9, 2015, they shall file authority supporting

28

that the Internal Affairs Investigation interviews qualify as a prior statement “was given under
3

1

penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding or in a deposition” pursuant to Federal

2

Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A).

3
4

Defendants may only attempt to use these documents as represented to the court. The
court RESERVES RULING on this motion pending the evidence at trial.

5

Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine No. 7 [Docket No. 96]

6

Withdrawn.

7

Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 1 [Docket No. 83]

8

Defendants move to exclude any reference to the City and County of San Francisco as a
party or paymaster. Plaintiff’s only claim against the City was for municipal liability, and the

10

court granted summary judgment on that claim in favor of the City. Plaintiff conceded in his

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

9

opposition to this motion that the City is no longer a party. [Docket No. 115.] The motion is

12

GRANTED.

13

Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 2 [Docket No. 84]

14

Defendants move to prevent Plaintiff from offering opinion testimony about police

15

practices regarding conducting traffic stops and the use of force. The motion is GRANTED.

16

Plaintiff may only reference his training and understanding of police practices to explain his own

17

behavior. (e.g., “I did X because I was trained to do so in order to de-escalate a situation.”)

18

Plaintiff Adamson may not testify about whether his own actions or the actions of the Defendants

19

were appropriate, reasonable, or within accepted police practices. (e.g., Plaintiff may not testify

20

that he was trained to apply a carotid hold in a particular way, and that Sgt. Stansbury’s

21

application did not comply with that training; Plaintiff may not testify that Officer O’Brien’s

22

initial inquiry into Plaintiff’s probation or parole status was improper police procedure.)

23

Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 3 [Docket No. 85]

24

Defendants move to exclude Plaintiff’s opinion testimony regarding medical issues and

25
26

medical expenses.
The motion is GRANTED in part. Plaintiff may only testify about his subjective

27

perceptions and what he saw or felt in regard to his own physical condition. Plaintiff may not

28

testify or allude to the causation of injuries, diagnosis or prognosis of any medical conditions, or
4

1

the interpretation of any medical records (e.g., Plaintiff may testify that after the incident, he had

2

to start sleeping on the floor, had to take more pain medication, etc. Plaintiff may not testify that

3

his back condition “was worsened” by the incident.)
As Plaintiff did not offer argument in opposition, Plaintiff may not testify about what his

4
5

medical treatment providers told him, or whether medical expenses were reasonable, necessary, or

6

caused by the incident.

7

Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 4 [Docket No. 86]

8

Defendants move to exclude all medical bills and any references to them, including the

9

amounts billed and paid. Defendants move to exclude the medical bills because Plaintiff did not
disclose a medical expert, and Plaintiff cannot competently testify about whether medical

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

10

expenses were reasonable and necessary, or how to apportion a medical bill as attributable to the

12

incident versus attributable to his preexisting back condition.
The motion is GRANTED, except that Plaintiff may use medical bills to refresh his or his

13
14

treatment providers’ recollection about the date and type of treatment received after the incident.

15

See discussion below re medical treatment provider witnesses.

16

Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 5 [Docket No. 87]

17

Defendants move to exclude evidence of Plaintiff’s lost wages. The parties agree that the

18

period of potential lost wages is from April to October 2014.
At the pretrial conference, Plaintiff’s counsel represented that he sought damages in the

19
20

form of lost wages during the pendency of the criminal prosecution solely under the Ralph Act.1

21

Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to lost wages because the City and County of San Francisco has

22

not instituted criminal proceedings against other officers in similar circumstances. To begin with,

23

the City and County of San Francisco is no longer a defendant. Moreover, Plaintiff’s offer of

24

proof describes only his own deposition testimony regarding the incident; he does not submit any

25

evidence about whether other officers have been criminally prosecuted following complaints or

26

lawsuits challenging police behavior. Plaintiff’s argument that the criminal prosecution would not

27
1

28

The court will not consider Plaintiff’s subsequent written effort to recant that representation, but
notes that the result would not be different for the Section 1983 or Bane Act claim.
5

1

have gone forward but for Defendants’ “misrepresentations and omissions” is purely speculative.

