Heartland Payment Systems, Inc. v. Mercury Payments Systems LLC

Filing 62

ORDER by Judge Claudia Wilken DENYING 19 MOTION TO TRANSFER. (ndr, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 11/4/2014)

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1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 4 HEARTLAND PAYMENT SYSTEMS, INC., 5 No. C 14-0437 CW Plaintiff, 6 ORDER DENYING MOTION TO TRANSFER v. 7 8 (Docket No. 19) MERCURY PAYMENT SYSTEMS, LLC, Defendant. 9 ________________________________/ United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 Plaintiff Heartland Payment Systems (Heartland) asserts 12 various unfair business practice claims against Defendant Mercury 13 Payment Systems (Mercury). 14 the District of Colorado under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (Docket No. 15 19). 16 DENIES the motion to transfer. Heartland opposes. 17 18 Mercury moves to transfer the case to Having considered the papers, the Court BACKGROUND On January 29, 2014, Heartland, a New Jersey-based company 19 incorporated in Delaware, filed a complaint against Mercury, a 20 Colorado-based company incorporated in Delaware, alleging various 21 unfair business practices claims. 22 the Northern District of California. 23 The complaint was brought in Both parties are payment processors who provide businesses, 24 known as merchants, point-of-sale (POS) systems. 25 POS systems enable merchants to accept credit cards and debit 26 cards. 27 brands are able to receive their fees, merchants are able to 28 Id. at ¶ 9. Compl. ¶ 11. Through POS systems, banks and credit card 1 receive the proceeds from the sale, and consumers have their 2 accounts charged. 3 Id. The complaint alleges that Mercury engages in unfair business practices in violation of federal and California law. 5 companies use, although not exclusively, an “interchange-plus 6 pricing model.” 7 card brands charge a fee, typically as a percentage of the 8 transaction plus a per-transaction fee. 9 providers then charge an additional fee to the merchants as the 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 4 cost for being the intermediary between the banks, credit card 11 brands and the merchants. 12 is charged by the banks and credit card brands, and is not 13 controlled by the POS systems providers. 14 controlled by the POS system providers. 15 Id. Both According to this model, banks and credit Id. Id. at ¶ 16. POS systems The interchange fee is that which Id. The “plus” fee is Id. Heartland alleges that Mercury deceptively inflates the 16 interchange fee when presenting its pricing and billing to 17 merchants and prospective merchants. 18 an increase in the “plus” fee, Heartland alleges that Mercury 19 instead represents that any increase in the interchange-plus fee 20 is due to the banks and credit card brands increasing the 21 interchange fee. 22 Id. Rather than disclosing Id. Heartland’s claims center on how Mercury prices and bills its 23 services to merchants, as well as how it advertises its services. 24 Id. at ¶¶ 18-38. 25 Mercury: (1) false advertising in violation of 15 U.S.C. 26 § 1125(a)(1)(B) (Lanham Act); (2) unfair competition in violation 27 of California’s Unfair Competition Law, Business and Professions 28 Code section 17000 et seq. (UCL); (3) false advertising in Heartland asserts five causes of action against 2 1 violation of California Business and Professions Code section 2 17500 et seq.; (4) intentional interference with contractual 3 relations; and (5) intentional interference with prospective 4 economic advantage. LEGAL STANDARD 5 6 “For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the 7 interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil 8 action to any other district or division where it might have been 9 brought or to any district or division to which all parties have United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 consented.” 11 court has discretion to adjudicate motions for transfer according 12 to an individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience 13 and fairness. 14 the court to weigh multiple factors in its determination whether 15 transfer is appropriate in a particular case.” 16 Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495, 498 (9th Cir. 2000). 17 a motion for transfer, the moving party must establish: (1) that 18 venue is proper in the transferor district; (2) that the 19 transferee district is one where the action might have been 20 brought; and (3) that the transfer will serve the convenience of 21 the parties and witnesses and will promote the interest of 22 justice.” 23 WL 5568345, at *2 (N.D. Cal.) (citations omitted). 24 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). “Under § 1404(a), the district A motion to transfer venue under § 1404(a) requires Jones v. GNC “To support Reflex Packaging, Inc. v. Audio Video Color Corp., 2013 The Ninth Circuit considers the following factors to 25 determine whether to transfer venue: “(1) plaintiff's choice of 26 forum, (2) convenience of the parties, (3) convenience of the 27 witnesses, (4) ease of access to the evidence, (5) familiarity of 28 each forum with the applicable law, (6) feasibility of 3 1 consolidation with other claims, (7) any local interest in the 2 controversy, and (8) the relative court congestion and time of 3 trial in each forum.” 4 “The burden is on the defendant to show that, of the relevant 5 factors, the balance of convenience weighs in favor of transfer to 6 another district.” 