Harrington v. Saul

Filing 29

Order by Judge Phyllis J. Hamilton granting 25 Motion for Attorney Fees.(pjhlc2, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 7/29/2022)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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STEVEN HARRINGTON,

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v.

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ANDREW SAUL,

United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Case No. 20-cv-04148-PJH

Plaintiff,

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ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR
ATTORNEYS’ FEES
Re: Dkt. No. 25

Defendant.

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Before the court is plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees pursuant to the Equal

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Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). The matter is fully briefed and

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suitable for decision without oral argument. Having read the parties’ papers and carefully

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considered their arguments and the relevant legal authority, and good cause appearing,

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the court hereby GRANTS the motion for the following reasons.

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BACKGROUND

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On June 23, 2020, plaintiff appealed the decision from the Social Security

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Administration that he was not eligible for disability benefits. Dkt. 1. On April 12, 2021,

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plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and defendant cross moved for summary

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judgment. Dkt. 20, 21. On March 14, 2022, this court granted plaintiff’s motion for

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summary judgment, in part, and denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment in its

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entirety. Dkt. 23 at 15. On May 31, 2022, plaintiff moved for attorneys’ fees, seeking an

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award of $11,237.54. Dkt. 25 at 5. Defendant filed an opposition on June 16, 2022, and

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plaintiff filed a reply on the same day. Dkt. 27, 28.

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DISCUSSION

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A.

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The EAJA mandates an award of attorneys’ fees and expenses to a prevailing

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party, other than the United States, in any civil action other than one sounding in tort

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“brought by or against the United States . . . unless the court finds the position of the

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United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award

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unjust.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).
In making this determination, a court “must focus on two questions: first, whether

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

Legal Standard

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the government was substantially justified in taking its original action; and, second,

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whether the government was substantially justified in defending the validity of the action

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in court.” Gutierrez v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 1258–59 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal citation

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and quotation marks omitted). The government bears the burden of showing substantial

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justification. Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 569 (9th Cir. 1995).
If fees are awarded under the EAJA, the court has considerable discretion in

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determining the amount of the fee award, including the reasonableness of the fees

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claimed by the prevailing party. Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1398 (9th Cir.

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1992). In determining what constitutes a reasonable fee award, a court should consider

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factors such as the number of hours requested and duplication of effort. Id. at 1397. A

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court should not, however, apply a “de facto cap on the number of hours for which

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attorneys may be compensated under the EAJA in a ‘routine’ case challenging the denial

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of social security benefits. Rather individualized consideration must be given to each

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case.” Costa v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 690 F.3d 1132, 1134 (9th Cir. 2012). A

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court may impose “a small reduction, no greater than 10 percent—a ‘haircut’—based on

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its exercise of discretion and without a more specific explanation.” Moreno v. City of

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Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2008). Greater reductions require “a more

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specific articulation of the court’s reasoning.” Id. at 1111.

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B.

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Analysis
Plaintiff moves for a total fee award of $11,237.54. Dkt. 25-1, ¶ 5. The parties do

not dispute that plaintiff is the prevailing party in this matter. See Gutierrez, 274 F.3d at
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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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1257 (stating, “[a]n applicant for disability benefits becomes a prevailing party for the

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purposes of the EAJA if the denial of her benefits is reversed and remanded regardless

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of whether disability benefits ultimately are awarded”). Defendant does not assert that

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the government’s position was substantially justified or that special circumstances exist

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here. The parties do not dispute that plaintiff counsel’s hourly rates are reasonable under

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Ninth Circuit standards—$207.78 for 2020 and $217.54 for 2021 and 2022. Statutory

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Maximum Rates Under the Equal Access to Justice Act, United States Courts for the

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Ninth Circuit, https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/attorneys/statutory-maximum-rates; See 8

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U.S.C. § 2412 (d)(2)(A), Thangaraja v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 870, 876–77 (9th Cir. 2005);

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Ninth Circuit Rule 39-1.6. And plaintiff does not oppose defendant’s request that any

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fees awarded be made payable to plaintiff if they are subject to the Treasury Offset

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Program. Dkt. 27 at 2; Dkt. 28 at 12.

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What the parties do dispute is the reasonableness of plaintiff’s proposed fee

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award. Specifically, defendant argues plaintiff’s proposed fee award is unreasonable for

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three reasons: (1) the number hours billed by counsel is too high given counsel’s

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experience with social security cases and given the two “run-of-the-mill” issues raised in

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this case; (2) plaintiff’s counsel billed for clerical work at an attorneys’ hourly rate; and (3)

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plaintiff’s counsel billed .1 hours for perfunctory tasks. Dkt. 27 at 3–5. For these

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reasons, defendant requests a fifty-percent reduction to plaintiff’s proposed fee award.

