Synchronoss Technologies v. Dropbox Inc

Filing 407

ORDER DENYING the parties' 274 281 287 305 314 316 321 325 328 329 332 350 353 356 359 361 367 370 373 382 383 385 388 390 395 Administrative Motions to File Under Seal. Signed by Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. on 6/17/2019.(hsglc3S, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 6/17/2019)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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SYNCHRONOSS TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
Plaintiff,

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DROPBOX INC., et al.,
Defendants.

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

ORDER DENYING ADMINISTRATIVE
MOTIONS TO SEAL

v.

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Case No. 16-cv-00119-HSG

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Re: Dkt. Nos. 274, 281, 287, 305, 314, 316,
321, 325, 328, 329, 332, 350, 353, 356, 359,
361, 367, 370, 373, 382, 383, 385, 388, 390,
395

Pending before the Court are administrative motions to file under seal portions of various

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filings in this case. See Dkt. Nos. 274, 281, 287, 305, 314, 316, 321, 325, 328, 329, 332, 350, 353,

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356, 359, 361, 367, 370, 373, 382, 383, 385, 388, 390, 395. The Court DENIES these motions in

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their entirety.

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I.

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LEGAL STANDARD
For motions to seal that comply with the local rules, courts generally apply a “compelling

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reasons” standard. Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 677–78 (9th Cir. 2010). “This

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standard derives from the common law right ‘to inspect and copy public records and documents,

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including judicial records and documents.’” Id. (quoting Kamakana v. City & Cty. of Honolulu,

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447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006)). “Unless a particular court record is one traditionally kept

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secret, a strong presumption in favor of access is the starting point.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178

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(quotation marks and citation omitted). To overcome this strong presumption, the moving party

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must “articulate compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings that outweigh the

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general history of access and the public policies favoring disclosure, such as the public interest in

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understanding the judicial process.” Id. at 1178–79 (citations, quotation marks, and alterations

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omitted). “In general, compelling reasons sufficient to outweigh the public’s interest in disclosure

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and justify sealing court records exist when such court files might have become a vehicle for

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improper purposes, such as the use of records to gratify private spite, promote public scandal,

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circulate libelous statements, or release trade secrets.” Id. at 1179 (quotation marks and citation

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omitted). The Court must:

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balance the competing interests of the public and the party who
seeks to keep certain judicial records secret. After considering these
interests, if the Court decides to seal certain judicial records, it must
base its decision on a compelling reason and articulate the factual
basis for its ruling, without relying on hypothesis or conjecture.

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Id. (citations, brackets, and quotation marks omitted).
Civil Local Rule 79-5 supplements the “compelling reasons” standard. The party seeking

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to file under seal must submit “a request that establishes that the document, or portions thereof, are

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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privileged, protectable as a trade secret or otherwise entitled to protection under the law . . . . The

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request must be narrowly tailored to seek sealing only of sealable material . . . .” Civil L.R. 79-

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5(b). Courts have found that “confidential business information” in the form of “license

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agreements, financial terms, details of confidential licensing negotiations, and business strategies”

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satisfies the “compelling reasons” standard. See In re Qualcomm Litig., No. 3:17-cv-0108-GPC-

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MDD, 2017 WL 5176922, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2017) (observing that sealing such information

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“prevent[ed] competitors from gaining insight into the parties’ business model and strategy”);

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Finisar Corp. v. Nistica, Inc., No. 13-cv-03345-BLF (JSC), 2015 WL 3988132, at *5 (N.D. Cal.

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June 30, 2015).

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Finally, records attached to motions that are only “tangentially related to the merits of a

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case” are not subject to the strong presumption of access. Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp.,

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LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1101 (9th Cir. 2016). Accordingly, parties moving to seal such records need

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only meet the lower “good cause” standard of Rule 26(c). Id. at 1097. The “good cause” standard

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requires a “particularized showing” that “specific prejudice or harm will result” if the information

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is disclosed. Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210–11 (9th

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Cir. 2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c).

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II.

DISCUSSION
Having carefully considered the pending administrative motions to file under seal, the

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Court finds that various defects preclude granting these motions. At times, designating parties

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failed to submit Rule 79-5 declarations. And the parties generally did not narrowly tailor their

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sealing requests, as most sealing requests sought to redact substantial volumes of information

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otherwise unredacted in other portions of the same or other filings. What follows describes some

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of the defects in each administrative motion. These examples are not meant to be an exhaustive

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list of the parties’ failures; rather, they demonstrate the myriad ways that the parties have not

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complied with the local rules or otherwise submitted proper sealing requests.
A.

