Patten v. Hancock

Filing 33

ORDER DENYING 23 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction ; AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING TRANSFER OF VENUE. Show Cause Response due by 1/29/2016. Responses due by 2/12/2016. Replies due by 2/19/2016. Signed by Judge Jeffrey S. White on 1/14/16. (jjoS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 1/14/2016)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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Plaintiff,

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ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
DISMISS AND ORDER TO SHOW
CAUSE REGARDING TRANSFER OF
VENUE

v.

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LELAND W. HANCOCK, et al.,

Re: Docket No. 23

Defendants.

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

Case No. 15-cv-04022-JSW

LEON PATTEN,

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Now before the Court for consideration is the motion to dismiss filed by Defendants,

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Leland W. Hancock (“Mr. Hancock”) and Beverly J. Hancock (“Mrs. Hancock”) (collectively,

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“the Hancocks”). The Court has considered the parties’ papers, relevant legal authority, and the

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record in this case, and it finds the motion suitable for disposition without oral argument. See

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N.D. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). The Court VACATES the hearing scheduled for January 22, 2016, and it

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HEREBY DENIES the Hancocks’ motion.
BACKGROUND

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Plaintiff, Leon Patten (“Patten”) is a tenant in an apartment complex located at 620 West

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Flora Street, Stockton, California (the “Complex”), which the Hancocks own. (Compl. ¶¶ 10, 13.)

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Patten has an amputated leg. (Id. ¶ 8.) He alleges that the only laundry facilities are located on

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the second floor of the Complex and alleges that the Complex does not have an elevator. (Id. ¶¶

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18-20.) According to Patten, as a result, he has been denied access to the laundry room, in

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violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (the “ADA Claim”). See 42

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U.S.C. § 12182(a).1

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Patten also includes a number of state law claims relating to his tenancy. However, he
alleges that subject matter jurisdiction is premised on the ADA Claim. (Compl. ¶ 4.)

The Court shall address additional facts as necessary in the analysis.

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ANALYSIS

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A.

Applicable Legal Standard.
The Hancocks move to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).

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When a defendant moves to dismiss a complaint or claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,

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the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the court has jurisdiction to decide the claim.

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Thornhill Publ’n Co. v. Gen. Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979). A motion to

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dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) may be “facial or factual.” Safe

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Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). A facial attack on the
jurisdiction occurs when factual allegations of the complaint are taken as true. Federation of

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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African Am. Contractors v. City of Oakland, 96 F.3d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir. 1996). The plaintiff is

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then entitled to have those facts construed in the light most favorable to him or her. Federation of

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African Am. Contractors, 96 F.3d at 1207. A factual attack on subject matter jurisdiction occurs

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when defendants challenge the actual lack of jurisdiction with affidavits or other evidence.

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Thornhill, 594 F.2d at 733; see also Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014).

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Where, as is the situation here, a defendant “raises a factual attack, the plaintiff must

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support … jurisdictional allegations with ‘competent proof,’ under the same evidentiary standard

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that governs in the summary judgment context.” Leite, 749 F.3d at 1121 (quoting Hertz Corp. v.

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Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 96-97 (2010)). The district court may resolve those factual disputes itself,

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unless “the existence of jurisdiction turns on disputed factual issues[.]” Id. at 1121-22 (citing Safe

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Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039-40, Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th

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Cir.1983), and Thornhill, 594 F.2d at 733).

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“Jurisdictional dismissals in cases premised on federal-question
jurisdiction are exceptional, and must satisfy the requirements
specified in Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678[.]” Sun Valley Gas., Inc. v.
Ernst Enters., 711 F.2d 138, 140 (9th Cir.1983). In Bell, the
Supreme Court determined that jurisdictional dismissals are

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warranted “where the alleged claim under the constitution or federal
statutes clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely for the
purpose of obtaining federal jurisdiction or where such claim is
wholly insubstantial and frivolous.” 327 U.S. at 682–83.

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We have held that a “[j]urisdictional finding of genuinely disputed
facts is inappropriate when ‘the jurisdictional issue and substantive
issues are so intertwined that the question of jurisdiction is
dependent on the resolution of factual issues going to the merits' of
an action.” Sun Valley, 711 F.2d at 139 (quoting Augustine v.
United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir.1983)). The question of
jurisdiction and the merits of an action are intertwined where “a
statute provides the basis for both the subject matter jurisdiction of
the federal court and the plaintiff’s substantive claim for relief.” Id.

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039-40.
B.

Patten Has Met His Burden to Show the Court Has Subject Matter Jurisdiction.
The Hancocks argue that the Court lacks jurisdiction over the ADA claim, because the

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laundry room is not a “public accommodation,” under the ADA. In general, residential apartment

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complexes do not fall within the scope of the ADA’s definition of public accommodation. 42

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U.S.C. § 12181(7)(A)-(L); see also Independent Housing Services of San Francisco v. Fillmore

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Center Associates, 840 F. Supp. 1328, 1344 n.14 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (citing legislative history of the

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ADA for the proposition that the term “other places of lodging” does not include residential

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facilities). However, “areas within multifamily residential facilities that qualify as places of public

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accommodation are covered by the ADA if use of the areas is not limited exclusively to owners,

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residents, and their guests.” Department of Justice, Americans with Disabilities Act Title III

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Technical Assistance Manual Covering Public Accommodations and Commercial Facilities, § III-

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1.2000 (1994 Supp.) (emphasis added).