2

Plaintiff has not submitted any authority or evidence supporting causation and his entitlement to

3

lost wages for this period of time. Therefore, Plaintiff may not seek damages in the form of lost

4

wages during the pendency of his criminal prosecution.

5

Plaintiff also may not seek an award of damages for emotional distress related to the

6

criminal prosecution. To the extent Plaintiff bases his claim for emotional distress damages on a

7

malicious prosecution theory, Plaintiff has not stated a claim for malicious prosecution against the

8

Defendants. Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to present evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption

9

of independent judgment exercised by the San Francisco District Attorney in prosecuting charges
against Plaintiff. The only evidence Plaintiff submitted was his own deposition testimony. See

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

10

Newman v. Cty. of Orange, 457 F.3d 991, 995 (9th Cir. 2006) (in order “[t]o rebut the presumption

12

. . . and to survive summary judgment on a malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must provide

13

more than an account of the incident in question that conflicts with the account of the officers

14

involved.”). Plaintiff also fails to present argument or evidence that Defendants acted

15

“maliciously or with reckless disregard” of his rights, see Barlow v. Ground, 943 F.2d 1132, 1136

16

(9th Cir. 1991), and offers no authority to support his entitlement to emotional distress damages in

17

these circumstances. The motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff may not seek emotional distress

18

damages stemming from the criminal prosecution.

19

Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 6 [Docket No. 88]

20

Defendants move to exclude daily observation reports, as well as evidence of complaints,

21

claims, rumors or allegations unrelated to the incident. The motion is GRANTED AS

22

UNOPPOSED.

23

Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 7 [Docket No. 89]

24

Defendants move to exclude evidence regarding the details and results of the criminal

25
26

prosecution.
The motion is GRANTED. Evidence that the jury acquitted Plaintiff on the charge of

27

violence against an officer, and failed to reach a verdict on the charge of resisting arrest cannot be

28

used by Plaintiff to show that he did not resist arrest or did not act violently toward the
6

1

Defendants. The failure of prosecutors to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Plaintiff acted

2

violently toward Defendants or that he resisted arrest does not preclude Defendants from

3

attempting to establish these facts as a defense in this civil action.

4

To the extent that parties attempt to use the testimony from the criminal proceedings for

5

impeachment, or as party admissions or prior inconsistent statements, the parties agreed that the

6

testimony should be generically described (e.g., “you testified under oath on [date]”) to prevent

7

any negative inferences that might be associated with the existence of the criminal prosecution. If

8

a party seeks to use testimony that implicates the existence of the criminal proceedings, such

9

testimony must first be cleared with the court.

10
III.

DISPUTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

The court discussed its rulings on disputed jury instructions at the October 29, 2015
12
pretrial hearing. The court intends to issue proposed final jury instructions early next week, and
13
will discuss them, along with the verdict form, during a final charging conference late next week
14
at a time to be announced. The parties shall come prepared to argue the relationship between the
15
excessive force, Bane Act and Ralph Act claims at that time.
16
IV.

17

TRIAL WITNESSES

Defendants object to a number of Plaintiff’s proposed witnesses based on his failure to

18
19

properly disclose them.2 Other than a placeholder for a “Kaiser treating physician,” Plaintiff did

20

not disclose any of the disputed witnesses in his initial disclosures. Plaintiff did not supplement

21

his initial disclosures, nor did he name any of the disputed witnesses in expert disclosures.
The parties filed their witness lists as part of their joint pretrial conference statement on

22
23

October 9, 2015. [Docket No. 77.] On October 16, 2015, Defendants filed objections to

24

Plaintiff’s witness list. [Docket No. 104.] Defendants specifically objected to sixteen of

25

Plaintiff’s proposed witnesses, based in part on the failure to make proper and timely disclosures.