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Dropbox submitted an administrative motion to file under seal portions of its motion to

Dkt. No. 274

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strike portions of the expert reports of Christopher Alpaugh. See Dkt. No. 274. Having reviewed

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the motion and the corresponding Rule 79-5 declarations, the Court finds that Dropbox did not

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submit a narrowly tailored list of sealable material. For example, Dropbox at one point seeks to

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redact the term “block server,” see Dkt. No. 274-4 at 14:2, but the same discussion about the block

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server is unredacted on the previous page, see id. at 13.

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B.

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Synchronoss submitted an administrative motion to file under seal portions of its

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opposition to Dropbox’s motion to strike portions of the expert reports of Christopher Alpaugh.

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See Dkt. No. 281. Having reviewed the motion and the corresponding Rule 79-5 declarations, the

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Court finds that Synchronoss did not submit a narrowly tailored list of sealable material. For

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example, Synchronoss seeks to redact any reference to Apple in its opposition. See Dkt. No. 281-

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8 at 15–16. But the identification of Apple is unredacted in Dropbox’s motion, and thus publicly

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available. See Dkt. No. 275 at 21–25. And Synchronoss seeks to redact quotes of Dropbox’s

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motion which are unredacted in the underlying motion. Compare, e.g., Dkt. No. 281-8 at 7, with

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Dkt. No. 275 at 13.

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Dkt. No. 281

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C.

Dkt. No. 287

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Dropbox submitted an administrative motion to file under seal portions of its reply in

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support of its motion to strike portions of the expert reports of Christopher Alpaugh. See Dkt. No.

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287. Having reviewed the motion and the corresponding Rule 79-5 declarations, the Court finds

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that Dropbox did not submit a narrowly tailored list of sealable material. For example, Dropbox

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seeks to redact references to Apple in its reply. See Dkt. No. 287-4 at 13. But the identification of

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Apple is unredacted in Dropbox’s motion, and thus publicly available. See Dkt. No. 275 at 21–25.

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And again, Dropbox seeks to redact references to “block server,” which are unredacted elsewhere.

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Compare Dkt. No. 287-4 at 6:1, with Dkt. No. 275 at 13–14.
D.

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Synchronoss submitted an administrative motion to file under seal portions of its motion to

Dkt. No. 305

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strike portions of the expert reports of Dr. Keith Ugone and Dr. Michael Freedman. See Dkt. No.

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305. Synchronoss later filed a motion to remove incorrectly filed documents, indicating that

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certain exhibits filed publicly with docket numbers 305 and 306 should have been filed under seal.

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See Dkt. No. 312. Synchronoss stated that it would resubmit these documents under seal, but

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failed to do so. See id. The Court thus cannot now determine whether any information should be

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filed under seal.

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E.

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Dropbox submitted an administrative motion to file under seal portions of its opposition to

Dkt. No. 350

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Synchronoss’s motion to strike portions of the expert reports of Ugone and Freedman. See Dkt.

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No. 350. Synchronoss, however—as one of the designating parties—failed to submit a Rule 79-5

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declaration.

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F.

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Synchronoss submitted an administrative motion to file under seal portions of its reply in

Dkt. No. 373

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support of its motion to strike portions of the expert reports of Ugone and Freedman. See Dkt. No.

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373. Having reviewed the motion and the corresponding Rule 79-5 declarations, the Court finds

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that Synchronoss did not submit a narrowly tailored list of sealable material. For example,

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Synchronoss seeks to redact an excerpt from a deposition with Dr. Ugone. See Dkt. No. 373-4 at
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5:5–10. And Dropbox—as the designating party—states that this should be sealed because it

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contains “Dropbox’s Non-Public Sensitive Business and/or Financial Information.” See Dkt. No.

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379 at 2. But nothing in that excerpt appears to contain any sensitive business and/or financial

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information.

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G.

