Martinez v. John Muir Health

Filing 31

ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT by Judge Claudia Wilken.(dtmS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/28/2018)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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KAREN MARTINEZ, individually
and on behalf of similarly
situated individuals,

United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Case No. 17-cv-05779-CW
ORDER GRANTING IN PART
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR A
MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT

Plaintiff,
v.
JOHN MUIR HEALTH,

(Dkt. No. 14)
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Defendant.

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Plaintiff Karen Martinez, on behalf of a putative class,

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brings this wage and hour suit against Defendant John Muir

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Health.

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pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

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alternative, Defendant moves for an order requiring Plaintiff to

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provide a more definite statement pursuant to Federal Rule of

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Civil Procedure 12(e).

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Defendant filed a reply.

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Defendant’s motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for a more

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definite statement.

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Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint
In the

Plaintiff filed an opposition and
The Court hereby GRANTS IN PART

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Unless otherwise noted, the factual background is taken from

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the allegations of the first amended complaint (FAC), which are

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taken as true for purposes of this motion.

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Docket No. 13 (FAC).

Defendant is a non-profit corporation operating primarily in

Contra Costa County.

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Case Manager from May 1, 1997 to February 19, 2016.

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hourly-paid, non-exempt employee earning $79.97 per hour at the

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time of her termination.

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discretionary bonuses from Defendant: (1) a “Success Sharing

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Bonus,” which is a yearly bonus given to all non-exempt employees

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based on Defendant’s financial success for the year; (2) a

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“Certification Bonus,” which is a yearly bonus given to all non-

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exempt employees whose job positions require a certification

Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as a
She was an

She received the following non-

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credential; and (3) a “Top Range Bonus,” which is a yearly bonus

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given to all non-exempt employees who are at the top of the pay

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scale and no longer receive yearly base rate wage increases.

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Plaintiff’s regular work schedule was 8:00 am to 4:30 pm.

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She alleges that, beginning in fall 2013, Defendant instituted

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cost-cutting measures that increased the employee-to-patient

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ratio.

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to perform numerous work duties ‘off the clock’ so as to meet the

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new patient metrics.”

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would clock out at the end of the workday but would continue to

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input patient notes and process insurance claims.

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alleges that she worked off the clock each and every workday.

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As a result, Plaintiff and other employees “were required

For example, Plaintiff and other employees

Plaintiff

Plaintiff asserts that the amount of overtime she is due for

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working off the clock can be calculated using certain electronic

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systems used by Defendant.

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EPIC and MIDAS, which Defendant’s employees use to record and

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document patient care notes.

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at which employees enter data into those systems.

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requires employees to use another electronic system, KRONOS, to

Defendant maintains two such systems,

Both EPIC and MIDAS track the times

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Defendant

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clock in and out for purposes of timekeeping for payroll.

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Plaintiff asserts that the amount of overtime she worked can be

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calculated by comparing the time entries from EPIC and MIDAS with

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the time entries in KRONOS.

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required to work approximately 300 hours off the clock and thus

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is owed approximately $30,000 in unpaid wages.

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Plaintiff estimates that she was

Plaintiff alleges that, despite knowing that Plaintiff and
other employees were performing work off the clock and without

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compensation, Defendant failed to prevent the performance of such

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work.

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as Plaintiff were working without compensation because

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Defendant’s agents witnessed them doing so at Defendant’s

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facility and because Defendant’s own electronic systems showed

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that employees were working off the clock.

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Plaintiff alleges that Defendant knew that employees such

Plaintiff also regularly worked more than five hours without

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taking a meal or rest period.

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and other employees from taking meal or rest periods by

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emphasizing (such as in performance reviews) that the patient is

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the primary focus of the team and that employees must provide

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competent, compassionate, and timely care.

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Defendant discouraged Plaintiff

Plaintiff filed this suit on October 6, 2017.

Docket No. 1.

