Abuhamdieh v. United States Postal Service

Filing 17

Order by Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu granting 6 Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment.(dmrlc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 4/28/2016)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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AIMAN ABUHAMDIEH,
Plaintiff,

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v.

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Case No. 15-cv-05770-DMR

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,
Defendant.

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS, OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Re: Dkt. No. 6

Pro se Plaintiff Aiman Abuhamdieh filed this lawsuit seeking damages related to a lost

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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mail package. Defendant United States Postal Service (“USPS”) moves pursuant to Federal Rules

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of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) to dismiss the complaint, or in the alternative, for

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summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56. [Docket No. 6.] The court held a hearing on the motion

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on March 24, 2016. For the following reasons, the court grants Defendant’s motion.

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I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed the present suit in San Mateo County Small Claims Court seeking damages

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related to USPS’s alleged loss of a package addressed to Plaintiff that contained a car part.

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Plaintiff alleges that USPS owes him the total value of the lost car part plus taxes ($428.45 +

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$38.65), as well as the incidental expenses he incurred to store his vehicle for eight days (8 x

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$95.00), for a total of $1,227.01. Compl. ¶ 3. USPS sent Plaintiff a check for $104.81, which

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Plaintiff refused to cash because he believes it is not the correct amount owed. Compl. ¶ 4.
Defendant removed the action to this court. Defendant now moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s

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complaint. In the alternative, Defendant moves for summary judgment.

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II.

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ANALYSIS
Plaintiff does not clearly plead the legal basis for his complaint. His claim can be

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construed as either a tort claim, or as one for breach of an insurance contract with USPS. The

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court will analyze both possibilities. See, e.g., Anderson v. United States Postal Serv., 761 F.2d

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527, 528 (9th Cir. 1985) (construing a similar claim as either tort or breach of insurance contract

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claim); Brandofino v. United States Postal Serv., 14 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1162-63 (D. Ariz. 1998)

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(same).

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A. Tort Claim

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Plaintiff’s complaint can be interpreted as a claim that USPS lost Plaintiff’s package

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through negligence or other tortious act. Defendant argues that to the extent Plaintiff brings a tort

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claim, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because USPS has not waived sovereign

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immunity for such a claim. A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) challenges the court’s

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subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). A court will dismiss a party’s claim for

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lack of subject matter jurisdiction “only when the claim is so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed
by prior decisions of th[e Supreme] Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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involve a federal controversy.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998)

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(citation and quotation marks omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).

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The USPS is an “independent establishment of the executive branch of the Government of

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the United States,” and is therefore “part of the Government.” United States Postal Serv. v.

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Flamingo Indus., 540 U.S. 736, 744 (2004). Therefore, a suit against the USPS is a suit against

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the United States. Anderson, 761 F.2d at 528. As a sovereign, the United States is immune from

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suit and can be sued only to the extent it has waived its sovereign immunity. United States v.

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Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980). A waiver of sovereign immunity must be unequivocally

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expressed and narrowly construed; it cannot be implied or liberally interpreted. Al–Haramain

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Islamic Found., Inc. v. Obama, 705 F.3d 845, 850 (9th Cir. 2012). Absent an explicit waiver of

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sovereign immunity, a district court has no jurisdiction over actions against the federal

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government. Mitchell, 445 U.S. at 538.

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Tort claims against the United States are governed by the Federal Tort Claims Act

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(“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), which waives immunity from certain torts. 39 U.S.C. § 409(c).

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The test to determine if a federal government entity is subject to suit is: (1) whether there is waiver

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and (2) whether the entity is subject to the substantive law. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476

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(1994). This two-step analysis applies to inquiries into USPS’ amenability to suit. Currier v.

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Potter, 379 F.3d 716, 724 (9th Cir. 2004).
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Here, Plaintiff alleges that USPS failed to deliver a mail package that was addressed to

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him. His claim does not pass the first prong of the Meyer test, because USPS is specifically

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exempted from liability from tort claims “arising out of loss, miscarriage, or negligent

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transmission of letters or postal matter.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b); see, e.g., Anderson, 761 F.2d at

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528; Brandofino, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 1163. Such a claim is therefore barred by the doctrine of

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sovereign immunity. The court grants Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion to the extent that

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Plaintiff brings a tort claim.

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B. Breach of Contract Claim

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The complaint may also be construed as alleging that USPS breached its insurance contract
with Plaintiff. Under this construction, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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claim upon which relief may be granted, and thus must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). In the

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alternative, Defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment under Rule 56.