26
27
28

2

Fact discovery closed on June 27, 2015. [Docket No. 39.] The deadline for expert
disclosure was September 24, 2015. The deadline for supplemental expert disclosure was October
8, 2015. Expert discovery closed on October 22, 2015. [Docket No. 70.]
7

1

Additionally, Defendants objected to medical treatment providers on the basis that Plaintiff had

2

not properly disclosed them as experts. On October 27, 2015, long after the deadline for pretrial

3

submissions, Plaintiff submitted two amended witness lists that added nine witnesses, six of whom

4

are medical treatment providers. [Docket Nos. 128 and 129.]

5

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a), a party’s initial disclosures must identify

6

witnesses who are “likely to have discoverable information ... that the disclosing party may use to

7

support its claims or defenses.” A party has an affirmative obligation to supplement the initial

8

disclosures “in a timely manner” if they become incomplete or incorrect. Fed. R. Civ. Pro.

9

26(e)(1)(A). Supplementation, however, is not mandatory “if the additional or corrective
information has [ ] been made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

10

writing.” Id.

12

Rule 37(c)(1) permits the Court to preclude the use at trial of any information required to

13

be disclosed by Rule 26(a) that is not properly disclosed. Failure to disclose may be excused if the

14

party can demonstrate substantial justification or if the nondisclosure is harmless. Id.

15

Defendants’ objections are OVERRULED as to Clifford Mayes and Clarence Williams.

16

Both were identified as witnesses in the incident report, and Clarence Williams testified in the

17

criminal proceeding.

18

Plaintiff also proposes to call Mrs. Adamson as a trial witness solely for the purpose of

19

testifying about her percipient knowledge about Plaintiff’s injuries. Plaintiff has not explained

20

why he did not disclose Mrs. Adamson until his pretrial submission, since he has been aware all

21

along that she had discoverable information supporting his claim. [Docket No. 145.] Plaintiff

22

argues that he did not need to disclose Mrs. Adamson because Defendants were made aware of her

23

through Plaintiff’s deposition testimony. The deposition excerpts submitted by Plaintiff are

24

meager. One excerpt indicates that she kept track of household records, which is not relevant.

25

The other excerpt indicates that she knew he slept on the floor “a few times.” [Docket No. 145-1.]

26

This is insufficient to put Defendants on notice that she might have discoverable information of

27

any significance about his injuries. Plaintiff’s failure to timely disclose her is not substantially

28

justified, and is not harmless, for Defendants assert that had they been put on notice, they would
8

1

have sought her deposition. The court SUSTAINS Defendants’ objections as to Mrs. Adamson.

2

Plaintiff has represented that D’Paris Williams, Jami Tillotson, and Orlando

3

Rodreiguez will only be offered for impeachment purposes, and thus were not required to be

4

disclosed. It is unclear whether these individuals can present proper impeachment, as they do not

5

appear related to the incident in any way. The court RESERVES RULING on Defendants’

6

objections. If Plaintiff intends to call any of these witnesses for impeachment, he must make a

7

proffer to the court before the jury enters for the day.

8
9

Finally, Defendants object to Plaintiff’s ability to call medical treatment providers.
According to Defendants, Plaintiff’s initial disclosure only identified “medical treatment providers
at Kaiser Hospital,” Plaintiff did not serve any supplemental disclosures, and Plaintiff did not

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

10

disclose any medical expert witnesses. Plaintiff does not dispute these assertions.

12

Other than the “Kaiser medical treatment providers” identified in Plaintiff’s initial

13

disclosures, Plaintiff did not disclose any other treatment providers as potential witnesses until he

14

named nine of them in his October 9, 2015 pretrial submission. For one of these nine providers,

15

instead of listing a name, Plaintiff gave a description (“physical therapist who treated Plaintiff for

16

injury to his back”), and an address. [Docket No. 77 at 11.] On October 27, 2015, Plaintiff added

17

six treatment providers through two “amended witness lists,” which were filed eighteen days after

18

the pretrial witness disclosure deadline, and five days after the close of expert discovery. [Docket

19

Nos. 128 and 129.] Two of the treatment providers, William Quibell and Thomas Kesinger,

20

appear to fit the description of the previously unnamed physical therapist appearing on Plaintiff’s

21

October 9, 2015 pretrial witness list. However, that list only referred to one (rather than two)

22

physical therapists.

