Garedakis v. Brentwood Union School District

Filing 62

Order by Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu re: 56 Discovery Letter Brief.(dmrlc2, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 4/27/2015)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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MICHAEL GAREDAKIS, et al.,

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Case No. 14-cv-04799-PJH (DMR)

Plaintiffs,
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v.

ORDER RE: JOINT DISCOVERY
LETTER

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BRENTWOOD UNION SCHOOL
DISTRICT, et al.,

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Defendants.

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

Re: Dkt. No. 56

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The parties have filed a joint discovery letter. [Docket No. 56.] The parties agree that this

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case requires a protective order, as litigation may potentially reveal sensitive information. They

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also agree to adopt the court’s Model Protective Order (“MPO”)1 in large part. However, they

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propose competing modifications to the MPO’s definition of “Confidential Information or Items”

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in Section 2.2. The court finds that this matter is appropriate for resolution without oral argument

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pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b).

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I.

BACKGROUND

Six special education students and their families filed this lawsuit. The students were all

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assigned to the classroom of Defendant Dina Holder, a special education teacher at Loma Vista

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and Krey Elementary Schools in Brentwood, California. In the Second Amended Complaint

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[“SAC”, Docket No. 35], Plaintiffs allege that Holder subjected her students (who then ranged

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from ages three to six) to verbal, psychological, and physical abuse over a period of approximately

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four years, from the 2008-2009 to the 2012-2013 school years. SAC at ¶¶ 28-29.
The other individually-named Defendants are current and former BUSD administrators.

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The MPO is available online at http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/model-protective-orders.

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Id. at ¶¶ 16-22. The SAC alleges that as early as 2008, these Defendants had knowledge that

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students in Holder’s classroom were being subjected to abuse or neglect; had an obligation to

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protect the students but did not do so; failed to adequately train their employees; failed to

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adequately supervise the special education program; failed to remove Holder from the classroom;

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and failed to take any measures in response to reports of abuse by Holder. Id. at ¶¶ 30-37.

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II.

DISCOVERY DISPUTE

Section 2.2 of the MPO defines information that is considered confidential:

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2.2
“CONFIDENTIAL” Information or Items:
information
(regardless of how it is generated, stored or maintained) or tangible
things that qualify for protection under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(c).

United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), in turn, authorizes a court to protect a party from

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“annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense” upon a showing of good

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cause. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1).

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On top of this standard definition, the parties agree that the protective order should

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incorporate stipulations and protective orders from previous lawsuits involving the same events.

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However, Plaintiffs’ proposal does not cover material from the previous lawsuits that has become

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part of the public domain. The parties competing proposals are as follows:

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Plaintiffs’ Proposed Language
This Stipulation and Protective Order
incorporates the Stipulations and Protective
Orders previously entered into in the Phelan
v. Brentwood Union School District, Case No.
C 12-00465 (LB) and Guerrero, et al. v
Brentwood Union School District litigation
(C-13-03873-LB) which remain in full force
and effect except to the extent that
information has become part of the public
domain pursuant to Section 3 below.
[emphasis added]

Defendants’ Proposed Language
This Stipulation and Protective Order
incorporates the Stipulations and Protective
Orders previously entered into in the Phelan
v. Brentwood Union School District, Case
No. C 12-00465 (LB) and Guerrero, et al. v
Brentwood Union School District litigation
(C-13-03873-LB) which remain in full force
and effect.

The parties also propose that specific categories of documents be deemed confidential, but
disagree as to which categories:

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Plaintiffs’ Proposed Language
In addition, the parties agree that the
following information or items are deemed
“CONFIDENTIAL” and as such shall not be
disclosed to any individuals not listed in
paragraph 7.2 of this Stipulation and Order:

Defendants’ Proposed Language
In addition, the parties agree that the
following information or items are deemed
“CONFIDENTIAL” and as such shall not be
disclosed to any individuals not listed in
paragraph 7.2 of this Stipulation and Order:

(a) All documents and information derived
there from [and] deemed CONFIDENTIAL in
the Phelan v. Brentwood Union School
District and Guerrero v. Brentwood Union
School District litigation;

(a) All documents and information derived
there from [and] deemed CONFIDENTIAL
in the Phelan v. Brentwood Union School
District and Guerrero v. Brentwood Union
School District litigation;

(b) Medical and psychological records and
information derived from [or] pertaining [to]
any Party.

