Castellanos et al v. State of California et al

Filing 155

ORDER Ruling on Scope of First Amendment Claim and on Emotional Distress Damages. Defendant's Response due by 4:00 p.m. on 7/15/2016. Signed by Judge Jeffrey S. White on July 14, 2016. (jswlc3S, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 7/14/2016)

1
2
3
4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

6
7

EDIN S. CASTELLANOS,
Plaintiff,

8

ORDER RULING ON SCOPE OF FIRST
AMENDMENT CLAIM AND ON
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS DAMAGES

v.

9
10

JEREMY J. MAYA,
Defendant.

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

Case No. 15-cv-00272-JSW

12
Following jury selection, the Court held a further conference with the parties regarding

13
14

outstanding issues.

15

A.

Scope of First Amendment Claim.
The first issue raised was whether Plaintiff could premise his First Amendment Claim, in

16
17

part, on the basis that he complained to deputies at the San Francisco County Jail about

18

Defendant’s treatment of him at the CHP Office.1 According to Plaintiff’s version of events,

19

Defendant was in close proximity to him at the time he made this statement and shortly thereafter

20

Defendant gratuitously pushed him into the cell and then into the wall. These facts are not

21

included in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint.
Rather, Plaintiff alleged that “[w]hile placing Plaintiff into the holding cell, [Defendant]

22
23

administered some level of unnecessary force to which Plaintiff verbally objected and, following

24

which and while Plaintiff was still in handcuffs, [Defendant] needlessly and inappropriately threw

25

Plaintiff towards a wall and bench area (in the holding cell) causing him serious physical injuries.”

26
1

27
28

This allegation is separate from a statement that Plaintiff purportedly made to Defendant to
the effect of “Hey, I’m already in jail and in handcuffs. You don’t have any right to push me like
that.” Defendant was asked about this statement at his deposition and did not recall Plaintiff
making such a statement. (Docket No. 43-5, Deposition of Jeremy Maya at 85:15-20.)

1
2

(Docket No. 28, First Amended Complaint ¶ 8, p. 3:20-23.)
When Plaintiff alleged that Defendant violated his First Amendment right to freedom of

3

speech, he alleged that this claim was ‘based upon Plaintiff’s right to verbally object to

4

[Defendant’s] use of unnecessary force (see 3:20-23, supra) ….” (Id. ¶ 8, p. 4 n.1.) Although that

5

statement is more general, the parenthetical specifically refers the objection to a use of force at the

6

San Francisco County Jail and did not recount incidents that occurred at the CHP Office. In

7

addition, in opposition to Defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment, Plaintiff argued that

8

“[t]he evidence in this case (some of which has been admitted by Defendant) confirms free speech

9

was exercised when Plaintiff … verbally objected to an unnecessary pushing of his person while
in the holding cell and in handcuffs.” (Docket No. 43, Plaintiff’s Opp. Br. at 19:12-14.) This

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

10

argument does not clearly encompass a statement made to someone other than Defendant. In

12

addition, although Plaintiff submitted a declaration in support of his motion for summary

13

judgment, he did not mention that he complained to anyone about Defendant’s treatment of him at

14

the CHP office as he was entering the San Francisco County Jail. (See Docket No. 43-14,

15

Declaration of Edin Castellanos.)

16

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), which governs amendments to pleadings

17

prior to trial, a court “should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).

18

The factors the Court must consider are: “(1) bad faith, (2) undue delay, (3) prejudice to the

19

opposing party, (4) futility of amendment[,]” and (5) whether the moving party previously

20

amended a pleading. In re Western States Wholesale Nat. Gas Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d 716, 738

21

(9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Each factor is not given equal weight.

22

Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). “Absent prejudice,

23

or a strong showing of any of the remaining … factors, there exists a presumption under Rule

24

15(a) in favor of granting leave to amend.” Eminence Capital, 316 F.3d at 1052.

