Brown v. Family Radio Inc. et al
Filing
26
ORDER by Judge Hamilton granting 20 Motion for Leave to File Motion for Reconsideration; ORDER granting reconsideration. (pjhlc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/28/2014) (Additional attachment(s) added on 2/28/2014: # 1 Certificate/Proof of Service) (nahS, COURT STAFF).
1
2
3
4
5
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
6
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
7
8
9
LIZZIE E. BROWN,
11
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
10
12
Plaintiff,
v.
13
FAMILY RADIO, INC., et al.,
14
No. C 13-5305 PJH
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION
Defendants.
_______________________________/
15
16
Before the court is the motion of pro se plaintiff Lizzie E. Brown for leave to file a
17
motion for reconsideration of a portion of the court's January 16, 2014 order granting
18
defendants' motion to dismiss. Defendants filed a statement of non-opposition to the
19
motion. The motion is GRANTED, as follows, and the court construes the arguments made
20
in the motion as those supporting the request for reconsideration.
21
Plaintiff is a 76-year-old African-American woman, who was formerly employed by
22
defendant Family Radio, Inc. ("Family Radio") and was laid off on September 20, 2012. On
23
October 8, 2013, plaintiff filed the present action in Alameda County Superior Court,
24
alleging age discrimination in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act ("Title VII"),
25
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (which the court interpreted as a claim under the ADEA), and race
26
and religious discrimination, also under Title VII. She also alleged claims of breach of
27
contract and breach of the implied covenant, and unlawful termination in violation of public
28
policy. Named as defendants were Family Radio, its former head Harold Camping (now
1
2
deceased) and its manager Tom Evans.
Plaintiff did not attach the right-to-sue letters to the complaint, and did not clarify that
3
she had filed charges with both DFEH and the EEOC, and did not assert any state-law
4
discrimination claims. On November 11, 2013, defendants removed the case to this court,
5
and on November 21, 2013, filed a motion to dismiss.
6
In ruling on the motion, the court dismissed the claims against Mr. Camping and Mr.
7
Evans, with prejudice, dismissed the contract claims with prejudice, and dismissed the
8
discrimination claims with leave to amend. The court noted, however, that the ADEA
9
authorizes a claim for age discrimination only where age is the but-for cause of the alleged
discrimination. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177 (2009). Thus, the
11
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
10
court ruled that plaintiff would be required to allege either that she was terminated based on
12
her age, or that she was terminated based on her race and/or religion, and that whichever
13
she alleged, she would also be required to plead facts sufficient to state a plausible claim
14
that she was discriminated against by Family Stations. The court also ordered that any
15
amended complaint must have the right-to-sue notice(s) attached. The court set a deadline
16
of February 12, 2014 for plaintiff to file the amended complaint.
17
On February 6, 2013, plaintiff filed the present motion, arguing that reconsideration
18
is warranted because Gross's application is limited to a plaintiff's burden of persuasion, and
19
does not preclude a plaintiff from pleading alternative or inconsistent theories (both the
20
ADEA and Title VII as a basis for the discrimination claim(s).
21
In support, plaintiff cited Brazill v. California Northstate Coll. of Pharmacy, LLC, 904
22
F.Supp. 2d 1047 (E.D. Cal. 2012), a decision holding that Gross's application is limited to a
23
plaintiff's burden of persuasion and does not preclude a plaintiff from pleading alternate
24
theories for an adverse employment action. See id. at 1051-52 (citing Fagan v. U.S.
25
Carpet Installation, Inc., 770 F.Supp. 2d 490, 495 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (after Gross a plaintiff is
26
not required to plead that age discrimination is the “but for” cause of his termination); Prisco
27
v. Methodist Hosp., 2011 WL 1288678, at *3-4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 4, 2011); (Gross does not
28
prevent a plaintiff from asserting multiple discrimination claims in the same action); Ries v.
2
1
Winona Cnty., 2010 WL 3515722, at *10 (D. Minn. July 28, 2010) (Gross “was not a case
2
involving the sufficiency of an ADEA complaint” and does not preclude plaintiffs bringing
3
ADEA claims from pleading alternate theories of relief); Cartee v. Wilbur Smith Assocs.,
4
Inc., 2010 WL 1052082, at *3-4 (D.S.C. Mar. 22, 2010) (Gross is not applicable to a
5
judgment on the pleadings)). On February 11, 2014, defendants filed a statement of non-
6
opposition to the motion.
