James Schoenfeld v. Elvin Valenzuela

Filing 19

ORDER denying 17 Motion for Evidentiary Hearing; denying 18 Motion for Oral Argument; denying 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (cwlc2, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/19/2015)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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JAMES LEONARD SCHOENFELD,

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No. C 14-2993 CW

Petitioner,

ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR
EVIDENTIARY
HEARING (Docket
No. 17); DENYING
MOTION FOR ORAL
ARGUMENT (Docket
No. 81); DENYING
PETITION FOR WRIT
OF HABEAS CORPUS
(Docket No. 1)

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v.

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ELVIN VALENZUELA, Warden,
Respondent.

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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________________________________/
Petitioner James Leonard Schoenfeld, a state prisoner, seeks

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a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

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addition, Petitioner moves for an evidentiary hearing and oral

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argument on his petition.

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by a parole hearing panel chaired by a commissioner with an

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undisclosed, disqualifying conflict of interest, in violation of

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his due process right to an impartial decisionmaker.

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Elvin Valenzuela opposes the petition.

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traverse.

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Having considered all of the papers submitted by the parties, the

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Court denies the petition.

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In

Petitioner claims he was denied parole

Respondent

Petitioner filed a

The matter was taken under submission on the papers.

BACKGROUND
In July 1976, Petitioner hijacked a school bus, kidnapping

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the driver and twenty-six children.

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twenty-seven separate counts of kidnapping for ransom; he

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initially received concurrent sentences of life imprisonment

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without the possibility of parole on each count, but this was

Petitioner plead guilty to

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modified on appeal to reflect a life sentence with the possibility

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of parole.

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Petitioner's most recent parole hearing was held on March 13,

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2013, at the prison where he is in custody, the California Men's

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Colony in San Luis Obispo, California.

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by a two-person panel, with Jeffrey Ferguson as presiding

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commissioner and Raquel Fassnacht as deputy commissioner.

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representative from the Alameda County District Attorney's Office

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appeared at the hearing to oppose Petitioner's parole.

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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That hearing was conducted

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At the

conclusion of the hearing, the panel denied Petitioner parole.
At some time after the hearing, Mr. Ferguson took a position

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as an investigator for the Alameda County District Attorney's

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Office.

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for this position several months before Petitioner's parole

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hearing, and argues that Mr. Ferguson's failure to recuse or at

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least to disclose this potential conflict of interest denied him

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his due process right to a hearing before an unbiased adjudicator.

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Petitioner alleges that Mr. Ferguson made his application

In response to the Board's decision, Petitioner sought, but

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was denied, relief on state collateral review.1

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habeas petition followed.

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This federal

STANDARD OF REVIEW

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A federal writ of habeas corpus may not be granted with

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respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state

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court unless the state's adjudication of the claims: "(1) resulted

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His petition was denied by California Superior Court and
the California Court of Appeal; the California Supreme Court
denied his petition for review. In re Schoenfeld, 2014 Cal. LEXIS
4189 (2014).
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in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

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application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

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the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a

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decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the

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facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

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proceeding."

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28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

"Under the 'contrary to' clause, a federal habeas court may

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grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite

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to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme]

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Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts."

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Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000).

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'unreasonable application' clause, a federal habeas court may

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grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing

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legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but

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unreasonably applies that principle to the facts in the prisoner's

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case."

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established federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is the holdings

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of the Supreme Court as of the time of the relevant state court

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decision.

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binding on the state courts and only those holdings need to be

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reasonably applied, circuit law may be persuasive authority in

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analyzing whether a state court unreasonably applied Supreme Court

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authority.

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2003).

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Id. at 413.

"Under the

The only definitive source of clearly

Id. at 412.

Although only Supreme Court precedents are

Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1070-71 (9th Cir.

To determine whether the state court's decision is contrary

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to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

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established law, a federal court looks to the decision of the
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highest state court that addressed the merits of a petitioner's

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claim in a reasoned decision.

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669 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000).2

LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663,

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DISCUSSION

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Here, Petitioner has not demonstrated even that there is

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"clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

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Court of the United States," much less that the state court's

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reasoned opinion is contrary to or an unreasonable application of

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such clearly established United States Supreme Court law.

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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The Due Process Clause establishes the right to an impartial

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and disinterested tribunal.

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(1975).

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honesty and integrity.

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741 (9th Cir. 1995).

Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46

However, members of a tribunal are presumed to act with
Id. at 47; Stivers v. Pierce, 71 F.3d 732,
To overcome this presumption, a petitioner

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As Petitioner acknowledges, this case arrives in a
"somewhat unusual procedural circumstance." Pet. (Docket No. 1)
at 14. Petitioner's co-defendant in the kidnapping, Frederick
Newhall Woods, made an earlier state court petition for habeas
relief, which the California Court of Appeal denied in a one-page,
reasoned decision. In re Woods, No. A140539, slip op. (Feb. 6,
2014). However, when presented shortly thereafter with the same
claims by Petitioner, the California Court of Appeal denied them
without providing any reason, writing only: "The petition for
habeas corpus is denied." In re Schoenfeld, No. A141029, slip op.
(Apr. 4, 2014).
Here, Petitioner does not ask that this Court treat the
California Court of Appeal's denial of his petition as an
unreasoned opinion, but rather, states that "this Court could
conclude with confidence that the state court applied the same
reasoning in rejecting Schoenfeld's claim as it did in rejecting
Woods'" and contends that the same arguments that Mr. Woods made
in his petition apply equally in the present case. Therefore,
this Court does not consider the California Court of Appeal's
Schoenfeld decision to be an unreasoned opinion to be reviewed de
novo, but rather, infers that the California Court of Appeal
denied Petitioner's request for habeas relief for the same reasons
that it denied Mr. Woods'.
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"must show that the adjudicator has prejudged, or reasonably

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appears to have prejudged, an issue."

