Williams v. Hazel et al
Filing
35
ORDER by Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. GRANTING ( 10 , 25 ) MOTIONS TO DISMISS (Attachments: # 1 Certificate/Proof of Service)(ndrS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/25/2017)
1
2
3
4
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
6
7
STEPHEN JEROME WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
8
9
v.
10
ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO
DISMISS
E HAZEL, et al.,
Re: Dkt. Nos. 10, 25
Defendants.
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
Case No. 16-cv-01136-HSG
12
13
Plaintiff, a California prisoner currently incarcerated at Ironwood State Prison, filed this
14
pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court found that, liberally construed, the
15
amended complaint stated a cognizable claim for denial of access to the courts against correctional
16
officers Pelican Bay State Prison (“PBSP”) Transportation Sergeant Hazel, PBSP Sergeant Davis,
17
PBSP Sergeant Chandler, PBSP Associate Government Program Analyst Bramucci, and Pleasant
18
Valley State Prison (“PVSP”) Associate Government Program Analyst Vierra, and a cognizable
19
claim for denial of due process against Sergeant Hazel. Dkt. No. 9 at 4–5. Now before the Court
20
are two separate motions to dismiss, one filed by Sergeant Davis, Sergeant Chandler, Analyst
21
Bramucci, and Analyst Vierra (Dkt. No. 10), and the other filed by Sergeant Hazel (Dkt. No. 25).
22
Defendants argue that they are entitled to dismissal of the amended complaint pursuant to Federal
23
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim or, in the
24
alternative, that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Dkt. Nos. 10 and 25. Plaintiff has
25
filed oppositions to both motions (Dkt. Nos. 17 and 29), and Defendants have filed replies in
26
support of their respective motions (Dkt. Nos. 20 and 30). For the reasons set forth below, the
27
Court GRANTS the motions to dismiss.
28
//
BACKGROUND
1
According to the amended complaint, Plaintiff’s constitutional right to access the courts
2
3
was violated when Defendants failed to timely deliver his property, which included a court filing,
4
thereby causing him to miss a court deadline in an unrelated medical malpractice case. Plaintiff
5
alleges that his due process rights were violated when Sergeant Hazel deprived him of his legal
6
materials without a hearing.
7
A.
On September 18, 2008, while Plaintiff was incarcerated at Calipatria State Prison, he
8
9
Underlying Medical Malpractice Case
underwent oral surgery to remove his four wisdom teeth. Dkt. No. 7-1 at 11. In 2013, Plaintiff
learned that the 2008 dental surgery had not been completed properly, resulting in tooth, bone, and
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
gum decay. Id. X-rays taken in February and June 2013 indicated that a root tip had been
12
improperly left in Plaintiff’s gums during the 2008 surgery. Id. On August 28, 2013, Plaintiff had
13
corrective oral surgery and sustained further injury, pain and suffering. Id. at 16.
On September 12, 2013, in preparation for potential litigation and to seek compensation for
14
15
his injuries, Plaintiff requested his dental records. Dkt. No. 7-1 at 16. Plaintiff received these
16
records on January 14, 2014. Id. On February 20, 2014, Plaintiff filed an application with the
17
California Victim Compensation and Government Claim Board (“VCGCB”) regarding the 2008
18
oral surgery, alleging that California Correctional Health Care Services (“CCHCS”) staff had
19
committed medical and dental malpractice, and seeking leave to present a late tort claim. Id. at
20
14–19. On May 15, 2014, the VCGCB denied Plaintiff leave to file a late tort claim. Id. at 8.
21
On or about December 2014, Plaintiff filed a civil action in Monterey County Superior
22
Court, pursuant to Section 946.6 of the California Government Code, requesting relief from the
23
claim presentation requirement set forth in the California Government Claims Act (“CGCA”).1
24
Dkt. No. 7-1 at 21–23. On June 12, 2015, the Monterey County Superior Court denied Plaintiff’s
25
1
26
27
Before a person can sue a public entity or public employee for money damages for actions taken
within the scope of the person’s employment, the CGCA requires the person to first present the
claim to the public entity. See Cal. Gov’t. Code §§ 810 et seq.; Willis v. Reddin, 418 F.2d 702,
704 (9th Cir. 1969); Cal. v. Sup. Ct. (Bodde), 32 Cal. 4th 1234, 1240–44 (Cal. 2004).
28
2
1
petition for relief. Id. at 7-1 at 3–4. Judgment was entered on July 1, 2015. Id. at 4. On July 5,
2
2015, while Plaintiff was housed at Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”), Plaintiff received the
3
judgment and order denying his petition for relief. Dkt. No. 7 at 3–4. Plaintiff mistakenly
4
believed that the deadline to appeal this denial was July 12, 2015, whereas the correct deadline
5
was August 12, 2015. Id. at 4.
6
B.
7
Delay in Receiving Notice of Appeal
On July 6, 2015, Plaintiff prepared a notice of appeal (“NOA”), dated July 6, 2015, and
8
SVSP Officer Gonzalez made four copies of the NOA. Id. Plaintiff intended to place the NOA in
9
the outgoing mail later that day. Id. Later that morning, SVSP Officer White informed Plaintiff
that he was being transferred to PBSP within the hour and instructed Plaintiff to pack up his
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
property. Id. Plaintiff informed Officer White that he needed to mail out certain legal documents
12
that evening to comply with a court deadline. Id. Officer White informed Plaintiff that he would
13
arrive at PBSP within two days and that Plaintiff could mail out his legal documents at that time.
14
Id. En route to PBSP, Plaintiff had a layover day at PVSP.
15
Upon arriving at PBSP, Plaintiff learned that his property had not arrived with him. Dkt.