7
Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint ("FAC") on February 20, 2014, asserting that
discrimination on the basis of religion. She also asserts that she filed a charge with DFEH
10
on September 26, 2012, alleging discrimination on the basis of race; that the DFEH charge
11
For the Northern District of California
she filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC on September 19, 2012, alleging
9
United States District Court
8
was cross-filed with the EEOC on October 9, 2012; and that she received a right-to-sue
12
letter from DFEH dated November 15, 2012, and a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC dated
13
August 8, 2013. She does not say whether she filed an administrative charge alleging
14
discrimination on the basis of age.
15
While it is true that the decisions cited by plaintiff do hold that a plaintiff may plead
16
age discrimination under the ADEA "in the alternative," the matter appears less settled than
17
plaintiff's motion suggests. Other courts have held that a plaintiff alleging a violation of the
18
ADEA must allege that age was the "but-for" cause of the adverse action. See, e.g., Jeter
19
v. Hozhoni Found., 2013 WL 4431096 at *3 (D. Ariz. Aug. 16, 2013).
20
More significantly, numerous courts have acknowledged that the federal rules allow
21
pleading "in the alternative," but have also concluded that while it may not be necessary
22
that a plaintiff alleging discrimination under the ADEA plead but-for causation as such, it is
23
necessary that the plaintiff allege sufficient facts to make plausible the conclusion that "but
24
for" his/her age, the plaintiff would still be employed. See, e.g., Lewis v. Detroit Public
25
Schools, 2013 WL 5785781 at *12-14 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 23, 2013); (citing Smith v. CH2M
26
Hill, 521 Fed. Appx. 773, 774-75, 2013 WL 2450833 at *1 (11th Cir. June 5, 2013) (in
27
alleging that his termination was "substantially motivated" by age, the plaintiff had not
28
"allege[d] sufficient facts" to allow the court to "reasonably infer that [his employers]
3
1
violated the but-for standard set forth in the ADEA"); Payne v. Malemathew, 2011 WL
2
3043920, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2011) (under Gross, a plaintiff “need not plead but-for
3
causation, but an ADEA complaint must contain sufficient facts to make plausible the
4
conclusion that but for his age, [p]laintiff would still be employed”); Goodridge v. Siemens
5
Energy, Inc., 276 F.R.D. 540, 542 (N.D. Ala. 2011) (“after Gross (and Twombly and Iqbal),
6
a plaintiff who brings a claim under the ADEA must allege facts sufficient to support a
7
reasonable inference that age was the ‘but for’ cause of the adverse employment action
8
challenged under that claim"); Roginsky v. County of Suffolk, N.Y., 729 F.Supp. 2d 561,
9
568-69 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (what is required after Gross is that "the complaint contain
sufficient facts to make plausible the conclusion that 'but for' his age [p]laintiff would still be
11
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
10
employed)).
12
Accordingly, the court GRANTS the motion for reconsideration to this extent:
13
Paragraph 4 of the January 16, 2014 order (Order at 2:7-16) is DELETED, and the
14
following paragraph is inserted in its place:
15
20
The claims of discrimination on the basis of age, race, and religion are
DISMISSED for failure to allege facts sufficient to state a claim. The
dismissal is with leave to amend. The ADEA authorizes a claim for age
discrimination only where age is the but-for cause of the alleged
discrimination. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177 (2009).
Accordingly, if plaintiff alleges a claim of age discrimination under the ADEA,
she must plead facts that are sufficient to state a plausible claim that but-for
the alleged age discrimination, she would still be employed by Family Radio.
Whether she alleges discrimination based on age, race, or religion, she must
plead facts sufficient to state a plausible claim that she was discriminated
against by her employer Family Stations.
21
In addition, if plaintiff opts to file a second amended complaint that includes a claim
16
17
18
19
22
of age discrimination, she must allege facts showing that she filed an administrative charge
23
of discrimination based on age, and must attach copies of the administrative charges that
24
she describes in the FAC. "No civil action may be commenced by an individual under [the
25
ADEA] until 60 days after a charge alleging unlawful discrimination has been filed with the
26
[EEOC].” 29 U.S.C. § 626(d); see also Sommatino v. United States, 255 F.3d 704, 709
27
(9th Cir. 2001) ("substantial compliance with the presentment of discrimination complaints
28
to an appropriate administrative agency is a jurisdictional prerequisite); Sanchez v. Pacific
4
1
Powder Co., 147 F.3d 1097, 1099 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[t]he ADEA requires a person to file a
2
charge with the EEOC before initiating a civil action for age discrimination”).
3
4
No later than April 2, 2014, plaintiff shall either file a second amended complaint, or
advise the court that she wishes to proceed on the first amended complaint.
5
6
IT IS SO ORDERED.
7
Dated: February 28, 2014
______________________________
PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON
United States District Judge
8
9
11
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
10
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
5
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?