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Synchronoss submitted administrative motions to file under seal portions of its Daubert

Dkt. No. 314 & 395

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motion to exclude opinions and testimony of Dropbox’s expert Dr. Roberto Tamassia, and its

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reply brief in support of that motion. See Dkt. Nos. 314, 395. But the only designating party for

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purportedly sealable material was Dropbox, which did not submit a Rule 79-5 declaration.
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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Synchronoss submitted administrative motions to file under seal portions of its Daubert

Dkt. Nos. 321 & 382

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motion to exclude opinions and testimony of Dropbox’s damages expert Dr. Ugone, and its reply

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brief in support of that motion. See Dkt. Nos. 321, 382. Having reviewed the motions and the

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corresponding Rule 79-5 declarations, the Court finds that Synchronoss did not submit narrowly

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tailored lists of sealable material. For example, Synchronoss seeks to redact in many parts the

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phrase “freedom-to-operate,” but then uses this phrase in unredacted portions as well. Compare

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Dkt. No. 321-4 at i:6 (seeking to redact “Freedom-to-Operate”) and Dkt. No. 382-4 at i:4 (seeking

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to redact “Freedom-to-Operate”), with Dkt. No. 321-4 at 4:24 (stating that “Dr. Ugone explained

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in his deposition what this freedom-to-operate license means”).

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I.

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Dropbox submitted an administrative motion to file under seal portions of its opposition to

Dkt. No. 359

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Synchronoss’s Daubert motion to exclude expert opinions and testimony of Dropbox’s damages

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expert Dr. Ugone. Having reviewed the motion and the corresponding Rule 79-5 declarations, the

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Court finds that Dropbox did not submit a narrowly tailored list of sealable material. For example,

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Dropbox seeks to redact a statement about “Dropbox’s preference for a lump-sum payment

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structure when entering into license agreements,” but in the same sentence includes this same

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information, unredacted. See Dkt. No. 359-4 at 13:16–21 (“He pointed to them only for their

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form—he noted that they ‘demonstrate Dropbox’s preference for a lump-sum payment structure
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when entering into license agreements,’ and then considered that preference as one among many

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factors which demonstrate that Dropbox ‘[f]or business and economic reasons, . . . would have

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had a preference for a lump-sum royalty payment structure when negotiating with FusionOne for a

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license to the Patents-in-Suit.’”) (underlined portions sought to be redacted).

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J.

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Synchronoss submitted an administrative motion to file under seal portions of its Daubert

Dkt. No. 332

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motion to exclude opinions and testimony of Dropbox’s non-infringement expert Dr. Freedman.

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See Dkt. No. 332. Having reviewed the motion and the corresponding Rule 79-5 declarations, the

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Court finds that Synchronoss did not submit a narrowly tailored list of sealable material. For
example, Synchronoss seeks to file under seal Exhibit D to the motion, on the basis that it “refer[s]

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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to highly confidential internal business information of Synchronoss, the disclosure of which could

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result in irreparable harm to Synchronoss.” See Dkt. No. 332-1 at iii. But nothing in Exhibit D—

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excerpts of a deposition of Dr. Ugone—includes such information. And the Court finds there is

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no reason to redact innocuous statements such as “‘use’ the accused system.” See Dkt. No. 332-4

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at 2:24.

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K.

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Dropbox submitted an administrative motion to file under seal portions of its opposition to

Dkt. No. 356

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Synchronoss’s Daubert motion to exclude expert opinions and testimony of Dropbox’s non-

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infringement expert Dr. Freedman. See Dkt. No. 356. Having reviewed the motion and the

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corresponding Rule 79-5 declarations, the Court finds that Dropbox did not submit a narrowly

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tailored list of sealable material. For example, Dropbox seeks to redact a high-level description of

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Synchronoss’s basis for seeking to exclude portions of Dr. Freedman’s opinions, see Dkt. No.

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356-4 at 1, but it is not at all clear how that information constitutes—as Dropbox describes it in its

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Rule 79-5 declaration—“Non-Public Sensitive Business and/or Financial Information,” see Dkt.

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No. 356-1 at 1.

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L.

