North Richmond Senior Housing, Inc v. Muhammad

Filing 13

ORDER signed by Judge Saundra Brown Armstrong on 2/13/2014GRANTING 10 MOTION TO REMAND (terminating 3 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis). (Attachments: # 1 Certificate/Proof of Service) (ndr, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/14/2014)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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OAKLAND DIVISION

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7 NORTH RICHMOND SENIOR
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Plaintiff,

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v.

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Docket 10

Defendant.

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ORDER GRANTING
MOTION TO REMAND

JAMES KARIM MUHAMMAD,

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Case No: C 14-0299 SBA

HOUSING, INC.,

On December 6, 2013, Plaintiff North Richmond Senior Housing, Inc. (“Plaintiff”)
commenced the instant unlawful detainer action against Defendant James Karim
Muhammad (“Defendant”) in the Superior Court of California, County of Contra Costa.
Compl., Dkt. 1. The complaint seeks possession of certain real property located at 1555
Fred Jackson Way #318, Richmond, California 94801. See id. On January 21, 2014,
Defendant, proceeding pro se, removed the action to this Court on the basis of federal
question jurisdiction. See Notice of Removal, Dkt. 1. The parties are presently before the
Court on Plaintiff’s motion to remand. Dkt. 10. For the reasons stated below, the Court
GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion, and REMANDS the instant action to the Superior Court of
California, County of Contra Costa. The Court, in its discretion, finds this matter suitable
for resolution without oral argument. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 78(b); N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b).
I.

DISCUSSION
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Timeliness of Removal

Plaintiff contends that remand is appropriate because Defendant did not timely
remove this action. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) provides that a defendant must remove an action
within 30 days after his receipt, through service or otherwise, of the initial pleading setting

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forth the claim for relief upon which the action is based. Here, Defendant admits that he
received a copy of the complaint on December 8, 2013. Notice of Removal ¶ 2. However,
he did not file a Notice of Removal until 44 days later on January 21, 2014. Accordingly,
because Defendant did not remove this action within 30 days of his receipt of the
complaint, Plaintiff’s motion to remand is GRANTED.
B.

Federal Question Jurisdiction

Plaintiff contends that remand is also appropriate because there is no federal
question apparent on the face of the complaint, which only alleges a claim for unlawful
detainer. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) provides that “any civil action brought in a State court of
which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by
the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and
division embracing the place where such action is pending.” District courts “have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
“A case ‘arises under’ federal law either where federal law creates the cause of
action or ‘where the vindication of a right under state law necessarily turn[s] on some
construction of federal law.’ ” Republican Party of Guam v. Gutierrez, 277 F.3d 1086,
1088-1089 (9th Cir. 2002) (alteration in original) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr.
Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1983)). “ ‘[T]he presence or absence of federalquestion jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that
federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the
plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.’ ” Republican Party of Guam, 277 F.3d at 1089
(quoting Rivet v. Regions Bank, 522 U.S. 470, 475 (1998)). Federal subject matter
jurisdiction cannot be predicated on an actual or anticipated defense or counterclaim. See
Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 60 (2009).
A federal court must satisfy itself of its jurisdiction over the subject matter before
proceeding to the merits of the case. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 577,
583 (1999). In the case of a removed action, a district court must remand the case to state
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court “if at any time before the final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir.
1992). “The presumption against removal means that the defendant always has the burden
of establishing that removal is proper.” Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d
1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009). “[R]emoval statutes are strictly construed against removal.”
Luther v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP, 533 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 2008).
As such, any doubts regarding the propriety of the removal favor remanding the case. See
Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566.

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Here, Defendant contends that the Court has original jurisdiction over this unlawful
detainer action “under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1985, 42 U.S.C. §
1986, and 28 U.S.C. 1331.” See Notice of Removal ¶ 11. According to Defendant,
Plaintiff filed the instant action for the purpose of retaliating against him for filing a civil
action against Plaintiff in April 2008. Id. ¶ 3. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff seeks to
prevent him from prosecuting his lawsuit. Id. ¶¶ 3, 12. Defendant further asserts that
Plaintiff conspired with “the Honorable Lowell Richards, Commissioner of the Superior
Court . . . for the County of Contra Costa to deny [him his] . . . constitutional and statutory
right to a trial by jury in order to prevent [him] from attending to the lawsuit [he] filed
[against Plaintiff]” in violation of §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986. Id. ¶¶ 3, 13.

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In reviewing the complaint, it is readily apparent that this case does not satisfy the
jurisdictional requirements for federal subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s complaint
asserts a single claim for unlawful detainer and does not assert any federal claims. Thus, it
is facially apparent that this case does not meet the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 for
federal subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to remand is
GRANTED.
II.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
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Plaintiff’s motion to remand is GRANTED.

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The hearing currently scheduled for March 25, 2014 is VACATED.
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County of Contra Costa.

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The instant action is REMANDED to the Superior Court of California,

The Clerk shall close this file and terminate all pending matters.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

_______________________________
SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG
United States District Judge

2/13/2014

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