Bruzzone v. United States Attorney of Northern California District
Filing
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ORDER GRANTING 14 MOTION TO DISMISS AND 19 MOTION TO EXPAND PRE-FILING REVIEW ORDERS. ***Civil Case Terminated.*** Signed by Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. on 8/15/2023. (ndr, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 8/15/2023)Any non-CM/ECF Participants have been served by First Class Mail to the addresses of record listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF)
Case 4:22-cv-06412-HSG Document 38 Filed 08/15/23 Page 1 of 11
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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MICHAEL A BRUZZONE,
Plaintiff,
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v.
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UNITED STATES ATTORNEY OF
NORTHERN CALIFORNIA DISTRICT,
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Case No. 22-cv-06412-HSG
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
DISMISS AND MOTION TO EXPAND
PRE-FILING REVIEW ORDERS
Re: Dkt. Nos. 14, 19, 32
United States District Court
Northern District of California
Defendant.
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Pending before the Court are the United States Attorney for the Northern District of
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California’s (“Defendant” or “Government”) motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 14, “MTD”) and motion
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to expand pre-filing review orders (Dkt. No. 19, “Review Order Mot.”) as well as pro se Plaintiff’s
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“motion to submit known (suspect concealed) evidence in hearing” (Dkt. No. 32 “Evidence
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Motion”). The motions have been fully briefed.1 The Court finds this matter appropriate for
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disposition without oral argument and the matter is deemed submitted. See Civil L.R. 7-1(b). For
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the reasons discussed below the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss WITHOUT
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LEAVE TO AMEND, GRANTS Defendant’s motion to expand pre-filing review orders, and
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DENIES Plaintiff’s Evidence Motion.
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I.
In Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, the Ninth Circuit clarified the judicial notice rule and
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REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
incorporation by reference doctrine. See 899 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 2018). Under Federal Rule of
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Plaintiff submitted an untimely opposition to the motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 21 “MTD Opp.”)
and Defendant filed a reply (Dkt. No. 28). Plaintiff submitted an opposition to the motion to
expand pre-filing review orders (Dkt. No. 27, “Review Order Opp.”) and Defendant filed a reply
(Dkt. No. 29). Defendant filed a statement of non-opposition to Plaintiff’s Evidence Motion (Dkt.
No. 35).
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
Case 4:22-cv-06412-HSG Document 38 Filed 08/15/23 Page 2 of 11
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Evidence 201, a court may take judicial notice of a fact “not subject to reasonable dispute because
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it … can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
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questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). Accordingly, a court may take “judicial notice of matters of
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public record,” but “cannot take judicial notice of disputed facts contained in such public records.”
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Khoja, 899 F.3d at 999 (citation and quotations omitted). The Ninth Circuit has clarified that if a
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court takes judicial notice of a document, it must specify what facts it judicially noticed from the
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document. Id. at 999. Further, “[j]ust because the document itself is susceptible to judicial notice
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does not mean that every assertion of fact within that document is judicially noticeable for its
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truth.” Id. As an example, the Ninth Circuit held that for a transcript of a conference call, the
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court may take judicial notice of the fact that there was a conference call on the specified date, but
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may not take judicial notice of a fact mentioned in the transcript, because the substance “is subject
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to varying interpretations, and there is a reasonable dispute as to what the [document] establishes.”
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Id. at 999–1000.
Citing Federal Rule of Evidence 201, Defendant requests that the Court take judicial notice
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of records in twenty-three other cases filed by Plaintiff and attaches Exhibits A-L, orders and
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opinions issued in several cases and appeals filed by Plaintiff. See Dkt. No. 15 (“RJN”) at 1-2.
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The Court GRANTS Defendant’s request and takes judicial notice of 1) the fact that these cases
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and documents were filed, and 2) of any judicial findings contained in them. See United States ex
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rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir.1992) (explaining
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that courts “may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal
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judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue”).
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II.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s complaint is difficult to follow. To the best of the Court’s understanding,
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Plaintiff is suing the Government for its decision not to intervene in some of Plaintiff’s previous
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litigation against Intel. See Compl. at 12. Plaintiff has been declared a vexatious litigant as to
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“litigation against Intel and/or its current or former employees.” See Bruzzone v. Intel
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Corporation, 14-cv-01279-WHA, Dkt. No. 88 (“2014 Order”) at 13 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2014).
