Woods v. Valenzuela

Filing 68

ORDER by Judge Claudia Wilken granting 55 Motion to Strike. (ig, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 12/7/2018)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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FREDERICK NEWHALL WOODS,

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Plaintiff,

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ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
STRIKE

v.
JENNIFER SHAFFER, EXECUTIVE
OFFICER OF THE CALIFORNIA
BOARD OF PAROLE HEARINGS

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

Case No. 14-cv-01936-CW

(Dkt. No. 55)

Defendant.1

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Plaintiff Frederick Newhall Woods, a state prisoner, has

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moved, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), to

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strike all but one of the affirmative defenses pled by Defendant

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Jennifer Shaffer, the Executive Officer of the California Board

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of Parole Hearings (BPH).

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response and Plaintiff’s reply.

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the reasons below.

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The Court is in receipt of Defendant’s
The Court GRANTS the motion for

BACKGROUND

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Plaintiff initially filed a federal habeas petition in this

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case.

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appealed.

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Plaintiff’s claim sounds in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 rather than habeas

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and that Plaintiff should be afforded leave to amend his petition

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to assert his claim under § 1983.

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an amended complaint, converting his petition to a § 1983 action

The Court denied Plaintiff’s petition, and Plaintiff
The Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that

Plaintiff subsequently filed

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The Court ORDERS the case name changed from “Frederick
Newhall Woods v. Elvin Valenzuela” to “Frederick Newhall Woods v.
Jennifer Shaffer, Executive Officer of the California Board of
Parole Hearings.”

in accordance with the Ninth Circuit’s memorandum disposition and

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mandate.

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remedy an alleged violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due

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process rights and to prevent future violations of the same

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nature.

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actions, practices and policies allowed Jeffrey Ferguson—who had

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a pecuniary interest in denying Plaintiff parole—to preside over

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Plaintiff’s 2012 parole consideration hearing and adjudicate his

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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parole application.

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Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief to

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s

Plaintiff’s 2012 parole application was

denied.

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LEGAL STANDARD

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The Court “may strike from a pleading an insufficient

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defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous

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matter.”

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motion is to avoid spending time and money litigating spurious

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issues.

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1993), rev’d on other grounds, 510 U.S. 517 (1994).

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f).

The purpose of a Rule 12(f)

Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir.

While the Ninth Circuit has not ruled on this issue, this

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Court has held that an affirmative defense is insufficient if it

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fails to meet the heightened pleading standard set forth in Bell

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Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v.

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Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).

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Inc., No. 10-cv-945-CW, 2012 WL 1746848, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 16,

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2012).

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Powertech Tech., Inc. v. Tessera,

A defense is also insufficient if “there are no questions of

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fact,” “any questions of law are clear and not in dispute,” and

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“under no set of circumstances could the defense succeed.”

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Securities & Exchange Comm’n v. Sands, 902 F. Supp. 1149, 1165
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(C.D. Cal. 1995) (internal quotation marks and citations

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omitted).

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Otherwise, matter is immaterial if it has no essential or

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important relationship to the claim for relief pled. Fantasy,

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Inc., 984 F.2d at 1527.

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pertain and is not necessary to the issues in question in the

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case. Id.

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Matter is impertinent if it does not

Motions to strike are disfavored because they are often used
as delaying tactics and because of the limited importance of

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pleadings in federal practice.

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1450, 1478 (C.D. Cal. 1996).

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with a motion to dismiss, the court should view the pleading in

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the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”

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Bolt, Inc. v. IHI, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1057 (N.D. Cal.

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2004).

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clear that the matter to be stricken could have no possible

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bearing on the subject matter of the litigation.”

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Sun Microsystems, Inc., 758 F. Supp. 1335, 1339 (N.D. Cal. 1991).

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“Ultimately, whether to grant a motion to strike lies within the

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sound discretion of the district court.”

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Mellon, No. 12-cv-00846-LHK, 2012 WL 2838957, at *2 (N.D. Cal.

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July 10, 2012).

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prejudice to the opposing party, leave to amend should be freely

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given.”

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1979).

Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922 F. Supp.

“With a motion to strike, just as

Platte Anchor

A motion to strike “should not be granted unless it is

Colaprico v.

Cruz v. Bank of N.Y.

If a defense is struck, “[i]n the absence of

Wyshak v. City Nat. Bank, 607 F.2d 824, 826 (9th Cir.

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ANALYSIS

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Plaintiff moves to strike affirmative defenses one, four

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through seven, and ten through nineteen without leave to amend,
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and affirmative defenses two, three, and eight with leave to

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amend.

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affirmative defenses one through eight, fourteen, fifteen, and

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nineteen.

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affirmative defenses two, three, and eight, and STRIKES without

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leave to amend affirmative defenses one, four through seven,

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fourteen, fifteen, and nineteen.

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Defendant does not oppose Plaintiff’s motion as to

Accordingly, the Court STRIKES with leave to amend

The Court addresses Plaintiff’s motion as to those
affirmative defenses that remain at issue: ten through thirteen
and sixteen through eighteen.
Affirmative defense ten states: “Defendant is not

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vicariously liable for any act or omission of any other person,

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including Ferguson, by way of respondeat superior or otherwise.”

