Manriquez v. Vangilder et al

Filing 222

ORDER by Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. GRANTING DEFENDANT CUPPS 217 RENEWED MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.(ndrS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 1/13/2020)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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DANIEL CISNEROS,
Plaintiff,

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v.

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J. VANGILDER, et al.,

United States District Court
Northern District of California

DANIEL MANRIQUEZ,

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Plaintiff,

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT
CUPP’S RENEWED MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
Re: Dkt. No. 214

Defendants.

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Case No. 16-cv-00735-HSG

Case No. 16-cv-01320-HSG
Re: Dkt. No. 217

v.
J. VANGILDER, et al.,

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Defendants.

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Pending before the Court is Defendant Sergeant Scott Cupp’s renewed motion for

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judgment as a matter of law, following a jury trial in two related matters, Cisneros v. Vangilder,

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No. 16-cv-0735-HSG, and Manriquez v. Vangilder, No. 16-cv-1320-HSG. The Court held a

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hearing on the motion on December 11, 2019. See Cisneros, No. 16-cv-0735-HSG, Dkt. No. 219.

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For the reasons detailed below, the Court GRANTS the motion, finding that Defendant Cupp is

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entitled to qualified immunity.

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I.

BACKGROUND
This case arises out of an incident that occurred on June 4, 2015, in the Pelican Bay State

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Prison. At the time of the incident, Plaintiffs Daniel Cisneros and Daniel Manriquez were

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prisoners being housed at Pelican Bay, while Defendants were Pelican Bay corrections officers

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with various responsibilities regarding the supervision of Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ housing unit,

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including: Defendant Justin Vangilder (the unit’s control booth officer), Defendant Juan Vasquez

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(the unit’s floor officer), and Defendant Scott Cupp (a sergeant, who had primary supervisory

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responsibility for the unit). See, e.g., Cisneros, No. 16-cv-0735-HSG, Dkt. No. 202 at 17–18; Dkt.

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No. 208 at 44:3–18, 50:22–53:6; 215:18–20; 217:12–218:8; 241:7–19. On the date of the

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incident, at approximately 5:00 p.m., while Plaintiffs were in their cells, a chemical grenade

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discharged in the control booth of the housing unit. Id.
Based on these facts, Plaintiffs brought a claim against Defendants under 42 U.S.C.

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§ 1983, alleging that Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ rights under the Eighth Amendment to be free

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from cruel and unusual punishment when Defendants were deliberately indifferent to a substantial

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risk of serious harm to, and/or a serious medical need of Plaintiffs. See Cisneros, No. 16-cv-0735-

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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HSG, Dkt. No. 55 at ¶¶ 50–55. Plaintiffs also alleged that Defendants Vangilder and Vazquez

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were negligent, and that their negligence was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiffs harm. Id. at

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¶¶ 38–41. A jury trial was held on these claims beginning on June 19, 2019. See id., Dkt. Nos.

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203, 204.

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During trial, Plaintiffs testified that vapors from a T-16 oleoresin capsicum chemical

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grenade, which Defendant Vangilder had discharged in the control booth, entered their cells,

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causing them pain and suffering. Plaintiff Cisneros testified that he experienced myriad

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symptoms, including difficulty breathing, coughing, gagging, and a burning sensation in his eyes,

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nose, and throat. See, e.g., id., Dkt. No. 211 at 217:12–218:8. Similarly, Plaintiff Manriquez

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testified that he couldn’t breathe, was “gagging, coughing, choking,” and was panicking because

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he felt a burning sensation in his nose and throat and he couldn’t breathe. Id., Dkt. No. 208 at

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52:6–53:15. Plaintiffs and their witnesses testified that the prisoners were yelling “man down,” a

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term used in the prison to solicit help from the guards. See, e.g., id. at 220:3–20. Plaintiffs and

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their witnesses further testified that, after feeling the effects of the chemical agent, they and other

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prisoners repeatedly requested medical attention and the opportunity to exit their cells and

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decontaminate, but Defendants ignored their requests. See, e.g., id., Dkt. No. 208 at 54:12–57:10;

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Dkt. No. 211 at 221:1–224:9. Defendants denied that Plaintiffs (or any other prisoners) requested

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any medical attention or the opportunity to exit their cells and decontaminate. See id., Dkt. No.
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209 at 380:9–381:9, 401:1–13; 430:10–17.
The testimony further established that after Defendant Vangilder discharged the T-16

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chemical grenade, he called his supervisor, Defendant Cupp. See Cisneros, No. 16-cv-0735-HSG,

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Dkt. No. 209 at 374:18–375:17; 413:4–414:6. He told Defendant Cupp that the T-16 canister

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malfunctioned and deployed. Id. Defendant Cupp told Defendant Vangilder to see a nurse for a

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medical check. See id. at 379:9–17. Defendant Cupp also took the T-16 canister from Defendant

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Vangilder, who by that point had put it inside a bag. See id. at 374:2–25; 465:23–466:16.