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Mr. Bruzzone has also been declared a vexatious litigation as to “litigation against James
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Case 4:22-cv-06412-HSG Document 38 Filed 08/15/23 Page 3 of 11
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McManis, William Faulkner, McManis Faulkner, its current employees, and its former
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employees.” Bruzzone v. McManis, 18-cv-01235-PJHRJN, Dkt. No. 58 (“2018 Order”) at 14
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(N.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2018).
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
United States District Court
Northern District of California
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failure to comply with Rules 8 and 10, and failure to state a claim. See generally MTD.
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Defendant also moves to expand the existing pre-filing review orders “to include the United States
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and its employees, including defendants Plaintiff has named in the instant and prior actions.” See
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Review Order Mot. at 2.
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III.
MOTION TO DISMISS
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A.
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain
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statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A
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defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be
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granted under Rule 12(b)(6). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only where the
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complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.”
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Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). To survive a Rule
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12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff need only plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
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on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible
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when a plaintiff pleads “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
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the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
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Legal Standard
In reviewing the plausibility of a complaint, courts “accept factual allegations in the
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complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”
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Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). Nevertheless,
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courts do not “accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of
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fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Secs. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir.
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2008) (quoting Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001)).
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The Court also need not accept as true allegations that contradict matter properly subject to
judicial notice or allegations contradicting the exhibits attached to the complaint. Sprewell, 266
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F.3d at 988. And even where facts are accepted as true, “a plaintiff may plead [him]self out of
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court” if he “plead[s] facts which establish that he cannot prevail on his ... claim.” Weisbuch v.
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Cty. of Los Angeles, 119 F.3d 778, 783 n.1 (9th Cir. 1997) (quotation omitted).
United States District Court
Northern District of California
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Additionally, “[p]leadings must be construed so as to do justice.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e).
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“[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than
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formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation
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omitted). In addition, “[i]n civil rights cases where the plaintiff appears pro se, the court must
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construe the pleadings liberally and must afford plaintiff the benefit of any doubt.” Karim-Panahi
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v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). However, even a “liberal interpretation of
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a . . . complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” See
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Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “[P]ro se litigants are
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bound by the rules of procedure,” Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 54 (9th Cir. 1995), which require
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“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R.
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Civ. P. 8(a).
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Even if the court concludes that a 12(b)(6) motion should be granted, the “court should
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grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that
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the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203
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F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quotation omitted).
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B.
Discussion
i.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The Government argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction because the United States has not
waived sovereign immunity. See MTD 8-12. The Court agrees.
“An action can be brought by a party against the United States only to the extent that the
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Federal Government waives its sovereign immunity . . . . If sovereign immunity has not been
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waived, the court must dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Esquivel v. United
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States, 21 F.4th 565, 572–73 (9th Cir. 2021) (quotations omitted). The Government interprets
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Plaintiff’s complaint as alleging the following claims: “(1) violations of the False Claims Act; (2)
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breach of various implied quasicontractual obligations; (3) negligence; (4) libel; (5) conspiracy to
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violate Plaintiff’s civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985; and (6) violations of the Due Process Clause
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of the Fourteenth Amendment.” MTD at 9 (citing Compl. at 4-7, 10). The Court adopts the
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Government’s liberal construction of Plaintiff’s complaint for purposes of this order.
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In its motion, the Government walks through each type of claim and argues that the United
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States has not waived sovereign immunity for any of them, providing supporting case law. See id.
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at 10-12 (collecting cases). Mr. Bruzzone does not provide any comprehensible or coherent
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response. See generally MTD Opp. The Court agrees with the Government’s arguments and finds
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that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims in the complaint because the United States
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has not waived sovereign immunity as to any of the claims potentially alleged in the complaint.
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
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ii.
Failure to State a Claim
In the alternative, the Government argues that the case should be dismissed because
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“Plaintiff fails to plead any cognizable legal theories or sufficient facts to plausibly state any
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claims.” MTD at 15. The Government points out that “[t]o the extent Plaintiff purports to base
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his claim on the False Claims Act’s authorization of qui tam actions in 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b), it is
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black-letter law that Plaintiff cannot prosecute such an action pro se without the United States’
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permission—which Plaintiff has not obtained here.” Id. at 17. The Government further points out
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that “[o]ther than the qui tam provision (which Plaintiff cannot use), the False Claims Act does not
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authorize any other private cause of action that could possibly support Plaintiff’s claims” and that
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“[t]here is no express or implied cause of action for Plaintiff to bring suit against the United States
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Attorney here.” Id.
