Bestway (USA), Inc. et al v. SGROMO et al

Filing 147

ORDER by Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. DENYING 138 MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.(ndrS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 4/10/2019)

Download PDF
1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 BESTWAY (USA), INC., et al., Plaintiffs, 8 9 10 11 v. PIETRO PASQUALE-ANTONI SGROMO, et al., Case No. 17-cv-00205-HSG ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION Re: Dkt. No. 138 United States District Court Northern District of California Defendants. 12 13 Defendants and Cross-Claimants Leonard Gregory Scott and Eureka Inventions LLC 14 brought this motion on March 27, 2019, seeking a temporary restraining order and preliminary 15 injunction to prohibit Defendant Pietro Pasquale-Antoni Sgromo “and his related entities from 16 prosecuting the patent matter recently filed in . . . the Eastern District of Texas . . . captioned 17 Pietro Pasquale Antonio Sgromo (a/k/a Peter Anthony Sgromo), et al. v. Bestway Enterprise Co. 18 Ltd., et al., No. 2:19-cv-60-JRG.” See Dkt. No. 138 (“Mot.”) at 1. This is the third time that Scott 19 and Eureka have run to this Court attempting to prevent Sgromo from pursuing his claims in other 20 forums. See Dkt. Nos. 119, 130. According to Scott and Eureka, a temporary restraining order 21 and preliminary injunction are necessary this time around because “Sgromo is seeking to 22 effectively relitigate the same issues” that were resolved by this Court and an arbitrator. Id. at 3; 23 see also Dkt. No. 138-8 (Sgromo’s amended complaint in Eastern District of Texas). Rather than 24 filing an opposition brief addressing the merits of this motion, Sgromo submitted what he deemed 25 an “informal response.” See Dkt. No. 141. 26 A temporary restraining order is an “extraordinary remedy” that the court should award 27 only upon a clear showing that the party is entitled to such relief. See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. 28 Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). A temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction may 1 be issued only where the moving party has established: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; 2 (2) a likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities 3 tips in the movant’s favor; and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. See id. at 22. Scott and Eureka have not established that they will be irreparably harmed if Sgromo is not 4 5 enjoined from prosecuting his suit in the Eastern District of Texas. They argue that they will be 6 forced to spend money defending against Sgromo’s suit in this new jurisdiction and face the 7 possibility of “inconsistent and/or contradictory rulings.” See Mot. at 10–11. Scott and Eureka 8 cite to the Ninth Circuit’s unpublished decision in Jones v. Mendocino County as supporting their 9 position. See Mot. at 11. However, in affirming the entry of an injunction against a vexatious litigant who had filed fifteen prior lawsuits, the Ninth Circuit in Jones confirmed the general rule: 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 that “litigiousness alone is no reason to enjoin future litigation” and that injunctions against the 12 filing of related lawsuits in federal courts “are generally unnecessary, as res judicata and collateral 13 estoppel are usually more than adequate to protect defendants against repetitious litigation.” See 14 895 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation omitted). The Court does not see a reason to diverge from that general rule at this time. Because the 15 16 “doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata ordinarily provide adequate assurance that one 17 court’s resolution of a controversy will be respected by other courts,” Wood v. Santa Barbara 18 Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 705 F.2d 1515, 1524 (9th Cir. 1983), there will not be any 19 irreparable harm absent the entry of a restraining order or preliminary injunction. Scott and 20 Eureka should present their relitigation arguments to the court in the Eastern District of Texas. If 21 they are correct that Sgromo is merely attempting to relitigate issues that have already been 22 decided by this Court, then that action will be barred by res judicata, with little expense incurred. 23 See, e.g., Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008) (explaining mechanics and policy of claim 24 preclusion and issue preclusion, “which are collectively referred to as ‘res judicata’”). 25 // 26 // 27 // 28 // 2 1 Because Scott and Eureka cannot establish irreparable harm, the Court need not discuss the 2 other Winter factors and the motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction is 3 DENIED. 4 5 6 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: 4/10/2019 ______________________________________ HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR. United States District Judge 8 9 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 3

Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.


Why Is My Information Online?