16
No. 7 at 4. Sergeant Hazel informed Plaintiff that because Plaintiff had too many boxes of
17
property, Plaintiff’s property was still at PVSP and would arrive within a couple of weeks, maybe
18
a month. Id. Plaintiff informed Sergeant Hazel that his property contained legal documents that
19
had to be filed to meet a court deadline. Id. Sergeant Hazel and other PBSP correctional officers
20
advised Plaintiff to file an appeal. Id.
21
On July 8, 2015, Plaintiff submitted a CDCR Form 22 Request for Item to Sergeant Davis,
22
requesting that his property be delivered immediately so that Plaintiff could comply with a July
23
12, 2015 court deadline. Dkt. No. 7 at 4 and Dkt. No. 7-1 at 28. Sergeant Chandler responded to
24
the CDCR Form 22, and informed Plaintiff that PBSP had not received any of Plaintiff’s property
25
and directed Plaintiff to submit a missing property form to his prior facility. Id.
26
On July 9, 2015, the following day, Plaintiff submitted CDCR Form 602 Inmate Appeal,
27
PBSP No. 0-15-01713, to Analyst Bramucci requesting that his property be returned to him
28
immediately so that he could comply with a July 12, 2015 court deadline, and requesting that
3
1
PBSP provide him with an affidavit stating that he did not receive this property on July 8, 2015,
2
which rendered him unable to meet the court’s July 12, 2015 deadline for filing an appeal. Dkt.
3
No. 7 at 4 and Dkt. No. 7-1 at 31–33. On July 10, 2015, Analyst Bramucci forwarded grievance
4
PBSP No. 0-15-01713 to the appeals coordinator at PVSP, who assigned it the log number PVSP
5
No. 0-15-00960. Dkt. No. 7 at 4 and Dkt. No. 7-1 at 30–33.
6
7
8
9
On July 15, 2015, Plaintiff’s property arrived at PBSP but was not delivered to him. Dkt.
No. 7 at 7.
On July 21, 2015, Analyst J. Vierra cancelled grievance PBSP No. 0-15-01713 / PVSP No.
0-15-00960, noting that the grievance was resolved because, on July 20, 2015, Sergeant Carr had
informed Analyst Vierra that Plaintiff’s property had been sent to PBSP via Golden State
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
Overnight on July 14, 2015. Dkt. No. 7 at 5 and Dkt. No. 7-1 at 36. Plaintiff received Analyst
12
Vierra’s notice of cancellation on August 2, 2015. Dkt. No. 7 at 5. That same day, Plaintiff
13
appealed the cancellation because Plaintiff still had not received his property. Id. In his appeal,
14
Plaintiff stated that the court deadline had passed and that CDCR officials had failed to provide
15
him with an affidavit to file with the court to excuse his late-filing. Dkt. No. 7-1 at 32. Plaintiff
16
stated that his case was now time-barred. Id.
17
On August 3, 2015, Analyst Bramucci forwarded Plaintiff’s appeal back to PVSP. Dkt.
18
No. 7 at 5 and No. 7-1 at 38. On August 13, 2015, Analyst Vierra cancelled the appeal, and
19
directed Plaintiff to appeal the cancellation of the grievance by filing a separate grievance. Dkt.
20
No. 7 at 5 and Dkt. No. 7-1 at 40.
21
On August 25, 2015, Plaintiff submitted a second CDCR Form 22 Request for Service to
22
Sergeant Davis, requesting that his property be delivered to him. Dkt. No. 7 at 6 and Dkt. No. 7-1
23
at 5. In this Form 22, Plaintiff stated that the court deadline had passed. Dkt. No. 7-1 at 5. On
24
August 26, 2015, Sergeant Chandler responded to the Form 22 stating that PBSP was “working on
25
all property” and unable to provide an estimate as to when Plaintiff could expect his property. Id.
26
That same day, Plaintiff filed a new CDCR Form 602 Inmate Appeal, No. PVSP-0-15-01125, with
27
PVSP correctional officials, again requesting the return of his property. Dkt. No. 7 at 5 and Dkt.
28
No. 7-1 at 42. In this Form 602, Plaintiff stated that he had missed a court deadline and been
4
1
denied access to the courts. Dkt. No. 7-1 at 42.
On September 15, 2015, Sergeant Davis delivered Plaintiff’s property to him. Dkt. No. 7
2
3
at 6.
On September 21, 2015, Analyst Vierra interviewed Plaintiff by telephone regarding
4
5
grievance PVSP No. 0-15-01125. Dkt. No. 7 at 5. On September 22, 2015, grievance PVSP No.
6
0-15-01125 was granted in part at the second level of review in that PVSP acknowledged that it
7
had failed to address Plaintiff’s request for an affidavit regarding the missing property. Dkt. No. 7
8
at 5 and 46–47. The second level decision reassigned grievance PBSP No. 0-15-01713 / PVSP
9
No. 0-15-00960 back to the first level of review. Id. Plaintiff appealed this decision to the
director’s level of review and on November 3, 2015, Office of Appeals Chief Voong determined
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
that there was no issue to address relative to PVSP No. 0-15-01125 because the second level
12
decision allowed Plaintiff to resubmit grievance PBSP No. 0-15-01713 / PVSP No. 0-15-00960.
13
Dkt. No. 7 at 5 and 48. Plaintiff was informed that if he was dissatisfied with the second level
14
review decision with respect to grievance PBSP No. 0-15-01713 / PVSP No. 0-15-00960, he could
15
submit that grievance for third level review. Dkt. No. 7 at 5 and 48.
16
C.
Plaintiff’s Additional Allegations
17
Plaintiff makes the following additional allegations.