(b) The depositions of the parties in this case,
including the deposition transcripts in written
and/or video tape form and any exhibits
thereto;

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(c) The depositions of witnesses in this case
including the deposition transcripts in written
and/or video tape form and any exhibits
thereto;

United States District Court
Northern District of California

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(d) Documents and information derived from
and/or pertaining to the Minor Plaintiffs
including but not limited their medical and
psychological treatment and evaluation
records, their academic and special education
records and consultant/expert assessments.

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(e) Documents and information derived from
and/or pertaining to the adult Plaintiffs
including but not limited their medical and
psychological treatment and evaluation
records and consultant/expert assessments;

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(f) Documents and information derived from
and/or pertaining to the defendants and/or
other current or former Brentwood Union
district employees including but not limited
to their personnel and training records,
evaluations, compensation, benefits, payroll
records, and record of discipline;

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(g) All discovery served and responses
thereto in this action.

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III.

LEGAL STANDARDS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 provides that a party may obtain discovery “regarding
any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
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26(b)(1). “Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears

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reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

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“The court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from

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annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense,” including by (1) prohibiting

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disclosure or discovery; (2) conditioning disclosure or discovery on specified terms; (3)

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preventing inquiry into certain matters; or (4) limiting the scope of disclosure or discovery to

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certain matters. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). “For good cause to exist, the party seeking protection

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bears the burden of showing specific prejudice or harm will result if no protective order is

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granted.” Phillips v. GMC, 307 F.3d 1206, 1210-1211 (9th Cir. 2002). “Rule 26(c) confers broad
discretion on the trial court to decide when a protective order is appropriate and what degree of

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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protection is required.” Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984); see also Phillips

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ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. GM Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The law . . . gives

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district courts broad latitude to grant protective orders to prevent disclosure of materials for many

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types of information[.]”).

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Federal common law clearly recognizes the right of the public “to inspect and copy public

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records and documents, including judicial records and documents.” Nixon v. Warner

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Communications, 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978). “It is well-established that the fruits of pretrial

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discovery are, in the absence of a court order to the contrary, presumptively public.” San Jose

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Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 187 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 1999). The common law

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right creates a “strong presumption in favor of access.” Id. However, this presumption “can be

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overcome by sufficiently important countervailing interests,” i.e., if “good cause” is shown

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pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). Id. “A party asserting good cause bears the

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burden, for each particular document it seeks to protect, of showing that specific prejudice or harm

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will result if no protective order is granted.” Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d

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1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2003). “[B]road allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or

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articulated reasoning, do not satisfy the Rule 26(c) test.” Id. (citations omitted). “If a court finds

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particularized harm will result from disclosure of information to the public, then it balances the

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public and private interests to decide whether a protective order is necessary.” Phillips, 307 F.3d
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at 1211. “In balancing private and public interests, courts have looked to the following factors: (1)

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whether disclosure will violate any privacy interests; (2) whether the information being sought is

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for a legitimate purpose or for an improper purpose; (3) whether disclosure of the information will

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cause a party embarrassment; (4) whether confidentiality is being sought over information

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important to public health and safety; (5) whether the sharing of information among litigants will

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promote fairness and efficiency; (6) whether a party benefiting from the order of confidentiality is

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a public entity or official; and (7) whether the case involves issues important to the public.”

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Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 384 F.3d 822, 827 n. 6 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Phillips, 307 F.3d at 1211-

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IV.

DISCUSSION

United States District Court
Northern District of California

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A.

