Winkfield v. Childrens Hospital Oakland et al
Filing
21
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE DISMISSAL. Show Cause Response due by 2/7/2014. Signed by Judge Saundra Brown Armstrong on 1/22/2014. (ndr, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 1/23/2014)
1
2
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
3
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
4
OAKLAND DIVISION
5
LATASHA WINKFIELD, an individual
Case No: C 13-5993 SBA
6 parent and guardian of Jahi McMath, a minor,
Plaintiff,
7
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE
DISMISSAL
vs.
8
9 CHILDREN’S HOSPITAL OAKLAND, Dr.
David Durand M.D. and DOES 1 through 10,
10 inclusive,
Defendants.
11
12
13
14
Plaintiff Latasha Winkfield filed the instant declaratory and injunctive relief action
15
in this Court seeking an order requiring Defendants Children’s Hospital Oakland (“CHO”)
16
and it Chief of Pediatrics, Dr. David Duran, to maintain her daughter Jahi McMath (“Jahi”)
17
on a ventilator until such time as she is transferred from CHO to another care facility, and
18
to install gastric and tracheostomy tubes to facilitate the transfer. On January 5, 2014, Jahi
19
was transferred from CHO to Plaintiff. For the reasons that follow, the Court hereby
20
directs Plaintiff to show cause why the instant action should not be dismissed for lack of
21
subject matter jurisdiction.
22
I.
23
BACKGROUND
On or about, December 9, 2013, Jahi went into cardiac arrest shortly after
24
undergoing a tonsillectomy and related procedures at CHO. Thereafter, Jahi was placed on
25
a ventilator. Tragically, the resulting lack of oxygen to Jahi’s brain resulted in irreversible
26
brain death, and she was declared legally deceased by two CHO physicians within days of
27
her surgery. Over Plaintiff’s strenuous objection, CHO sought to remove Jahi from the
28
ventilator, claiming that she was “dead” and that no further medical treatment was
1
warranted. Upset with the treatment Jahi was receiving, Plaintiff sought to transfer Jahi
2
from CHO and requested that the hospital maintain her on a ventilator until such time as an
3
alternative facility could be secured. In addition, Plaintiff requested that CHO perform a
4
tracheostomy on Jahi and fit her with a gastric tube to facilitate the transfer. CHO refused
5
these requests, which prompted Plaintiff to file suit.
6
On December 20, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the Alameda County Superior
7
Court against CHO and Dr. Duran along with an ex parte application for temporary
8
restraining order (“TRO”) to enjoin CHO from removing Jahi from the ventilator and to
9
compel CHO to install a gastric tube and tracheostomy tube. Alameda Cnty. Case No. RP-
10
13-707598. The superior court granted the injunction to maintain Jahi on a ventilator, but
11
denied Plaintiff’s other requests. The court subsequently conducted an evidentiary hearing,
12
which included testimony from an independent, court-appointed physician from the
13
Stanford University School of Medicine, and ultimately concluded that Jahi was legally
14
deceased. Separately, the court extended the TRO until December 30, 2013.
15
On December 30, 2013, during the pendency of the state court action, Plaintiff filed
16
the instant action in this Court against CHO and Dr. Durand. The Complaint alleges five
17
claims for relief: (1) violation of the free exercise clause of the First Amendment;
18
(2) violation of the right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment; (3) violation of the right
19
to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment; (4) violation of section 504 of the
20
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“RA”), 29 U.S.C. § 794; and (5) violation of the Americans
21
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. The Complaint seeks
22
declaratory and injunctive relief to preclude the “removal of ventilator support and
23
mandating introduction of nutritional support, insertion of a tracheostomy tube, gastric
24
tube, and to provide other medical treatments … to promote [Jahi’s] maximum level of
25
improvement and provision of sufficient time for Plaintiff to locate an alternative facility to
26
care for her child in accordance with her religious beliefs.” Compl. at 15.