18
Plaintiff alleges that Sergeant Hazel made the personal decision to leave Plaintiff’s
19
property at PVSP and not place it on the bus that transported Plaintiff from PVSP to PBSP, and
20
that Sergeant Hazel failed to take any steps to locate, obtain and issue Plaintiff’s property to
21
Plaintiff after learning that Plaintiff required his property to meet a court deadline. Dkt. No. 7 at 6.
22
Plaintiff alleges that Sergeant Davis and Sergeant Chandler, who both are directly
23
responsible for issuing property to inmates upon their arrival at PBSP, failed to locate, obtain and
24
issue Plaintiff’s property to him despite knowing that he required his property to meet a court
25
deadline. Dkt. No. 7 at 7–8.
26
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Analysts Bramucci and Vierra failed to forward Plaintiff’s
27
inmate appeal concerning his property and court deadline to the appropriate staff at PBSP, and
28
failed to notify the appropriate PBSP staff that Plaintiff’s property had arrived at PBSP on July 15,
5
1
2015, and failed to instruct the appropriate PBSP staff to immediately release Plaintiff’s property
2
to him. Dkt. No. 7 at 8–9.
DISCUSSION
3
4
A.
Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a defendant to move to dismiss on the
5
ground that there is a “failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
7
12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss should be granted if a plaintiff fails to proffer “enough facts to state
8
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
9
(2007). The court “must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint,”
10
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), and must construe the alleged facts in the light most
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
6
favorable to the plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). The Court must
12
construe pro se pleadings liberally. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). The court
13
need not accept as true allegations that are conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or
14
unreasonable inferences. See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir.),
15
amended, 275 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001).
As a general rule, “a district court may not consider any material beyond the pleadings in
16
17
ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled
18
on other grounds by Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2002)
19
(citation omitted). The Court may, however, consider the following documents without
20
converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment: (1) documents whose
21
contents are alleged in or attached to the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, see
22
Branch, 14 F.3d at 454; (2) documents whose authenticity is not in question, and upon which the
23
complaint necessarily relies, but which are not attached to the complaint, see Lee v. City of Los
24
Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001); and (3) documents and materials of which the court
25
may take judicial notice, see Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir. 1994).
26
B.
27
28
Requests for Judicial Notice
Defendants have requested that the Court take judicial notice of sections 3084.1 and 3190
of the California Code of Regulations, title 15, as well as sections 54030.5, 54030.13.1 and
6
1
54100.23.2 of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) Department
2
Operations Manual (“DOM”). Dkt. No. 11. Plaintiff seeks to join Defendants’ request for judicial
3
notice, Dkt. No. 17 at 9, and also requests that the Court take judicial notice of sections 14010.19,
4
54010.12.2, 54010.4, 54030.7.1, and 54030.10.2 of the DOM, id. at 10–12 and 28–45.
5
When considering a motion to dismiss, a court does not normally look beyond the
6
complaint in order to avoid converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.
7
Ngoc Nguyen v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 749. F.Supp.2d 1022, 1024 (N.D. Cal. 2010). However,
8
a court may take judicial notice of material that is submitted as part of the complaint or is
9
necessarily relied upon by the complaint, as well as matters of public record. Lee, 250 F.3d at
688–89. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b), a “judicially noticed fact must be one not
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within the territorial
12
jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to
13
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Courts routinely take judicial notice of
14
state regulations which are readily ascertainable, Bd. of Public Works of Maryland, 426 U.S. 736,
15
742 n. 4 (1976), and routinely take judicial notice of records of state agencies, see City of
16
Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1224 n.2 (9th Cir. 2004) (“We may take judicial notice of a
17
record of a state agency not subject to reasonable dispute.”). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the
18
requests for judicial notice filed by both parties, and takes judicial notice of (1) 15 Cal. Code
19
Regs. §§ 3084.1 and 3190, because they are state regulations which are easily ascertainable; and
20
(2) DOM §§ 14010.19, 54010.12.2, 54030.10.2, 54010.4, 54030.7.1, 54030.5, 54030.13.1, and
21
54100.23.2, as they are matters of public record.
22
C.
23
Access to the Courts Claim
The First Amendment right of access to courts guarantees the right to meaningful access to
24
the courts. Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 2011) overruled on other grounds
25
as stated by Richey v. Dahne, 807 F.3d 1202, 1209 n.6 (9th Cir. 2015). The Ninth Circuit has
26
traditionally differentiated between two types of access to court claims: those involving prisoners’
27
right to affirmative assistance and those involving prisoners’ rights to litigate without active
28
interference. Id. at 1102.
7
A prisoner’s constitutional right to litigation assistance is limited to the tools prisoners
1
2
need in order to attack their sentences, either directly or collaterally, and in order to challenge the
3
conditions of their confinement. Silva, 658 F.3d at 1102 (citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. at 355).
4
The right to such assistance is limited to the pleading stage. Id. The state is not required to enable
5
the prisoner to discover grievances or to litigate effectively once in court. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at
6
354.
7
In contrast, a prisoner’s constitutional right to litigate without interference encompasses
8
the First Amendment right to petition the government by filing civil actions that have a reasonable
9
basis in law or fact, and extends beyond the pleading stage. Silva, 658 F.3d at 1102. This right
does not require prison officials to provide affirmative assistance in the preparation of legal
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
papers, but rather forbids states from erecting barriers that impede the right of access of
12
incarcerated persons. Id. The Ninth Circuit therefore has held that “prisoners have a right under
13
the First and Fourteenth Amendments to litigate claims challenging their sentences or the
14
conditions of their confinement to conclusion without active interference by prison officials.” Id.
15
(emphasis in original).