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Dropbox submitted an administrative motion to file under seal portions of its Daubert

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Dkt. No. 325

motion to exclude expert opinions of Christopher Alpaugh. See Dkt. No. 325. Having reviewed
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the motion and the corresponding Rule 79-5 declarations, the Court finds that Dropbox did not

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submit a narrowly tailored list of sealable material. For example, Dropbox seeks to redact a

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lengthy quote from Mr. Alpaugh’s report. See Dkt. No. 325-4 at 3:13–18, see also Dkt. No. 347

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(Synchronoss’s Rule 79-5 declaration claiming this excerpt contains “Non-Public Sensitive

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Business and/or Financial Information”). But that quote is almost entirely unredacted elsewhere.

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See Dkt. No. 354 at 5.

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M.

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Synchronoss submitted an administrative motion to file under seal portions of its

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Dkt. No. 353

opposition to Dropbox’s Daubert motion to exclude expert opinions of Christopher Alpaugh. See
Dkt. No. 353. Having reviewed the motion and the corresponding Rule 79-5 declaration, the

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Court finds that Synchronoss did not submit a narrowly tailored list of sealable material. For

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example, Synchronoss seeks to redact a reference to Synchronoss acquiring the “FusionOne patent

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portfolio,” but Synchronoss leaves this same information unredacted in the same paragraph.

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Compare Dkt. No. 353-4 at 10:18 (seeking to redact “FusionOne patent portfolio”), with id. at

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10:5 (discussing the “FusionOne patent portfolio”).

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N.

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Dropbox submitted an administrative motion to file under seal portions of its reply in

Dkt. No. 390

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support of its Daubert motion to exclude expert opinions of Christopher Alpaugh. See Dkt. No.

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390. But the only designating party for the portions sought to be filed under seal—Synchronoss—

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failed to submit a Rule 79-5 declaration.

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O.

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Dropbox submitted an administrative motion to file under seal portions of its Daubert

Dkt. No. 328

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motion to exclude expert opinions of Dr. Nisha Mody. See Dkt. No. 328. Having reviewed the

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motion and the corresponding Rule 79-5 declarations, the Court finds that Dropbox did not submit

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a narrowly tailored list of sealable material. For example, Dropbox seeks to redact various

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references to a third party named “RoyaltySource.” See Dkt. No. 328-4 at 6:19, see also Dkt. No.

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348 (Synchronoss’s Rule 79-5 declaration). But RoyaltySource is otherwise identified in

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unredacted portions of the motion. See Dkt. No. 330 at 6:23 (“RoyaltySource is so unreliable
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. . . .”).

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P.

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Synchronoss submitted an administrative motion to file under seal portions of its

Dkt. No. 370

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opposition to Dropbox’s Daubert motion to exclude expert opinions of Dr. Nisha Mody. See Dkt.

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No. 370. Having reviewed the motion and the corresponding Rule 79-5 declarations, the Court

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finds that Synchronoss did not submit a narrowly tailored list of sealable material. For example,

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Synchronoss seeks to redact references to RoyaltySource, an entity otherwise identified in

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unredacted portions of publicly available filings. Compare Dkt. No. 370-4 at 2:4, with Dkt. No.

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330 at 6:23.
Q.

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Dropbox submitted an administrative motion to file under seal portions of its reply in

Dkt. No. 383

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support of its Daubert motion to exclude expert opinions of Dr. Nisha Mody. See Dkt. No. 383.

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But one of the designating parties—Synchronoss—failed to submit a Rule 79-5 declaration.

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R.

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Synchronoss submitted an administrative motion to file under seal portions of its motion

Dkt. No. 329

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for summary judgment. See Dkt. No. 329. Having reviewed the motion and the corresponding

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Rule 79-5 declarations, the Court finds that Synchronoss did not submit a narrowly tailored list of

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sealable material. For example, Synchronoss seeks to redact a discussion of patent licenses with

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F-Secure and Openwave. See Dkt. No. 329-4 at 4. But the same information is unredacted in

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other filings before the Court, and thus is publicly available. See Dkt. No. 254 at 2.

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S.

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Dropbox submitted an administrative motion to file under seal portions of its opposition to

Dkt. No. 361

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Synchronoss’s motion for summary judgment. See Dkt. No. 361. Having reviewed the motion

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and the corresponding Rule 79-5 declarations, the Court finds that Dropbox did not submit a

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narrowly tailored list of sealable material. For example, Dropbox seeks to redact references to

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Synchronoss agreeing to acquire Openwave Messaging and that Openwave Mobility had no need

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for the infringed patents, but the same information is unredacted in the same paragraph. Compare

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361-4 at 15:7–9, with id. at 15:3–6.
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T.