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When a court considers matters outside the pleadings on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), it

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must convert the motion into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment, and in so doing, the court

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must give “[a]ll parties . . . a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to

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the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d); see also San Pedro Hotel Co., Inc. v. City of L.A., 159 F.3d

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470, 477 (9th Cir. 1998) (“In providing notice to the parties, ‘a district court need only apprise the

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parties that it will look beyond the pleadings to extrinsic evidence and give them an opportunity to

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supplement the record.’” (citation omitted)).

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At the hearing, the court informed Plaintiff that to the extent he was suing USPS for breach

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of contract, the court would convert Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary

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judgment. The court provided Plaintiff with notice of the requirements for opposing a motion for

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summary judgment, (Docket No. 15), and also offered Plaintiff additional time to submit evidence

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to support his claim. Plaintiff declined the opportunity, stating that he did not have any

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supplemental evidence.

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In support of its motion, Defendant submitted the declarations of Carole P. Johnson

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Brown, Customer Experience Specialist for Defendant’s Office of the Consumer Advocate, and

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Sandra L. Beverly, the Domestic Claims Manager at Defendant’s Accounting Service Center in St.
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Louis, Missouri. [Docket Nos. 6-1, 6-2.] Both declarations contain evidence regarding Plaintiff’s

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submission of an administrative claim to USPS.

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Defendant also submitted its Domestic Mail Manual (“DMM”), which contains the
regulations for all domestic mail. [Docket Nos. 6, 6-3, Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”), Ex.

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A.] The DMM is incorporated by reference into the Code of Federal Regulations and deemed

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published into the Federal Register. A plaintiff is presumed to have notice of its contents.

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Gelbfish v. United States Postal Serv., 51 F. Supp. 2d 252, 254 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (citations

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omitted). Defendant attached the relevant portions of the DMM to its motion. RJN, Ex. A. Since

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the DMM is published in the Federal Register and is publicly available, there is no likelihood of

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reasonable dispute of the DMM’s existence and its content. Accordingly, the court takes judicial

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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notice of the DMM pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b).

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A court shall grant summary judgment “if . . . there is no genuine dispute as to any material

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fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The burden

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of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact lies with the moving party, see

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Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986), and the court must view the evidence in the

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light most favorable to the non-movant. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255

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(1986) (citation omitted). A genuine factual issue exists if, taking into account the burdens of

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production and proof that would be required at trial, sufficient evidence favors the non-movant

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such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in that party’s favor. Id. at 248. The court may

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not weigh the evidence, assess the credibility of witnesses, or resolve issues of fact. See id. at 249.

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To defeat summary judgment once the moving part has met its burden, the nonmoving

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party may not simply rely on the pleadings, but must produce significant probative evidence, by

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affidavit or as otherwise provided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, supporting the claim that

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a genuine issue of material fact exists. TW Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809

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F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).

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The USPS is liable only to the extent that it agrees to be liable. Brandofino, 14 F. Supp. 2d

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at 1164 (citation omitted). The DMM allows for insurance coverage of up to $100.00 for

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packages bearing an “Intelligent Mail” package barcode. DMM § 503.4.2(a) (at ECF p. 4).
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Plaintiff’s package bore the required code, and Plaintiff was therefore eligible to receive $100.00

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in insurance coverage under the DMM. Beverly Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. B (at ECF p. 7). Plaintiff

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exhausted the administrative claim procedures outlined in the DMM. See DMM § 609 et seq.;

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Brown Decl. ¶ 2; Beverly Decl. ¶¶ 2-3. Defendant paid Plaintiff $104.81, which was the

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maximum insurance amount plus postage. Brown Decl. ¶ 4. Plaintiff does not dispute that he

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received a check for $104.81. Compl. ¶ 4. USPS is not liable in excess of this amount. See

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Green v. Hill, No. C93-2700-MHP, 1994 WL 10018, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 1994) (granting

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summary judgment on a claim against USPS for the value of a damaged package because USPS

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had paid plaintiff the full amount of insurance coverage). Accordingly, since Plaintiff has failed to
show a genuine dispute of material fact as to his breach of contract claim, the court grants

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summary judgment on that claim.

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III.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 29, 2016

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summary judgment, is GRANTED.

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Judge D

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For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, motion for

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CONCLUSION

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DONNA M. RYU
United States Magistrate Judge
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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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