16
17
18
19
20
21
Plaintiff categorizes his First Amendment claim as an “active interference” claim,
distinguishing it from an “affirmative assistance” claim:
Plaintiff Williams is not alleging that he was denied access to the courts because he was
deprived of the required “tools” and “assistance” the Lewis court held to be provided to
inmates challenging their convictions or conditions of confinement. Plaintiff Williams
alleges he was denied access to the courts because each of the named Defendants
intentionally and deliberately “obstructed” him from having “meaningful access to the
courts” and “interfered” with his right to “seek redress” and file a “grievance.”
22
Dkt. No. 17 at 19; see also Dkt. No. 29 at 9. The “active interference” claim, as described by
23
Plaintiff, is Defendants’ failure to take particular affirmative steps to track down Plaintiff’s
24
property to ensure Plaintiff met his court deadline. Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants
25
deliberately withheld his property for the purpose of causing him to miss a court deadline.
26
Rather, Plaintiff alleges that Sergeants Chandler and Davis, and Analysts Bramucci and
27
Vierra, failed to do legally required acts that caused the First Amendment violation. See Dkt. No.
28
17 at 11 (alleging that Sergeant Chandler was more concerned with backlog of all inmate property
8
1
than finding Plaintiff’s property), at 13‒14 (alleging that Sergeant Davis failed to direct Sergeant
2
Chandler to locate and deliver Plaintiff’s property), at 15‒16 (alleging that Analysts Bramucci and
3
Vierra failed to assist Plaintiff in resolving his property claim), at 11‒12 (listing CDCR
4
regulations allegedly violated by Sergeants Chandler and Davis), at 14‒17 (listing CDCR
5
regulations allegedly violated by Analysts Bramucci and Vierra). Similarly, Plaintiff argues that
6
Sergeant Hazel caused the First Amendment violation when he decided to leave Plaintiff’s
7
property at PVSP and failed to do legally required acts. Dkt. No. 29 at 7‒9.
8
9
For the reasons set forth below, Court finds that Defendants are entitled to qualified
immunity on Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim.
1.
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity is an entitlement, provided to government officials in the exercise of
12
their duties, not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,
13
200 (2001), overruled on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). The
14
doctrine of qualified immunity attempts to balance two important and sometimes competing
15
interests — “the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly
16
and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their
17
duties reasonably.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231. The doctrine thus intends to take into account the
18
real-world demands on officials in order to allow them to act “swiftly and firmly” in situations
19
where the rules governing their actions are often “voluminous, ambiguous, and contradictory.”
20
Mueller v. Auker, 576 F.3d 979, 993 (9th Cir. 2009). “The purpose of this doctrine is to recognize
21
that holding officials liable for reasonable mistakes might unnecessarily paralyze their ability to
22
make difficult decisions in challenging situations, thus disrupting the effective performance of
23
their public duties.” Id.
24
To determine whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity, the Court
25
must consider (1) whether the official’s conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) whether
26
that right was clearly established at the time of the incident. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232. Courts are
27
not required to address the two qualified immunity issues in any particular order, and instead may
28
“exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity
9
1
analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Id.
2
at 236. With respect to the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis, the Supreme Court
3
has recently held that “[a]n officer cannot be said to have violated a clearly established right unless
4
the right’s contours were sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in his shoes would have
5
understood that he was violating it, meaning that existing precedent . . . placed the statutory or
6
constitutional question beyond debate.” City and County of San Francisco, Cal. v. Sheehan, 135
7
S. Ct. 1765, 1774 (2015) (omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). This is an
8
“exacting standard” which “gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but
9
mistaken judgments by protecting all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate
10
United States District Court
Northern District of California
11
the law.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Although it is not necessary that a prior decision rule “the very action in question”
12
unlawful for a right to be clearly established, Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987),
13
the Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned that courts should not define clearly established law
14
at a high level of generality, see White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017) (per curiam). See also
15
Hamby v. Hammond, 821 F.3d 1085, 1095 (9th Cir. 2016) (plaintiff need not find case with
16
identical facts, but the further afield existing precedent lies the more likely that official’s acts fall
17
within vast zone of conduct that is constitutional).
18
2.
19
Sergeant Davis argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity because he could not have
20
known that he was violating a constitutional right when he processed Plaintiff’s property request
21
without issuing Plaintiff’s property; because there is no clearly established law that an inmate’s
22
right to prosecute a negligence case overrides prison property regulations; and because, to the
23
extent that Sergeant Davis’s actions caused Plaintiff to miss his appeal deadline, Sergeant Davis’s
24
actions were legally reasonable. Dkt. No. 10 at 18–19.
25
Sergeant Davis
The Court finds that Sergeant Davis is entitled to qualified immunity because, at the time
26
that Sergeant Davis processed Plaintiff’s property requests, there was no clearly established law
27
that established “beyond debate” that the conduct alleged (accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true)
28
violated the Constitution. See Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1863, 1866 (2014) (“under either
10
prong [of the qualified immunity analysis], courts may not resolve genuine disputes of fact in
2
favor of the party seeking summary judgment”). The only factual allegations in the amended
3
complaint regarding Sergeant Davis are the following: (1) on July 8, 2015, and on August 25,
4
2015, Plaintiff submitted property requests to Sergeant Davis wherein he specified that he needed
5
his property to comply with a July 12, 2015 court deadline; (2) Sergeant Davis forwarded the
6
requests to Sergeant Chandler; and (3) Sergeant Davis did not ensure the timely delivery of
7
Plaintiff’s property. The crux of Plaintiff’s argument is that Sergeant Davis should have ensured
8
him access to the courts by personally locating and delivering Plaintiff’s property. At the time of
9
Sergeant Davis’s alleged actions and inaction, it was not clearly established that a prison officer
10
was required to take the steps Plaintiff alleges he should have taken. Even now, to the Court’s
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
1
knowledge, there is no published Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit law that requires a prison
12
official who knows of a prisoner’s court deadline to take particular affirmative steps to track down
13
the prisoner’s property to assist the prisoner in meeting the deadline. See Brown v. Oregon Dep’t
14
of Corr., 751 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 2014) (defendants are not liable for violation of right that
15
was not clearly established at time violation occurred).