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Defendant Cupp took the bag containing the chemical grenade outside because Defendant

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Vangilder had told him it only partially deployed. See id. at 466:17–467:14. Once outside,

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Defendant Cupp removed the pin and released the spoon from the chemical grenade to fully

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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deploy it. See id. at 431:1–9, 466:17–467:14. Defendant Cupp testified that he was present for

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approximately five to ten minutes. See id. at 467:15–18. He then left and took the spent canister

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to the prison’s armory, which disposed of the spent canister and replaced it with a new one. See

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id. at 469:15–470:22. He did not check on the prisoners, and testified that he did not hear anyone

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coughing or needing assistance. See id. at 467:19–468:19; 482:13–486:10. Nor did Defendant

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Cupp ask the other officers to check on the prisoners in the housing unit to determine if they

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needed any medical attention. See id.; see also id., Dkt. No. 208 at 249:2–25.
At the end of Plaintiffs’ case-in-chief, Defendant Cupp moved for judgment as a matter of

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law under Rule 50(a) on qualified immunity grounds. See id., Dkt. No. 211 at 274:18–23, 289:17–

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298:10. The Court took the Rule 50(a) motion under submission. See id. In deferring ruling on

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the motion, the Court instructed the parties to submit special interrogatories for the jury to resolve

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certain facts relevant to the issue of whether Defendant Cupp was entitled to qualified immunity.

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Id.

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On June 21, 2019, the jury returned a verdict in favor of both Plaintiffs. See id., Dkt. No.

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206; see also Manriquez, No. 16-cv-1320-HSG, Dkt. No. 209. The jury: (1) found Defendant

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Vangilder was negligent, and awarded Plaintiff $1,000 each in damages to compensate Plaintiffs

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for their claims against him; (2) found Defendant Vazquez was both negligent and deliberately

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indifferent, and awarded Plaintiffs $1,500 each in damages to compensate Plaintiffs for their
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claims against him; and (3) found Defendant Cupp was deliberately indifferent, and awarded

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Plaintiffs $2,500 each in damages to compensate Plaintiffs for their claims against him. See id.

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Thus, in total, the jury awarded Plaintiffs $5,000 each. Id. However, in response to the special

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interrogatories included on the verdict form, the jury found that Defendant Cupp was neither

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aware that Plaintiffs suffered harmful effects from exposure to the chemical grenade, nor did he

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know that Defendants’ ventilation efforts were inadequate. See id. at 4, 6. It is on the basis of

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these responses that Defendant Cupp now moves the Court for judgment as a matter of law

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pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b), and in the alternative, for judgment

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notwithstanding the verdict under Rule 49(b)(3)(C). See Cisneros, No. 16-cv-0735-HSG, Dkt.

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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No. 214.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
“[A] party must make a Rule 50(a) motion for judgment as a matter of law before a case is

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submitted to the jury. If the judge denies or defers ruling on the motion, and if the jury then

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returns a verdict against the moving party, the party may renew its motion under Rule 50(b).”

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Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Go Daddy Software, Inc., 581 F.3d 951, 961 (9th Cir. 2009).

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In considering a Rule 50(b) motion that reasserts arguments presented in a Rule 50(a) motion, a

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court must uphold the jury’s verdict if “substantial evidence” supports the jury’s conclusion.

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Castro v. Cty of L.A., 833 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2016). Substantial evidence means “evidence

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adequate to support the jury’s conclusion, even if it is also possible to draw a contrary conclusion”

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from the same evidence. Id. (quotations omitted). A court should only grant a Rule 50(b) motion

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if, after construing all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the record

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“permits only one reasonable conclusion, and that conclusion is contrary to the jury’s verdict.” Id.

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(quotations omitted).

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III.

