Phillips v. Crane Co. et al

Filing 49

ORDER by Judge Claudia Wilken GRANTING 27 MOTION TO REMAND.( terminating 48 Stipulation) (ndr, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/26/2014)

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1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 4 DAVID PHILLIPS, Plaintiff, 5 6 No. C 13-5655 CW ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND (Re: Docket No. 27) v. 7 ASBESTOS CORPORATION LIMITED, et al., 8 Defendants. 9 ________________________________/ 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California Plaintiff David Phillips moves to remand this case back to 11 San Francisco superior court. Defendant Crane Co. opposes. The 12 Court finds this motion suitable for disposition without oral 13 argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). Having considered 14 the papers submitted by the parties, the Court GRANTS Phillips’ 15 motion to remand. 16 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 17 On December 20, 2011, Phillips filed suit in San Francisco 18 superior court against Crane and other defendants, asserting 19 negligence and other state law claims for causing him asbestos20 related injuries. Specifically, Phillips worked at several 21 locations containing asbestos, including the Mare Island Naval 22 Shipyard, and now suffers from asbestos-related pleural disease 23 and asbestosis, serious lung diseases that are associated with the 24 inhalation of asbestos fibers. In his complaint, Phillips 25 expressly waived claims against Crane relating to his exposure to 26 asbestos at military and federal government jobsites, or from U.S. 27 military vessels, aircraft, or equipment. 28 Complaint ¶ 6. 1 On December 6, 2013, Crane removed this action to federal 2 court. 3 Francisco superior court. Phillips now moves to remand the suit back to San 4 5 DISCUSSION Crane argues that it properly removed this action under the 6 federal officer removal statute, which provides that an action may 7 be removed by “any officer of the United States or any agency 8 thereof, or person acting under him, for any act under color of 9 such office.” 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). Suits against federal United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 officers are exceptional in that they may be removed to federal 11 court despite the nonfederal nature of the complaint. 12 County v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 431 (1999). 13 § 1441 is strictly construed, with any doubt resolved in favor of 14 remand, the removal rights of § 1442 are broader than those 15 provided by § 1441 because it is important to the federal 16 government to protect its officers. 17 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992); Durham v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 18 445 F.3d 1247, 1252 (9th Cir. 2006). 19 that there is a “clear command from both Congress and the Supreme 20 Court that when federal officers and their agents are seeking a 21 federal forum, we are to interpret section 1442 broadly in favor 22 of removal.” 23 Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 242 (1981)). 24 Jefferson Although removal under See Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 The Ninth Circuit instructs Durham, 445 F.3d at 1252 (quoting Arizona v. Thus, the fact that Phillips’ complaint expressly disavows 25 any federal claims is not determinative. 26 proper under the federal officer removal statute if the removing 27 party: (1) demonstrates that it acted under the direction of a 28 federal officer; (2) raises a colorable federal defense to the 2 Rather, removal is 1 plaintiff's claims; and (3) demonstrates a causal nexus between 2 the plaintiff's claims and the defendant's acts performed under 3 color of federal office. 4 25, 134-35 (1989); Fung v. Abex Corp., 816 F. Supp. 569, 571-72 5 (N.D. Cal. 1992). 6 Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 124- Here, Crane claims that the federal defense of military 7 contractor immunity shields it from liability. 8 provides, “Liability for design defects in military equipment 9 cannot be imposed, pursuant to state law, when (1) the United This doctrine United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 States approved reasonably precise specifications; (2) the 11 equipment conformed to those specifications; and (3) the supplier 12 warned the United States about the dangers in the use of the 13 equipment that were known to the supplier but not to the United 14 States.” Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 15 (1988). The justification for this defense is that liability for 16 independent contractors performing work for the federal government 17 constitutes a uniquely federal concern. 18 Id. at 505. In the present case, however, Phillips has expressly 19 disclaimed and waived any claim arising out of or related to any 20 asbestos exposure aboard federal jobsites and navy vessels. 21 removes any claims to which military contractor immunity might act 22 as a defense. 23 this waiver; this same waiver language was found to justify remand 24 in many cases in this district with very similar facts.1 25 26 27 28 This The Court sees no reason not to hold Phillips to 1 The See, e.g., Pratt v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd., 2011 WL 4433724 (N.D. Cal.); Dobrocke v. Allis-Chalmers Corp. Product Liability Trust, 2009 WL 1464153 (N.D. Cal.); Madden v. A.H. Voss Co., 2009 WL 341377 (N.D. Cal.); Westbrook v. Asbestos Defendants, 2001 WL 902642 (N.D. Cal.). 3 1 waiver justifies remand. 2 course, and is allowed to do so by the state court despite his 3 express waiver, Crane can remove once again.2 4 5 If Phillips later attempts to reverse IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: 2/26/2014 6 CLAUDIA WILKEN United States District Judge 7 8 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3) (“if the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal may be filed within thirty days after receipt by the defendant . . . of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable.”). 4

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