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Sometime after Plaintiff filed suit, the parties scheduled a

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mediation to attempt to resolve this case.1

Defendant

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In her opposition to the present motion, Plaintiff refers
to information Defendant provided in furtherance of the
mediation. See Opp at 4; see generally Declaration of Joshua D.
Buck (Buck Decl.). Defendant argues that this violates Rule 408,
which prohibits statements made during compromise negotiations
used for the purpose of proving or disproving the validity or
amount of a disputed claim. Accordingly, the Court does not
consider this information.
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unilaterally withdrew from the mediation three days before the

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scheduled date.

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began calling current employees into “interrogation sessions”

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where it offered “nuisance value” to employees owed significant

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damages.

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requesting them to waive their claims for a net sum of $1,000 per

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employee.

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of overtime owed each employee.

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letters are invalid and violate the Fair Labor Standards Act

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Buck Decl. ¶ 6.

Shortly thereafter, Defendant

Defendant presented these employees with a letter

See FAC, Ex. 4.

The letters do not provide the amount
Plaintiff alleges that these

(FLSA).
On November 17, 2017, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss.

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Docket No. 10.

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motion, Plaintiff filed the FAC.

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Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B).

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action: (1) failure to pay overtime wages in violation of the

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FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207; (2) failure to pay minimum wages for all

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hours worked; (3) failure to pay overtime wages for all hours

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worked; (4) failure to provide meal and rest breaks; (5) failure

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to provide accurate wage statements; (6) failure to timely pay

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all wages due; (7) recovery under the California Private Attorney

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General Act (PAGA); (8) interfering with court process by failing

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to disclose amounts due in negotiating individual settlements;

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and (9) unfair business practices.

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Defendant again moved to dismiss.

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In lieu of filing an opposition to Defendant’s
Docket No. 13; see also Fed. R.

Plaintiff’s FAC alleges nine causes of

On December 15, 2017,
Docket No. 14.

LEGAL STANDARD
A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the

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claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

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Civ. P. 8(a).

Fed. R.

The plaintiff must proffer “enough facts to state
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a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

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Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

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Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

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12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, dismissal is appropriate

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only when the complaint does not give the defendant fair notice

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of a legally cognizable claim and the grounds on which it rests.

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Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

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the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

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draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

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the misconduct alleged.”

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Ashcroft v.

On a motion under Rule

A claim is facially plausible “when

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

In considering whether the complaint is sufficient to state

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a claim, the court will take all material allegations as true and

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construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

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Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc., 540 F.3d 1049,

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1061 (9th Cir. 2008).

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of the complaint, materials incorporated into the complaint by

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reference, and facts of which the court may take judicial notice.

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Id. at 1061.

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conclusions, including threadbare “recitals of the elements of a

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cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.”

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Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

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The court’s review is limited to the face

However, the court need not accept legal

A party may also move for a more definite statement of a

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complaint “which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot

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reasonably prepare a response.”

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motion “must point out the defects complained of and the details

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desired.”

Id.

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e).

DISCUSSION
I.

Motion to Dismiss
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The

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Defendant moves to dismiss all nine asserted causes of
action for failure to state a claim.

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A.

First, Second, and Third Causes of Action

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Defendant first asserts that Plaintiff’s first, second, and
third causes of action fail because they do not contain the

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degree of specificity required to state claims for failure to pay

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minimum or overtime wages under the FLSA and the California Labor

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Code.

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Cir. 2014), as amended (Jan. 26, 2015), the Ninth Circuit

In Landers v. Quality Commc’ns, Inc., 771 F.3d 638 (9th

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considered this issue with respect to the FLSA for the first time

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post-Twombly and Iqbal.

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order to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege

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that she worked more than forty hours in a given workweek without

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being compensated for the overtime hours worked during that

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workweek.”

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detailed facts are not required and that the pleading should be

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“evaluated in the light of judicial experience.”

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Moreover, the plausibility of a claim is “context-specific.”