DISCUSSION

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Defendant Cupp renews his Rule 50 motion, again contending that he is entitled to

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qualified immunity. Defendant urges that, although the jury found him deliberately indifferent to

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Plaintiffs’ serious medical needs following exposure to the T-16 chemical grenade, the jury also

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specifically found that he (1) was not aware that Plaintiffs suffered harmful effects from the
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exposure to the chemical grenade and (2) did not know that Defendants’ ventilation efforts were

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inadequate. The Court first addresses Defendant Cupp’s qualified immunity argument, then

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addresses what implications, if any, this has for the damages award to each Plaintiff.

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A.

Qualified Immunity
i.

Legal Standard

“[D]efendants are entitled to qualified immunity so long as ‘their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

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known.’” Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1234–35 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

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457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). As the Supreme Court has noted, qualified immunity protects “all but

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the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335,

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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341 (1986). A court considering a claim of qualified immunity makes a two-pronged inquiry: (1)

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whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right and (2) whether

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such right was clearly established at the time of the defendant's alleged misconduct. See Pearson

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v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 535 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). The

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court may exercise its discretion in deciding which prong to address first, in light of the particular

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circumstances of each case. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236 (noting that while the Saucier sequence is

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often appropriate and beneficial, it is no longer mandatory).

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“[A] right is clearly established only if its contours are sufficiently clear that ‘a reasonable

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official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.’ In other words, ‘existing

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precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.’” Carroll v.

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Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348, 350 (2014). The inquiry of whether a constitutional right was clearly

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established must be undertaken in light of the “specific context” of the case, not as a broad general

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proposition. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a

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right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was

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unlawful in the situation he confronted. Id.; see, e.g., Pearson, 555 U.S. at 243–45 (concluding

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that officers were entitled to qualified immunity because their conduct was not clearly established

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as unconstitutional because the “consent-once-removed” doctrine, upon which the officers relied,

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had been generally accepted by the lower courts even though not yet ruled upon by their own
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federal circuit).
A court determining whether a right was clearly established looks to “Supreme Court and

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Ninth Circuit law existing at the time of the alleged act.” Community House, Inc. v. City of Boise,

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623 F.3d 945, 967 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Osolinski v. Kane, 92 F.3d 934, 936 (9th Cir. 1996)). In

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the absence of binding precedent, the court should look to all available decisional law, including

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the law of other circuits and district courts. See id. Unpublished district court decisions may also

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“inform” the court’s analysis. Sorrels v. McKee, 290 F.3d 965, 971–72 (9th Cir. 2002). It will,

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however, “be a rare instance in which, absent any published opinions on point or overwhelming

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obviousness of illegality, [the court] can conclude that the law was clearly established on the basis

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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of unpublished decisions only.” Id.
ii.

Analysis

Defendant Cupp contends that even though the jury found that he violated Plaintiffs’

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constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment through his deliberate

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indifference, he is nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity because at the time of the incident it

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was not clearly established that his conduct violated the Constitution. More specifically,

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Defendant cites Clement v. Gomez, which analyzed when an officer may be found deliberately

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indifferent to a serious medical need. 298 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2002). The Ninth Circuit held

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that officials “may have been deliberately indifferent to the prisoners’ serious medical needs if in

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fact they were aware of the harmful effects of the pepper spray and of the inadequacy of their

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ventilation methods and yet purposely refused to provide showers, [or] medical care . . . .” Id.

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Here, however, the jury found that Defendant Cupp was not subjectively aware that Plaintiffs

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suffered any harm, nor that the ventilation efforts were inadequate in the housing unit. See, e.g.,

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Cisneros, Dkt. No. 206 at 2, 6.

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Plaintiffs nevertheless suggest that Defendant Cupp “made a conscious choice to disregard

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the consequences of [his] acts or omissions by failing to check on the well-being of the prisoners

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when he had good reason to know that there was a substantial risk of serious harm.” See id., Dkt.

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No. 216 at 7 (quotations omitted). The Court is not persuaded. Plaintiffs’ emphasis on what

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Defendant Cupp “had good reason to know” attempts to convert the subjective knowledge
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requirement in Clement into an objective one. Yet the Supreme Court has held that deliberate

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indifference requires an officer’s subjective awareness. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

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829 (1994). “If a [prison official] should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the

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[official] has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.” Gibson v. Cty.

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of Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002), overruled on other grounds by Castro v.