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Stivers, 71 F.3d at 741.

First, there is no clearly established United States Supreme

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Court precedent on this question, because the Court "ha[s] not

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considered the question of whether a decision of a multimember

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tribunal must be vacated because of the participation of one

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member who had an interest in the outcome of the case."

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Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 827 (1986);3 Stivers, 71

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F.3d at 746-47 ("Neither this court nor the Supreme Court has

Aetna

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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addressed whether bias on the part of one member of a multi-person

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tribunal violates due process, without any showing that that

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member's bias affected the tribunal's decision.").

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here, the question before the Court is one that the Supreme Court

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expressly declined to answer, there is no clearly established

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Supreme Court precedent.

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(9th Cir. 2012).

Where, as

Meras v. Sisto, 676 F.3d 1184, 1188-90

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Petitioner argues that the Supreme Court's more recent

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decision in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868

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(2009), controls.

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court justice must recuse when the circumstances of his election

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call into question his ability to decide a particular case

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impartially.

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a factual scenario it described as "extreme by any measure,"

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resulting in "an extraordinary situation where the Constitution

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requires recusal."

Id.

Caperton concerned whether a state supreme

However, the Caperton court was presented with

Id. at 887.

In light of those extraordinary

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In fact, in Lavoie the Court expressly declined to address
this question. 475 U.S. at 827 n.4.
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facts, Caperton merely applied the existing rule that "there are

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objective standards that require recusal when 'the probability of

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actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high

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to be constitutionally tolerable.'"

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421 U.S. at 35).

Id. at 872 (quoting Withrow,

No such extraordinary facts exist in this case.

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In addition, the decision of California Court of Appeal

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denying Petitioner's claim for habeas relief was neither contrary

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to, nor an unreasonable application of, federal law.

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footnote 2, above, the California Court of Appeal denied

As noted in

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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Petitioner relief for the same reasons articulated in its opinion

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in In re Woods, which reads, in its entirety:

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Having reviewed the petition and accompanying
exhibits, the Attorney General's informal
response and petitioner's reply, we conclude the
record discloses "some evidence" supporting the
Board of Parole's determination that petitioner
would "pose a danger to the public interest if
released on parole. [Citations.]" (In re
Shaputis (2011) 53 Cal. 4th 192, 214.)
We also reject petitioner's due process claim
based on the allegation one of the two
Commissioners who presided at the parole hearing
did not disclose he had submitted an employment
application to the District Attorney's Office
with which the prosecuting attorney who appeared
at the hearing and argued against the grant of
parole is employed. A party claiming a parole
hearing panel is not impartial must demonstrate
"individualized prejudice"--i.e., show panel
members "have specific prejudice . . . against
the particular prisoner." (Hornung v. Superior
Court (2000) 81 Cal. App. 4th 1095, 1100; see
also Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 2250,
subd. (a)(3) [disqualification of hearing panel
member requires actual prejudice or bias "to the
extent that [panel member] cannot make an
objective decision"]; Southern Cal. Underground
Contractors, Inc. v. City of San Diego (2003) 108
Cal. App. 4th 533, 549 ["a party claiming that
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the decision maker was biased must show actual
bias, rather than the appearance of bias, to
establish a fair hearing violation"].)
Petitioner has not made a prima facie showing of
actual, specific prejudice against him.

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The petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.

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In re Woods, No. A140539, slip op. (Feb. 6, 2014) (Docket No. 1-1,

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at 438).

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Petitioner argues that the state court erred by applying an

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actual prejudice standard when Caperton does not require such a

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showing.

As noted above, the extraordinary factual circumstances

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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of Caperton are not present in this case.

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has previously held that "federal habeas relief is limited to

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those instances where there is proof of actual bias, or of a

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possible temptation so severe that one might presume an actual,

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substantial incentive to be biased."

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U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116437, at *45 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (citing Del

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Vecchio v. Illinois Dep't of Corr., 31 F.3d 1363, 1380 (7th Cir.

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1994) (en banc)).

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present case.

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In addition, this Court

Smart v. Harrington, 2011

The Court finds no such circumstances in the

"The Due Process Clause demarks only the outer boundaries of

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judicial disqualifications."

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Petitioner's situation does not lie at the "outer boundaries," and

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therefore, it does not implicate the Due Process Clause.

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Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 828.

CONCLUSION
Petitioner's Motion for an Evidentiary Hearing (Docket No.

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17) is denied as unnecessary.

An evidentiary hearing is not

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required unless Petitioner offers specific allegations that, if

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proven, would demonstrate entitlement to relief.

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Mahoney, 611 F.3d 978, 998 (9th Cir. 2010).
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Smith v.

Petitioner offered no

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such allegations here.

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(Docket No. 18) is also denied.

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Petitioner's Motion for Oral Argument

For the foregoing reasons, the state court's adjudication of

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Petitioner's claims did not result in a decision that was contrary

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to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

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established federal law, nor did it result in a decision that was

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based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

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the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.

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Accordingly, the Court DENIES the Petition for Writ of Habeas

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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Corpus (Docket No. 1).
Further, a certificate of appealability is DENIED.

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Reasonable jurists would not "find the district court's assessment

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of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong."

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McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

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certificate of appealability from the Ninth Circuit Court of

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Appeals.

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Respondent and close the file.

Slack v.

Petitioner may seek a

The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in favor of

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: February 19, 2015

CLAUDIA WILKEN
United States District Judge

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