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Docket No. 54 at 5.

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is immaterial and impertinent.

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Complaint (3AC) does not allege that Defendant is vicariously

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liable, nor could it.

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1085 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that supervisors are liable “for

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their own conduct” only in the § 1983 context).

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defense is unnecessary.

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affirmative defense ten without leave to amend.

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Plaintiff correctly argues that this defense
The operative Third Amended

See Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076,

This affirmative

Accordingly, the Court STRIKES

Affirmative defense eleven states: “Plaintiff’s request for

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declaratory judgment is not cognizable under § 1983 because a

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declaratory judgment would necessarily imply the invalidity of

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Plaintiff’s November 2012 parole-consideration hearing.”

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No. 54 at 5.

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insufficient as a matter of law.

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the 3AC seeks would dictate that:

Docket

Plaintiff correctly argues that this defense is
The declaratory judgment that

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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(a) [BPH]’s policy, custom, and practice of permitting
its commissioners to adjudicate parole applications
when they have personal, direct, and substantial
pecuniary interest in denying parole violates the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution;
(b) 15 C.C.R. § 2250 is inconsistent with the
requirements of the United States Constitution to the
extent that it fails to require the disqualification of
a parole decisionmaker if he or she has a direct,
personal, and substantial pecuniary interest in the
outcome of the parole decision; and (c) defendant’s
actions complained of herein violated plaintiff’s right
to a fair and impartial adjudicator under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution[.]
3AC at 9, Docket No. 50.
Defendant’s reliance on Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477
(1994), to support the sufficiency of her defense is unavailing.
Heck is not concerned with the validity of parole consideration
hearings.

Heck held that a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that his

or her conviction or sentence was reversed, expunged,
invalidated, or called into question by the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus before he or she can “recover damages for allegedly
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm
caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or
sentence invalid . . . .”

Id. at 486–87 (footnote omitted).

However, “if the district court determines that the plaintiff’s
action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity
of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the
action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other
bar to the suit.”

Id. at 487 (footnotes omitted and emphasis in

original).
Here, Plaintiff’s action, if successful, will not invalidate
or cause to be invalidated Plaintiff’s conviction or
imprisonment.

The 3AC is consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s
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memorandum disposition holding that Plaintiff’s claim falls

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outside “‘the core of habeas corpus’ and is therefore not

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cognizable in habeas.”

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(quoting Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 931, 935 (9th Cir.

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2016) (en banc)).

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judgment would not necessarily result in earlier release” because

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the ultimate relief Plaintiff seeks through his petition is “‘a

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new parole hearing at which . . . parole authorities may, in

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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their discretion, decline to shorten his prison term.’”

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(quoting Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005)).

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Accordingly, the Court STRIKES affirmative defense eleven without

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leave to amend.

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9th Cir. Mem. Disp. at 3, Docket No. 29

The Ninth Circuit explained that “a favorable

Id. at 4

Affirmative defense twelve states: “Plaintiff’s request for

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an injunction vacating Plaintiff’s 2012 parole denial is not

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cognizable under § 1983 because it would necessarily imply the

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invalidity of Plaintiff’s 2012 parole-consideration hearing.”

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Docket No. 54 at 5.

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fails as a matter of law.

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Plaintiff correctly argues that this defense
The 3AC seeks an injunction:

(1) enjoining and prohibiting the enforcement of 15
C.C.R. § 2250 when it is applied to permit the Board to
adjudicate the parole suitability of a California
inmate through a commissioner with a direct, personal,
and substantial pecuniary interest in the outcome of
the suitability adjudication; and (2) ordering
defendant to vacate Woods’ 2012 parole denial and to
schedule a new and fair parole consideration hearing
before an unbiased adjudicator within 30 days of the
finality of the Court’s decision[.]
3AC at 9.
Defendant’s reliance on Heck to support the sufficiency of

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her defense fails for the same reason that it failed in relation

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to affirmative defense eleven.

Edwards v. Balisok, on which
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Defendant also relies to support the sufficiency of her defense,

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is similarly inapposite.

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States Supreme Court held that a prisoner’s action was not

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cognizable under § 1983 because his challenge to procedures used

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in his disciplinary hearing necessarily implied the invalidity of

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his conviction or sentence.

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here as explained in the Ninth Circuit’s memorandum disposition.

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See 9th Cir. Mem. Disp. at 3–4.

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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affirmative defense twelve without leave to amend.

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520 U.S. 641 (1997).

Id. at 645–47.

There, the United

The same is not true

Accordingly, the Court STRIKES

Affirmative defense thirteen states: “Plaintiff’s request

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for a permanent injunction violates the Prison Litigation Reform

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Act because it is not narrowly drawn, extends further than

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necessary, and is not the least intrusive means necessary to

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correct any alleged harm.”

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Docket No. 54 at 5.