16
Plaintiff argues that the right to access the court was clearly established by the Supreme
17
Court in Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977), and Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996). Dkt.
18
No. 17 at 22. But defining the allegedly clearly established right at this level of generality does
19
not comply with the unambiguous instructions of the Supreme Court. See Mullenix v. Luna, 136
20
S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (“We have repeatedly told courts . . . not to define clearly established law at
21
a high level of generality. The dispositive question is whether the violative nature of particular
22
conduct is clearly established. This inquiry must be undertaken in light of the specific context of
23
the case, not as a broad general proposition.”). Plaintiff has emphasized that he is alleging an
24
“active interference” claim, Dkt. No. 17 at 19, and neither Bounds nor Lewis addresses the right to
25
litigate without active interference. Bounds established prisoners’ right to affirmative assistance,
26
holding that “the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities
27
to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners
28
11
1
with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.” 2 Bounds, 430
2
U.S. at 828. In Lewis, the Supreme Court did not did not speak to a prisoner’s right to litigate
3
without unreasonable interference, but rather limited the right to affirmative assistance to the
4
pleading stage. Silva, 658 F.3d at 1103.
It is unclear whether a court may consider binding circuit precedent in determining clearly
5
6
established law. The Ninth Circuit has defined “clearly established law” as Supreme Court and
7
circuit precedent. See Community House, Inc. v. Bieter, 623 F.3d 945, 967 (9th Cir. 2010) (“To
8
determine whether a right was clearly established, a court turns to Supreme Court and Ninth
9
Circuit law existing at the time of the alleged act.”) (citing Osolinski v. Kane, 92 F.3d 934, 936
(9th Cir. 1996)); Boyd v. Benton Cnty., 374 F.3d 773, 781 (9th Cir. 2004) (same). In Hope v.
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002), the Supreme Court relied on circuit precedent in finding that the
12
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, specifically that the defendants’ conduct violated
13
clearly established law in light of binding circuit precedent. Hope, 536 U.S. at 741–45 (“in light
14
of binding Eleventh Circuit precedent, an Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC)
15
regulation, and a DOJ report informing the ADOC of the constitutional infirmity in its use of the
16
hitching post, we readily conclude that the respondents' conduct violated “clearly established
17
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”) (citing
18
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).). In recent cases, the Supreme Court has
19
assumed for the sake of argument without explicitly holding that “controlling Court of Appeals’
20
authority could be a dispositive source of clearly established law,” Reichle v. Howards, 132 S.Ct.
21
2088, 2094 (2012); see also Carroll v. Carman, 135 S.Ct. 348, 350 (2014), but neither of these
22
cases has overruled Hope or called its exclusive reliance on circuit precedent into question.
Regardless, circuit precedent also fails to establish that the conduct alleged violated clearly
23
24
established law. The Ninth Circuit did recognize a First Amendment right to access the courts
25
26
27
28
2
The right to affirmative assistance to access to the courts is limited to prisoners’ pursuits of nonfrivolous claims concerning their conviction and non-frivolous § 1983 claims challenging the
conditions of their confinement. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355. “Impairment of any other litigating
capacity is simply one of the incidental (and perfectly constitutional) consequences of conviction
and incarceration.” Id.
12
1
2
3
without interference in Silva v. Di Vittorio:
This right [to access the courts without interference] does not require prison officials to
provide affirmative assistance in the preparation of legal papers, but rather forbids states
from “erect[ing] barriers that impede the right of access of incarcerated persons.”
4
Silva, 658 F.3d at 1102. The Ninth Circuit held that this right applied to all civil actions with a
5
reasonable basis in law or fact, and applied beyond the pleading stage. Silva, 658 F.3d at 1102‒
6
03. However, the First Amendment right recognized in Silva is clearly distinguishable from the
7
instant action in that the defendants in Silva allegedly acted with malicious intent in that they
8
transferred the prisoner between different facilities and seized and withheld his legal files to hinder
9
the prisoner’s ability to litigate pending civil lawsuits. Id. at 1101‒04 (finding that these alleged
facts sufficiently stated a First Amendment claim to survive motion to dismiss). Silva is also
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
distinguishable in that the inmate-plaintiff was allegedly denied access to the courts because of the
12
defendants’ actions, while in the instant action, it is Defendants’ inaction that Plaintiff alleges
13
caused the constitutional violation. At most, Silva clearly establishes that a prisoner has a right to
14
litigate without prison officials engaging in affirmative, malicious interference. It does not
15
address whether prison officials have an obligation to take affirmative steps to assist a prisoner in
16
meeting his court deadlines by personally undertaking to locate missing property.
17
Plaintiff cites a number of additional cases that he argues clearly establish that Sergeant
18
Davis should have taken affirmative steps to locate and deliver his property, or otherwise assist
19
him in meeting his court deadline. Even assuming that it may look to these cases in determining
20
whether the law was clearly established, the Court disagrees. Plaintiff argues that Williams v.
21
I.C.C. Committee, 812 F. Supp. 1029, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 1992), establishes that the denial of access
22
to legal documents prepared by a pro se inmate constitutes a First Amendment violation. Dkt. No.
23
17 at 19. However, Williams holds only that the allegation that an inmate has been deprived of his
24
legal papers and that this deprivation made him miss a deadline to file an amended complaint
25
states a cognizable First Amendment claim. Williams does not place beyond debate the
26
constitutional question as to whether a prison official’s failure to take particular affirmative steps
27
to personally locate missing property to assist an inmate in meeting his court deadline violates the
28
First Amendment.
