TechShop, Inc. v. Rasure et al

Filing 279

ORDER by Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. DENYING ( 127 , 129 and 173 ) MOTIONS TO SEAL. (ndrS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/10/2020)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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TECHSHOP, INC.,
Plaintiff,

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v.

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ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO
SEAL
Re: Dkt. Nos. 127, 129, 173

DAN RASURE, et al.,
Defendants.

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

Case No. 18-cv-01044-HSG

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Defendants filed administrative motions to file documents under seal in connection with

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their motions in limine and responses to Plaintiff’s motions in limine. Dkt. Nos. 127, 129, 173.

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For the reasons articulated below, the Court DENIES the motions.

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I.

LEGAL STANDARD
Courts generally apply a “compelling reasons” standard when considering motions to seal

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documents. Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 678 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Kamakana

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v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006)). “This standard derives from the

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common law right ‘to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records

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and documents.’” Id. (quoting Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178). “[A] strong presumption in favor of

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access is the starting point.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178 (quotations omitted). To overcome this

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strong presumption, the party seeking to seal a judicial record attached to a dispositive motion

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must “articulate compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings that outweigh the

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general history of access and the public policies favoring disclosure, such as the public interest in

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understanding the judicial process” and “significant public events.” Id. at 1178–79 (quotations

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omitted). “In general, ‘compelling reasons’ sufficient to outweigh the public’s interest in

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disclosure and justify sealing court records exist when such ‘court files might have become a

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vehicle for improper purposes,’ such as the use of records to gratify private spite, promote public

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scandal, circulate libelous statements, or release trade secrets.” Id. at 1179 (quoting Nixon v.

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Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978)). “The mere fact that the production of records

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may lead to a litigant’s embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure to further litigation will not,

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without more, compel the court to seal its records.” Id.
Records attached to nondispositive motions must meet the lower “good cause” standard of

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Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as such records “are often unrelated, or only

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tangentially related, to the underlying cause of action.” Id. at 1179–80 (quotations omitted). This

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requires a “particularized showing” that “specific prejudice or harm will result” if the information

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is disclosed. Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210–11 (9th

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Cir. 2002); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). “Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific

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examples of articulated reasoning” will not suffice. Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966

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F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992) (quotation omitted).

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II.

DISCUSSION
Because motions in limine are nondispositive motions, the Court will apply the lower good

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cause standard. Here, Defendants seek to file under seal: (1) portions of their Motion in Limine

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No. 1; (2) Exhibit 1 to the Declaration of Andrea Pallios Roberts in Support of Motion in Limine

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No. 1; (3) portions of their Motion in Limine No. 2; and (4) Exhibits 1, 3–15 to the Declaration of

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Ann McFarland Draper in Support of Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine No. 2.

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See Dkt. Nos. 127, 129, 173.

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The only proffered justification for sealing is that the information was designated as

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“confidential” or “highly confidential” by Plaintiff. See Dkt. No. 127-1 at ¶ 4, Dkt. No. 129-1 at

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¶ 4, Dkt. No. 173-1 at ¶ 4. But a designation of confidentiality is not sufficient to establish that a

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document is sealable. See Civ. L. R. 79-5(d)(1)(A). “Confidential” is merely the parties’ initial

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designation of confidentiality to establish coverage under the stipulated protective order. See

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Verinata Health, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., No. 12-cv-05501-SI, 2015 WL 5117083, at *5

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(N.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2015) (“But good cause ‘cannot be established simply by showing that the

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document is subject to a protective order or by stating in general terms that the material is
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considered to be confidential’”) (quoting Bain v. AstraZeneca LP, No. 09-cv-4147, 2011 WL

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482767, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2011)). Thus, Defendants’ motions do not comply with Civil

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Local Rule 79-5(d)(1)(A). In addition, as the designating party for the materials, Plaintiff did not

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comply with Civil Local Rule 79-5(e)(1), because it did not file a declaration within four days of

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Defendants’ motions. See Civ. L.R. 79-5(e)(1).

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III.

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CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ administrative motions to file under seal.

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Dkt. No. 127, 129, 173. The Court DIRECTS Defendants to file public versions of all documents

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for which the proposed sealing has been denied within seven days of this order. Defendants may
also file new motions to seal within seven days of this order according to the requirements

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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discussed above.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: 3/10/2020
______________________________________
HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.
United States District Judge

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