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The Court agrees. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges no legally cognizable claim against the
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United States Attorney: to the best of the Court’s understanding, Plaintiff is suing the Government
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because it declined to intervene in his qui tam action against Intel. But the False Claims Act does
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not require the Government to intervene in a qui tam action: it specifically states that the
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Government may elect not to proceed with an action. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3) (“If the
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Government elects not to proceed with the action, the person who initiated the action shall have
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the right to conduct the action”).2
To the extent Plaintiff claims that he had some sort of contractual or quasi-contractual
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arrangement with the Government (see e.g., Compl. at 10), this claim is also frivolous. As the
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Federal Circuit explained in an appeal filed by Mr. Bruzzone in one of his previous actions, “qui
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tam actions themselves do not give rise to any contractual obligations because, at most, they arise
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only from an imputed promise to perform a legal duty.” Bruzzone v. United States, No. 2022-
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1470, 2022 WL 3147196, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 8, 2022). The Court agrees with the Government
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that the Complaint, to the extent the Court can even understand it, simply does not allege any
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“facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, under any
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theory, with respect to Defendants’ purported obligation to pay Plaintiff over $68 million.
The Court therefore dismisses the complaint due to 1) lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
United States District Court
Northern District of California
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and 2) failure to state a claim.3 Based on the nature of the deficiencies in Plaintiff's complaint and
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his subsequent filings, the Court finds that granting leave to amend would be futile. The Court
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therefore DISMISSES the complaint WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. See Ramirez v. Galaza,
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334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that “[l]eave to amend should be granted unless the
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pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts, and should be granted more
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liberally to pro se plaintiffs”) (quotations omitted).
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IV.
MOTION TO EXPAND PRE-FILING REVIEW ORDERS
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A.
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“The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), provides district courts with the inherent power
Legal Standard
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to enter pre-filing orders against vexatious litigants.” Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500
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F.3d 1047, 1057 (9th Cir. 2007). But the Ninth Circuit has cautioned that “such pre-filing orders
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are an extreme remedy that should rarely be used. Courts should not enter pre-filing orders with
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undue haste because such sanctions can tread on a litigant’s due process right of access to the
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While it is true that “a pro se relator cannot prosecute a qui tam action on behalf of
the United States,” Stoner v. Santa Clara Cnty. Off. of Educ., 502 F.3d 1116, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007),
no authority supports imposing any duty on the United States to intervene in a qui tam case
brought by a pro se plaintiff.
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The Government makes additional arguments for dismissal in its briefing, which the Court does
not reach here.
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courts.” Id. At the same time, “[f]lagrant abuse of the judicial process cannot be tolerated because
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it enables one person to preempt the use of judicial time that properly could be used to consider
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the meritorious claims of other litigants.” De Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir.
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1990).
The Ninth Circuit has adopted a four-factor test to determine whether a pre-filing order is
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warranted:
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When district courts seek to impose pre-filing restrictions, they must:
(1) give litigants notice and an opportunity to oppose the order before
it is entered; (2) compile an adequate record for appellate review,
including a listing of all the cases and motions that led the district
court to conclude that a vexatious litigant order was needed; (3) make
substantive findings of frivolousness or harassment; and (4) tailor the
order narrowly so as to closely fit the specific vice encountered.
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
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Ringgold-Lockhart v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 761 F.3d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir. 2014) (quotations
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omitted and cleaned up).
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A.
Discussion
Even though the use of pre-filing review orders “against a pro se plaintiff should be
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approached with particular caution,” the Court finds that all four factors are met and that such an
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order is warranted. See De Long, 912 F.2d at 1148 (quoting Pavilonis v. King, 626 F.2d 1075,
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1079 (1st Cir.)).
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i.
Notice
The Government filed a motion to expand the pre-filing review orders, which Plaintiff
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opposed. See Review Order Mot. and Review Order Opp. Plaintiff therefore has had “notice and
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an opportunity to oppose the order before it is entered.” Ringgold-Lockhart, 761 F.3d at 1062; see
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also Balik v. City of Torrance, 841 F. App’x 21, 22 (9th Cir. 2021) (rejecting as unpersuasive
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plaintiff’s argument that he was “entitled to a hearing before the district court declared him a
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vexatious litigant”).4
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ii.