25

Under Rule 15(b), if a party objects at trial “that evidence is not within the issues raised in

26

the pleadings, the court may permit the pleadings to be amended. The court should freely permit

27

an amendment when doing so will aid in presenting the merits and the objecting party fails to

28

satisfy the court that the evidence would prejudice that party’s action or defense on the merits. “
2

With respect to the Rule 15(a) factors, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not acted in

1
2

bad faith, but he did delay in raising these facts as a basis for an amendment to the First

3

Amendment Claim. The facts surrounding this incident have been known to Plaintiff from the

4

inception of this litigation and, thus, could easily have been included in his original complaint and

5

in his amended complaint or in his declaration in opposition to Defendant’s motion for summary

6

judgment. The Court concludes that it would not be futile to permit Plaintiff to premise a First

7

Amendment claim on these facts. Thus, under both Rule 15(a) and 15(b), resolution of this issue

8

rests on whether Defendant would be prejudiced by permitting Plaintiff to testify to these facts.
The Court HEREBY ORDERS Defendant to provide a brief to the Court outlining how he

9

contends he was prejudiced by Plaintiff’s failure to disclose the allegation that he complained to

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

10

deputies at the San Francisco County Jail about Defendant’s treatment of him at the CHP Office

12

prior to the incident in the holding cell. Defendant’s response shall be due by 4:00 p.m. on July

13

15, 2016.

14

B.

15

Whether Plaintiff Can Recover “Mental Distress” Damages.
The second issue raised was whether Plaintiff could seek mental distress damages. In his

16

First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff did allege that he suffered mental distress as a result of

17

Defendant’s conduct. (FAC, ¶ 8 at p. 4:22.) However, in the parties’ proposed Joint Pretrial

18

Conference Order, the parties included a section entitled “Evidentiary and Related Issues on

19

Which The Parties Agree.” (Docket No. 74, Joint Pretrial Conference Order at 2:15.) In that

20

section, the parties stated “Plaintiff is not claiming any mental or emotional injury beyond the

21

normal pain and suffering arising from his neck injury.” (Id. at 2:17-18.) This agreement is also

22

documented in an email exchange between counsel, dated December 31, 2015. (Docket No. 88,

23

Letter Brief at p. 23.) In that exchange, Defendant’s counsel stated “[b]ased on your

24

representation during the deposition of Mr. Castellanos that plaintiff does not contend – and will

25

not be seeking damages for mental or emotional injury beyond ordinary emotional distress

26

attendant to his physical injury, I have instructed my paralegal to contact ACE to exclude

27

psychiatric and counseling records from the scope of our subpoenas.” (Id.) Plaintiff’s counsel

28

responded “[y]ou have correctly stated what I said – that Plaintiff Edin Castellanos is not claiming
3

1

any mental or emotional in
y
e
njury beyond the normal pain and su
d
uffering arisin from his neck injury.
ng

2

We are not clai
e
iming any ps
sychiatric inj
njury of any k
kind.” (Id.)

3

In supp
plemental bri
iefing about whether the testimony o Kimberly Lutes-Koths should be
e
of

4

exc
cluded, and at oral argum
a
ment, Plainti suggested that Ms. Lu
iff
d
utes-Koths should be per
rmitted to

5

testify about th “psycholo
he
ogical toll” on Plaintiff o the state cr
of
riminal proc
ceedings. W
When the

6

Court inquired how such te
estimony fit within the sc
cope of the p
parties’ agre
eement, Plain
ntiff’s

7

cou
unsel stated he believed the parties’ stipulation w ambiguo and wou not preclu him
was
ous
uld
ude

8

from seeking emotional dis
e
stress damag from a co
ges
onstitutional wrong.
l

9

The Co has revie
ourt
ewed the par
rties’ agreem
ment set forth in the Joint Pretrial Co
h
onference
Ord and the email exchan between the parties. The Court does not fin the agreem is
der
e
nge
n
nd
ment

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

10

am
mbiguous. If Plaintiff wa
f
anted to mak an excepti for the m
ke
ion
mental distres associated with his
ss
d

12

state criminal proceedings or any of the events bey
p
e
yond the pain and sufferi arising fr
n
ing
from his neck
k

13

inju he could have noted that. He di not. Ther
ury,
d
d
id
refore, the C
Court shall pr
reclude any t
testimony

14

tha falls outsid the scope of the partie agreemen that Plaint will not seek pain an suffering
at
de
es’
nt
tiff
nd

15

dam
mages beyon the norma pain and suffering aris
nd
al
s
sing from hi neck injury
is
y.

16
17
18
19

IT IS SO ORDER
S
RED.
Da
ated: July 14, 2016
,
___
__________
___________
__________
________
JEF
FFREY S. W
WHITE
Un
nited States D
District Judg
ge

20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
4