Resolute Forest Products, Inc. et al v. Greenpeace International et al

Filing 550

ORDER by Judge Jon S. Tigar denying 545 Administrative Motion ; striking 549 Motion for Attorney Fees. (mll, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 6/6/2023)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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RESOLUTE FOREST PRODUCTS, INC.,
et al.,

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Plaintiffs,
v.
GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL, et al.,
Defendants.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’
ADMINISTRATIVE MOTION
REGARDING BRIEFING SCHEDULE
FOR ATTORNEY FEE MOTIONS AND
STRIKING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION
FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES
Re: ECF No. 545, 549

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Case No. 17-cv-02824-JST

Defendants Daniel Brindis, Greenpeace International, Greenpeace, Inc., Amy Moas, and

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Rolf Skar (collectively “Greenpeace”) filed an administrative motion regarding a briefing schedule

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on attorney’s fees motions. ECF No. 545. Greenpeace requests that “the Court to maintain

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jurisdiction over this case for the limited purpose of adjudicating forthcoming attorney fee[s]

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motions ordered by Magistrate Judge Westmore in her November 2, 2022 Order.” Id. at 2.

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Plaintiffs Fibrek General Partnership, Fibrek International, Inc., Fibrek U.S., Inc., Resolute FP

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Augusta, LLC, Resolute FP Canada, Inc., Resolute FP US, Inc., and Resolute Forest Products, Inc.

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(collectively “Resolute”) oppose the administrative motion and argue that motions for attorney’s

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fees are untimely because Judge Westmore set a December 1, 2022 deadline for such motions.

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ECF No. 546 at 2-3.

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On June 1, 2023, before the Court ruled on its administrative motion, Greenpeace filed a

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motion for attorney’s fees, in which it argued that its motion is timely for two reasons. First, the

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deadline for its fees motion could not have been December 1, 2022 because the “Court in its order

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denying the Sanctions Appeal on April 10, 2023 found that Plaintiffs’ discovery misconduct

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identified by Magistrate Judge Westmore ‘warrants . . . requiring Plaintiffs to pay certain

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attorney’s fees incurred by Defendants,’ and Plaintiffs have yet to pay those fees.” ECF No. 549

United States District Court
Northern District of California

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at 11–12 (quoting ECF No. 537 at 5). Additionally, because the Court’s order denying the motion

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for relief did not set a deadline to move for attorney’s fees, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)

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controls. Id. at 12. Second, Resolute’s “timeliness argument ignores the full scope of” Judge

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Westmore’s order because it “awards fees to both parties” and then “instructs the parties to meet

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and confer as to the amount of fees, and to file motions if they are unable to agree.” Id. at 13. The

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parties’ failure to meet and confer or to move forward with fees motions “was wholly reasonable

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and appropriate” because “undertaking the costly process of briefing the amount of fees owed

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while the Sanctions Appeal was pending would have been entirely insufficient” for the parties. Id.

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Greenpeace also argues that Resolute’s “citation to cases standing for the general

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proposition that an appeal does not stay a Magistrate Judge’s order . . . are inapposite” because

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they do not “involve the settling of a fee award, let alone a situation where the District Court after

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the appeal reaffirmed that the non-appealing party was entitled to fees that party had not yet

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moved for,” id. at 12 n.2; Resolute has “not been prejudiced at all by [Greenpeace’s] decision to

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wait to bring this Fee Motion until after the Sanctions Appeal was decided,” id.; and they “placed

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significant obligations on the party that filed the objections, which that party sought to avoid by

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appealing,” and here, the “order held that both parties must pay fees, and the meeting of the parties

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and further motion practice was intended to facilitate the determination of the specific amount,” id.

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at 13.

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The Court finds that Greenpeace’s motion is untimely. The caselaw is clear that “the filing

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of objections to a magistrate judge’s order on a non-dispositive matter does not stay the order’s

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operation.” Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. C-10-03561-WHA DMR, 2011 WL 3794892, at

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*5 n.7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2011); see also In re Air Crash at Taipei, Taiwan on Oct. 31, 2000, No.

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MDL1394-GAF(RCX), 2002 WL 32155477, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2002) (“[A]llowing the

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automatic stay of [a] magistrate [judge]’s orders would not only encourage the filing of frivolous

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appeals, but would grind the magistrate [judge] system to [a] halt.” (quoting Litton Industs., Inc. v.

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Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb Inc., 124 F.R.D. 75, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)). Here, the parties were

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required to follow the deadlines Judge Westmore’s order, i.e., they were required to meet and

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confer as to the amount of attorney’s fees before December 1, 2022, and if they could not reach an
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agreement as to the amount of fees, they were required to file motions for attorney’s fees by

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December 1, 2022. As both parties concede, they failed to do so and did not request to extend the

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deadlines in Judge Westmore’s order. Therefore, Greenpeace’s motion for fees is untimely.

United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Greenpeace’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing. First, although Judge Westmore

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awarded Greenpeace attorney’s fees, and the Court concluded that awarding fees was proper in its

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April 2023 order, to obtain those fees, Greenpeace was required to meet and confer as to the

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amount of fees, and then file a motion if it could not come to an agreement with Resolute as to the

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amount of fees by December 1, 2022. ECF No. 486 at 30–31. Thus, because Greenpeace failed to

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comply with those requirements, it is not entitled to the fees it was awarded. Second, Greenpeace

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cites to no authority supporting that the type of non-dipositive order, the obligations placed upon

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by the parties by the order, or the lack of prejudice to one party for the other’s non-compliance

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with the order are relevant considerations in the Court’s analysis of the timeliness of Greenpeace’s

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motion. Instead, the authority the Court has found suggests the opposite. See, e.g., Hanni v. Am.

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Airlines, Inc., No. C-08-00732 CW(EDL), 2009 WL 1505286, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 27, 2009)

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(finding that a magistrate order was not stayed pending resolution of a motion for relief from that

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order without considering the type of order at issue, the obligations placed upon the parties by the

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order, or the prejudice of delayed compliance with the order); accord Oracle Am., Inc., 2011 WL

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3794892, at *5 n.7 ; In re Air Crash, 2002 WL 32155477, at *5.

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Accordingly, the Court denies Greenpeace’s administrative motion, ECF No. 545, and
strikes its motion for attorney’s fees, ECF No. 549.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: June 6, 2023
______________________________________
JON S. TIGAR
United States District Judge

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