Dkt. No. 388

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Synchronoss submitted an administrative motion to file under seal portions of its reply in

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support of its motion for summary judgment. See Dkt. No. 388. Having reviewed the motion and

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the corresponding Rule 79-5 declarations, the Court finds that Synchronoss did not submit a

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narrowly tailored list of sealable material. For example, Synchronoss seeks to redact information

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that it entered into a $10 million licensing transaction with Openwave, but similar information is

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unredacted in other filings before the Court, and thus is publicly available. Compare Dkt. No.

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388-4 at 11:10, with Dkt. No. 254 at 2.

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U.

Dkt. No. 316

Dropbox submitted an administrative motion to file under seal portions of its motion for

United States District Court
Northern District of California

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summary judgment. See Dkt. No. 316. Having reviewed the motion and the corresponding Rule

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79-5 declarations, the Court finds that Dropbox did not submit a narrowly tailored list of sealable

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material. For example, Dropbox seeks to redact descriptions of its desktop client’s identification

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of changes using “signatures,” but otherwise discloses that Dropbox’s system assigns

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“signature[s]” and “uses the signatures to determine what segments have been modified.”

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Compare Dkt. No. 316-4 at 13:24–25, with Dkt. No. 317 at 18:11–14.

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V.

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Synchronoss submitted an administrative motion to file under seal portions of its

Dkt. No. 367

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opposition to Dropbox’s motion for summary judgment. See Dkt. No. 367. Having reviewed the

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motion and the corresponding Rule 79-5 declarations, the Court finds that Synchronoss did not

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submit a narrowly tailored list of sealable material. For example, Synchronoss seeks to redact—

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and Dropbox as the designating party endorses the redaction of—some references to “rsync,” but

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Dropbox does not endorse the redaction of other references to “rsync.” Compare 367-4 at 12:19,

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with id. at 3:21, 4:4.

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W.

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Dropbox submitted an administrative motion to file under seal portions of its reply in

Dkt. No. 385

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support of its motion for summary judgment. See Dkt. No. 385. Having reviewed the motion and

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the corresponding Rule 79-5 declarations, the Court finds that Dropbox did not submit a narrowly
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tailored list of sealable material. For example, Dropbox seeks to redact references to “rsync.” See

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Dkt. No. 385-4 at 7:15–16. But Dropbox—as the designating party—did not endorse similar

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redactions of “rsync” in Synchronoss’s opposition to Dropbox’s motion for summary judgment.

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See Dkt. No. 367-4 at 3:21 (referring to “rsync”); see also Dkt. No. 377 (Dropbox’s Rule 79-5

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declaration).

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III.

CONCLUSION
The Court DENIES all pending sealing requests in their entirety. Pursuant to Civil Local

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Rule 79-5(f), the parties may file unredacted versions of all briefs and their attachments. The

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parties may also file renewed motions to seal according to the requirements discussed above.

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If the parties wish to file renewed motions to seal, the parties are directed to meet and

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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confer before the submissions and coordinate redactions. The Court does not want one party

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redacting everything the opposing party has ever designated confidential, only for the designating

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party to endorse some, but not all of those redactions in its Rule 79-5 declaration, with little to no

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explanation for why only certain information should be redacted. Instead, for any given filing the

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parties wish to keep partially redacted, the parties should coordinate and submit a renewed

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administrative motion to file under seal that narrowly seeks redaction of only appropriately

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redactable information upon which all parties agree, and which includes all corresponding Rule

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79-5 declarations as attachments to the one submission. In the few instances where the

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designating party is not a party to this suit, see Dkt. Nos. 325, 361, the parties are further directed

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to make good-faith efforts to coordinate and secure Rule 79-5 declarations from those parties in

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advance of filing the renewed motions to seal.

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Under the local rules, parties ordinarily must file unredacted versions or renewed motions

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to seal within seven days of an order denying the administrative motion to file under seal. Given

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the Court’s direction to the parties to undertake a coordinated approach to any renewed

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submissions, the Court extends this deadline to fourteen days.

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The Court expects the parties will use their best objective judgment to file motions that are
narrowly tailored, properly supported by declarations, and that satisfy the requisite standards.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: 6/17/2019

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HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.
United States District Judge

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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