7 Corp., 2010 WL 3619565, at *2 (N.D. Cal.) (citing Commodity 8 Futures Trading Comm’n v. Savage, 611 F.2d 270, 279 (9th Cir. 9 1979)). Id. (citing Jones, 211 F.3d at 498-99.) TransPerfect Global, Inc. v. Motionpoint United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 ANALYSIS 11 Mercury argues that the District of Colorado is a proper 12 venue, that convenience factors overwhelmingly favor the transfer 13 and that the interests of justice favor the transfer to discourage 14 forum-shopping. 15 I. Proper Venue 16 As an initial matter, the Court finds that venue is proper 17 either in this district or in the District of Colorado. Both 18 districts have personal jurisdiction over the parties. 19 parties agree that they both have sufficient contacts in both 20 states, and that those contacts satisfy the personal jurisdiction 21 “minimum contacts” analysis. 22 Wash., Office of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 316 23 (1945). 24 have subject matter jurisdiction over this case, both diversity 25 jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and federal question jurisdiction, 26 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 27 jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the Court finds that The See Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of In addition, the Court finds that courts in both venues Given that both fora have subject matter 28 4 1 courts in both venues have supplemental jurisdiction over the 2 state claims. 3 II. Convenience Factors 4 28 U.S.C. § 1367. “Once venue is determined to be proper in both districts, the 5 Court evaluates which venue is more convenient to the parties and 6 the witnesses.” 7 Mercury argues that “convenience factors overwhelmingly favor 8 transfer,” because “the alleged acts giving rise to the claims 9 occurred in Colorado, the majority of witnesses (party and Reflex Packaging, 2103 WL 5568345, at *3. United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 nonparty) reside in Colorado, and virtually all documentary 11 evidence is located in Colorado.” 12 counters that this district is the most convenient venue because 13 it is its preferred forum, many of the acts in question occurred 14 in California, and many third-party witnesses and evidence is 15 located here. Docket No. 19 at 8. Heartland 16 A. Heartland’s choice of forum 17 The plaintiff’s choice of forum is generally given deference. 18 Jones, 211 F.3d at 498-99. 19 choice of forum should be given little weight because “the 20 operative facts giving rise to this complaint occurred in 21 Colorado.” 22 occurred within the forum of original selection and that forum has 23 no particular interest in the parties or the subject matter, the 24 plaintiff’s choice is entitled only to minimal consideration.” 25 Pac. Car & Foundry Co. v. Pence, 403 F.2d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 26 1968). 27 28 Mercury alleges that Heartland’s Docket No. 19 at 14. “If the operative facts have not The operative acts alleged in the complaint occurred in California. The crux of Heartland’s suit is that Mercury engaged 5 1 in deceptive business practices; because California accounts for a 2 sizable percentage of each entity’s business, Heartland alleges 3 that much of the deceptive practices occurred in California. 4 Furthermore, Heartland provides, with specificity, the names of 5 California merchants Mercury allegedly deceived. 6 factor weighs against transfer. Thus, this 7 B. Convenience of the parties 8 Mercury argues that it will be inconvenient to litigate this 9 matter in this district. Mercury is headquartered in Colorado, United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 and has no offices in California. 11 offices in California and 181 employees in the state. 12 one Colorado office. 13 Colorado would shift the inconvenience of one party to the other 14 party. 15 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (“If the gain of convenience to one party is 16 offset by the added inconvenience to the other, the courts have 17 denied transfer of the action.”) 18 transfer. 19 20 21 Heartland has, however, two It has only Transferring this case to the District of See STX, Inc. v. Trik Stik, Inc., 708 F. Supp. 1551, 1556 Thus, this factor weighs against C. Convenience to witnesses 1. Party witnesses The convenience of witnesses is often the most important 22 factor in deciding whether to transfer an action. Getz v. Boeing 23 Co., 547 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1083 (N.D. Cal. 2008). The convenience 24 of witnesses includes “a separate but related concern, the 25 availability of compulsory process to bring unwilling witnesses 26 live before the jury.” 27 Supp. 2d 820, 820 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 28 inconvenience to the parties’ employees, whom the parties can Brackett v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 619 F. 6 The Court, however, discounts 1 compel to testify. See STX, Inc., 708 F. Supp. at 1556. Mercury argues that it would be inconvenient for it to 3 litigate in this district because “key party . . . witnesses in 4 this case reside in Colorado.” 5 it argues that its “employees . . . will be the key witnesses in 6 this case,” and that “virtually all of Mercury’s current employees 7 live and work in Colorado.” 8 employees residing in California, including its Executive Director 9 of Business Development, who will likely be called to testify. 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 2 Given that the Court discounts the inconvenience to Mercury’s 11 employees, this factor weighs against transfer. 12 13 Docket No. 19 at 9. Id. Specifically, Heartland has, however, 181 2. Non-party witnesses As stated above, the convenience of witnesses is often the 14 most important factor in deciding whether to transfer an action. 15 Mercury points to its former employees, including former sales 16 executives, as some of the “key witnesses” in this case. 17 rightly points out that Colorado non-party witnesses cannot be 18 compelled to appear in this Court. 19 not stated, however, why the former employees would have 20 information its current employees lack. 21 has not shown how the inability to compel the non-party witnesses 22 would lead to unfair prejudice. 23 Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c). Mercury It has In other words, Mercury On the other hand, Heartland has identified several 24 California witnesses, including merchants, who can be compelled to 25 appear in this Court. 26 out of events that occurred in California, and that the deceptive Given that Heartland’s allegations arise 27 28 7 1 practices have California “victims” whom Heartland will likely 2 call to testify, California is more convenient to potential non- 3 party witnesses. Thus, this factor weighs against transfer. 4 D. Access to evidence 5 The “costs of litigation can . . . be substantially lessened 6 if the venue is in the district in which most of the documentary 7 evidence is stored.” 8 Supp. 2d 1088, 1095 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 9 has decreased, however, as technological advances in document Park v. Dole Fresh Vegetables, Inc., 964 F. The weight of this factor United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 storage and retrieval have greatly reduced the burden of 11 transporting documents between districts. 12 2d at 820; David v. Alphin, 2007 WL 39400, at *3 (N.D. Cal.) 13 (“with technological advances in document storage and retrieval, 14 transporting documents does not generally create a burden”). 15 Brackett, 619 F. Supp. Mercury claims that “the sources of proof are almost 16 exclusively located in Colorado.” 17 sources include “advertising and promotional materials,” its 18 website and social media communications. 19 however, that key evidence -- “monthly billing statements” -- is 20 printed in Michigan. 21 are not electronically stored (which is unlikely), the cost of 22 transmitting that evidence from Michigan to Colorado will be 23 equivalent to the cost of transmitting it from Michigan to 24 California. Id. Docket No. 19 at 12. Id. These Mercury admits, Even assuming those monthly statements Thus, this factor is neutral. 25 26 27 28 8 1 E. Forum’s familiarity with the applicable law 2 Four of Heartland’s five causes of action arise out of 3 alleged violations of California law. 4 states that the District of Colorado would have jurisdiction over 5 Heartland’s state claims and would apply California law, it is 6 clear that this Court is more familiar with California law than 7 any non-California district court. 8 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1081 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (“A California district 9 court is more familiar with California law than district courts in United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 other states”). While Mercury rightly See In re Ferrero Litig., 768 Thus, this factor weighs against transfer. 11 F. Feasibility of consolidation 12 There are no related cases pending in the federal District of 13 Colorado. Thus, the factor is neutral. 14 G. Local interest in the controversy 15 This Court has held that when the case implicates the rights 16 of a state’s residents, a court in that state has a greater 17 interest in the dispute than a court in another state. 18 Transperfect, 2010 WL 36195565, at *4. 19 alleged that the rights of California residents are implicated, as 20 they have been the victims of unfair and deceptive business 21 practices. 22 residents are implicated, nor does it assert that the rights of 23 Colorado residents are at stake. 24 transfer. Here, Heartland has Mercury does not dispute that the rights of California Thus, this factor weighs against 25 26 27 28 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 H. Relative court congestion Heartland alleges that the median time from filing a complaint to trial is similar in both districts (24.6 months in this district, and 24.4 months in the District of Colorado.) The backlogs are not significantly disproportionate; thus, this factor is neutral. III. Forum-Shopping “Evidence of forum-shopping by a plaintiff supports a defendant’s motion to transfer venue.” Lucas v. Daiichi Sankyo Co., 2011 WL 2020443, at *4 (N.D. Cal.). Mercury argues that “the interests of justice favor transfer to discourage forum-shopping.” Docket No. 19 at 15. It asserts that the parties and the subject matter “are disconnected from California” and “have nothing to do with California.” Id. Heartland has alleged, however, that many of the operative acts occurred in California, and that both parties have contacts in the state. Courts have found evidence of forum shopping when a party does not reside in the district, see id., or when, in a class action, the class members reside outside of the state, see Wilson v. Walgreen Co., 2011 WL 4345079, at *3 (N.D. Cal.). While Heartland does not reside in this district, it does have significant contacts in the district due to its California office and employees. Thus, the Court does not find sufficient evidence to support an inference that Heartland is forum-shopping. 25 26 27 28 10 1 2 IV. Balancing of Factors All of the factors weigh against transfer or are neutral. 3 Thus, Mercury has failed to show that the balance of 4 inconveniences favors transfer to the District of Colorado. 5 6 7 CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Mercury’s motion to transfer (Docket No. 19) is DENIED. 8 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 12 Dated: November 4, 2014 CLAUDIA WILKEN United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 11

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