23

Plaintiff’s witness summaries are sparse and generic. For ten medical treatment providers,

24

(Thomas R. Johnson, Dr. Brad Moy, Dr. Manuel M. Dizon, Dr. Brian Sakamoto, William Quibell,

25

Thomas Kesinger, Dr. John D. Warbritton III, Ricki P. Nolley, Jr., Dr. Joseph M. Grant, and Dr.

26

Samuel Graves), Plaintiff merely states that the provider treated and/or diagnosed Plaintiff for

27

injury to his back. Plaintiff had a preexisting back injury and was on disability leave prior to the

28

subject incident. His witness list fails to specify whether any of these medical treatment providers
9

1

treated or diagnosed him for his preexisting back injury or had information about his post-incident

2

condition. Two medical treatment providers, Dr. Dioskon Rena and Dr. Varsh R. Sikka, are

3

identified as having treated and/or diagnosed Plaintiff for his pre-existing back injury and injuries

4

suffered due to the subject incident. One treatment provider, Dr. Charles Sonu, is identified as

5

having treated and/or diagnosed Plaintiff only for his pre-existing back injury.

6

Of the approximately fourteen medical treatment providers listed in Plaintiff’s pretrial

7

witness lists, only Peter Wilhelm Emblad appears to be a treatment provider at Kaiser Hospital,

8

which fits the description in Plaintiff’s initial disclosure. Dr. Emblad appears to have treated

9

Plaintiff at the emergency room following the subject incident. [Docket Nos. 77, 128 and 129]

10

With respect to medical treatment providers, the court rules as follows. Plaintiff did not

United States District Court
Northern District of California

11

disclosure any medical expert under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 (a)(2)(A), and did not provide written

12

reports under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B) or summary reports as required for non-specially

13

retained experts under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(C). For this reason, Defendants’ objection is

14

SUSTAINED in part. None of Plaintiff’s medical provider witnesses may offer expert opinion

15

testimony because none were properly disclosed as experts. However, Plaintiff’s initial

16

disclosures put Defendants on notice that a Kaiser treatment provider had discoverable

17

information that supported Plaintiff’s claim. Plaintiff may therefore call Dr. Emblad, the Kaiser

18

provider who treated Plaintiff directly following the incident. For the reasons stated above, Dr.

19

Emblad may only provide percipient testimony and may not provide medical opinion testimony

20

because he was not properly disclosed as an expert. Defendants’ objection is OVERRULED in

21

part regarding Dr. Emblad.

22

As to other medical treatment providers, Defendant’s objection is SUSTAINED in part.

23

Plaintiff did not properly disclose them. The fact that Defendants subpoenaed medical records did

24

not adequately put Defendants on notice that Plaintiff was planning to call any particular provider.

25

Plaintiff argues that he should nevertheless be permitted to offer the testimony of all medical

26

treatment providers as percipient, non-expert witnesses. Plaintiff asserts that they can provide

27

limited testimony to verify that they saw the Plaintiff on a specific date, and ran specific tests or

28

provided particular treatment. Plaintiff represents that the medical treatment providers would not
10

1

give any testimony beyond these bare facts, such as testimony about the causation of injuries,

2

prognosis or diagnosis of medical conditions. But this kind of limited testimony would be

3

cumulative of the testimony that Plaintiff himself could provide about the dates and type of

4

treatment he received. However, as discussed at the pretrial hearings, the court allowed Plaintiff

5

to select one medical provider (Mr. Thomas Kesinger) to give limited percipient, non-opinion

6

testimony described above. Defendants’ objections to medical treatment provider witnesses are

7

otherwise SUSTAINED.

8
V.
9

EXHIBITS

The parties will remove the “Confidential” watermark added to the exhibits for the

10
purposes of the litigation.
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

The following summarizes the rulings made by the court at the November 5, 2015 pretrial
12
hearing.
13

A. Defendants’ Objections to Plaintiff’s Proposed Exhibits

14
1. Exhibit 1
15
Plaintiff will substitute copies of Exhibit 1 without the asterisk markings.
16
2. Exhibit 3
17

Defendants’ objection is SUSTAINED.