Record for Appellate Review
The record for appellate review “needs to show, in some manner, that the litigant’s
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Balik and the other unpublished Ninth Circuit decisions cited in this order are not precedent, but
may be considered for their persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; CTA9 Rule 36-3.
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activities were numerous or abusive.” See De Long, 912 F.2d at 1147. Plaintiff has filed over
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twenty cases in both state and federal courts, most of which either directly list Intel as a party or
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are related, as this case is, to his Intel litigation. See RJN at 1; 2014 Order at 9; 2018 Order at 3.
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Much ink has already been spilled summarizing Plaintiff’s extensive litigation history and the
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Court will not repeat it in detail here. See 2014 Order at 9; 2018 Order at 3. Below is a summary
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of the cases filed by Mr. Bruzzone to date:
1.
Bruzzone v. Intel Corp., et al., No. 99-cv-779409 (Santa Clara Super. Ct. Jan. 20,
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2.
Sealed Matter, No. 08-cv-04169-WHA (N.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2008)
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3.
Sealed Matter, No. 09-cv-00679-WHA (N.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2009);
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4.
Bruzzone v. Intel Corp., No. 11-cv-213829 (Santa Clara Super. Ct. Nov. 29, 2011);
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5.
Bruzzone, et al. v. Intel Corp., et al., No. 13-cv-03729-WHA (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12,
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6.
Bruzzone v. Intel Corp., et al., No. 14-cv-01279-WHA (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2014);
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7.
Bruzzone v. ARM Inc., et al., No. 14-cv-273902 (Santa Clara Super. Ct. Dec. 2,
8.
Bruzzone v. Greenwood, et al., No. 14-cv-273903 (Santa Clara Super. Ct. Dec. 2,
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9.
Bruzzone v. Intel Corp., No. 15-mc-80002-WHA (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2015);
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10.
Bruzzone v. Intel Corp., et al., No. 16-mc-80042-VC (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2016);
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11.
Bruzzone v. Intel Corp., et al., No. 16-mc-80063-HSG (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2016);
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12.
Bruzzone v. Alsup, No. 16-mc-80103-RS (N.D. Cal. May 10, 2016);
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13.
Bruzzone v. Intel Corp. Legal Dep't, et al., No. 16-mc-80111-EMC (N.D. Cal. May
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19, 2016);
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14.
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13, 2016);
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15.
Bruzzone v. Intel Corp., et al., No. 16-mc-80233-WHA (N.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2016);
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16.
Bruzzone v. Arm Inc., et al., No. 17-cv-2943-WHA (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2017);
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
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1999);
2013);
2014);
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2014);
Bruzzone v. Intel Corp. Legal Dep't, et al., No. 16-mc-80126-JST (N.D. Cal. June
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Case 4:22-cv-06412-HSG Document 38 Filed 08/15/23 Page 9 of 11
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17.
Bruzzone v. Alsup, No. 17-cv-04558-JD (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2017);
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18.
Bruzzone v. McManis, et al., No. 18-cv-01235-PJH (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2018);
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19.
Bruzzone v. Intel Corp., et al., No. 18-cv-00865-KJM-DB (E.D. Cal. Apr. 10,
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20.
Bruzzone v. United States, No. 21-cv-01261 (Fed. Cl. Apr. 15, 2021);
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21.
Bruzzone v. Intel Corp., No. 21-cv-01539-TLN-CKD (E.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2021);
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22.
Bruzzone v. Intel Corp., No. 22-mc-00045 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2022);
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23.
Bruzzone v. Intel Corp., No. 22-cv-00430 (S.D. Iowa Dec. 19, 2022).
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
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2018);
See RJN at 1.
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Plaintiff has already been declared a vexatious litigant in this district as to litigation against
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Intel, James McManis, William Faulkner, and McManis Faulkner, and affiliated parties. See 2014
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Order at 13; 2018 Order at 14. This order incorporates the factual record and reasoning contained
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in Judge Alsup’s and Judge Hamilton’s earlier vexatious-litigant order, which this order extends.
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See 2014 Order; 2018 Order.
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iii.
