Gregorio et al v. The Clorox Company

Filing 83

ORDER by Judge Laurel Beeler addressing 82 Discovery Letter Brief. In the attached order, the court provides guidance to the parties regarding their attorney-client-privilege and work-product-protection disputes and directs them to further mee t and confer (in person if possible, but at least by telephone if not) for no less than one hour to try to resolve their disputes. If they are unable to do so, they may submit a further joint letter brief by February 6, 2019. (lblc1S, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 1/30/2019)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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San Francisco Division

United States District Court
Northern District of California

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JOSEPH GREGORIO, et al.,

Case No. 17-cv-03824-PJH (LB)

Plaintiffs,

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v.

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THE CLOROX COMPANY,
Defendant.

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ORDER ADDRESSING DISCOVERY
DISPUTES REGARDING PRIVILEGE
AND WORK PRODUCT
Re: ECF No. 82

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INTRODUCTION

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The putative class action is about defendant Clorox Company’s allegedly mislabeling certain

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products that it sells as “natural” or “naturally derived” when they actually contain ingredients that

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are synthetic and non-natural. The plaintiffs and Clorox raise four categories of discovery disputes

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with respect to a number of documents that Clorox is withholding on the grounds of attorney-

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client privilege and work-product protection.1 The court provides the following guidance to the

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parties and directs them to further meet and confer (in person if possible, but at least by telephone

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if not) for no less than one hour to try to resolve their disputes.

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Joint Letter Br. – ECF No. 82. Citations refer to material in the Electronic Case File (“ECF”);
pinpoint citations are to the ECF-generated page numbers at the top of documents.
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ORDER – No. 17-cv-03824-PJH (LB)

ANALYSIS

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1. Work Product for Documents Created Before This Litigation Was Anticipated
“‘The work-product rule is a qualified immunity protecting from discovery documents and

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tangible things prepared by a party or his representative in anticipation of litigation.’” Hatamian v.

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Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., No. 14-cv-00226-YGR(JSC), 2016 WL 2606830, at *1 (N.D. Cal.

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May 6, 2016) (internal ellipsis omitted) (quoting Admiral Ins. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 881 F.2d 1486,

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1494 (9th Cir. 1989)). “‘The phrase in anticipation of litigation extends beyond an attorney’s

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preparation for a case in existing litigation, and includes documents prepared in anticipation of

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foreseeable litigation, even if no specific claim is contemplated.’” Id. at *7 (emphasis removed)

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(quoting ACLU of N. Cal. v. Dep’t of Justice, 70 F. Supp. 3d 1018, 1029–30 (N.D. Cal. 2014)).

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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“However, there must be some identifiable prospect of litigation that led to the documents’

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creation.” Id. (quoting ACLU, 70 F. Supp. 3d at 1031–32). “In contrast, documents that merely set

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forth a general strategy or template that might relate to or be relevant to future litigation are not

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prepared in anticipation of a particular trial.” Id. “A template that does not pertain ‘to a specific

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claim or consist of more than general instructions to its attorneys’” is not work product.” Id.

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(internal brackets omitted) (quoting ACLU, 70 F. Supp. 3d at 1032).
The plaintiffs state that Clorox received their demand letter on February 2, 2017, and the

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plaintiffs filed their initial complaint on July 6, 2017.2 The plaintiffs claim that Clorox asserts

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work-product protection over 68 documents that were created as far back as 2013, long before this

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litigation was anticipated.3 The plaintiffs argue that the documents thus could not have been

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created in anticipation of litigation.4 Clorox responds that while this litigation began in 2017, the

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use of the term “natural” has been a flashpoint for litigation generally over the past half decade.5

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Clorox claims that it has faced numerous threats of litigation concerning the word “natural” on

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Id. at 1.

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Id.

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Id.

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Id. at 4.

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ORDER – No. 17-cv-03824-PJH (LB)

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other products in its portfolio over the past several years and thus “potentially anticipated

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litigation over the use of the word ‘natural’ on Green Works product[s].”6 Clorox does not identify

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any specific threats of litigation, does not claim that it reasonably anticipated any specific

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litigation from these threats, and does not claim that it ever was actually sued.

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The fact that the use of the term “natural” has been a flashpoint for litigation generally does

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not establish that the documents in question are entitled to work-product protection. Cf. Hatamian,

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2016 WL 2606830, at *7 (denying work-product protection for documents that “were created for

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litigation generally, without reference to any particular claim. The mere possibility of future

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litigation is not enough.”). With that guidance, the court directs the parties to further meet and
confer regarding whether Clorox can assert a claim that the documents in question were created

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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because of the prospect of some particular litigation.7

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2. Work Product for Non-Attorney Documents
The plaintiffs argue that Clorox assets work-product protection over nine documents authored

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by non-attorneys working outside of Clorox’s legal department before this litigation began.8

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Clorox responds that the documents “incorporate ‘legal advice from Clorox in-house counsel

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regarding labeling of Green Works cleaning products’ and attach several documents authored by

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attorneys.”9 Clorox’s response addresses the wrong issue. The fact that documents may have

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incorporated legal advice does not entitle them to work-product protection (as opposed to, e.g.,

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attorney-client privilege). Rather, to be entitled to work-product protection, a document must have

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been created because of the prospect of anticipated litigation. United States v. Torf (In re Grand

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Jury Subpoena), 357 F.3d 900, 907–08 (9th Cir. 2004). With that guidance, the court directs the

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Id.