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A plaintiff may establish a plausible claim in a number of ways,

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for example, “by estimating the length of her average workweek

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during the applicable period and the average rate at which she

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was paid, the amount of overtime wages she believes she is owed,

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or any other facts that will permit the court to find

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plausibility.”

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the number of overtime hours she worked, however.

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Circuit noted this was unnecessary: “After all, most (if not all)

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of the detailed information concerning a plaintiff-employee's

Id. at 641.

Id. at 644-45.

Id.

The court held that, “in

The court warned, however, that

Id. at 645.
Id.

A plaintiff is not required to approximate

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Id.

The Ninth

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compensation and schedule is in the control of the defendants.”

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Id.

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Here, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to “nudge[]
[her] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.”

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Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

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overtime for the time spent inputting information into EPIC and

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MIDAS that occurred after she had clocked out of KRONOS.

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further explains that her base rate of pay was too low because it

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did not include certain non-discretionary bonuses that she

Plaintiff explains that she is owed

She

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received.

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workweek, the rate at which she was paid, and the amount of

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overtime wages she believes she is owed, as well as numerous

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other supporting details.

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provides Defendant with adequate notice of her first three causes

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of action.

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language of the FLSA,” as Defendant suggests.

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at 643 (citing Dejesus v. HF Management Services, 726 F.3d 85, 89

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(2d Cir. 2013)).

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Plaintiff also estimated the length of her average

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s complaint

Plaintiff does not merely “parrot the statutory
Landers, 771 F.3d

Defendant also contends that Plaintiff does not sufficiently

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allege that Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiff

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and others were working off the clock.

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Superior Court, 53 Cal. 4th 1004, 1051 (2012) (noting that

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“liability is contingent on proof [the defendant] knew or should

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have known off-the-clock work was occurring.”).

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specifically alleges that Defendant and its agents observed

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Plaintiff and other employees inputting information into EPIC and

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MIDAS after their shifts ended.

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Defendant maintains records that would show that Plaintiff and

Brinker Rest. Corp. v.

But Plaintiff

Plaintiff also alleges that

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others were not being compensated for overtime, i.e., the EPIC,

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MIDAS, and KRONOS time entries.

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Plaintiff need not allege more.

Defendant additionally asserts that Plaintiff’s complaint
does not state why Plaintiff did not clock overtime for the

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additional time she spent inputting information into EPIC and

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MIDAS, despite the fact that she knew how.

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pay stub Plaintiff attached to her complaint, which shows that

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she clocked overtime and received compensation for that overtime.

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But Plaintiff alleges in her complaint that Defendant instituted

Defendant points to a

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cost-cutting measures that increased the employee-to-patient

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ratio.

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to perform numerous work duties ‘off the clock’ so as to meet the

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new patient metrics.”

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all appropriate inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, the Court finds

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that Plaintiff adequately alleges that she felt pressured by

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Defendant’s policies to input information into EPIC and MIDAS

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after hours, without tracking it as overtime.

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Plaintiff is not required under the relevant statutes or Landers

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to explain exactly why she did not clock overtime, even though

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doing so may increase the plausibility of her claim.

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only allege that she worked overtime without being compensated

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and that Defendant knew or should have known of this fact.

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Because Plaintiff has already done so, Defendant’s argument on

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this point is not persuasive.

As a result, Plaintiff and other employees “were required

Considering these allegations and making

Moreover,

She must

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B.

Fourth Cause of Action

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Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action

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for failure to provide meal and rest breaks also fails to state a

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claim.

Specifically, Defendant argues that Plaintiff
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insufficiently explains “how or why Plaintiff and the proposed

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class were deprived of meal breaks” and instead “recites only the

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statutory language.”

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Motion at 8.

Plaintiff, however, does allege that Defendant discouraged
taking rest and lunch breaks by emphasizing in performance

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reviews and policies that patient care should be the priority.

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Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant instituted cost-cutting

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measures that increased the employee-to-patient ratio, which

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interfered with taking rest and lunch breaks.