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Cty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2016); see also Clement, 298 F.3d at 904 (“[T]he

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official must both be aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial

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risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” (quotation omitted)).
Clement further underscores this requirement in the context of withholding medical

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assistance regarding the effects of chemical agents. Clement, 298 F.3d at 904. There, officers at a

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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prison administered bursts of pepper spray to stop a fight among inmates. See id. at 902. Some of

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the pepper spray vapors circulated to inmates in nearby cells, causing difficulty breathing and

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asthma attacks for at least two inmates. Id. The Ninth Circuit denied qualified immunity at the

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summary judgment stage, concluding that there were sufficient facts from which a jury could find

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that the officers purposefully refused to provide medical assistance despite being “aware of the

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harmful effects of the pepper spray and of the inadequacy of their ventilation methods.” Id. at

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904. In other words, there was evidence that could support a finding that defendants knew the

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inmates had been affected by the pepper spray. Id. at 904–906. Here, however, the jury found

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that Defendant Cupp was not aware that Plaintiffs suffered harmful effects from the discharge of

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the T-16 canister.

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Plaintiffs next suggest that the special interrogatories merely establish that Defendant Cupp

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lacked subjective knowledge about these specific Plaintiffs’ serious medical needs (i.e., Cisneros

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and Manriquez), but that the jury must have believed that Defendant Cupp “had actual knowledge

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that prisoners in Plaintiffs’ pod were suffering.” Cisneros, No. 16-cv-0735-HSG, Dkt. No. 216 at

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5. But again, Plaintiffs’ argument appears to be that Defendant Cupp should have known of

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Plaintiffs’ serious medical needs based on the other facts in the record. But the Court need not

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speculate, as the jury explicitly found that Defendant Cupp was not aware that Plaintiffs suffered

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harmful effects from the exposure to the chemical grenade. Plaintiffs have offered no basis on
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which the Court may disregard these findings, and the Court declines to do so. In sum, the Court

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finds that given the jury’s specific findings that Defendant Cupp was not aware that either Plaintiff

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suffered harmful effects from exposure to the T-16 canister, and was not aware that Defendants’

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ventilation efforts were inadequate, Defendant Cupp is entitled to qualified immunity.
Because the Court finds that Defendant Cupp is entitled to qualified immunity, the Court

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does not address Defendant Cupp’s alternative argument under Rule 49.

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B.

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Plaintiffs argue that even if the Court were to grant Defendant Cupp’s motion, they are

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entitled to the full $5,000 in damages. See Cisneros, No. 16-cv-0735-HSG, Dkt. No. 216 at 8.

Damages

Plaintiffs suggest that Defendants should be found jointly and severally liable. Id. This is belied

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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by the verdict form itself, however, on which the jury entered discrete damages amounts for each

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Defendant. See id., Dkt. No. 206. The jury awarded each Plaintiff $1,000 against Defendant

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Vangilder; $1,500 against Defendant Vasquez; and $2,500 against Defendant Cupp. See id.

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Plaintiffs rely on Hazle v. Crofoot, in which the Ninth Circuit found that because the

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defendants had caused the plaintiff actual injury, the plaintiff was entitled to an award of

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compensatory damages. See 727 F.3d 983, 991–92 (9th Cir. 2013). Hazle is simply inapposite.

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Because there was no question in Hazle that the plaintiff had suffered injury and the defendants

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were liable, the Court found error in the jury’s zero-damages verdict. Id. at 993–95. The Court

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had no reason to address—and therefore did not discuss—the apportionment of damages among

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the defendants. But here, in contrast, the jury made that determination on its own. The verdict

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form clearly determined that Defendant Cupp was responsible for $2,5000 of the $5,000 in total

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damages awarded. Cisneros, No. 16-cv-0735-HSG, Dkt. No. 206. Because Defendant Cupp is

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qualifiedly immune, Plaintiffs are each only entitled to an award of $2,500 from Defendants

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Vangilder and Vasquez.

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IV.

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CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant Cupp is entitled to qualified immunity and

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GRANTS his renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. The Clerk is directed to enter

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judgment in favor of each Plaintiff against Defendants Vangilder and Vasquez, in the amount of
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$1,000 against Defendant Vangilder and $1,500 against Defendant Vasquez, consistent with the

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jury verdict, see Dkt. No. 206, and in favor of Defendant Cupp consistent with this order, and to

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close the case.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: 1/13/2020
______________________________________
HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.
United States District Judge

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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