McDonald v. CP OpCo, LLC et al

Filing 87

ORDER by Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. DENYING DEFENDANTS 66 MOTION TO DISMISS. (ndrS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 4/26/2018)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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DAVID MCDONALD,
Plaintiff,

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CP OPCO, LLC, et al.,

Re: Dkt. No. 66

Defendants.

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION TO DISMISS

v.

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Case No.17-cv-04915-HSG

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Pending before the Court is a motion to dismiss by Defendants Apollo Global

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Management, LLC; Apollo Centre Street Partnership, L.P.; Apollo Franklin Partnership, L.P.;

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Apollo Credit Opportunity Fund III AIV I LP; Apollo SK Strategic Investments, L.P.; Apollo

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Special Opportunities Managed Account, L.P.; and Apollo Zeus Strategic Investments, L.P.

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(collectively, “the Apollo Defendants”). Dkt. No. 66 (“Mot.”). For the reasons set forth below,

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the Court DENIES Apollo’s motion.

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I.

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DISCUSSION
On November 27, 2017, Plaintiff David McDonald filed a Second Amended Complaint

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naming, in part, the Apollo Defendants and Defendant CP OpCo, LLC (“Classic Party Rentals” or

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“Classic”). Specifically, Plaintiff alleged violations of the Worker Adjustment and Retraining

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Notification (“WARN”) Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101, et seq., the California Worker Adjustment

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Retraining Notification (“Cal WARN”) Act, Cal. Lab. Code §§ 1400, et seq., and California’s

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Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq. (“UCL”). Dkt. No. 50 (Second

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Amended Complaint, or “SAC”) ¶¶ 51-78. Plaintiff’s claims against the Apollo Defendants are

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based on his assertion that they are parent companies to Classic, who terminated his employment

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and that of the putative class in July 2017. See SAC ¶¶ 22-28, 34-45. In their motion to dismiss,

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the Apollo Defendants contend that with respect to their alleged parent-subsidiary relationship

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with Classic, Plaintiff “does not plead any facts that explain how any of [the] Apollo entities were

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in any way involved in [the] terminations,” rendering his claims fatally conclusory. See Mot. at 4;

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see also id. at 5 (“Plaintiff has failed to plead any facts . . . from which to infer that [Apollo] could

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be liable for Classic’s alleged WARN Act violation”), 13 (contending that Cal WARN Act claim

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is “as legally deficient as the federal WARN Act claim, and for the very same reasons”), 18

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(stating that UCL claim “rises and falls with the two WARN Act claims”).

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The Court disagrees. The Apollo Defendants provide no Ninth Circuit authority that

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supports the heightened pleading standard for which they advocate. At this stage, it is well-settled
that Plaintiff need only plead sufficient facts to state a plausible claim, i.e., one that would allow

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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this Court to reasonably infer that the Apollo Defendants are liable for the alleged conduct. See

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Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

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Moreover, this “plausibility standard does not prevent a plaintiff from pleading facts alleged upon

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information and belief where the facts are peculiarly within the possession and control of the

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defendant or where the belief is based on factual information that makes the inference of

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culpability plausible.” Soo Park v. Thompson, 851 F.3d 910, 928 (9th Cir. 2017) (citations and

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ellipses omitted). Thus, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the Apollo Defendants’ corporate

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structure and decisionmaking are sufficient. The sort of fact-intensive inquiry the Apollo

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Defendants seek is more appropriate on summary judgment or, if necessary, at trial.

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II.

CONCLUSION

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Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the Apollo Defendants’ motion is DENIED.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: 4/26/2018

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HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.
United States District Judge

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