27
On January 2, 2014, Plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary injunction seeking to
28
maintain Jahi on a ventilator and to compel CHO to insert Jahi with a gastric tube and a
-2-
1
tracheostomy tube. On the same date, the Court referred the parties to a Magistrate Judge
2
of this Court for an emergency mandatory settlement conference to take place on January 3,
3
2014, at 11:00 a.m. Dkt. 10, 11.
4
Early in the day on January 3, 2014, the parties appeared in state court in connection
5
with Plaintiff’s parallel state court action, and reached an agreement to transfer custody of
6
Jahi to Plaintiff. Thereafter, the parties attended the settlement conference with the
7
Magistrate Judge, and, after extensive negotiations, reached an agreement to effectuate the
8
transfer of Jahi from CHO. Pursuant to the parties’ agreements, CHO released Jahi to
9
Plaintiff, who accepted custody and responsibility for Jahi on the evening of January 5,
10
2014. Dkt. 16.
11
II.
12
DISCUSSION
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.
13
Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this
14
limited jurisdiction . . . and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party
15
asserting jurisdiction.” Id. (internal citations omitted). A federal court has an independent
16
duty to assess whether federal subject matter jurisdiction exists, whether or not the parties
17
raise the issue. See United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed Inc., 360 F.3d 960,
18
967 (9th Cir. 2004).
19
A.
20
Under Article III of the United States Constitution, judicial power is limited to
MOOTNESS
21
“Cases” and Controversies.” Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492-93 (2009).
22
“The doctrine of standing is one of several doctrines that reflect this fundamental
23
limitation.” Id. For constitutional standing to exist, there must be the “irreducible
24
constitutional minimum” of an injury-in-fact. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
25
555, 560 (1992). An injury-in-fact is “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is
26
(a) concrete and particularized ... and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
27
hypothetical.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). While standing is
28
determined based on the facts as they existed at the time the complaint was filed, an actual
-3-
1
controversy must exist at all stages of review, and a claim becomes moot and non-
2
justiciable if the requisite personal interest captured by the standing doctrine “ceases to
3
exist at any point during the litigation.” Jacobs v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 526 F.3d 419, 425
4
(9th Cir. 2008).
5
In the instant case, it is questionable whether a live controversy remains in this case.
6
The only relief sought in the Complaint is to compel CHO to maintain Jahi on a ventilator
7
and to perform certain medical procedures to facilitate her transfer from CHO. On January
8
5, 2013, CHO transferred custody, care and control of Jahi to Plaintiff. Now that Jahi no
9
longer is at CHO, the relief sought by Plaintiff appears to be moot. See, e.g., Dilley v.
10
Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the transfer of an inmate to a
11
different prison facility mooted his individual equitable claims absent a showing that there
12
is a reasonable expectation that the inmate would return to the facility).
13
B.
14
Separate and apart from the issue of mootness, the Court may lack jurisdiction under
ROOKER-FELDMAN
15
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. “Rooker-Feldman is a powerful doctrine that prevents
16
federal courts from second-guessing state court decisions by barring the lower federal
17
courts from hearing de facto appeals from state court judgments[.]” Bianchi v. Ryaarsdam,
18
334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2003). “It is a forbidden de facto appeal under Rooker-
19
Feldman when the plaintiff in federal district court complains of a legal wrong allegedly
20
committed by the state court, and seeks relief from the judgment of that court.” Noel v.
21
Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1164 (9th Cir. 2003)). The fact that plaintiff is bringing constitutional
22
claims does not preclude application of the doctrine where the claims are “inextricably
23
intertwined” with the state court’s ruling. See Bianchi, 334 F.3d at 900 n.4 (“It is
24
immaterial that Bianchi frames his federal complaint as a constitutional challenge to the
25
state courts’ decisions, rather than as a direct appeal of those decisions. The Rooker-
26
Feldman doctrine prevents lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over any claim
27
that is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the decision of a state court, even where the party
28
-4-
1
does not directly challenge the merits of the state court’s decision but rather brings an
2
indirect challenge based on constitutional principles.”).1
3
Here, the state court ruled that CHO had shown by clear and convincing evidence
4
that Jahi “had suffered brain death and was deceased as defined under Health and Safety
5
Code 7180 and 7181,” and on that basis, denied Plaintiff’s request for a TRO. Straus Decl.
