Sincerny v. City of Walnut Creek
Filing
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ORDER by Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS 40 MOTION TO DISMISS. (ndrS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/30/2018)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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PAUL ALFRED SINCERNY,
Plaintiff,
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v.
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CITY OF WALNUT CREEK, et al.,
Defendants.
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
Case No.17-cv-02616-HSG
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’
MOTION TO DISMISS
Re: Dkt. No. 40
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Pending before the Court is a motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint by
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Defendants City of Walnut Creek (“the City”), Ryan Hibbs, Lee Herrington, Ashley Roskos, and
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one “Officer Adams.” Dkt. No. 40. Plaintiff Paul Sincerny filed his initial complaint on May 5,
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2017. Dkt. No. 1. Defendants moved to dismiss that complaint on August 25, 2017. Dkt. No. 17.
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The Court granted the motion with leave to amend on October 17, 2017. See Dkt. No. 32.
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Plaintiff subsequently filed the First Amended Complaint on December 28, 2017. Dkt. No. 39
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(“FAC”). Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss on January 11, 2018. Dkt. No. 40. The
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Court heard argument on the motion on March 29, 2018. For the reasons stated on the record, as
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recounted below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants’ motion.
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I.
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DISCUSSION
Defendants first seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Monell v. N.Y. City Dep’t
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of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff stipulated at oral
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argument that there is no viable Monell claim as to a custom or policy of excessive force by the
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City. Defendants’ motion is therefore granted as to any such claim. Next, “Plaintiff alleges an
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official custom on the part of the City of Walnut [C]reek and the [Walnut Creek Police
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Department] of arresting persons without probable cause, based upon [their] failure to use
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constitutional procedures . . . to detain citizens with regard to a suspected crime” and “perform
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[proper] . . . show-ups to identify a suspect for probable cause.” FAC ¶ 40. At the pleading stage,
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this is sufficient to state a Monell claim. See AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d
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631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that allegations of a Monell claim “may not simply recite the
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elements of a cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give
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fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively,” and “must plausibly
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suggest an entitlement to relief”) (quoting Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011)).
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Defendants’ motion is therefore denied as to this claim. Moreover, exercising its discretion under
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b), the Court finds it appropriate to bifurcate trial of Plaintiff’s
individual claims under section 1983 and his Monell claim. Bifurcation will preserve substantial
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
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judicial and party resources in the event that the non-municipal Defendants are not found
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individually liable. For the same reason, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), the Court
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also stays any and all discovery that pertains exclusively to those derivative liability claims. See
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Estate of Lopez v. Suhr, No. 15-cv-01846-HSG, 2016 WL 1639547, at *6-7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 26,
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2016).
Last, Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims under the Americans with Disabilities
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Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12132 et seq. (“ADA”). Defendants’ motion is granted as to Plaintiff’s ADA
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claim against the non-municipal Defendants because, as the Court stated in its order on the motion
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to dismiss the initial complaint, they are not a public entity subject to the statute. Dkt. No. 32 at 8
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(citing City & Cnty. of S.F. v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1773 (2015)). Defendants’ motion is
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denied, however, as to Plaintiff’s ADA claim against the City. At this stage of the litigation, the
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Court is required to “construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,”
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see Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008), and finds
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that Plaintiff has pled “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” see Bell
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Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
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II.
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CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN
PART Defendants’ motion as follows:
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DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
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Plaintiff’s ADA claim against the non-municipal Defendants is DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.
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Plaintiff’s Monell claim, insofar as it is premised on a theory of excessive force, is
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Defendants’ motion is DENIED as to Plaintiff’s Monell claim insofar as it is
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premised on City’s alleged identification procedures, and as to Plaintiff’s ADA
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claim against the City.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: 3/30/2018
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
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HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.
United States District Judge
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