13
1
Plaintiff argues that Jackson v. Procunier, 789 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1986), also clearly
2
establishes that prison officials must take affirmative steps to assist an inmate in meeting his court
3
deadline. However, similar to Silva, Jackson only establishes that an inmate has a right to be free
4
from deliberate and malicious interference with his access to the courts. The Jackson court found
5
that the allegation that prison officials intentionally delayed the mailing of the inmate’s in forma
6
pauperis filing, thereby causing dismissal of his case, stated a cognizable First Amendment claim
7
at the pleading stage. The Jackson court specified that this holding applied only to intentional
8
conduct, and not to something less than intentional conduct, such as recklessness or gross
9
negligence. Jackson, 789 F.2d at 312. Jackson also does not place beyond debate the
constitutional question as to whether a prison official’s failure to take particular affirmative steps
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
to personally locate missing property to assist an inmate in meeting his court deadline violates the
12
First Amendment.
13
Plaintiff also argues that Sergeant Davis disregarded and violated clearly established
14
CDCR regulations and therefore acted both unreasonably, citing to Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct.
15
305, 309 (2015), and incompetently, citing to Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). Dkt.
16
No. 17 at 22–24. In other words, Plaintiff argues that because Sergeant Davis’ actions and
17
inactions violated CDCR regulations, Sergeant Davis is not entitled to qualified immunity because
18
the doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials from civil liability only if their conduct “does
19
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
20
would have known,” Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308, and because qualified immunity “provides ample
21
protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law,” Malley, 475
22
U.S. at 341. To the extent that Plaintiff bases his First Amendment claim on violations of prison
23
regulations, such violations cannot be remedied under § 1983 unless they also violate a federal
24
constitutional or statutory right. See Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 192 (1984) (§ 1983 provides
25
no redress for prison officials’ violation of state prison regulations); see also Nurre v. Whitehead,
26
580 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2009) (section 1983 claims must be premised on violation of federal
27
constitutional right); Sweaney v. Ada Cnty., Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997) (section
28
1983 creates cause of action for violation of federal law); Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90
14
1
F.3d 367, 370–71 (9th Cir. 1996) (federal and state law claims should not be conflated; to the
2
extent the violation of a state law amounts to a deprivation of a state-created interest that reaches
3
beyond that guaranteed by the federal Constitution, section 1983 offers no redress). “[S]tate
4
officials [do not] lose their immunity by violating the clear command of a statute or regulation—of
5
federal or state law—unless that statute or regulation provides the basis for the cause of action
6
sued upon.” See Davis, 468 U.S. at 194 n.12.3
Accordingly, Sergeant Davis is entitled to qualified immunity, and his motion to dismiss is
7
8
GRANTED. The Court DISMISSES with prejudice the First Amendment claim against Sergeant
9
Davis.
3.
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
Sergeant Chandler
Sergeant Chandler argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity because he could not
12
have known that his responses to Plaintiff’s property requests would violate Plaintiff’s rights; and
13
because there is no clearly established law that an inmate’s mere contention to a prison official
14
that the inmate has a court deadline gives rises to an affirmative duty. Dkt. No. 10 at 19. Plaintiff
15
argues that Sergeant Chandler’s position as an officer in PBSP Receiving & Release rendered him
16
responsible for issuing Plaintiff his property upon Plaintiff’s request. Dkt. No. 17 at 24.
The Court finds that Sergeant Chandler is entitled to qualified immunity because, at the
17
18
time that Sergeant Chandler processed Plaintiff’s property requests, there was no clearly
19
established law that required a prison official who knew of a prisoner’s court deadline to take
20
particular affirmative steps to personally track down the prisoner’s property to assist the prisoner
21
in meeting the deadline. The only factual allegations in the amended complaint regarding
22
Sergeant Chandler are the following: (1) that he responded to Plaintiff’s July 8, 2015 property
23
request by advising Plaintiff that PBSP had not yet received his property and by advising Plaintiff
24
3
25
26
27
28
In addition, in arguing that the regulations imposed a duty to ensure Plaintiff’s access to the
courts, Plaintiff’s argument is tantamount to an action for private enforcement of these particular
prison regulations. The Court is unaware of any authority for the proposition that a plaintiff has a
private right of action to enforce a prison regulation, see Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S.
273, 283–86 (2002) (basing a claim on an implied private right of action requires a showing that
the statute both contains explicit rightscreating terms and manifests an intent to create a private
remedy), and Plaintiff offers no authority recognizing such a right of private enforcement.
15
to submit a property request to his prior facility; and (2) that he responded to Plaintiff’s August 25,
2
2015 property request by informing Plaintiff that PBSP was working to resolve the issue and that
3
he was unable to provide an estimate as to when Plaintiff would receive his property. The crux of
4
Plaintiff’s argument is that Sergeant Chandler should have ensured him access to the courts by
5
personally locating and delivering Plaintiff’s property. As discussed above, at the time of
6
Sergeant Chandler’s actions or inaction, there was no published Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit
7
law requiring a prison official who knew of a prisoner’s court deadline to take particular
8
affirmative steps to track down the prisoner’s property to assist the prisoner in meeting the
9
deadline. See Brown, 751 F.3d at 990. Accordingly, Sergeant Chandler is entitled to qualified
10
immunity, and his motion to dismiss is GRANTED. The Court DISMISSES with prejudice the
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
1
First Amendment claim against Sergeant Chandler.
12
4.
13
Analyst Bramucci argues that she is entitled to qualified immunity because her actions
14
were based on the procedures for reviewing administrative grievances, and because there is no
15
clearly established law that an inmate’s contention to a prison official that the inmate has a court
16
deadline gives rise to an affirmative duty to override administrative grievance procedures. Dkt.
