Economus v. City and County of San Francisco et al

Filing 154

ORDER by Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. DENYING 39 ADMINISTRATIVE MOTION TO FILE UNDER SEAL.Motions due by 4/3/2019. (ndrS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/27/2019)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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ANTHONY ECONOMUS,
Plaintiff,

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v.

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Case No. 18-cv-01071-HSG
ORDER DENYING ADMINISTRATIVE
MOTION TO FILE UNDER SEAL
Re: Dkt. No. 39

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN
FRANCISCO, et al.,

United States District Court
Northern District of California

Defendants.
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Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Anthony Economus’s administrative motion to file

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under seal Exhibit A to the Declaration of Patrick Buelna in support of Plaintiff’s motion for leave

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to file Plaintiff’s second amended complaint. See Dkt. No. 39 (“Mot.”). For the reasons

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articulated below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion.

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I.

LEGAL STANDARD
Courts generally apply a “compelling reasons” standard when considering motions to seal

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documents. Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 678 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Kamakana

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v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006)). “This standard derives from

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the common law right ‘to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial

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records and documents.’” Id. (quoting Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178). “[A] strong presumption in

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favor of access is the starting point.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178 (quotations omitted). To

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overcome this strong presumption, the party seeking to seal a judicial record attached to a

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dispositive motion must “articulate compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings that

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outweigh the general history of access and the public policies favoring disclosure, such as the

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public interest in understanding the judicial process” and “significant public events.” Id. at 1178–

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79 (quotations omitted). “In general, ‘compelling reasons’ sufficient to outweigh the public’s

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interest in disclosure and justify sealing court records exist when such ‘court files might have

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become a vehicle for improper purposes,’ such as the use of records to gratify private spite,

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promote public scandal, circulate libelous statements, or release trade secrets.” Id. at 1179

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(quoting Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978)). “The mere fact that the

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production of records may lead to a litigant’s embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure to further

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litigation will not, without more, compel the court to seal its records.” Id.
The Court must “balance[] the competing interests of the public and the party who seeks to

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keep certain judicial records secret. After considering these interests, if the court decides to seal

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certain judicial records, it must base its decision on a compelling reason and articulate the factual
basis for its ruling, without relying on hypothesis or conjecture.” Id. Civil Local Rule 79-5

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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supplements the compelling reasons standard set forth in Kamakana: the party seeking to file a

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document or portions of it under seal must “establish[] that the document, or portions thereof, are

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privileged, protectable as a trade secret or otherwise entitled to protection under the law . . . The

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request must be narrowly tailored to seek sealing only of sealable material.” Civil L.R. 79-5(b).

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Records attached to nondispositive motions, however, are not subject to the strong

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presumption of access. See Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179. Because such records “are often

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unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the underlying cause of action,” parties moving to seal

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must meet the lower “good cause” standard of Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

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Id. at 1179–80 (quotations omitted). This requires only a “particularized showing” that “specific

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prejudice or harm will result” if the information is disclosed. Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v.

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Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210–11 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c).

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“Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples of articulated reasoning” will

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not suffice. Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992) (quotations

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omitted).

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II.

DISCUSSION
Because these records are attached to a nondispositive motion, the Court will apply the

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lower good cause standard. Plaintiff seeks to file under seal Exhibit A, copies of incident reports

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from the San Francisco Police Department related to the underlying collision in this action. See
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Mot. at 2. The only basis Plaintiff proffers for sealing is that “Defendant [ ] has designated the

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incident reports prepared in connection with Plaintiff’s civil right injuries as ‘CONFIDENTIAL.’”

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Id. Plaintiff’s declaration in support of the motion similarly states that because Defendant alerted

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Plaintiff that the “police reports were designated in their entirety as ‘CONFIDENTIAL,’” they

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therefore “should be re-filed under seal.” Dkt. No. 39-2 ¶ 2. Plaintiff seeks to withhold Exhibit A

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in its entirety. Defendants did not file a declaration establishing that Exhibit A was sealable.

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The Court finds that Plaintiff’s cursory justification does not adequately plead a

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“particularized showing” of “specific prejudice or harm.” See Phillips, 307 F.3d at 1210–11

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(citation and quotations omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). The fact that Exhibit A is
designated as “Confidential” is not sufficient to establish that a document is sealable. Civ. L. R.

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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79-5(d)(1)(A). “Confidential” is merely the parties’ initial designation of confidentiality to

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establish coverage under the stipulated protective order. See Verinata Health, Inc. v. Ariosa

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Diagnostics, Inc., No. 12-cv-05501-SI, 2015 WL 5117083, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2015) (“But

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good cause ‘cannot be established simply by showing that the document is subject to a protective

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order or by stating in general terms that the material is considered to be confidential’”) (quoting

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Bain v. AstraZeneca LP, No. 09-cv-4147, 2011 WL 482767, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2011)).

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Thus, Plaintiff’s motion does not comply with Civil Local Rule 79-5(d)(1)(A). Withholding

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Exhibit A in its entirety also does not appear “narrowly tailored” to seal only sealable material, as

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required by Civil Local Rule 79-5. In addition, as the designating party for the materials in

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Exhibit A, Defendants did not comply with Civil Local Rule 79-5(e)(1), because it did not file a

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Declaration within four days of Plaintiff’s motion. See Civ. L.R. 79-5(e)(1).

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The Court therefore DENIES Plaintiff’s motion. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 79-5(f)(2),

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Plaintiff may file an unredacted version of Exhibit A or a new motion to seal within seven days of

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this Order according to the requirements discussed above.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: 3/27/2019
______________________________________
HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.
United States District Judge
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