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Mr. Hancock attests that “[t]he washer and dryer facilities described in the Complaint at

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the [Complex] are exclusively for tenant use and the general public is not invited or permitted to

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use the washer and dryer facilities.” (Docket No. 23-1, Declaration of Leland Hancock, ¶ 5.) Mr.

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Hancock also attests that a resident of the Complex serves as an on-site manager. (Docket No. 30-

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1, Reply Declaration of Leland Hancock (“Hancock Reply Decl.”), ¶ 2.) Mr. Hancock further

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attests that one of the duties of the on-site manager is to open the washer and dryer facilities at the

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Complex at 9:00 a.m. and close and lock the facilities at 9:00 p.m. He attests that he has

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instructed the on-site manager that “the washer and dryer facilities are for the use of tenants and

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their guests.” (Id., ¶¶ 3-4.)
In response, Patten submits a declaration from his counsel, who attests that during an

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inspection of the Complex, he “found at least two coin-operated laundry rooms upstairs. The

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doors to both laundry rooms were open. There was no active mechanism to limit access to

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residents. There was no mechanism to restrict access from non-residents. I saw no signs

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indicating that the laundry rooms were open to tenants only.” (Docket No. 18, Declaration of Sam

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Taherian, ¶¶ 17-18, Ex. B.)
Patten also submits a declaration from Antwoine Guyton, who attests that he worked as a

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“cleanup person” for the property manager. (Docket No. 20, Declaration of Antwoine Guyton

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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(“Guyton Decl.”), ¶ 1.) According to Mr. Guyton, “[f]rom at least September 2014 through

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present, the laundry facilities have been open to the public. The doors of the laundry facilities

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have always been wide open, even into the night,” and “[t]here is no sign indicating the laundry

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rooms are restricted to tenants.” (Id., ¶¶ 5-6.) Patten also submits a declaration from Eugene

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Patrick Green, who describes himself as a “transient.” (Docket No. 21, Declaration of Eugene

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Patrick Green, ¶ 1.) Mr. Green attests that he has been using the laundry rooms on the second

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floor of the Complex since the first half of 2015. (Id., ¶ 3.)
The Court concludes that Patten has met his burden to show that there are disputed issues

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of fact on the issue of whether the laundry room is limited to tenants’ use or is open to the general

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public. Because the statute that provides the basis for the Court’s jurisdiction also provides the

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basis for Patten’s substantive claim for relief, and because, at this stage of the litigation, the Court

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cannot say Patten’s claims are frivolous, the Court DENIES the motion to dismiss. See, e.g.,

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Thornhill, 594 F.2d 730, 734 (9th Cir.1979) (“[W]hen a statute provides the basis for both the

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subject matter jurisdiction of the federal court and the plaintiffs’ substantive claim for relief, a

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motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction rather than for failure to state a claim is

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proper only when the allegations of the complaint are frivolous.”) (quotation omitted).

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//

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//
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USION
CONCLU

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For the foregoing re
easons, the Court DENIE the Hanc
C
ES
cock’s motio to dismiss The
on
s.

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Court’s ruling, however, is without pre
s
ejudice to the Hancock’s renewing th argumen by way of
e
s
his
nt

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a properly noticed motion for summary judgment.
p
f
y

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Althoug the Defen
gh
ndants are lo
ocated in this District, Pl
s
laintiff and th Complex are located
he
x

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in the Eastern District of California. Courts may “
t
D
C
C
“transfer a ca sua sponte under the doctrine of
ase

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for
rum non conveniens, as codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1
c
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1404(a), so l
long as the p
parties are fir given the
rst

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opp
portunity to present their views on th issue.” C
r
he
Costlow v. W
Weeks, 790 F.2d 1486, 14 (9th Cir.
488

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198
86). Accord
dingly, the pa
arties are HE
EREBY ORD
DERED to s
show cause w the Cou should
why
urt
not transfer this case to the United Stat District C
t
e
tes
Court for the Eastern Dis
e
strict of Cali
ifornia,

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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pur
rsuant to 28 U.S.C. secti 1404(a). The Court Orders that P
ion
Patten’s resp
ponse to this Order to
s

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Sho Cause sh be due by January 29 2016. Th Hancock’s response sh be due b no later
ow
hall
b
9,
he
s
hall
by

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tha February 12, 2016. Patten may file a reply by February 19, 2016. Th Court shal issue an
an
y
he
ll

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Ord regardin transfer on Patten ha filed his r
der
ng
nce
as
reply.

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IT IS SO ORD
DERED.

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Da
ated: January 14, 2016
y

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___
__________
___________
__________
________
JEF
FFREY S. W
WHITE
Un
nited States D
District Judg
ge

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