Sadlowski et al v. PetersenDean Builder Group, Inc.

Filing 29

ORDER ON MOTION TO REMAND. Signed by Judge Claudia Wilken on 6/6/17. (dtmS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 6/6/2017)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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DOLORES SADLOWSKI, et al.,

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Plaintiffs,

ORDER ON MOTION TO
REMAND

v.

(Docket No. 16)

PETERSEN-DEAN, INC., et al.,

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No. C 17-1601 CW

Defendants.
________________________________/

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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Plaintiffs move to remand this case to state court.

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Defendants have filed an opposition and Plaintiffs have filed a

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reply.

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Court grants Plaintiffs’ motion.

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Having considered the papers submitted by the parties, the

BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs make the following factual allegations in their

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Second Amended Complaint (2AC).

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Petersen-Dean, Inc. in October 2004.

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not clear to whom--that James Peterson, the owner of both

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Defendants Petersen-Dean, Inc. and PD Solar, Inc., misused company

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funds and as a result failed to pay employees in a timely manner.

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Sadlowski then went on medical leave.

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return from leave, in August 2016.

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Sadlowski’s daughter, began working for PD Solar in March 2007.

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She too was terminated in August 2016.

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Sadlowski began working for
She made complaints--it is

She was terminated upon her

Plaintiff Shalina Jones,

In February 2017, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in Alameda

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County Superior Court in California alleging violation of the

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California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA); violation of

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California Labor Code section 1102.5 prohibiting retaliation

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against whistleblowers; wrongful termination; violation of

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California Labor Code sections 201 and 203 concerning payment of

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wages after termination; and violation of the federal Family and

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Medical Leave Act (FMLA).

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their First Amended Complaint (1AC), which retained their federal

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causes of action.

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In early March 2017, Plaintiffs filed

On March 24, Defendants removed.

On April 3, Plaintiffs’

counsel transmitted a draft 2AC to Defendants’ counsel dropping

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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the FMLA claim and informing her that he intended to move for

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remand.

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believed the case would still be subject to federal jurisdiction

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because the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)

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completely preempts state law claims based on an ERISA

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administrator’s failure promptly to provide benefits.

The same day, Defendants’ counsel responded that she

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On May 1, Plaintiffs filed the operative 2AC, including

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neither the FMLA claim nor the claim Defendants’ counsel believed

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preempted by ERISA.

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California’s FEHA; a claim of violation of California’s Family

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Rights Act; a claim of whistleblower retaliation in violation of

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California Labor Code section 1102.5; and wrongful termination.

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Plaintiffs furthermore assert that neither seeks damages that

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would involve a federal question or federal preemption.

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Plaintiffs moved for remand on May 9.

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The 2AC includes five claims of violations of

DISCUSSION
A defendant may remove a civil action filed in state court to

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federal district court so long as the district court could have

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exercised original jurisdiction over the matter.
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28 U.S.C.

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§ 1441(a).

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1447 provides that if at any time

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before judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject

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matter jurisdiction over a case previously removed from state

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court, the case must be remanded.

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motion to remand, the scope of the removal statute must be

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strictly construed.

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(9th Cir. 1992).

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jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden of

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establishing that removal is proper.”

28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

On a

See Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566

“The ‘strong presumption’ against removal

Id.

Courts should resolve

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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doubts as to removability in favor of remanding the case to state

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court.

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Id.

The Ninth Circuit has “long held that post-removal amendments

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to the pleadings cannot affect whether a case is removable,

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because the propriety of removal is determined solely on the basis

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of the pleadings filed in state court.”

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Wholesale Corp., 471 F.3d 975, 976 (9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).

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However, in Williams the district court retained diversity

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jurisdiction over the case after the plaintiff dismissed the sole

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federal claim and it was primarily on this basis that the Ninth

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Circuit found the district court erred by remanding.

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see also Hill v. Rolleri, 615 F.2d 886, 889 (9th Cir. 1980)

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(describing rule that removability is determined based on the

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pleadings at the time notice of removal is filed as the “general

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rule in diversity cases”).

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there does not appear to be diversity of citizenship.

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in Williams went on to hold, “Any post-removal pleadings must be

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treated just as they would be in a case originally filed in

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federal court.”

Williams v. Costco

Id. at 977;

Here, Plaintiffs do not allege and

471 F.3d at 977.
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The court

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Because the original complaint and 1AC contained a federal

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claim, the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’

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state-law claims, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), and therefore is not

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required by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) to remand.

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complaint supersedes the original, see Valadez-Lopez v. Chertoff,

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656 F.3d 851, 857 (9th Cir. 2011), Plaintiffs effectively

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dismissed their federal claims when they filed their 2AC.

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district court has discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction

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when it has dismissed all claims over which it has original

Because an amended

A

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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jurisdiction.

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114 F.3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir.), supplemented, 121 F.3d 714 (9th

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Cir.), as amended (1997).

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exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims is

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triggered by the presence of one of the conditions in § 1367(c),

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it is informed by the [United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs,

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383 U.S. 715 (1966)] values ‘of economy, convenience, fairness,

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and comity.’”

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Ninth Circuit have repeatedly held that “in the usual case in

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which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the

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balance of factors . . . will point toward declining to exercise

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jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.”

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at 1001 (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343,

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350 n.7 (1988)).

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28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc.,

“While discretion to decline to

Id. (citation omitted).

The Supreme Court and the

Acri, 114 F.3d

The Gibbs factors weigh in favor of declining to exercise

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supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims.

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Judicial economy favors remand because the case is at a very early

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stage.

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resolution and it would not take the state court long to become

The Court has not invested significant resources in its

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equally familiar with it.

See GlobalSantaFe Drilling Co. v. Ins.

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Co. of State of Pa., 2006 WL 13090, at *7 (N.D. Cal.).

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court is no less convenient.

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court with “a surer-footed reading of applicable law.”

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U.S. at 726.

State

Comity favors resolution by a state
Gibbs, 383

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Defendants essentially argue fairness, complaining that

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Plaintiffs dismissed their federal claims in order to secure

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remand to state court, and Plaintiffs admit as much.

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least when a plaintiff did not include federal claims in “bad

However, at

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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faith or for the sole purpose of putting defendants through the

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removal-remand procedure” and “moved for remand with all due speed

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after removal,” this is a permissible tactical decision.

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v. Berkeley Farms, Inc., 64 F.3d 487, 490-91 (9th Cir. 1995),

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abrogated on other grounds by Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp.,

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546 U.S. 132 (2005).

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approximately six weeks after removal and little has happened save

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the instant motion and Defendants’ separate answers to Plaintiffs’

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2AC. Defendants do not argue that Plaintiffs originally included

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federal claims in bad faith.

Baddie

Here, Plaintiffs moved for remand

The Court finds that the balance of factors weigh in favor of

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declining supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ 2AC and

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accordingly it will grant Plaintiffs’ motion to remand.

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CONCLUSION

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For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion to remand is

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GRANTED (Docket No. 16).

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Superior Court of Alameda County.

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The clerk shall remand the case to the

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: June 6, 2017
CLAUDIA WILKEN
United States District Judge

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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