6
Ex. 26 at 14 (emphasis added). Although this action does not directly challenge that
7
finding, it appears to do so indirectly. Plaintiff alleges that section 7180 is unconstitutional
8
because it deprives her of the right to render medical decisions affecting her child. To the
9
extent that this Court agrees with Plaintiff, such a finding would seriously undermine the
10
state court’s ruling, which expressly relied on section 7180 to find that Jahi is deceased and
11
correspondingly deny Plaintiff’s request for immediate injunctive relief. At a minimum,
12
the claims herein appear to be “inextricably intertwined” with the state court action, thereby
13
triggering application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.2 Doe v. Mann, 415 F.3d 1038,
14
1041 (9th Cir. 2005) (where Rooker-Feldman applies, a federal court “must also refuse to
15
decide any issue raised in the suit that is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with an issue resolved
16
by the state court in its judicial decision.”).
17
C.
18
Finally, it appears that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring claims under section 504 of
STANDING
19
the RA or the ADA, which proscribe discrimination on account of the plaintiff’s disability.
20
In her Complaint, Plaintiff does not allege that she is disabled. Rather, the pleadings allege
21
that Jahi is disabled due to her brain injury, and that Defendants are violating the respective
22
Acts through their attempt to remove Jahi from the ventilator. Compl. ¶¶ 60, 65, 76. Thus,
23
the only person alleged to have a disability is Jahi, who is not a party. Though Plaintiff
24
1
25
The Ninth Circuit has applied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to interlocutory state
court decisions. Doe & Associates Law Office v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th
Cir.2001) (applying doctrine to state court denial of motion to quash.
26
2
The fact that the relief sought by Plaintiff from this Court is identical to relief
sought in state court also supports application of the Rooker-Feldman bar. Bianchi, 334
F.3d at 900 (noting that in determining the applicability of Rooker-Feldman, the court must
28 pay close attention to the relief sought by the federal-court plaintiff.”).
27
-5-
1
identifies herself in the pleadings as Jahi’s mother and guardian, she has neither requested
2
to be nor been appointed by the Court as Jahi’s guardian ad litem and therefore cannot
3
assert any claims vicariously on Jahi’s behalf. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c)(2) (requiring a
4
court to “appoint a guardian ad litem—or issue another appropriate order—to protect a
5
minor or incompetent person who is unrepresented in an action.”); Prince v. Fremont Police
6
Dept., No. C 13-1366 SBA, 2013 WL 3157925 (N.D. Cal. June 20, 2013) (dismissing §
7
1983 claims filed by parents based on violations of their children’s constitutional rights
8
because parents were not appointed as guardians at litem). Thus, Plaintiff appears to lack
9
standing to bring claims under the RA and ADA.
10
11
III.
CONCLUSION
The record suggests that the Court may not or no longer have subject matter
12
jurisdiction to consider the merits of Plaintiff’s claims. Before dismissing the action,
13
however, the Court will afford Plaintiff an opportunity to demonstrate why the instant
14
action should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly,
15
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the parties shall meet and confer regarding the
16
issues discussed above. To the extent that the parties agree that subject matter jurisdiction
17
is lacking, or if Plaintiff no longer desires to pursue her claims in this action, the parties
18
shall submit a stipulation for dismissal, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41. If
19
no agreement is reached, Plaintiff shall show cause, in writing, why the instant action
20
should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as set forth above. The
21
stipulation for dismissal or Plaintiff’s written response to this Order shall be filed by no
22
later than February 7, 2014. Defendant shall file its response to Plaintiff’s memorandum, if
23
any, by February 14, 2014. The parties’ respective memoranda shall not exceed ten (10)
24
pages in length. The Court will deem the matter under submission upon the filing of
25
Defendant’s memorandum.
26
27
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 22, 2014
______________________________
SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG
United States District Judge
28
-6-
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?