Jones v. Nutiva, Inc.

Filing 120

ORDER by Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. DENYING 86 MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS. (ndrS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 10/18/2017)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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PRESTON JONES, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

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v.

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ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS
Re: Dkt. No. 86

NUTIVA, INC.,
Defendant.

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

Case No. 16-cv-00711-HSG

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Pending before the Court is Preston Jones and Shirin Delalat’s (“Plaintiffs”) motion for

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attorneys’ fees and costs. Dkt. No. 86. The Court finds this matter appropriate for disposition

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without oral argument and the matter is deemed submitted. See Civil L.R. 7-1(b). For the reasons

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detailed below, the Court DENIES the motion.

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I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Jones filed this putative nationwide class action in Contra Costa County Superior

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Court on January 7, 2016, alleging that Nutiva, Inc.’s advertising representations for its coconut

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oil products are false and misleading. See Dkt. No. 2-1. In particular, Jones alleged that

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statements such as “100% less cholesterol than butter,” “better than butter,” and “0g trans fat”

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misled consumers into thinking Defendant’s products were healthy. See id. ¶¶ 59–90. Defendant

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removed the action to federal court on February 11, 2016, under the Class Action Fairness Act of

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2005, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(2) and 1453(b). See Dkt. No. 1.

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Defendant filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings on March 8, 2016, which the Court

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granted in part, dismissing Jones’ claims for products that he had not purchased and for injunctive

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relief because he lacks standing. See Dkt. No. 55 at 6–8, 15–16. Following the Court’s order,

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Jones amended the complaint, adding Plaintiff Shirin Delalat. Dkt. No 73. Defendant filed a

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motion to dismiss, which the Court granted in part. See Dkt. No. 104. The Court again dismissed

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Plaintiffs’ claims for products that they had not purchased and for injunctive relief because they

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lacked standing. Id. at 6.

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Plaintiffs filed their third amended complaint on September 28, 2017, see Dkt. No. 115,

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and the parties are currently briefing Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, see Dkt. No. 118.

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Although the case is ongoing, Plaintiffs seek an interim attorneys’ fees award under California

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Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5 and California Civil Code § 1780(e), contending that Defendant

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changed the labels on some of its products since Plaintiffs filed this action. See Dkt. No. 86.

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II.

LEGAL STANDARD
A.

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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In order to encourage parties to bring cases in the public interest, courts may, in their

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Section 1021.5

discretion, award attorneys’ fees to “successful parties” if:

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(a) a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has
been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons;
[and] (b) the necessity and financial burden of private
enforcement . . . are such as to make the award appropriate.

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Cal. Code Civ. P. § 1021.5; see also Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 34 Cal. 4th 553, 565 (Cal.

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2004). Generally, California courts have liberally construed who is a “successful party” for

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purposes of § 1021.5. The California Supreme Court has confirmed, for example, that “an

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attorney fee award may be justified even when plaintiff’s legal action does not result in a favorable

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final judgment.” Graham, 34 Cal. 4th at 565–566.

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To determine whether a party is successful absent a judgment in his favor, California

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courts apply the “catalyst theory.” Under this theory, a party is “successful” if “[he] achieves [his]

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litigation objectives by means of defendant’s ‘voluntary’ change in conduct in response to the

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litigation.” Graham, 34 Cal. 4th at 572. The plaintiff must establish that: “(1) the lawsuit was a

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catalyst motivating the defendant[] to provide the primary relief sought; (2) [] the lawsuit had

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merit and achieved its catalytic effect by threat of victory, not by dint of nuisance and threat of

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expense . . .; and (3) [] the plaintiff[] reasonably attempted to settle the litigation prior to filing the

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lawsuit. Tipton-Whittingham v. City of Los Angeles, 34 Cal. 4th 604, 608 (Cal. 2004) (citing
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companion case Graham, 34 Cal. 4th 553, supra). To be a catalyst, there must be “a causal

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connection between the lawsuit and the relief obtained” and the lawsuit must not be “frivolous,

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unreasonable, or groundless.” Graham, 34 Cal. 4th at 573–75; see also Henderson v. J.M.