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One aspect of Defendants’ Section 2.2 proposal is that any information designated

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confidential in the prior lawsuits must be deemed confidential in this lawsuit, even if it has since

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entered the public domain. In contrast, Plaintiffs’ proposal would incorporate the stipulations and

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protective orders from the previous litigations “except to the extent that information has become

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part of the public domain pursuant to Section 3 [of the MPO].”

Documents in the Public Domain

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Section 3 of the MPO defines the scope of the MPO’s protections, which “cover not only

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Protected Material . . . but also (1) any information copied or extracted from Protected Material;

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(2) all copies, excerpts, summaries, or compilations of Protected Material; and (3) any testimony,

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conversations, or presentations by Parties or their Counsel that might reveal Protected Material.”

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Section 3 also notes that certain information is explicitly not covered by the MPO, including

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information that is already in the public domain: “[T]he protections conferred by this Stipulation

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and Order do not cover the following information: (a) any information that is in the public domain

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at the time of disclosure to a Receiving Party or becomes part of the public domain after its

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disclosure to a Receiving Party as a result of publication not involving a violation of this Order,

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including becoming part of the public record through trial or otherwise; and (b) any information

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known to the Receiving Party prior to the disclosure or obtained by the Receiving Party after the

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disclosure from a source who obtained the information lawfully and under no obligation of
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confidentiality to the Designating Party.”
Defendants’ insistence on essentially reclaiming information in the public domain as

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confidential stems from their belief that protected information in the previous lawsuits was made

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public, but “ not ... in accordance with the terms of [the governing] protective order[s].” Letter at

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7.

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dissemination. Indeed, Plaintiffs assert that they have never disclosed confidential information or

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violated any protective order. To the extent that materials are in the public domain, they are

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already accessible to the public. No interest will be served by prohibiting the public from

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accessing those materials in this lawsuit.

Defendants make this conclusory statement but offer no details about the allegedly improper

Accordingly, Defendants have not shown good cause for preventing the disclosure of

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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information already in the public domain.

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B.

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Plaintiffs and Defendants agree on two categories of information. First, they concur that

Additional Categories of Confidential Documents

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medical and psychological records and information, derived from or pertaining to any party,

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should be automatically deemed confidential. Second, they agree that the minor Plaintiffs’

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academic and special education records should be designated as confidential. See Docket No. 61.

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Turning to the areas of disagreement, Defendants’ proposed Section 2.2 would expand the

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categories of information automatically deemed confidential to include (1) any depositions of

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parties and witnesses in this case; (2) information “derived from or pertaining to” the Minor

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Plaintiffs and the Adult Plaintiffs, including their medical and psychological treatment and

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evaluation records, their academic and special education records and consultant/expert

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assessments; (3) information “derived from or pertaining to” Defendants and/or any other BUSD

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employees, including their personnel and training records, evaluations, compensation, benefits,

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payroll records, and records of discipline”; and (4) all discovery requests and responses in this

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case.

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As a general matter, each of these categories is impermissibly broad. Categories (1) and

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(4) would automatically deem all discovery to be confidential, regardless of whether it includes

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any confidential or sensitive information. Categories (2) and (3) would deem confidential any
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information “derived from or pertaining to” all Plaintiffs and Defendants; read literally, this could

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cover all relevant information in this case. Defendants offer little specific justification for these

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sweeping designations.
Plaintiffs acknowledge that confidential information undoubtedly exists within the

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categories of material that Defendants wish to presumptively protect from public disclosure.2

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However, Plaintiffs argue that the blanket designation of entire categories of information is

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unnecessary because the MPO provides a suitable, targeted designation procedure. The court

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agrees with Plaintiffs. Nothing prevents a party from designating specific information as

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confidential under the MPO. The measures permitted under the MPO and the Local Civil Rules
provide sufficient protection against the disclosure of truly sensitive information, while protecting

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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against over-designation, which could impede a party’s discovery efforts, and could also

