Phillips v. Crane Co. et al
Filing
49
ORDER by Judge Claudia Wilken GRANTING 27 MOTION TO REMAND.( terminating 48 Stipulation) (ndr, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/26/2014)
1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
3
4
DAVID PHILLIPS,
Plaintiff,
5
6
No. C 13-5655 CW
ORDER GRANTING
MOTION TO REMAND
(Re: Docket No.
27)
v.
7
ASBESTOS CORPORATION LIMITED, et
al.,
8
Defendants.
9
________________________________/
10
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
Plaintiff David Phillips moves to remand this case back to
11
San Francisco superior court.
Defendant Crane Co. opposes.
The
12
Court finds this motion suitable for disposition without oral
13
argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b).
Having considered
14
the papers submitted by the parties, the Court GRANTS Phillips’
15
motion to remand.
16
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
17
On December 20, 2011, Phillips filed suit in San Francisco
18
superior court against Crane and other defendants, asserting
19
negligence and other state law claims for causing him asbestos20
related injuries.
Specifically, Phillips worked at several
21
locations containing asbestos, including the Mare Island Naval
22
Shipyard, and now suffers from asbestos-related pleural disease
23
and asbestosis, serious lung diseases that are associated with the
24
inhalation of asbestos fibers.
In his complaint, Phillips
25
expressly waived claims against Crane relating to his exposure to
26
asbestos at military and federal government jobsites, or from U.S.
27
military vessels, aircraft, or equipment.
28
Complaint ¶ 6.
1
On December 6, 2013, Crane removed this action to federal
2
court.
3
Francisco superior court.
Phillips now moves to remand the suit back to San
4
5
DISCUSSION
Crane argues that it properly removed this action under the
6
federal officer removal statute, which provides that an action may
7
be removed by “any officer of the United States or any agency
8
thereof, or person acting under him, for any act under color of
9
such office.”
28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1).
Suits against federal
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
10
officers are exceptional in that they may be removed to federal
11
court despite the nonfederal nature of the complaint.
12
County v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 431 (1999).
13
§ 1441 is strictly construed, with any doubt resolved in favor of
14
remand, the removal rights of § 1442 are broader than those
15
provided by § 1441 because it is important to the federal
16
government to protect its officers.
17
F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992); Durham v. Lockheed Martin Corp.,
18
445 F.3d 1247, 1252 (9th Cir. 2006).
19
that there is a “clear command from both Congress and the Supreme
20
Court that when federal officers and their agents are seeking a
21
federal forum, we are to interpret section 1442 broadly in favor
22
of removal.”
23
Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 242 (1981)).
24
Jefferson
Although removal under
See Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980
The Ninth Circuit instructs
Durham, 445 F.3d at 1252 (quoting Arizona v.
Thus, the fact that Phillips’ complaint expressly disavows
25
any federal claims is not determinative.
26
proper under the federal officer removal statute if the removing
27
party: (1) demonstrates that it acted under the direction of a
28
federal officer; (2) raises a colorable federal defense to the
2
Rather, removal is
1
plaintiff's claims; and (3) demonstrates a causal nexus between
2
the plaintiff's claims and the defendant's acts performed under
3
color of federal office.
4
25, 134-35 (1989); Fung v. Abex Corp., 816 F. Supp. 569, 571-72
5
(N.D. Cal. 1992).
6
Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 124-
Here, Crane claims that the federal defense of military
7
contractor immunity shields it from liability.
8
provides, “Liability for design defects in military equipment
9
cannot be imposed, pursuant to state law, when (1) the United
This doctrine
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
10
States approved reasonably precise specifications; (2) the
11
equipment conformed to those specifications; and (3) the supplier
12
warned the United States about the dangers in the use of the
13
equipment that were known to the supplier but not to the United
14
States.”
Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512
15
(1988).
The justification for this defense is that liability for
16
independent contractors performing work for the federal government
17
constitutes a uniquely federal concern.
18
Id. at 505.
In the present case, however, Phillips has expressly
19
disclaimed and waived any claim arising out of or related to any
20
asbestos exposure aboard federal jobsites and navy vessels.
21
removes any claims to which military contractor immunity might act
22
as a defense.
23
this waiver; this same waiver language was found to justify remand
24
in many cases in this district with very similar facts.1
25
26
27
28
This
The Court sees no reason not to hold Phillips to
1
The
See, e.g., Pratt v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd., 2011 WL 4433724
(N.D. Cal.); Dobrocke v. Allis-Chalmers Corp. Product Liability
Trust, 2009 WL 1464153 (N.D. Cal.); Madden v. A.H. Voss Co., 2009
WL 341377 (N.D. Cal.); Westbrook v. Asbestos Defendants, 2001 WL
902642 (N.D. Cal.).
3
1
waiver justifies remand.
2
course, and is allowed to do so by the state court despite his
3
express waiver, Crane can remove once again.2
4
5
If Phillips later attempts to reverse
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: 2/26/2014
6
CLAUDIA WILKEN
United States District Judge
7
8
9
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
2
See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3) (“if the case stated by the
initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal may be
filed within thirty days after receipt by the defendant . . . of a
copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from
which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or
has become removable.”).
4
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?