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Id. at 5.

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Under the EAJA, the prevailing party “bears the burden of establishing entitlement

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to an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates.”

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Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983). The prevailing party must exercise

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“billing judgment,” i.e., only bill for work that would be billed to a private client. Id. at 434

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(“Hours that are not properly billed to one’s client also are not properly billed to one’s

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adversary pursuant to statutory authority.”). And the prevailing party should not seek

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fees for work that is “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Id.

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First, plaintiff’s counsel declares she spent 51.8 hours litigating this action. Dkt.
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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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25-1. A court “should defer to the winning lawyer’s professional judgment as to how

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much time he was required to spend on the case.” Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1112. It is not

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unusual for an attorney to bill over 50 hours for social security matters of this nature that

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involve a voluminous record. See Valle v. Berryhill, No. 16-CV-02358-JSC, 2018 WL

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1449414, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2018) (awarding fees based on 116.9 billable attorney

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hours); Stevenson v. Astrue, No. C 10-04837 LB, 2012 WL 5412704, at *7 (N.D. Cal.

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Nov. 6, 2012) (awarding fees based on 59.3 billable attorney hours). There is no basis to

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call into question plaintiff counsel’s declaration, including counsel’s experience with social

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security matters or the routine nature of this case. See Gregory S. v. Saul, No. 19-CV-

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07543-JSC, 2021 WL 1668059, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2021) (awarding fees to counsel

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experienced in social security matters because social security “cases involve a myriad of

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complex legal issues as well as oftentimes a voluminous administrative record”). Indeed,

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it is “an abuse of discretion to apply a de facto policy limiting social security claimants to

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twenty to forty hours of attorney time in routine cases.” Costa, 690 F.3d at 1137 (internal

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quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the court does not find plaintiff’s proposed fee

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award unreasonable because it is based on 51.8 billable attorney hours.

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Second, the Ninth Circuit has explained that “purely clerical or secretarial tasks

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should not be billed at a paralegal or lawyer’s rate, regardless of who performs them.”

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Davis v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1543 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal

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quotation marks and alterations omitted). Plaintiff’s counsel stipulates to erroneously

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billing .2 hours of clerical work at an attorney’s rate, and such entries are unreasonable.

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Dkt. 28 at 7; Dkt. 25-2. Accordingly, plaintiff’s proposed fee award will be reduced by

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$41.56.

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Third, courts have found .1 billing entries to be reasonable, so long as the entries

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are not for perfunctory, vague, or redundant tasks. See Khan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

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No. 18-CV-02868-JSC, 2019 WL 5102601, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2019). Plaintiff’s

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counsel billed .1 hours for tasks such as reviewing orders, decisions, and an answer, and

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drafting client emails and paperwork. These tasks and billing entries are not perfunctory,
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vague, or redundant. As such, plaintiff’s proposed fee award is not unreasonable on this

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basis.

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Accordingly, the court finds plaintiff’s proposed award of $11,237.54 minus $41.56
reasonable.

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Plaintiff seeks an additional award for the 2.5 attorney hours associated with

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preparing plaintiff’s reply brief. Under the EAJA, a plaintiff may seek fees for hours spent

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litigating an EAJA fee award. See INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 162 (1990). Courts

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routinely award fees for hours spent preparing reply briefs. See Valle, No. 16-CV-02358-

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JSC, 2018 WL 1449414, at *3 (finding a billing entry for 9.75 hours reasonable for

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preparing a reply brief); Potter v. Colvin, No. 14-cv-02562-JSC, 2015 WL 7429376, at *4

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(N.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2015) (awarding $569.04 in fees for three hours spent preparing a

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reply brief); Smith v. Astrue, No. C 10–4814 PJH, 2012 WL 3114595, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July

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31, 2012) (awarding fees for 2.6 hours spent preparing a reply brief). Accordingly, the

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court finds the additional fees in the amount of $543.85 associated with plaintiff’s reply

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brief reasonable.
CONCLUSION

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The court GRANTS plaintiff's motion and awards $11,739.83 in attorneys’ fees.

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Barring evidence of a valid assignment, the EAJA fee award shall be paid directly to

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plaintiff, subject to any administrative offset due to outstanding federal debt.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: July 29, 2022
/s/ Phyllis J. Hamilton
PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON
United States District Judge

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