Holland et al v. The Related Companies, Inc. et al
Filing
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ORDER GRANTING 4 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Kristen Holland, Peter Holland. Signed by Judge Jeffrey S. White on July 23, 2015. (jswlc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 7/23/2015)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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PETER HOLLAND, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
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No. C 15-03220 JSW
v.
THE RELATED COMPANIES, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
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Now before the Court is the motion for a preliminary injunction filed by plaintiffs Peter and
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Kristen Holland (collectively referred to as “Plaintiffs”). Having considered the parties’ arguments
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and relevant legal authority, and having had the benefit of oral argument, the Court hereby
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GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction.
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In order to obtain a preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs “must establish that [they are] likely to
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succeed on the merits, that [they are] likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary
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relief, that the balance of equities tips in [their] favor, and that an injunction is in the public
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interest.” Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (citations omitted).
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The Winter court also noted that because injunctive relief is “an extraordinary remedy,” it “may only
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be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Id. at 22 (citing
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Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam)). Thus, “[i]n each case, courts ‘must
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balance the competing claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party of the granting or
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withholding of the requested relief.’” Id. at 24 (citing Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S.
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531, 542 (1987)). “‘In exercising their sound discretion, courts of equity should pay particular
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regard for the public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction.’” Id.
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(citing Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982)).
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Issuing an injunction that alters status quo pendente lite, although disfavored, may be issued
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where “the facts and law clearly favor the moving party.” Stanley v. University of So. Calif., 13 F.3d
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1313, 1320 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Dahl v. HEM Pharmaceuticals Corp., 7 F.3d 1399, 1403, 1405
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(9th Cir. 1993) (noting issuance of injunction requiring affirmative action is subject to heightened
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scrutiny, but still affirming issuance of preliminary mandatory injunction).
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The Fair Housing Amendments Act (“FHAA”) makes it unlawful “[t]o discriminate against
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any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision
of services or facilities in connection with such dwelling, because of a handicap.” 42 U.S.C. §
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For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
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3604(f)(2). The statute “defines discrimination to include a refusal to make reasonable
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accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be
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necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” City of Edmonds v.
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Washington State Bldg. Code Council, 18 F.3d 802, 804 (9th Cir. 1994). The FHAA was intended
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“protect the right of handicapped persons to live in the residence of their choice in the community”
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and “imposes an affirmative duty to reasonably accommodate handicapped persons.” Id. at 806 (42
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U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B)).
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To establish “a claim of discrimination based on failure to reasonably accommodate, a
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plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he suffers from a handicap as defined by the FHAA; (2)
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defendants knew or reasonably should have known of the plaintiff’s handicap; (3) accommodation
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of the handicap ‘may be necessary’ to afford plaintiff an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the
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dwelling; and (4) defendants refused to make such accommodation.” Giebeler v. M & B Associates,
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343 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. California Mobile Home Park Mgmt.
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Co., 107 F.3d 1374, 1380 (9th Cir. 1997)).
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“The reasonable accommodation inquiry is highly fact-specific, requiring case-by-case
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determination.” United States v. California Mobile Home Park Mgmt. Co., 29 F.3d 1413, 1418 (9th
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Cir. 1994). The Ninth Circuit has made clear that the FHAA’s accommodation provisions must be
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interpreted “with the specific goals of the FHAA in mind: to protect the right of handicapped
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persons to live in the residence of their choice in the community, and to end the unnecessary
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exclusion of persons with handicaps from the American mainstream.” Giebeler, 343 F.3d at 1149
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(internal quotations and citations omitted). To demonstrate that an accommodation is necessary,
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Plaintiffs “must show that, but for the accommodation, they likely will be denied an equal
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opportunity to enjoy the housing of their choice.” Id. (quoting Smith & Lee Assocs, Inc. v. City of
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Taylor, 102 F.3d 781, 795 (6th Cir. 1996). An accommodation is considered “reasonable under the
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FHAA when it imposes no fundamental alteration in the nature of the program or undue financial or
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administrative burdens.” Id. at 1157.
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Here, the dispute between the parties is actually quite narrow. Defendants do not dispute that
Peter Holland has a disability as defined by the statute or that he has a disability-related need to be
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For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
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relocated during the construction. Defendants only dispute that the scope of the requested
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accommodation, to be relocated to another unit at no additional cost to Plaintiffs for the duration of
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their lease, is reasonable. At the time that Defendants initially conceded that Peter Holland is
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disabled and has a disability-related need to be relocated, there was another studio unit available that
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was farther away from the construction noise and was only $600 a month more than Plaintiff’s
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current rent. Unfortunately, at that time, Defendants were not willing to provide that unit to
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Plaintiffs at the cost of their current rent. Now Defendants are willing to move Plaintiffs to another
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unit farther away from the construction noise, at the Defendants’ sole cost, and charge Plaintiffs’
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their current rent. The only unit available is a one bedroom which rents out for close to $2,000 more
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than Plaintiffs’ current rate. Defendants anticipate that the construction will be completed by
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September 8, 2015. Defendants want to be able to move Plaintiffs back to their original unit, at the
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Defendants’ sole cost, when the construction has been completed.
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Peter Holland is a combat veteran of the United States Army and suffers from post-traumatic
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stress disorder (“PTSD”). (Declaration of Peter Holland, ¶ 3.) The construction noise reminds him
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of gunfire, explosions, and screaming. (Id., ¶ 12(1).) Because the construction noise sounds like
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combat to him, Peter Holland is perpetually on a war footing and reminded of his time in the Army
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in ways that he would never wish to be. He feels like he is in a war zone, and his brain acts
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accordingly. (Id., ¶ 38.) Given the random and intermittent nature of the construction noise
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throughout the day, it reminds him of being shot at by enemy forces. (Id., ¶ 40.) His PTSD-related
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nightmares are awful, even when he is not being triggered on a daily basis. (Id., ¶ 41.) He is afraid
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that staying in that triggering environment could do permanent damage to his mental state, and by
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extension, to his wife and young daughter. He is unclear how long it will take him, or even if he
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will be able, to return to the mostly functional base line he had before the construction noise began.
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(Id., ¶ 60.)
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At the hearing, Plaintiffs’ counsel argued that the construction noise, including the
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randomness of when the noise occurs, has created significant insecurity and stress for Plaintiffs.
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This insecurity and stress would be exacerbated by moving for a short duration of time with an
uncertain end date. Although the construction is scheduled to end by September 8, 2015, it is not yet
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For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
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clear when it will actually be completed. Until that time, Plaintiffs would be living in boxes and
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waiting to hear that it is time to move back to Unit 7C. If they were giving the certainty of being
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able to stay in the new apartment through the end of the lease in December, they would be more
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likely to unpack and settle in to the new space. Moreover, there would be no uncertainty regarding
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their move date. That would likely give Peter Holland more of a reprieve from his PTSD that was
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triggered by the construction.
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In contrast, the Court finds that the increased financial burden on Defendants for letting
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Plaintiffs stay in the new apartment through the end of their lease in December, as opposed to
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staying until the construction ends in September, would be negligible. For every month that
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Plaintiffs stay in the new apartment but pay their current rent, Defendants will lose $2,000 in
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revenue. However, if Plaintiffs were to move back to Unit 7C after construction were completed,
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Defendants would have to keep Unit 7C vacant during the construction period and would lose the
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fair market rental value for that unit during this time period. Plaintiffs estimate, and Defendants do
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not contest, that the fair market rental value for Unit 7C is $3,395. (Declaration of Steven L. Derby,
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¶ 6.) For the month and a half that Defendants estimate the construction will continue, Defendants
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would lose approximately $8,100 in rent through the two units and would incur the cost of paying
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for another move back to Unit 7C. If Plaintiffs were to stay in the new apartment through the end of
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their lease in December, Defendants would lose approximately $10,000 from the difference between
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the market rate of the new apartment and the rental rate that Plaintiffs pay over a five month period.
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However, Defendants would be able to rent out Unit 7C at the market rate. Therefore, depending on
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the cost of moving Plaintiffs a second time, the difference in what Defendants agree would be a
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reasonable accommodation (moving Plaintiffs out of and then back to Unit 7C after the construction
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is completed), and in what Plaintiffs are requesting (moving out of Unit 7C for the duration of their
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lease) is likely less that $1,000. Defendants have not made any effort to show how losing this small
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amount of rental money in an apartment complex with approximately 450 apartments would be an
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undue burden. Moreover, in balancing the equities and considering the harm that Plaintiffs have
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already suffered, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ need for a genuine reprieve from the construction
noise and an opportunity to have a more stable and settled living situation far outweighs any
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For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
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incremental additional cost to Defendants.
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Plaintiffs have made a strong showing that the construction noise severely interferes with
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their ability to use and enjoy the unit they are currently renting. Defendants do not appear to contest
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this point and make no effort to rebut it. Plaintiffs also make a showing, which Defendants do not
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attempt to rebut, that the cost of relocating Plaintiffs to an alternative unit during the pendency of the
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construction project is a reasonable accommodation that would not cause an undue financial or
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administrative burden on Defendants. The only point that Defendants dispute is whether they should
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be allowed to move Plaintiffs back to Unit 7C once the construction project has ended. In light of
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the facts discussed above, the Court finds that the reasonable accommodation includes allowing
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Plaintiffs to stay in the new apartment at their current rental rate for the duration of their lease.
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Plaintiffs have demonstrated that the law and facts clearly favors them. Stanley, 13 F.3d at
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1320. Moreover, Plaintiffs have demonstrated that they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the
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absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in their favor, and that an injunction is
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in the public interest. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. Therefore, the Court HEREBY GRANTS the motion
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for preliminary injunction. Defendants are HEREBY ORDERED to make a reasonable
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accommodation to Plaintiffs by moving them to an upper apartment in their building, free of
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construction noise, for the duration of their lease at their current rental rate. Plaintiffs may schedule
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the move at their convenience and Defendants are ORDERED to pay the reasonable costs of such re-
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location.
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Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) generally requires that a successful
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application for a preliminary injunction post a bond or other security, “[t]he court has discretion to
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dispense with the security requirement, or to request mere nominal security, where requiring security
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would effectively deny access to judicial review.” California ex rel. Van De Kamp v. Tahoe
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Regional Planning Agency, 766 F.2d 1319, 1325 (9th Cir. 1985), amended on other grounds, 775
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F.2d 998 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Crowley v. Local No. 82, 679 F.2d 978, 1000 (1st Cir. 1982)
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(stating that “in noncommercial cases, the court should consider the possible loss to the enjoined
party together with the hardship that a bond requirement would impose on the applicant,” and
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For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
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secondly, “in order not to restrict a federal right unduly, the impact that a bond requirement would
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have on the enforcement of the right should also be considered.”). Here, the Court notes that
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Defendants did not request in their opposition papers that Plaintiffs post a bond. When the Court
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inquired about a bond at the hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs
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represented that posting a bond would impose a financial burden on them. In light of the small
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amount of potential damages that Defendants would incur if the Court wrongfully required
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Defendants to allow Plaintiffs to stay in the new apartment after the construction ceases and the fact
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that Plaintiffs are individuals with limited funds, the Court exercises its discretion to dispense with
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the security requirement.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Dated: July 23, 2015
JEFFREY S. WHITE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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