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Smucker Co., CV 10–4524–GHK (VBKx), 2013 WL 3146774, at *4, *9 (C.D. Cal. June 19,

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2013).

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B.

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Under California Civil Code § 1780(e), “[t]he court shall award court costs and attorney’s

Section 1780

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fees to a prevailing plaintiff in litigation filed pursuant to [the Consumer Legal Remedies Act].”

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The statute does not define “prevailing party,” but, “California courts have ‘adopt[ed] a pragmatic
approach, determining prevailing party status based on which party succeeded on a practical

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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level.’” Gonzales v. CarMax Auto Superstores, LLC, 845 F.3d 916, 918 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing

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Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 140, 150 (Cal. Ct. App.2006)). Courts

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have held that a plaintiff is the prevailing party if he obtained a “net monetary recovery” or

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“realized [his] litigation objectives,” even if reached as part of a settlement agreement. Kim v.

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Euromotors West/The Auto Gallery, 149 Cal. App. 4th 170, 178–79 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).

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III.

ANALYSIS

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Plaintiffs state that they are “successful” and “prevailing” parties, entitling them to

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attorneys’ fees, because Defendant changed some of its products’ labels during the course of this

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litigation. See Dkt. No. 86. In particular, Plaintiffs contend that the complaint filed on January 8,

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2016, and a withdrawn motion for partial summary judgment filed on October 18, 2016, induced

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Defendant to alter its products’ labels. See id. at 14–15.

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The Court finds that this request is premature. The action is still pending and Plaintiffs

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have not established that an interim award is warranted in this case. Courts have held that “[i]t is a

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fair reading of the statutory language regarding ‘a successful party’ and ‘any action which has

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resulted’ that an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to [§ 1021.5] is premature if the action is still

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unresolved.” Sengupta v. City of Monrovia, No. CV 09-00795 ABC SHX, 2010 WL 3368438, at

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*3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2010) (citing Bullock v. City & County of San Francisco, 221 Cal. App. 3d

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1072, 1094 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)). Here, the case remains unresolved: the parties only recently
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finalized the pleadings and moved into the class certification stage.

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Plaintiffs have not cited, nor has the Court found, an analogous case in which a court

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granted a motion for an interim award of attorneys’ fees under § 1021.5. Plaintiffs’ cases are

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readily distinguishable because the courts in those cases awarded attorneys’ fees after a

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defendant’s voluntary conduct rendered an entire case or specific claims moot. See, e.g.,

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Macdonald v. Ford Motor Co., 142 F. Supp. 3d 884, 890 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (finding determination

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of attorneys’ fees appropriate where parties agreed the defendant’s voluntary recall mooted claims

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and only remaining issue was fees); see also Tipton 34 Cal. 4th at 607 (same). Here, in contrast,

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Plaintiffs have not suggested that Defendant’s conduct renders any of their claims moot. And to
the extent Defendant’s conduct could have altered a claim for injunctive relief, the Court has

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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already concluded that Plaintiffs lack standing to seek injunctive relief in this case. See Dkt. Nos.

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55, 104. The Court, therefore, declines to exercise its discretion to grant attorneys’ fees under

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§ 1021.5. Although Plaintiffs ultimately may be entitled to an attorneys’ fee award, they have not

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identified any legal or equitable basis for awarding attorneys’ fees at this early stage in the

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litigation.
Plaintiffs’ request for attorneys’ fees under California Civil Code § 1780(e) similarly fails

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at this time. As with Plaintiffs’ claim under § 1021.5, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ request

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premature. Plaintiffs have not succeeded on their Consumer Legal Remedies Act Claim. They

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have not received any monetary recovery or otherwise achieved their litigation objectives, as

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evidenced by the ongoing litigation. See Kim, 149 Cal. App. 4th at 178–79.

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IV.

CONCLUSION

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Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees and costs.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: 10/18/2017
______________________________________
HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.
United States District Judge

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