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Clorox cites Ocean Mammal Institute v. Gates, No. 07-00254 DAE-LEK, 2008 WL 2185180 (D.
Haw. May 27, 2008), a case where the defendants had previously been sued in the past few years with
respect to the programs at issue. Id. at *13. Clorox does not assert a similar basis for reasonably
anticipating litigation.
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Joint Letter Br. – ECF No. 82 at 2.

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Id. at 4.

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ORDER – No. 17-cv-03824-PJH (LB)

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parties to further meet and confer regarding whether Clorox can assert a claim that the documents

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in question were created because of the prospect of some particular litigation.

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3. Attorney-Client Privilege for Spreadsheets
The plaintiffs argue that Clorox assets attorney-client privilege over 64 Excel spreadsheets that

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were never communicated to or from an attorney (or, in several cases, to or from anyone at all).10

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Clorox does not dispute that the spreadsheets in question were not communicated to or from an

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attorney (as opposed to, presumably, non-attorney employees).11 Rather, Clorox responds that the

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spreadsheets contain legal advice authored by its in-house counsel and argues that the mere fact

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that the legal advice was included in spreadsheets, as opposed to an email or a Word document,

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Northern District of California

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does not render it non-privileged.12 It is not immediately clear whether Clorox is claiming that the

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entirety of the spreadsheets reflects legal advice or whether only portions of the spreadsheets do,

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or whether it is redacting only those portions of the spreadsheets that reflect legal advice and

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producing the rest or whether it is withholding the entire spreadsheets. Clorox is correct that

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privileged communications between an attorney and client do not lose their privileged character

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merely because those communications are stored in a spreadsheet. The fact that spreadsheets

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might include privileged communications does not necessarily render the entirety of the

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spreadsheets privileged, however, given that the spreadsheets themselves were never

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communicated to or from an attorney. With that guidance, the court directs the parties to further

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meet and confer regarding the basis for Clorox’s claim of attorney-client privilege.13

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Joint Letter Br. – ECF No. 82 at 2.

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See id. at 4–5.

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Id.

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Clorox cites two cases, Gen-Probe Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., No. 09cv2319 BEN NLS, 2012
WL 3762447 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2012), and Ideal Electric Co. v. Flowserve Corp., 230 F.R.D. 603
(D. Nev. 2005), for the proposition that different drafts of communications to attorneys are still
protected under the attorney-client privilege. Those cases involved communications between clients
and attorneys attaching successive drafts of documents. Gen-Probe, 2012 WL 3762447, at *3 (client
and attorney communicated successive drafts of letter); Ideal, 230 F.R.D. at 607–08 (client and
attorney communicating successive drafts of affidavit). Clorox does not claim here that it
communicated different drafts of these spreadsheets to attorneys; instead, its claim is that the
ORDER – No. 17-cv-03824-PJH (LB)

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4. Attorney-Client Privilege for Emails Between Non-Attorneys
The plaintiffs argue that Clorox assets attorney-client privilege over four emails between non-

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attorneys.14 Clorox responds that the emails attached the spreadsheets discussed in the previous

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section and thus relayed the legal advice included in those spreadsheets and therefore are

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privileged. In addition to the issues raised above about the privileged or non-privileged nature of

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the underlying spreadsheets, it is not immediately clear whether the parent emails at issue have

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independent content, whether Clorox is withholding the parent emails, and, if so, what its basis is

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for doing so. It is also not clear whether the employees who were sending these emails did so in

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order to enable Clorox’s attorneys to provide legal advice and understood the communications
were to be treated as confidential. Cf. Lewis v. Wells Fargo & Co., 266 F.R.D. 433, 444 (N.D. Cal.

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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2010) (relevant inquiry in determining privilege over communications between non-attorney

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corporate employees is “whether: 1) the communication was within the scope of the employee’s

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corporate duties; and 2) the employee was aware that the communication was made in order to

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enable [corporation]’s attorneys to provide legal advice to the corporation and understood that the

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audit to which the communication related was to be treated as confidential”). The court directs the

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parties to further meet and confer regarding the basis for Clorox’s claim of attorney-client

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privilege regarding these emails in conjunction with their meet and confer regarding the

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underlying spreadsheets.

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CONCLUSION

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The court directs the parties to further meet and confer (in person if possible, but at least by

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telephone if not) for no less than one hour to try to resolve their disputes. If the parties are unable

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spreadsheets contain communications and legal advice from its attorneys. See Joint Letter Br. – ECF
No. 82 at 4–5. In that case, the privileged or non-privileged nature of each spreadsheet stands on its
own; there is no blanket “draft” rule of privilege that applies.
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Id. at 3.

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ORDER – No. 17-cv-03824-PJH (LB)

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to resolve their disputes, they may submit a further joint letter brief within one week, i.e., by

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February 6, 2019.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: January 30, 2019
______________________________________
LAUREL BEELER
United States Magistrate Judge

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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ORDER – No. 17-cv-03824-PJH (LB)

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