17
No. 10 at 19–20. Plaintiff argues that Analyst Bramucci’s actions violated the procedures for
18
reviewing administrative grievances when she failed to process his appeal of the cancellation of
19
his inmate appeal at PBSP and instead forwarded it to PVSP; and when she failed to instruct PBSP
20
Receiving and Release personnel to issue Plaintiff’s property. Dkt. No. 17 at 25–26.
21
Analyst Bramucci
The relevant allegation in the amended complaint regarding Analyst Bramucci is that
22
when, on August 2, 2015, Plaintiff submitted an appeal of Analyst Vierra’s cancellation of
23
Plaintiff’s PVSP grievance and complained that his court deadline had passed and that CDCR
24
officials had not provided him an affidavit to excuse the late filing, Analyst Bramucci forwarded
25
the grievance back to PVSP even though Plaintiff’s property was at PBSP. Here, Plaintiff
26
informed Analyst Bramucci that he had missed a deadline, not that he had a pending deadline.
27
The crux of Plaintiff’s argument is that his right to access the courts required Analyst Bramucci to
28
personally locate his legal documents after the filing deadline.
16
1
The Court finds that Analyst Bramucci is entitled to qualified immunity because, at the
2
time that Analyst Bramucci processed Plaintiff’s grievances and appeals, there was no clearly
3
established law that either (1) required a prison official to personally take particular affirmative
4
steps to track down a prisoner’s legal property to assist the prisoner in meeting court deadlines, or
5
(2) required a prison official to personally take particular affirmative steps to locate and deliver a
6
prisoner’s legal property where the court deadline had passed. As discussed supra, while there is
7
a clearly established First Amendment right to access the courts without active interference, there
8
is no clearly established companion right to affirmative assistance from prison officials to meet
9
court deadlines. Similarly, there is no clearly established companion right to affirmative
assistance from prison officials to locate and deliver legal documents needed for a court deadline
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
that has already passed.
12
Accordingly, Analyst Bramucci is entitled to qualified immunity, and her motion to
13
dismiss is GRANTED. The Court DISMISSES with prejudice the First Amendment claim against
14
Analyst Bramucci.
15
5.
Analyst Vierra
16
Analyst Vierra argues that she is entitled to qualified immunity because her actions in
17
addressing Plaintiff’s grievances did not violate a constitutional right of which a reasonable person
18
should have known. Dkt. No. 10 at 20. Plaintiff argues that Analyst Vierra violated prison rules
19
and regulations when she failed to forward Plaintiff’s property appeal to PBSP after she learned
20
that Plaintiff’s property had arrived at PBSP; when she failed to instruct PBSP grievance analysts
21
to timely issue his property; and when she canceled Plaintiff’s property appeal instead of
22
instructing Plaintiff to resubmit the appeal to the PBSP Appeals Coordinator for second level
23
review. Dkt. No. 17 at 26–27.
24
The relevant allegations in the amended complaint regarding Analyst Vierra are the
25
following: (1) that she learned on July 20, 2015 that Plaintiff’s property had arrived at PBSP and
26
cancelled Plaintiff’s grievance on July 21, 2015, but failed to instruct PBSP prison officials to
27
timely deliver his property; and (2) that she cancelled Plaintiff’s appeal on August 13, 2015. Here,
28
Plaintiff informed Analyst Vierra that his filing deadline had passed on July 12, 2015. The crux of
17
1
Plaintiff’s argument is that his right to access the courts required Analyst Vierra to personally
2
locate his legal documents after the filing deadline.
3
The Court finds that Analyst Vierra is entitled to qualified immunity because, at the time
4
that Analyst Vierra processed Plaintiff’s grievances and appeals, there was no clearly established
5
law that either (1) required a prison official to personally take particular affirmative steps to track
6
down a prisoner’s legal property to assist the prisoner in meeting court deadlines, or (2) required a
7
prison official to personally take particular affirmative steps to locate and deliver a prisoner’s legal
8
property where the court deadline had passed. As discussed supra, while there is a clearly
9
established First Amendment right to access the courts without active interference, there is no
clearly established companion right to affirmative assistance from prison officials to meet court
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
deadlines. Similarly, there is no clearly established companion right to affirmative assistance from
12
prison officials to locate and deliver legal documents needed for a court deadline that has already
13
passed.
Accordingly, Analyst Vierra is entitled to qualified immunity, and her motion to dismiss
14
15
is GRANTED. The Court DISMISSES with prejudice the First Amendment claim against Analyst
16
Vierra.
17
6.
Sergeant Hazel
18
Sergeant Hazel argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable officer
19
in his position would not have known that his actions in transporting Plaintiff to PBSP would
20
violate Plaintiff’s right to access the courts. Dkt. No. 25 at 18. Plaintiff argues that a reasonable
21
officer would have understood that prison regulations required Sergeant Hazel to (1) transport an
22
inmate’s property on the same bus as the inmate when the prison officer had been informed that
23
the property contains legal documents; and (2) to make an effort to resolve the missing property
24
issue by contacting the relevant parties and ensuring the immediate transfer and release of the
25
inmate’s property. Dkt. No. 29 at 7 and 14–15. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that a reasonable
26
officer would have contacted PVSP officials and arranged for Plaintiff’s property to be timely
27
shipped to PBSP. Id. at 7.
