Wilson III v. Town of Danville et al
Filing
23
ORDER by Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu granting 10 Motion to Dismiss with Leave to Amend. (dmrlc2, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 5/30/2017)
1
2
3
4
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
6
7
JOHN WILSON III,
Plaintiff,
8
v.
9
10
TOWN OF DANVILLE, et al.,
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S
MONELL CLAIM WITH LEAVE TO
AMEND
Re: Dkt. No. 10
Defendants.
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
Case No. 17-cv-00863-DMR
Defendants Town of Danville and Danville Police Officer Tyler Nelson (“Nelson”)
12
13
(collectively “Defendants”) move to dismiss Plaintiff John Wilson III’s third cause of action
14
against the Town of Danville alleging municipal liability under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436
15
U.S. 658 (1978) (“Monell claim”). Motion to Dismiss (“MTD”) [Docket No. 10]. Plaintiff
16
opposes. [Docket No. 13]. The court finds this matter appropriate for resolution without oral
17
argument. See Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). Having considered the parties submissions, and for the reasons
18
stated below, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED.
19
I.
20
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff makes the following allegations in his complaint, all of which are taken as true for
21
purposes of this motion.1 On the morning of February 13, 2015, Plaintiff was sitting inside a
22
parked car in the parking lot of the Best Western Motel located at 803 Camino Ramon, Danville,
23
California. Complaint [Docket No. 1] (“Compl.”), ¶ 9. Nelson approached Plaintiff and asked
24
him why he was sitting in the parking lot. Plaintiff responded that he was a guest at the motel and
25
was waiting for his girlfriend to unlock the door to their room. Id., ¶ 10. Plaintiff asked Nelson
26
1
27
28
When reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must “accept as true all
of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
(per curiam) (citation omitted).
1
why he stopped him. Nelson replied that Plaintiff looked suspicious. Id. When Plaintiff lifted the
2
console inside the car to show Nelson his identification, Nelson noticed a small amount of
3
cannabis inside the console. Id. Nelson questioned Plaintiff about the cannabis, and Plaintiff
4
responded that the cannabis did not belong to him. Id. Nelson then called for back-up, at which
5
point approximately 10 police officers including K9 officer2 Rony arrived on scene. Id., ¶ 11.
6
Without cause or provocation, the officers began violently beating Plaintiff. Id. One officer
7
aggressively pulled Plaintiff’s dreadlocks, and another repeatedly punched Plaintiff in the face. Id.
8
Nelson then released Rony on Plaintiff. Id. The officers watched as Rony bit Plaintiff’s abdomen,
9
arms, and thighs. Id. As a result of the incident, Plaintiff suffered multiple injuries to his left arm,
10
right forearm, stomach, chest, left thigh, and face. Id., ¶ 13.
Plaintiff thereafter filed this civil rights action against Defendants alleging seven federal
United States District Court
Northern District of California
11
12
and state law claims including: 1) a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unlawful search and seizure claim based on
13
the Fourth Amendment; 2) a section 1983 excessive force claim based on the Fourth Amendment;
14
3) a section 1983 claim for municipal liability under Monell ; 4) violation of California's Bane Act,
15
California Civil Code section 52.1; 5) negligence; 6) battery; and 7) intentional infliction of
16
emotional distress. All but the Monell claim are alleged solely against Nelson.
Defendants now move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Monell claim against the Town of Danville.
17
18
II.
LEGAL STANDARDS
19
A.
20
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims alleged in
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
21
the complaint. See Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995).
22
When reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must “accept as true all
23
of the factual allegations contained in the complaint,” Erickson, 551 U.S at 94, and may dismiss a
24
claim “only where there is no cognizable legal theory” or there is an absence of “sufficient factual
25
matter to state a facially plausible claim to relief.” Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc.,
26
622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009);
27
28
2
Plaintiff uses the term “K9 officer” to refer to a police dog.
2
1
Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001)) (quotation marks omitted). A claim has
2
facial plausibility when a plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
3
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
4
678 (citation omitted). In other words, the facts alleged must demonstrate “more than labels and
5
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl.
6
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986));
7
see Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds by
8
Galbraith v. Cty. of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002).
9
B.
Monell Claim
“A government entity may not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, unless a policy,
10
United States District Court
Northern District of California
11
practice, or custom of the entity can be shown to be a moving force behind a violation of
12
constitutional rights.” Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing
13
Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). Under section 1983, “local governments are responsible only for ‘their
14
own illegal acts’ . . . and are not vicariously liable under § 1983 for their employee’s actions.”
15
Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479
16
(1986)) (emphasis omitted).
In order to establish liability under Monell, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the
17
18
plaintiff “possessed a constitutional right of which [s]he was deprived;” (2) that the municipality
19
had a policy, custom and/or practice; (3) that the policy, custom and/or practice “amounts to
20
deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional right;” and (4) the municipal policy, custom
21
and/or practice was “the moving force behind the constitutional violation.” Dougherty, 654 F.3d
22
at 900.
23
24
In Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011), the Ninth Circuit set forth the
following pleading standard to be applied to Monell claims:
25
26
27
28
First, to be entitled to the presumption of truth, allegations in a
complaint or counterclaim may not simply recite the elements of a
cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying
facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend
itself effectively. Second, the factual allegations that are taken as
true must plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it is not
3
unfair to require the opposing party to be subject to the expense of
discovery and continued litigation.
1
2
Id.; see also AE ex rel. Hernandez v. County of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2012)
3
(reasserting Starr pleading standard for Monell claims); Galindo v. City of San Mateo, No. 16-CV-
4
03651-EMC, 2016 WL 7116927, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2016) (explaining that “Monell
5
allegations must be [pled] with specificity”); La v. San Mateo Cty. Transit Dist., No. 14-CV-
6
01768-WHO, 2014 WL 4632224, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2014) (same); Bagley v. City of
7
Sunnyvale, No. 16-CV-02250-LHK, 2017 WL 344998, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2017) (same).
