Bestway (USA), Inc. et al v. SGROMO et al
Filing
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ORDER by Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. DENYING 138 MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.(ndrS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 4/10/2019)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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BESTWAY (USA), INC., et al.,
Plaintiffs,
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v.
PIETRO PASQUALE-ANTONI SGROMO,
et al.,
Case No. 17-cv-00205-HSG
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Re: Dkt. No. 138
United States District Court
Northern District of California
Defendants.
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Defendants and Cross-Claimants Leonard Gregory Scott and Eureka Inventions LLC
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brought this motion on March 27, 2019, seeking a temporary restraining order and preliminary
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injunction to prohibit Defendant Pietro Pasquale-Antoni Sgromo “and his related entities from
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prosecuting the patent matter recently filed in . . . the Eastern District of Texas . . . captioned
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Pietro Pasquale Antonio Sgromo (a/k/a Peter Anthony Sgromo), et al. v. Bestway Enterprise Co.
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Ltd., et al., No. 2:19-cv-60-JRG.” See Dkt. No. 138 (“Mot.”) at 1. This is the third time that Scott
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and Eureka have run to this Court attempting to prevent Sgromo from pursuing his claims in other
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forums. See Dkt. Nos. 119, 130. According to Scott and Eureka, a temporary restraining order
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and preliminary injunction are necessary this time around because “Sgromo is seeking to
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effectively relitigate the same issues” that were resolved by this Court and an arbitrator. Id. at 3;
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see also Dkt. No. 138-8 (Sgromo’s amended complaint in Eastern District of Texas). Rather than
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filing an opposition brief addressing the merits of this motion, Sgromo submitted what he deemed
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an “informal response.” See Dkt. No. 141.
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A temporary restraining order is an “extraordinary remedy” that the court should award
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only upon a clear showing that the party is entitled to such relief. See Winter v. Natural Res. Def.
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Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). A temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction may
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be issued only where the moving party has established: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits;
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(2) a likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities
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tips in the movant’s favor; and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. See id. at 22.
Scott and Eureka have not established that they will be irreparably harmed if Sgromo is not
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enjoined from prosecuting his suit in the Eastern District of Texas. They argue that they will be
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forced to spend money defending against Sgromo’s suit in this new jurisdiction and face the
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possibility of “inconsistent and/or contradictory rulings.” See Mot. at 10–11. Scott and Eureka
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cite to the Ninth Circuit’s unpublished decision in Jones v. Mendocino County as supporting their
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position. See Mot. at 11. However, in affirming the entry of an injunction against a vexatious
litigant who had filed fifteen prior lawsuits, the Ninth Circuit in Jones confirmed the general rule:
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
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that “litigiousness alone is no reason to enjoin future litigation” and that injunctions against the
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filing of related lawsuits in federal courts “are generally unnecessary, as res judicata and collateral
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estoppel are usually more than adequate to protect defendants against repetitious litigation.” See
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895 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation omitted).
The Court does not see a reason to diverge from that general rule at this time. Because the
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“doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata ordinarily provide adequate assurance that one
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court’s resolution of a controversy will be respected by other courts,” Wood v. Santa Barbara
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Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 705 F.2d 1515, 1524 (9th Cir. 1983), there will not be any
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irreparable harm absent the entry of a restraining order or preliminary injunction. Scott and
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Eureka should present their relitigation arguments to the court in the Eastern District of Texas. If
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they are correct that Sgromo is merely attempting to relitigate issues that have already been
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decided by this Court, then that action will be barred by res judicata, with little expense incurred.
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See, e.g., Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008) (explaining mechanics and policy of claim
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preclusion and issue preclusion, “which are collectively referred to as ‘res judicata’”).
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Because Scott and Eureka cannot establish irreparable harm, the Court need not discuss the
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other Winter factors and the motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction is
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DENIED.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: 4/10/2019
______________________________________
HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.
United States District Judge
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
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