28
The Court finds that Sergeant Hazel is entitled to qualified immunity because, at the time
18
that Sergeant Hazel transported Plaintiff to PBSP, there was no clearly established law that
2
established “beyond debate” that the conduct alleged (accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true, see
3
Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1863, 1866) violated the Constitution. The relevant allegations in the
4
amended complaint regarding Sergeant Hazel are as follows: (1) Sergeant Hazel made the
5
decision to leave Plaintiff’s property at PVSP rather than transporting it on the same bus as
6
Plaintiff; and (2) when informed on July 7, 2015 that Plaintiff’s property contained legal
7
documents, Sergeant Hazel did not personally locate and deliver the property, and only suggested
8
that Plaintiff file an appeal. The crux of Plaintiff’s argument is that Sergeant Hazel should have
9
ensured him access to the courts by either (1) ensuring that Plaintiff’s property was transferred on
10
the same bus as Plaintiff or (2) personally locating and delivering Plaintiff’s property. At the time
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
1
of Sergeant Hazel’s alleged actions and inaction, it was not clearly established that a prison officer
12
was required to take the steps Plaintiff alleges he should have taken. As discussed supra, there is
13
no published Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit law that requires a prison official who knows of a
14
prisoner’s court deadline to take particular affirmative steps to track down the prisoner’s property
15
to assist the prisoner in meeting the deadline. See Brown, 751 F.3d at 990. Accordingly, Sergeant
16
Hazel is entitled to qualified immunity, and the Court DISMISSES with prejudice the First
17
Amendment claim against Sergeant Hazel.
18
D.
Due Process Claim
19
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals against
20
governmental deprivations of “life, liberty or property,” as those words have been interpreted and
21
given meaning over the life of our republic, without due process of law. Board of Regents v. Roth,
22
408 U.S. 564, 570–71 (1972); Mullins v. Oregon, 57 F.3d 789, 795 (9th Cir. 1995). Interests that
23
are procedurally protected by the Due Process Clause may arise from two sources — the Due
24
Process Clause itself and laws of the states. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223–27 (1976).
25
Deprivations that are authorized by state law and are less severe or more closely related to the
26
expected terms of confinement may also amount to deprivations of a procedurally protected liberty
27
interest, provided that (1) state statutes or regulations narrowly restrict the power of prison
28
officials to impose the deprivation, i.e., give the inmate a kind of right to avoid it, and (2) the
19
1
liberty in question is one of “real substance.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 477–87 (1995).
2
Generally, “real substance” will be limited to freedom from (1) a restraint that imposes “atypical
3
and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life,” id. at
4
484, or (2) state action that “will inevitably affect the duration of [a] sentence,” id. at 487.
5
Sergeant Hazel argues that Plaintiff has not alleged that he was deprived of a
6
constitutionally protected liberty interest, and that Plaintiff cannot show a constitutionally
7
protected right to have his property transported on the same vehicle as his person for the following
8
reasons. First, Sergeant Hazel argues that, to the extent that Plaintiff had a property interest in his
9
NOA, this property interest arose from his right to access the courts. If Plaintiff cannot state a
First Amendment violation, Plaintiff also fails to state a claim for a due process violation. Second,
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
Sergeant Hazel argues that Plaintiff had no liberty or property interest in having his property
12
transferred with him, and that there was therefore no duty to afford Plaintiff a hearing before
13
deciding to delay the transfer of Plaintiff’s property. Dkt. No. 25 at 16–17. Finally, Sergeant
14
Hazel argues that, in the alternative, he is entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 17–19.
15
Plaintiff argues that the delay in transferring his property states a due process claim under
16
§ 1983 because it constituted a constructive deprivation of property that was authorized and
17
deliberate, citing to Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535–44 (1981). He argues that Sergeant
18
Hazel’s decision to delay transfer of his property was authorized because Sergeant Hazel was
19
“acting under the authority of a Sergeant responsible for transporting California State Prison
20
inmates, and their property,” and that the decision was not random because Sergeant Hazel knew
21
that “there were established procedures where Plaintiff’s property would be transported to Pelican
22
Bay State Prison . . . . at a later time.” Dkt. No. 29 at 13. He also argues that Sergeant Hazel
23
could “easily predict that Plaintiff had legal materials within his property, and quite possibly a
24
court deadline,” and that Sergeant Hazel therefore had a “meaningful opportunity” to “simply ask
25
Plaintiff if his property contained any legal materials pertaining to an active case with an
26
impending deadline.” Id. at 13.
27
28
The Court finds that Sergeant Hazel is entitled to qualified immunity. At the time that
Sergeant Hazel transported Plaintiff to PBSP, there was no clearly established law that required a
20
1
prison official transporting a prisoner to affirmatively ask the prisoner if his property contained
2
any documents pertaining to active cases with upcoming deadlines. There is no published
3
Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit law imposing such a duty on prison officials. Rather, the
4
governing caselaw at that time, which continues to be good law, clearly found no due process
5
interest in a prisoner’s legal documents. In Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517 (9th Cir. 1996), the
6
Ninth Circuit found that although a jail regulation required prison officials to search legal
7
documents in the presence of the prisoner, the defendant-prison official’s violation of this rule did
8
not violate the prisoner’s due process rights because the search was not an atypical, significant
9
hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. 75 F.3d at 523. The case cited by
Plaintiff, Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535–44 (1981), is not good law. Parratt has long been
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
overruled by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986), which held that that the Due Process
12
Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of
13
property. 474 U.S. at 664–65. Accordingly, Sergeant Hazel is entitled to qualified immunity, and
14
the Court DISMISSES with prejudice the due process claim against Sergeant Hazel.
CONCLUSION
15
16
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss filed by Sergeant
17
Davis, Sergeant Chandler, Analyst Bramucci, and Analyst Vierra, Dkt. No. 10; and GRANTS the
18
motion to dismiss filed by Sergeant Hazel, Dkt. No. 25. The Court DISMISSES the amended
19
complaint with prejudice.
20
21
22
23
24
25
The Clerk shall terminate Docket Nos. 10 and 25; enter judgment in favor of Defendants;
and close the file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: 9/25/2017
______________________________________
HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.
United States District Judge
26
27
28
21
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?