18
3. Exhibits 6, 7, 8, 9
19
Plaintiff may use these exhibits solely for impeachment or to refresh recollection.
20
4. Exhibit 10
21

Defendants’ objection is SUSTAINED. The parties shall use Defendants’ Exhibit F,

22
which is a complete version of this document.
23
5. Exhibits 11-15
24

Defendants’ objections are SUSTAINED.

25
6. Exhibit 16
26
Plaintiff may use this exhibit solely for impeachment or to refresh recollection.
27
28
11

7. Exhibits 17-25

1
2
3

Defendants’ objections are SUSTAINED. Plaintiff may use these medical records to
refresh recollection.
8. Exhibits 26 and 27

4
5

Defendants’ objections are OVERRULED. See also discussion above re Defendants’

6

MIL No. 2 for limitations on Plaintiff’s testimony regarding his training or understanding of

7

policies.

8
9
10

United States District Court
Northern District of California

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

9. Exhibits 28, 29, 30
Defendants’ objections are SUSTAINED.
10. Exhibit 31
Defendants’ objection is OVERRULED. Its use may be subject to a limiting instruction
that Defendants were lawfully permitted to make the traffic stop itself.
11. Exhibit 33
Defendants’ objection is SUSTAINED.
12. Exhibits 37 and 38
Defendants’ objections are SUSTAINED.
13. Exhibit 39
Plaintiff represents that Exhibit 39 would only be used for rebuttal. The court
RESERVES RULING on this exhibit, pending the evidence at trial.
14. Exhibits 42-47 and 49-51
Plaintiff represents that he does not intend to introduce these exhibits into evidence.
15. Exhibits 48 and 49
Plaintiff represents that he only intends to use these exhibits for impeachment.
16. Exhibit 52
Defendants’ objection is SUSTAINED.
17. Exhibit 53
Defendants’ objection is SUSTAINED.

28
12

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

United States District Court
Northern District of California

11
12
13
14
15
16
17

18. Exhibit 54
The parties shall meet and confer about the file format for this video exhibit. Any dispute
shall be raised with the court on November 9, 2015 at 8:30 a.m.
B. Plaintiff’s Objections to Defendants’ Exhibits
1. Exhibit F
Objection withdrawn.
2. Exhibit K
Plaintiff’s objection is SUSTAINED.
3. Exhibit L
Plaintiff’s objection to Exhibit L is SUSTAINED. This exhibit is irrelevant, as Plaintiff
cannot claim lost wages.
4. Exhibits M, N, and P
Defendants represent that they only intend to use these exhibits for impeachment.
5. Exhibit R
Defendants represent that they only intend to use this exhibit to refresh recollection.
6. Exhibits S, T, U, V, W, X, and Y
Defendants represent that they only intend to use these exhibits for rehabilitation or to

18

refresh recollection, or for impeachment. Use of these exhibits is subject to the court’s ruling that

19

references to prior testimony must not include references to the criminal prosecution.

20
21
22

7. Exhibit DD
The parties have represented that they will not attempt to introduce their expert reports into
evidence. See discussion above re Plaintiff’s MIL No. 3.

23
VI.

STATEMENT RE ESTABLISHED FACTS

24
The parties submitted competing statements regarding the traffic stop and the instructions
25
to Plaintiff to exit the car and sit on the curb. The parties agreed that the statement should be read
26
to the jury as part of the final jury instructions.
27
The court will make the following statement as part of the final jury instructions:
28
13

1

“The officers were legally permitted to make the traffic stop, instruct Adamson to exit the

2

car, and instruct him to sit on the curb. The legality of the traffic stop and those instructions are

3

not before the jury. However, you may consider all of the circumstances regarding the traffic stop,

4

the instruction to exit the car, and the instruction to sit on the curb, in deciding whether any

5

Defendant used excessive force, or whether any Defendant committed an act of violence against

6

Plaintiff on the basis of his race.”

7
8

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 6, 2015

9

______________________________________

10

Donna M. Ryu

United States District Court
Northern District of California

11

United States Magistrate Judge

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
14