Greene v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

Filing 69

ORDER DENYING 67 Motion for Protective Order. Signed by Judge Jeffrey S. White on August 21, 2015. (jswlc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 8/21/2015)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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ROSEMARY GREENE,
Plaintiff,

For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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No. C 15-00048 JSW
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
PROTECTIVE ORDER

v.
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,
Defendant.

Re: Docket No. 67
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Now before the Court for consideration is the August 18, 2015 joint letter brief, in which

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Plaintiff Rosemary Greene seeks a protective order to preclude Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,

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from taking her deposition. The Court determines that this matter is appropriate for disposition

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without oral argument and it is deemed submitted. See N.D. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b).

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Under Rule 26, the Court “may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person

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from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1).

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The party attempting to avoid discovery carries a heavy burden of demonstrating why discovery

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should be denied. Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 1975). “Broad

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allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning, do not satisfy the

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Rule 26(c) test.” Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting

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Cipollone v. Ligget Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3d Cir. 1986)). The Court may direct that

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discovery should proceed using a method other than that selected by the party seeking discovery.

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(C). However, a “strong showing is required before a party will be denied

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entirely the right to take a deposition.” Blankenship, 519 F.2d at 429.

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Plaintiff contends that good cause exists to enter a protective order because she is undergoing

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treatment for atrial fibrillation and posttraumatic stress disorder. In support of this contention, she

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attaches a letter by a doctor of internal and bariatric medicine, which states: “Mrs. Greene cannot

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participate in executing a deposition due to medical conditions; atrial fibrillation and posttraumatic

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stress disorder.” In response, Defendant notes, inter alia, that Plaintiff’s Second Amended

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Complaint states that Plaintiff has recently earned her living as a realtor. Defendant also has limited

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the deposition, which is noticed to begin at 1:00 p.m., to four hours of testimony, excluding breaks,

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reserving the right to notice a second half-day deposition.

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Plaintiff has not explained why the noticed deposition would place a greater burden on her
health than does the practice of her profession. Indeed, neither Plaintiff nor her doctor provide any

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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medical basis for the assertion that Plaintiff “cannot” be deposed due to her health conditions. See,

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e.g., Conforto v. Mabus, No. 12-cv-1316, 2014 WL 3896079, *6 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2014) (granting

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motion to compel videotaped deposition despite doctor’s opinion that deposition would burden the

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plaintiff’s health). The Court finds that Plaintiff’s conclusory assertions fall short of satisfying

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Plaintiff’s heavy burden of showing “specific prejudice or harm that will result if no protective order

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is granted.” Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. General Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210-11 (9th

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Cir. 2002).

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For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request for a protective order. The
deposition of Plaintiff shall proceed as noticed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: August 21, 2015
JEFFREY S. WHITE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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