Plaintiff argues that “an objection to the scope of the

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injunction sought is not an affirmative defense,” but rather “a

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negative.”

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which the Ninth Circuit held that an objection to the scope of an

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injunction sought is a valid affirmative defense, and the Court

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is aware of none.

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phase, Defendant may raise her objection to the scope of the

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injunction then.

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answer.

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thirteen without leave to amend.

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Docket No. 57 at 5.

Neither party cites a case in

Should this case proceed to the remedies

Defendant’s objection is misplaced in an

Accordingly, the Court STRIKES affirmative defense

Affirmative defense sixteen states: “Plaintiff’s request for

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a declaratory judgment that Defendant’s actions violated his

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Fourteenth Amendment rights is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”

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Docket No. 54 at 5.

Plaintiff correctly argues that this defense
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fails as a matter of law.

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Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc. to support

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the sufficiency of her defense is unavailing.

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(1993).

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209 U.S. 123 (1908), applies “only to prospective relief” and

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“does not permit judgments against state officers declaring that

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they violated federal law in the past.”

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(internal citation omitted).

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Metcalf cites Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64 (1985).

Defendant’s reliance on Puerto Rico

506 U.S. 139

Metcalf concluded that the doctrine in Ex parte Young,

Metcalf, 506 U.S. at 146

To support this proposition,
There, the

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petitioners had brought class actions claiming that the

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respondent’s calculations of benefits under an aid program

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violated federal law.

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declaratory and notice relief “related solely to past violations

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of federal law,” which had subsequently changed.

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United States Supreme Court determined that declaratory judgment

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was improper because there was (1) “no claimed continuing

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violation of federal law, and therefore no occasion to issue an

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injunction,” and (2) no “threat of state officials violating the

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repealed law in the future.”

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that “the issuance of a declaratory judgment in these

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circumstances would have much the same effect as a full-fledged

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award of damages or restitution by the federal court, the latter

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kinds of relief being of course prohibited by the Eleventh

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Amendment.”

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continuing violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, see 9th Cir.

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Mem. Disp. at 3 (holding that Plaintiff’s “alleged due process

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violation in the 2012 proceeding inflicts a continuing harm”);

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Defendant may in the future violate Plaintiff’s constitutional

Id.

Id. at 64.

The petitioners sought

Id. at 73.

The

The Court determined

The same is not true here.

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Id. at 67.

Plaintiff claims a

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rights in the same fashion complained of; and the declaratory

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judgment sought would not entitle Plaintiff to an award of

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damages or restitution, nor does Plaintiff seek such relief.

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Accordingly, the Court STRIKES affirmative defense sixteen

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without leave to amend.
Affirmative defense seventeen states: “Plaintiff’s request

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for an injunction ordering Defendant to vacate Plaintiff’s 2012

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parole denial is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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54 at 5.

Docket No.

Plaintiff correctly argues that this defense fails as a

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matter of law.

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is impermissibly retroactive and that Plaintiff’s continued

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incarceration is the result of his 2015 parole denial run

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directly counter to the Ninth Circuit’s memorandum disposition,

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which states:

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Defendant’s arguments that the injunction sought

Woods received a 2015 parole hearing and was again
denied parole. But the sole reason the 2015 parole
hearing occurred was that Woods was denied parole in
2012 based on a process he alleges was constitutionally
deficient; the 2012 denial made Woods’ continued
incarceration possible, and it is the ongoing injury
from that particular proceeding that Woods seeks to
remedy. So long as Woods is incarcerated, he will
continue to experience the effects of the 2012 denial
and any constitutional injuries he suffered.

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9th Cir. Mem. Disp. at 3 (emphasis in original).

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the Court STRIKES affirmative defense seventeen without leave to

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amend.

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Accordingly,

Affirmative defense eighteen states: “The Eleventh Amendment

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bars Plaintiff from any relief, except prospective relief.”

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Docket No. 54 at 5–6.

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defense fails as a matter of law.

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conclusory fashion that “Plaintiff requests retroactive relief.”

Plaintiff correctly argues that this

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Defendant counters in

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Docket No. 56 at 5.

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purpose of preventing present and future harm” and cannot be

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“characterized solely as retroactive.”

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F.3d 816, 825 (9th Cir. 2007); see 9th Cir. Mem. Disp. at 3.

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Accordingly, the Court STRIKES affirmative defense eighteen

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without leave to amend.

The relief Plaintiff seeks “serve[s] the

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Flint v. Dennison, 488

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to
strike.

Defendant may file an amended answer within fourteen

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days of this Order’s issuance, if she can remedy the deficiencies

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in affirmative defenses two, three and eight.

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motion hearing and further case management conference is set for

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May 7, 2019, at 2:30 p.m.

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management statement one week prior to the setting.

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pretrial conference is set for August 6, 2019, at 2:30 p.m., and

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a two-day bench trial will begin at 8:30 a.m. on August 19, 2019.

A dispositive

The parties shall file a case
A final

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: December 7, 2018
CLAUDIA WILKEN
United States District Judge

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