Supershuttle International, Inc. v. Aysov

Filing 32

ORDER RE MOTIONS. Signed by Judge Jeffrey S. White on 7/23/2015. (jebS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 7/23/2015)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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SUPERSHUTTLE INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
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Petitioner,

No. C 14-05618 JSW

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v.

ORDER

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RAVIL AYSOV,
Respondent.
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SUPERSHUTTLE INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
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Petitioner,

No. C 14-05624 JSW

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v.

ORDER

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REVAZ GOTSIRIDZE,
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Respondent.
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___________________________________/
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SUPERSHUTTLE INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
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Petitioner,

No. C 14-05630 JSW

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v.

ORDER

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VYACHESLAV VINER,

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Respondent.
___________________________________/

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SUPERSHUTTLE INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
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Petitioner,

No. C 14-05632 JSW

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v.

ORDER

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SERGIU VULPE,
Respondent.
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SUPERSHUTTLE INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
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Petitioner,

No. C 14-05633 JSW

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v.

ORDER

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GAREGIN OLAGOV,
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Respondent.
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Now before the Court in all related captioned cases are the motions to dismiss filed by
Respondents and the motions to stay proceedings and compel arbitration filed by Petitioner

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SuperShuttle International, Inc. (“SuperShuttle”). Having considered the parties’ pleadings and

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relevant legal authority, for the reasons set forth in this Order, the Court GRANTS Respondents’

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motions to dismiss. In light of the Court’s finding that it lacks jurisdiction to hear this matter, the

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Court does not address the pending motions to stay and compel arbitration.

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BACKGROUND

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There are five similar and related cases pending before this Court filed by SuperShuttle

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against five individual Russian-born drivers of SuperShuttle vans. Each driver contracted with V&L

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Express, LLC (“V&L Express”) to drive SuperShuttle vans. V&L Express entered into five Unit

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Franchise Agreements (“Agreements”) with SuperShuttle. SuperShuttle contends that the

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agreements mandate the arbitration of any controversy arising out of the Agreements.

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Respondents filed claims against SuperShuttle and V&L Express before the California Labor

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Commission, claiming, among other things, that SuperShuttle is liable to the drivers under the

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California Labor Code for unpaid overtime wages, meal period wages, and rest period wages.

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(See Declaration of Jaime B. Laurent, ¶¶ 3-4.) SuperShuttle opened an arbitration proceeding before

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the American Arbitration Association and has paid all the filing fees for arbitration. (Id. at ¶ 4.)

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SuperShuttle filed the current petitions before this Court, requesting an order pursuant to Section 4

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of the Federal Arbitration Act compelling Respondents to arbitrate their claims currently before the

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California Labor Commissioner under the terms of the V&L Express Agreements. SuperShuttle

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does not join V&L Express as a party.

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The Court shall address specific additional facts in the remainder of this Order.

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ANALYSIS
A.

Applicable Legal Standards for Motion to Dismiss.
A motion to dismiss is proper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) where the

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pleadings fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The complaint is construed in the

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light most favorable to the non-moving party and all material allegations in the complaint are taken

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to be true. Sanders v. Kennedy, 794 F.2d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 1986). The Court may consider the

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facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to the complaint, documents relied upon but not

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attached to the complaint, when the authenticity of those documents is not questioned, and other

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matters of which the Court can take judicial notice. Zucco Partners LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552

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F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2009).

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim

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showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Even under Rule 8(a)’s liberal pleading standard, “a

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plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than

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labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”

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Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S.

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265, 286 (1986)). Pursuant to Twombly, a plaintiff must not merely allege conduct that is

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conceivable but must instead allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

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face.” Id. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

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allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

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alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “The

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plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer

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possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. ... When a complaint pleads facts that are merely

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consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility

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of entitlement to relief.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57) (internal quotation marks

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omitted).

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B.

Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss Based on Failure to Join V&L Express as a Party.
Respondents move to dismiss SuperShuttle’s actions based on the company’s failure to join

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V&L Express as a party to this suit. According to Respondents, V& L Express is a necessary and

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indispensable party whose addition would result in dismissal of this action due to destruction of

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diversity jurisdiction.

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In order to determine whether dismissal for failure to join a necessary and indispensable

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party is appropriate, the Court engages in “three successive inquiries.” EEOC v. Peabody Western

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Coal Co., 400 F.3d 774, 779 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Peabody Western”). First, the district court must

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determine whether the absent party is a “required” party. Id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a). A party

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is “required” in two circumstances: (1) when complete relief is not possible without the absent

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party’s presence; or (2) when the absent party claims a legally protected interest in the action such

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that (i) disposition of the action may “impair or impede” the person’s ability to protect that interest

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or (ii) “leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double,

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multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

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19(a); Peabody Western, 400 F.3d at 779.

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Here, this case was initiated by Respondents as a claim before the California Department of

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Labor for wages and benefits due. In that proceeding, the drivers presented claims against both

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SuperShuttle and V&L Express. Although SuperShuttle’s petition before this Court references V&L

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Express as domiciled in California, it omits the entity as a party in the petitions to compel

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arbitration. SuperShuttle argues that the contractual arrangement to pursue the resolution of disputes

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in arbitration may be resolved without the presence of the franchisee owner, V&L Express.

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However, the alleged joint employer or intermediary between the drivers and SuperShuttle has an

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interest in the resolution of the underlying contention whether the drivers are to be considered

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employees or independent contractors. As drivers for V&L Express, Respondents agreed to be

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bound by any agreements between V&L Express and SuperShuttle. All representations made in

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hiring and employment would be relevant to the ultimate determination of the employment

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relationship among the parties. V&L Express, as the intermediary between Respondents and

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Petitioner, should have the option to weigh in on the decision whether any possible agreement to
arbitrate binds them and the drivers. The Court finds that V&L Express is a necessary and required

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party in SuperShuttle’s petition to enforce arbitration because the determination of the forum for

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resolution of the ultimate question of employment status constitutes a legally protected interest in

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the action such that disposition of the action may “impair or impede” the person’s ability to protect

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that interest. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a); Peabody Western, 400 F.3d at 779.

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Because V&L Express is “required” as a party, the Court must determine whether joinder is

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feasible. See Peabody Western, 400 F.3d at 779. Pursuant to Rule 19(a), joinder is not “feasible”

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when: (1) venue is improper; (2) the absentee party is not subject to personal jurisdiction; and (3)

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when joinder would destroy subject matter jurisdiction. See id. Here, if Petitioners joined V& L

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Express as a party, the Court could not maintain jurisdiction over the matter as diversity would be

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destroyed.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Respondents’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(7) for failure to join a necessary party under Rule 19.

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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Respondents’ motions to dismiss. In light of

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the Court’s finding that it lacks jurisdiction to hear this matter, the Court does not address the

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pending motions to stay and compel arbitration. A separate judgment shall issue and the clerk may

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close the file.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: July 23, 2015

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JEFFREY S. WHITE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE