Turner v. Corinthian International Parking Services, Inc.

Filing 26

Order by Hon. Saundra Brown Armstrong denying 6 Plaintiff's Motion to Remand without Prejudice and Granting Leave to Amend the Putative Class Definition. Signed on 12/01/2015.(tmiS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 12/3/2015)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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OAKLAND DIVISION

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ADRIAN TURNER, individually, and on
10 behalf of other members of the general public
similarly situated,
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Plaintiff,

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vs.
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Case No: C 15-03495 SBA
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO REMAND WITHOUT
PREJUDICE AND GRANTING
PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO AMEND
THE PUTATIVE CLASS
DEFINITION

CORINTHIAN INTERNATIONAL

14 PARKING SERVICES, INC., an unknown

business entity; and DOES 1 through 100,

15 inclusive,
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Defendant(s).

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Plaintiff Adrian Turner (“Plaintiff”) commenced the instant putative wage and hour

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class action against Defendant Corinthian International Parking Services, Inc.

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(“Defendant”) in the Superior Court of California, Alameda. Compl., Dkt. 1-1. Defendant

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removed the action to this Court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28

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U.S.C. § 1332(d). Notice of Removal, Dkt. 1. The parties are presently before the Court

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on Plaintiff’s motion to remand. Dkt. 6. Having read and considered the papers filed in

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connection with this matter and being fully informed, the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiff’s

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motion to remand without prejudice, for the reasons stated below. The Court GRANTS

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Plaintiff leave to amend the putative class definition to clarify facts bearing on the Court’s

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jurisdiction. The Court, in its discretion, finds this matter suitable for resolution without

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oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 78(b); N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b).

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I.

BACKGROUND

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Defendant is an employer with employees throughout the State of California.

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Compl. ¶ 6. Plaintiff is a former employee of Defendant who resides in the State of

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California. Id. ¶ 5. Plaintiff brings the instant wage and hour action on behalf of “[a]ll

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current and former hourly-paid or non-exempt California-based employees who were

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employed by Defendants [sic] within the State of California at any time during the period

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from four years preceding the filing of this Complaint to final judgment.” Id. ¶¶ 12-13.

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Plaintiff alleges seven causes of action arising under California law, including claims for

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unpaid overtime, unpaid meal period premiums, unpaid rest period premiums, failure to pay

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minimum wage, failure to timely pay final wages, unreimbursed business expenses, and

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unfair business practices. As relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages, statutory

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damages, penalties, interest, attorneys’ fees, and costs.

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II.

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LEGAL STANDARD
“A motion to remand is the proper procedure for challenging removal.” Moore-

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Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009). Remand is required

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“if at any time before the final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject

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matter jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

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Under CAFA, district courts have jurisdiction in any civil action where: (1) the

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aggregate number of members of a proposed plaintiff class is 100 or more; (2) the

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aggregate amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000; and (3) any class member is a citizen

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of a state different from any defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d); see also Bridewell-Sledge v.

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Blue Cross of California, 798 F.3d 923, 927-28 (9th Cir. 2015). “Class members” include

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“persons (named or unnamed) who fall within the definition of the proposed or certified

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class.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(D).

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The burden of establishing removal jurisdiction under CAFA lies with the proponent

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of federal jurisdiction. Ibarra v. Manheim Investmens, Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1199 (9th Cir.

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2015). However, “‘no antiremoval presumption attends cases invoking CAFA, which

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Congress enacted to facilitate adjudication of certain class actions in federal court.’”
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Bridewell-Sledge, 798 F.3d at 929 (quoting Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens,

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--- U.S. ---, 135 S. Ct. 547, 554 (2014)). Rather, courts must construe CAFA “‘with a

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strong preference that interstate class actions should be heard in a federal court if properly

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removed by any defendant.’” Id. (quoting Dart Cherokee, 135 S. Ct. at 554). Once federal

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jurisdiction has been established under CAFA, the party seeking remand bears the burden

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of proof as to the applicability of any statutory exception. Id. (citing Mondragon v. Capital

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One Auto Fin., 736 F.3d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 2013)).

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III.

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DISCUSSION
Plaintiff moves to remand the instant action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

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According to Plaintiff, CAFA jurisdiction fails for three reasons: (1) Defendant fails to

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establish the requisite diversity of citizenship; (2) Defendant fails to establish that the

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amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000; and (3) both the “local controversy” exception

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and the “home state” exception to CAFA jurisdiction apply. In connection with this

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motion, Plaintiff requests an award of attorneys’ fees and costs incurred because of removal

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on the ground that Defendant lacked an objectively reasonable basis for taking such action.

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Defendant responds that: (1) minimal diversity exits; (2) the amount in controversy exceeds

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$5,000,000; and (3) Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that an exception to CAFA jurisdiction

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applies. Defendant also opposes Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees and costs.

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A.

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In its Notice of Removal, Defendant alleges, “At least one proposed class member is

DIVERSITY

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not a citizen of California.” Notice of Removal ¶ 6(a). Plaintiff contends that this

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allegation is insufficient to establish diversity because Defendant failed to allege the actual

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citizenship of the relevant parties. Moreover, Plaintiff contends that diversity “is simply

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impossible because the proposed class only includes California citizens.” Pl.’s Mot. at 5,

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Dkt. 6. Specifically, Plaintiff notes that the Complaint defines the proposed class to consist

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only of “California-based employees who were or are employed by Defendant[] in the state

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of California.” Id. According to Plaintiff, by operation of the class definition, persons

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domiciled in another state are not included in the proposed class. Id.
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Defendant argues that Plaintiff has misconstrued the class definition, and that a class

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of “California-based employees” is not necessarily limited to California citizens.

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According to Defendant, the class definition “says nothing about [the employees’]

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domicile.” Def.’s Opp’n at 3, Dkt. 15. Thus, Defendant contends, former employees

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currently domiciled in another state “would still be part of the proposed putative class.” Id.

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Defendant further argues that actual citizenship may be established in response to a motion

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for remand (as opposed to in the notice of remand), and provides research from the

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LexisNexis Comprehensive Person Report purporting to show that six of its former

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employees are currently “domiciled outside of California.” Id. at 4; see also Decl. of

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Daniel Miller, Exs. A-F, Dkt. 15-1.
Defendant is a citizen of California. See Decl. of Jill J. Parker, ¶ 3 & Ex. B, Dkt. 6-

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1. Diversity therefore depends, as a threshold matter, on the construction of Plaintiff’s

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proposed class definition. In his reply brief, Plaintiff insists that the proposed class is

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explicitly limited “to all ‘California-based’ individuals, meaning those individuals who are

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currently based or domiciled in California.” Pl.’s Reply at 9, Dkt. 18. Relying on Johnson

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v. Advance America, 549 F.3d 932 (4th Cir. 2008), Plaintiff asserts that any individuals

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who “are not California citizens, are not putative class members.” Pl.’s Reply at 9. A

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defendant who is a citizen of the forum state cannot establish diversity where the putative

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class is limited to citizens of that state. See Johnson, 549 F.3d at 937-38 (no diversity

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where the putative class was limited to “citizens” of the forum state, of which defendant

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was also a citizen). The challenge for Plaintiff, however, is that his Complaint fails to limit

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the putative class as explicitly as the complaint in Johnson. Although Plaintiff argues that

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the proposed class is limited to California citizens, the Court cannot so conclude based

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solely on the language of the Complaint. This, however, does not conclude the matter.

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Ordinarily, “post-removal amendments to the pleadings cannot affect whether a case

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is removable, because the propriety of removal is determined solely on the basis of the

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pleadings filed in state court.” Williams v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 471 F.3d 975, 976

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(9th Cir. 2006). Recently, however, the Ninth Circuit held that “plaintiffs should be
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permitted to amend a complaint after removal to clarify issues pertaining to federal

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jurisdiction under CAFA.” Benko v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp., 789 F.3d 1111, 1117 (9th

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Cir. 2015). “Where a defendant removes a case to federal court under CAFA, and the

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plaintiffs amend the complaint to explain the nature of the action for purposes of our

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jurisdictional analysis, we may consider the amended complaint to determine whether

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remand to the state court is appropriate.” Id. (noting that a complaint filed in state court

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“may not address CAFA-specific issues”).

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Since Benko, district courts in this circuit have allowed amendments to clarify class

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definitions when ruling on motions to remand. See, e.g., Weight v. Active Network, Inc.,

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29 F. Supp. 3d 1289, 1293 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (remanding after the putative class definition

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was amended from state “residents” to state “citizens”); In re Anthem, Inc., --- F. Supp.3d

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---, 2015 WL 5265686 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2015) (same); Wickens v. Blue Cross of

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California, Inc., 2015 WL 4255129 (S.D. Cal. July 14, 2015) (granting leave to amend the

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putative class definition from “residents” to “citizens” before issuing a final order on

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remand); Smilow v. Anthem Blue Cross Life & Health Ins. Co., 2015 WL 4778824 (C.D.

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Cal. Aug. 13, 2015) (same). In each case, the Court found that a proposed amendment

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limiting the class definition to citizens of the forum state served, not “to manipulate the

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forum, but rather to clarify a point that happen[ed] to bear on [the court’s] jurisdiction.”

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Weight, 29 F. Supp. 3d at 1294.

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Here, the pleadings do not expressly allege that non-California citizens are excluded

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from the class definition. Therefore, based on the record presented, the Court cannot

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remand the action for the lack of diversity. Nonetheless, as the above-cited authorities

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make clear, Plaintiff should be afforded the opportunity to amend the pleadings to clarify

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the putative class definition. See, e.g., Aviles v. Quick Pick Express, LLC, 2015 WL

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5601824 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2015) (granting leave to amend the putative class definition to

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limit a class of persons “employed by [the Defendant] in California” to encompass only

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“citizens of California,” even absent an explicit request by the plaintiff). The Complaint as

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currently pled supports the notion that Plaintiff intended to limit the proposed class to
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California citizens employed by Defendant in California. The Complaint alleges claims

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against a California-based Defendant, asserts only claims for relief arising under California

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law, and clearly limits the class to persons employed by Defendant in California.

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Furthermore, although not artfully alleged, the class definition is susceptible to Plaintiff’s

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asserted interpretation, i.e., that “California-based” refers to California citizenship. The

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Court is therefore satisfied that the proposed revised class definition constitutes a

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clarification, not an attempt to manipulate the forum. “By amending [his] [C]omplaint . . . ,

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[Plaintiff] can provide [this] court with the information required to determine whether [this]

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suit is within the court’s jurisdiction under CAFA.” Benko, 789 F.3d at 1117.

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Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to remand WITHOUT
PREJUDICE to Plaintiff’s ability to renew the motion after filing an amended complaint.

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B.

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The Court notes that Plaintiff also argues for remand based on: (1) the lack of

OTHER GROUNDS FOR REMAND

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evidence regarding the amount in controversy; and (2) the applicability of both the “home

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state” and “local controversy” exceptions. Because the matter of diversity likely will be

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dispositive in this matter, and in order to ensure that the operative complaint accurately

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reflects the ostensibly intended class definition, the Court declines to reach the additional

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grounds for remand at this juncture. Nevertheless, for the benefit of the parties, the Court

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notes that they have failed to apply the appropriate standards regarding their respective

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burdens on these jurisdictional issues. In order to avoid the application of any erroneous

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standard in a renewed motion to remand, the Court advises as follows.

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“Whether damages are unstated in a compliant, or, in the defendant’s view are

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understated, the defendant seeking removal bears the burden to show by a preponderance of

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the evidence that the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds $5 million when federal

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jurisdiction is challenged.” Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1197. “Under this system, a defendant

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cannot establish removal jurisdiction by mere speculation and conjecture, with

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unreasonable assumptions.” Id. at 1198. The amount-in-controversy requirement is “to be

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tested by consideration of real evidence and the reality of what is at stake in the litigation,
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using reasonable assumptions underlying the defendant’s theory of damages exposure.” Id.

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A court decides “where the preponderance lies” after both parties have submitted proof. Id.

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If the removing party establishes federal jurisdiction under CAFA, the party seeking

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remand bears the burden of proof as to the applicability of any statutory exception.

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Mondragon, 736 F.3d at 883. The party seeking remand must present evidence from which

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the district court can make the necessary jurisdictional findings. Id. at 884. Assumptions

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based solely on the allegations of the Complaint are insufficient. Id. at 884-85.

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C.

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In connection with this motion, Plaintiff requests an award of attorneys’ fees and

REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS

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costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). “An order remanding the case may require payment

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of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the

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removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); see also Otay Land Co. v. United Enterprise Ltd., 672 F.3d

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1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2012). Given that the Court has denied Plaintiff’s motion to remand

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without prejudice, an award of attorneys’ fees and costs is inappropriate at this time.

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Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request.

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IV.

CONCLUSION

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For the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

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1.

Plaintiff’s motion to remand is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

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2.

Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to file an amended complaint for the express

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purpose of clarifying the putative class definition. Plaintiff shall have fourteen (14) days

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from date of entry of this Order to file an amended complaint. Should Plaintiff seek to

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renew his motion to remand, Plaintiff shall simultaneously file a noticed motion with the

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amended complaint. Defendant and Plaintiff may file opposition and reply briefs,

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respectively, in accordance with the deadlines set forth in Local Rule 7-3.

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3.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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This Order terminates Docket No. 6.

Dated: 12/1/15

______________________________
SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG
Senior United States District Judge

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