DeGuzman et al v. Crane Co. et al

Filing 130

ORDER by Judge Phyllis J. Hamilton denying 88 Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand. (pjhlc2S, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 5/31/2017)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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JAIME DEGUZMAN, et al.,

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Case No. 17-cv-02228-PJH

Plaintiffs,

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v.

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION TO REMAND

CRANE CO., et al.,

Re: Dkt. No. 88

Defendants.

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Plaintiffs’ motion to remand came on for hearing before this court on May 31,
2017. Plaintiffs appeared through their counsel, Mahzad Hite. Defendant Crane Co.

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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(“Crane”) appeared through its counsel, Matthew G. Ball. The appearances of other

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defendants are noted in the court’s minute order. See Dkt. 128. Having read the papers

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filed by the parties and carefully considered their arguments and the relevant legal

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authority, and good cause appearing, the court hereby DENIES the motion to remand, for

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the reasons stated on the record at the hearing.

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A civil action that “is against or directed to . . . any [United States] officer (or any

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person acting under that officer) . . . for or relating to any act under color of such office” is

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removable to federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). A party seeking removal under the

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federal officer removal statute must demonstrate that “[1] it is a ‘person’ within the

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meaning of the statute; [2] there is a causal nexus between its actions, taken pursuant to

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a federal officer’s directions, and plaintiff’s claims; and [3] it can assert a ‘colorable’

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federal defense.” Durham v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 445 F.3d 1247, 1251 (9th Cir. 2006)

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(citations omitted); see also Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1122–24 (9th Cir. 2014).

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To establish the third element, Crane relies on the government contractor defense,

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which applies if “(1) the United States approved reasonably precise specifications; (2) the

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equipment conformed to those specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the United

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States about the dangers in the use of the equipment that were known to the supplier but

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not to the United States.” Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988).

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There is no dispute that Crane is a “person” under the removal statute. See Fung

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v. Abex Corp., 816 F. Supp. 569, 572 (N.D. Cal. 1992). The notice of removal alleges a

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causal nexus between plaintiffs’ claims and the actions allegedly taken at the behest of a

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federal officer. See Notice of Removal ¶¶ 9–14. Specifically, Crane submits a number of

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declarations averring that it acted under the direction of the Navy in the design and

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manufacture of the allegedly-defective valves, which the Navy supervised by mandating

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conformity with detailed specifications, which required asbestos.

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Thus, as plaintiffs conceded at the hearing, Crane has a colorable federal defense
to plaintiffs’ design defect claim. “It is well settled that if one claim cognizable under

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Section 1442 is present, the entire action is removed, regardless of the relationship

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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between the Section 1442 claim and the non-removable claims.” Nat’l Audubon Soc. v.

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Dep’t of Water & Power of City of Los Angeles, 496 F. Supp. 499, 509 (E.D. Cal. 1980)

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(citing Murphy v. Kodz, 351 F.2d 163 (9th Cir. 1965)). Thus, removal of the entire case

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was proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1).

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Plaintiffs’ representation, made for the first time in its reply brief, that “Plaintiffs will

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waive their design-defect claims against Crane so that this case can be remanded” does

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not change the analysis. See Reply at 8. The design defect theory against Crane is

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pleaded in the complaint, and Crane has asserted a colorable federal defense to that

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claim to support removal. If plaintiffs choose to amend their complaint and/or stipulate to

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dismissal of claims against Crane, the court will reconsider the possibility of remand upon

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plaintiffs’ motion. However, as a general matter, “jurisdiction must be analyzed on the

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basis of the pleadings filed at the time of removal without reference to subsequent

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amendments.” Sparta Surgical Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 159 F.3d 1209,

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1213 (9th Cir. 1998).

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: May 31, 2017
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PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON
United States District Judge
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