The Bank of New York Mellon v. Clarke et al

Filing 9

ORDER ADOPTING 5 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS AND REMANDING ACTION. Signed by Judge JEFFREY S. WHITE on 7/16/15. (jjoS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 7/16/2015)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON,
Plaintiff,

For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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No. C 15-02400 JSW

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION AND
REMANDING ACTION

v.
JEFF P. CLARKE, et al.,
Defendants.

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On May 29, 2015, Defendant Jeff P. CLark, proceeding pro se, filed a notice of removal and

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an application to proceed in forma pauperis. Without consent, on June 5, 2015, this matter was

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reassigned to the undersigned from Magistrate Judge Maria-Elena James with a Report and

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Recommendation to remand this action. Defendant, as the party seeking removal, bears the burden

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of demonstrating subject matter jurisdiction. Defendant was given an opportunity to demonstrate

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the existence of subject matter jurisdiction, but has failed to do so. For the reasons set forth in the

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remainder of this Order, the Court HEREBY REMANDS this action to the Sonoma County Superior

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Court.

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On April 7, 2015, Plaintiff filed a complaint for unlawful detainer in Sonoma County

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Superior Court against Defendant (the “State Court action”). (See Notice of Removal.) Defendant

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removed the State Court action on the basis that jurisdiction is premised upon a federal question.

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(See Notice of Removal.) “[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of

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the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant ... to the district court

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of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.”

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Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1983) (citation omitted); see

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also 28 U.S.C. § 1441.

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However, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. See, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian

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Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Accordingly, the burden of establishing federal

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jurisdiction for purposes of removal is on the party seeking removal, and the removal statute is

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strictly construed against removal jurisdiction. Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115, 1117 (9th

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Cir. 2004); see also Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). “Federal jurisdiction

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must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Gaus, 980 F.2d

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at 566.
“The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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complaint rule.’” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 382, 392 (1987). The well-pleaded

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complaint rule recognizes that the plaintiff is the master of his or her claim. “[H]e or she may avoid

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federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law.” Id. Thus, under the well-pleaded complaint

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rule, federal-question jurisdiction arises where the “complaint establishes either that federal law

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creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a

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substantial question of federal law.” Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983).

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The State Court action is an unlawful detainer action which is purely a creature of California

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law. Thus, federal law does not create the cause of action. Wells Fargo Bank v. Lapeen, 2011 WL

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2194117, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 2011); Wescom Credit Union v. Dudley, 2010 WL 4916578, at *2

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(C.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2010). Moreover, the Court concludes that the claim will not necessarily

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depend upon the resolution of a substantial question of federal law, because Plaintiff need not prove

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compliance with the federal law relied upon by Defendant to establish its claim. See, e.g., Grable &

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Sons Metal Prods. v. Darue Eng. & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314-15 (2005).

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Furthermore, a court cannot exercise removal jurisdiction on the ground that the complaint

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gives rise to a potential or an anticipated defense that might raise a federal question, even if the

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defense is the only question truly at issue in the case. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. at 10, 14; see

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also Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393 (“[I]t is now settled law that a case may not be removed to federal

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court on the basis of a federal defense, including the defense of pre-emption, even if the defense is
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anticipated in the plaintiff’s complaint, and even if both parties concede that the federal defense is

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the only question truly at issue.”) (emphasis in original). Therefore, the Court finds that it lacks

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subject matter jurisdiction to hear this matter and must remand to the state court. See 28 U.S.C. §

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1447(c); see also Maniar v. FDIC, 979 F.2d 782, 785 (9th Cir. 1992).

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Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation and REMANDS this case

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to Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Sonoma. The Clerk shall transfer the

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file forthwith.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: July 16, 2015
JEFFREY S. WHITE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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