8
III.
9
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff alleges on information and belief that the Town of Danville is liable under Monell
because it has a custom, policy, and/or practice of (1) “condoning and tacitly encouraging the
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
abuse of police authority and disregard for the constitutional rights of its citizens,” Compl., ¶ 22;
12
(2) of deliberate indifference to the “repeated violations of the constitutional rights of citizens by
13
officers of the Danville Police Department,” id., ¶ 23; and (3) of “failing to properly and
14
adequately investigate, train, supervise, monitor, instruct, and discipline” its police officers, id., ¶¶
15
14, 25. According to Plaintiff, the acts and/or omissions complained of in his complaint including
16
the deprivation of his constitutional rights were the “proximate result” of these aforementioned
17
customs, polices, and/or practices. Compl., ¶¶ 23-26.
18
19
20
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Monell claim on the grounds that it is conclusory
and fails to allege sufficient facts to support municipal liability.
In response, Plaintiff cites two cases which are readily distinguishable. In each case, the
21
complaint pleaded more concrete and specific facts to support a Monell claim than Plaintiff pleads
22
here. In Phillips v. County of Fresno, No. 1:13-CV-0538 AWI BAM, 2013 WL 6243278, at *10
23
(E.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013), the district court held that the “allegation of a causal relationship on
24
‘information and belief’ may be sufficient to establish a causal relationship,” and found that
25
although the plaintiff’s Monell claim was sparse, the plaintiff pleaded enough facts regarding the
26
jail’s prior problems of understaffing and overcrowding to provide adequate notice of the claim to
27
the defendant. Similarly, in Estate of Duran v. Chavez, No. 2:14-cv-02048-TLN-CKD, 2015 WL
28
8011685, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2015), the district court found that the plaintiffs pleaded enough
4
1
facts to support a claim for supervisor liability under Monell and pointed, among other allegations,
2
to the plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the supervising officer’s personal observations of the
3
decedent’s distress and his subordinate officers’ failure to obtain medical treatment for the
4
decedent. By contrast here, Plaintiff pleads no specific facts or allegations to support his claim for
5
municipal liability.
6
Indeed, Plaintiff appears to concede that his Monell claim as currently pleaded is
7
insufficient under the current pleading standards. In his opposition brief, Plaintiff describes his
8
Monell claim as asserting that the Town of Danville (1) failed to train officers to recognize and
9
avoid excessive/unreasonable force including the appropriate deployment of K9 officers; (2) failed
to discipline its officers in the use of excessive force; and (3) failed to properly train Nelson and
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
discipline him for his use of force against Plaintiff. See Opp’n at 5. Tellingly, none of these
12
allegations appear in his complaint, which contains only generic references to the Town of
13
Danville’s failure to train and/or discipline its police officers. See Compl., ¶¶ 14, 25. The court
14
will not consider new allegations which appear only in Plaintiff’s opposition brief. See Schneider
15
v. Calif. Dep't of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998) (“In determining the propriety of
16
a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a court may not look beyond the complaint to a plaintiff's moving
17
papers, such as a memorandum in opposition to a defendant's motion to dismiss.”) (emphasis
18
omitted); see also Albano v. Cal-W. Reconveyance Corp., No. 4:12-CV-4018 KAW, 2012 WL
19
5389922, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2012) (declining to address new allegations in plaintiff’s
20
opposition to the motion to dismiss); Qureshi v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. C09-4198
21
SBA, 2010 WL 841669, at *9, n.5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2010) (declining to consider new
22
allegations in plaintiff’s opposition to the motion to dismiss which attempted to expand the scope
23
of the plaintiff’s appraisal fraud claim).
24
Plaintiff’s Monell claim is insufficient as currently pleaded. However, the court grants
25
Plaintiff leave to amend. Amendment is liberally allowed under Rule 15. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
26
15(a)(2) (courts should “freely give leave when justice so requires”). Additionally, there is no
27
reason to deny leave to amend at this early stage in the case. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182
28
(1962) (explaining that in the absence of an “apparent or declared reason,” such as undue delay,
5
1
bad faith or dilatory motive, prejudice to the opposing party, futility of the amendments, or
2
repeated failure to cure deficiencies in the complaint by prior amendment, it is an abuse of
3
discretion for a district court to refuse to grant leave to amend a complaint).
Defendants make the reasonable suggestion that the court should grant the motion without
4
5
prejudice to Plaintiff later seeking leave to add a Monell claim once Plaintiff has conducted
6
appropriate discovery. Accordingly, the due date for Plaintiff’s amended pleading will be
7
discussed at the June 7, 2017 Case Management Conference. The parties should discuss an
8
appropriate deadline for amendment in their Joint Case Management Conference Statement, which
9
is due on May 31, 2017.
10
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Monell claim with leave
12
to amend. The due date for Plaintiff’s amended pleading will be discussed at the upcoming June
13
7, 2017 Case Management Conference.
R NIA
18
DERED
O OR
IT IS S
______________________________________
Donna M. Ryu
. Ryu
United Statesonna M Judge
D Magistrate
ge
RT
19
Jud
ER
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
6
A
H
20
FO
17
Dated: May 30, 2017
LI
16
IT IS SO ORDERED.
UNIT
ED
15
S DISTRICT
TE
C
TA
RT
U
O
S
14
NO
United States District Court
Northern District of California
11
IV.
N
D IS T IC T
R
OF
C
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?