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improperly block information from public purview.
Defendants also argue that good cause exists for its proposal because the allegations in this

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lawsuit suggest that BUSD personnel were complicit in or responsible for the alleged abuse of

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disabled children. “[A]ny public association with the Plaintiffs’ allegations would cause

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significant reputational damage, extending beyond mere embarrassment, to Defendants, District

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employees, and other third-party witnesses.” Letter at 5, 7. This is the type of “broad allegation[]

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of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning” that does not satisfy a

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party’s burden of showing good cause. Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1130. Defendants’ concern that any

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BUSD personnel identified during discovery would be damaged by the association with this case

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is speculative. Even if this anticipated harm were sufficiently particularized, the balance of public

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and private interests weight in favor of denying the expansive protections sought by Defendants.

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BUSD is a public entity and the individually-named Defendants are public administrators; other

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BUSD personnel who may be identified during discovery would also be public employees. The

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lawsuit involves allegations of child abuse in a public school and the sufficiency of the school

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For example, “Plaintiffs agree that some portions of [some] documents and information should
be confidential (e.g., Social Security numbers, medical information, benefit applications, etc.).”
Letter at 3.
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dis
strict’s response. These issues are im
i
mportant to th public. D
the
Disclosure of information pertaining

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to Defendants or other BUS violates no identified privacy int
D
o
SD
d
terests other than those i
r
individuals’

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inte
erest in not being embar
b
rrassed by as
ssociation wi a controv
ith
versial subject matter. U
Under these

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emonstrated good cause for
circ
cumstances, the court co
oncludes that Defendants have not de
t
s
d
e

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De
efendants’ pr
roposed blan designat
nket
tion of categ
gories of info
ormation as c
confidential.

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V.
V

CONC
CLUSION

The MP offers a streamlined process for d
PO
s
p
designating confidential information for
l
n,

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cha
allenging tha designatio and for th court to in
at
on,
he
ntervene whe the partie cannot res
en
es
solve their

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dis
sputes. Defe
endants have not demons
e
strated good cause for ex
xtending the MPO to pre
esumptively
cov broad cat
ver
tegories of in
nformation that could sw
t
weep in info
ormation, wh
hether it is ac
ctually

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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con
nfidential or not. Accord
dingly, the parties’ prote
p
ective order shall include the followi as
e
ing

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Sec
ction 2.2:

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2.2
“CO
ONFIDENTIAL” Inform
mation or Items: Information
(regardless of how it is generated, stored or ma
aintained) o tangible
or
things that qualify for protection under Fe
n
ederal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(c).
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This Stipula
ation and Pr
rotective Or
rder incorporates the Sti
ipulations
and Protect
tive Orders previously entered in in the P
nto
Phelan v.
Brentwood Union Scho District, Case No. C 12-00465 (LB) and
ool
Guerrero, et al. v Brent
e
twood Union School Dis
n
strict litigation (C-1303873-LB) which remain in full for and effec except to t extent
rce
ct
the
ation has be
ecome part o the public domain pu
of
c
ursuant to
that informa
Section 3 be
elow.
In addition, the parties agree that th following information or items
a
he
g
n
are deemed “CONFIDE
d
ENTIAL” an as such s
nd
shall not be disclosed
to any indiv
viduals not listed in para
agraph 7.2 o this Stipul
of
lation and
Order:
(a) All docu
uments and information derived the from and deemed
n
ere
d
CONFIDEN
NTIAL in the Phelan v. B
Brentwood U
Union Schoo District
ol
and Guerrer v. Brentw
ro
wood Union S
School Distr litigation and
rict
n;
(b) Medical and psycho
l
ological reco
ords and info
ormation derived from
or pertaining to any Par
g
rty.
S
RED.
IT IS SO ORDER

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Da
ated: April 27 2015
7,

________
___________
__________
___________
_
Donna M. Ryu
Un
nited States M
Magistrate J
Judge

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