Enea v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC

Filing 83

ORDER by Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 74 ADMINISTRATIVE MOTION TO FILE UNDER SEAL. (ndrS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/19/2020)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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GIORGIO ENEA,
Plaintiff,

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v.

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MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC, et al.,

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
ADMINISTRATIVE MOTION TO FILE
UNDER SEAL
Re: Dkt. No. 74

Defendants.

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

Case No. 18-cv-02792-HSG

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Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s administrative motion to file documents under seal.

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Dkt. No. 74. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s administrative

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motion.

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I.

LEGAL STANDARD
Courts generally apply a “compelling reasons” standard when considering motions to seal

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documents. Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 678 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Kamakana

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v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006)). “This standard derives from the

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common law right ‘to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records

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and documents.’” Id. (quoting Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178). “[A] strong presumption in favor of

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access is the starting point.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178 (quotations omitted). To overcome this

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strong presumption, the party seeking to seal a judicial record attached to a dispositive motion

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must “articulate compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings that outweigh the

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general history of access and the public policies favoring disclosure, such as the public interest in

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understanding the judicial process” and “significant public events.” Id. at 1178–79 (quotations

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omitted). “In general, ‘compelling reasons’ sufficient to outweigh the public’s interest in

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disclosure and justify sealing court records exist when such ‘court files might have become a

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vehicle for improper purposes,’ such as the use of records to gratify private spite, promote public

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scandal, circulate libelous statements, or release trade secrets.” Id. at 1179 (quoting Nixon v.

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Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978)). “The mere fact that the production of records

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may lead to a litigant’s embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure to further litigation will not,

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without more, compel the court to seal its records.” Id.
The Court must “balance[] the competing interests of the public and the party who seeks to

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keep certain judicial records secret. After considering these interests, if the court decides to seal

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certain judicial records, it must base its decision on a compelling reason and articulate the factual

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basis for its ruling, without relying on hypothesis or conjecture.” Id. Civil Local Rule 79-5
supplements the compelling reasons standard set forth in Kamakana: the party seeking to file a

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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document or portions of it under seal must “establish[] that the document, or portions thereof, are

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privileged, protectable as a trade secret or otherwise entitled to protection under the law . . . The

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request must be narrowly tailored to seek sealing only of sealable material.” Civil L.R. 79-5(b).
Records attached to nondispositive motions must meet the lower “good cause” standard of

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Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as such records “are often unrelated, or only

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tangentially related, to the underlying cause of action.” See Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179–80

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(quotations omitted). This requires a “particularized showing” that “specific prejudice or harm

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will result” if the information is disclosed. Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp.,

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307 F.3d 1206, 1210–11 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). “Broad allegations of

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harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples of articulated reasoning” will not suffice. Beckman

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Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992) (quotation omitted).

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II.

DISCUSSION

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Plaintiff seeks to file under seal Exhibits 1 and 3 attached to his opposition to Defendant’s

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motion for summary judgment and portions in his opposition that reference the exhibits. Dkt. No.

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74. The only proffered justification for sealing is that the information was designated as

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“Confidential” by Defendant. Id. But a designation of confidentiality is not sufficient to establish

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that a document is sealable. See Civ. L. R. 79-5(d)(1)(A). “Confidential” is merely the parties’

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initial designation of confidentiality to establish coverage under the stipulated protective order.
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See Verinata Health, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., No. 12-cv-05501-SI, 2015 WL 5117083, at

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*5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2015) (“But good cause ‘cannot be established simply by showing that the

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document is subject to a protective order or by stating in general terms that the material is

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considered to be confidential’”) (quoting Bain v. AstraZeneca LP, No. 09-cv-4147, 2011 WL

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482767, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2011)). Thus, Plaintiff’s motion does not comply with Civil

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Local Rule 79-5(d)(1)(A). In addition, as the designating party for the materials, Defendant did

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not comply with Civil Local Rule 79-5(e)(1), because it did not file a declaration within four days

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of Plaintiff’s motion. See Civ. L.R. 79-5(e)(1).
Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s administrative motion to seal.

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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III.

CONCLUSION
The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s administrative motion to file under seal, Dkt. No. 74, and

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DIRECTS Plaintiff to file public versions of all documents for which the proposed sealing has

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been denied within seven days of this order.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: 2/19/2020
______________________________________
HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.
United States District Judge

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