Making all

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inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, this is sufficient to state a

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claim.

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C.

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With respect to Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action for

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Fifth Cause of Action

failure to provide accurate wage statements, Defendant asserts

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that Plaintiff does not say what was unlawful about Defendant’s
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wage statements.

But Plaintiff explains in her first through

fourth causes of action how she was underpaid, and she alleges

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that other employees were similarly underpaid.

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to Plaintiff’s allegations, Defendant issued incorrect wage

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statements reflecting the underpaid amount.

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acknowledge, this cause of action depends on Plaintiff’s first

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through fourth causes of action.

Thus, according

As both parties

Because those claims survive

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Defendant’s motion to dismiss, Plaintiff’s fifth claim also
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survives.
D.

Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Causes of Action

Defendant challenges that Plaintiff’s sixth, seventh, and
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ninth causes of action are not sufficiently plead.

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Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action, the parties agree that these

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claims are derivative of Plaintiff’s other claims.

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because Plaintiff’s other claims survive, these claims also

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survive.

As with

Again,

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E.

Eighth Cause of Action

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At the hearing, Plaintiff clarified that her eighth cause of
action seeks declaratory judgment that settlements and releases

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obtained by Defendant from putative class members should be

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invalidated.

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action fails because it is (1) unripe and (2) insufficiently

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plead.

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Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s eighth cause of

Defendant argues that this cause of action is not ripe

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because the FAC does not allege that Plaintiff was offered an

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individual settlement or release.

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this claim is “too speculative for resolution” because it rests

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upon a series of contingencies; namely, that Defendant will seek

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to enforce a settlement against a signatory who opts into the

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FLSA class.

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1289 (9th Cir. 1990).

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similar, but distinct, constitutional concern: standing.

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well-established that “if none of the named plaintiffs purporting

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to represent a class establishes the requisite of a case or

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controversy with the defendants, none may seek relief on behalf

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of himself or any other member of the class.”

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Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974).

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action adds nothing to the question of standing, for even named

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plaintiffs who represent a class must allege and show that they

Thus, Defendant argues that

W. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Sonoma Cty., 905 F.2d 1287,
Defendant’s argument actually raises a

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It is

O’Shea v.

“That a suit may be a class

personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered

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by other, unidentified members of the class to which they belong

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and which they purport to represent.”

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343, 357 (1996) (internal quotation marks and alterations

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omitted).

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974, 985 (9th Cir. 2007) (in “a class action, standing is

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satisfied if at least one named plaintiff meets the

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requirements.”).

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waiver.”

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S.

See also Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d

Standing is “jurisdictional and not subject to

Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349.

Because Plaintiff does not

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allege that she herself received or signed an offer to settle,

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she lacks standing to bring the eighth cause of action.

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the eighth cause of action is dismissed.

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to amend to renew this claim if Plaintiff timely joins a named

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co-plaintiff who suffered the injury described in the eighth

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cause of action.

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from bringing a motion for corrective action to protect the

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rights of potential class members, which Plaintiff appears to

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have done.

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II.

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Thus,

The Court grants leave

This dismissal also does not preclude Plaintiff

See Docket No. 24.

Motion for More Definite Statement
With respect to the first through seventh and the ninth

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causes of action, Defendant’s motion for a more definite

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statement pursuant to Rule 12(e) is denied for the reasons given

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for denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss.

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eighth cause of action, Defendant’s motion for a more definite

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statement is denied as moot.

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With respect to the

CONCLUSION

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Defendant’s motion to dismiss is DENIED with respect to the

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first through seventh and the ninth causes of action and GRANTED
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without prejudice with respect to the eighth cause of action.

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The Court grants leave to amend to renew this claim if Plaintiff

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timely joins a named co-plaintiff who suffered the injury

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described in the eighth cause of action.

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a more definite statement is DENIED.

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Defendant’s motion for

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: March 28, 2018
CLAUDIA WILKEN
United States District Judge

United States District Court
Northern District of California

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