Substantive Findings of Frivolousness or Harassment
“An injunction cannot issue merely upon a showing of litigiousness.” Moy v. United
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States, 906 F.2d 467, 470 (9th Cir. 1990). Instead, “[t]o decide whether the litigant’s actions are
18
frivolous or harassing, the district court must look at both the number and content of the filings as
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indicia of the frivolousness of the litigant's claims.” Molski, 500 F.3d at 1059 (quotations omitted).
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The Court finds Plaintiff’s conduct frivolous and harassing. See, e.g., Huggins v. Hynes,
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117 F. App’x 517, 518 (9th Cir. 2004) (affirming district court’s pre-filing review order in part
22
because plaintiff “abused the courts by repeatedly relitigating the same controversy and repeatedly
23
filing frivolous motions and pleadings”).” Plaintiff is apparently fixated on litigating against Intel
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and its employees and agents. He now attempts to skirt the pre-filing review orders that were
25
issued to stop his harassment of Intel by suing the federal government for failing to intervene in
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his qui tam case against Intel, a patently unviable claim as a matter of law. See generally Compl.
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Like many of the cases and filings summarized in the earlier vexatious-litigant orders, the present
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complaint is hard to follow, but what the Court can understand confirms that it is frivolous. See
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Case 4:22-cv-06412-HSG Document 38 Filed 08/15/23 Page 10 of 11
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generally id. The number of cases Plaintiff has filed, the legal unviability of the present case, and
2
his fixation with seeking to recover from someone for his repeatedly rejected claims against Intel
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lead the Court to find that his conduct is both frivolous and harassing.
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iv.
“The fourth and final factor in the De Long standard is that the pre-filing order must be
5
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narrowly tailored to the vexatious litigant’s wrongful behavior.” Molski, 500 F.3d at 1061.
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In Molski, the court approved the scope of an order because it prevented the plaintiff from filing
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“only the type of claims Molski had been filing vexatiously,” and “because it [would] not deny
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Molski access to courts on any ... claim that is not frivolous.” Id.
Defendants propose that Plaintiff be prevented from filing any complaints against the
10
United States District Court
Northern District of California
Order is Narrowly Tailored
11
United States of America or any past, current, or future employees without first obtaining leave of
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Court. See Dkt. No. 19-1 (“Proposed Order”). The vexatious litigant order against Plaintiff has
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already had to be expanded once and the Court agrees that it should be expanded again. However,
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it finds the Government’s suggestion too broad. The Court will limit the pre-filing order
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expansion to cover only cases filed against the Government and its employees which relate in any
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way to Plaintiff’s litigation or claims against Intel or any of its employees, agents, or attorneys.5
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V.
EVIDENCE MOTION
The Court was unable to follow pro se Plaintiff’s motion or understand what relief he
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seeks. To the extent Plaintiff seeks some sort of evidentiary hearing or proceeding, the motion is
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DENIED because the Court has found no subject matter jurisdiction over his claims.6
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VI.
The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 14) WITHOUT LEAVE
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CONCLUSION
TO AMEND.
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In Balik, the Ninth Circuit affirmed an order which both dismissed a case because the “claims are
too frivolous and unsubstantial to invoke subject matter jurisdiction,” and entered a pre-filing
review order against the plaintiff. See 841 F. App’x at 21-22. The Court reads Balik to confirm
that it can issue a pre-filing review order in a case over which it lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
6
Plaintiff was asked to re-notice his Evidence Motion (see Dkt. No. 33) and he appears to have
filed a slightly different motion as part of that process (see Dkt. No. 34). Dkt. No. 34 was no more
intelligible than Dkt. No. 32.
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Case 4:22-cv-06412-HSG Document 38 Filed 08/15/23 Page 11 of 11
The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to expand pre-filing review orders (Dkt. No. 19).
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2
Plaintiff may not file, without obtaining prior leave from the Court, any further pro se complaints:
a) against Intel Corporation, its current employees, its former employees, Evangelina
3
Almirantearena, Steve Lund, Harley Stock, and/or Andrew Grove; or
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b) against James McManis, William Faulkner, McManis Faulkner, its current employees,
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and/or its former employees; or
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c) against the United States of America or the past, current, or future employees of the
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federal government—including employees of the United States Attorney’s Office and
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the federal judiciary—that relate in any way to his litigation or claims against Intel and
its past, current, or future employees, agents, or attorneys.
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If Plaintiff wishes to file a complaint that meets the above description, he shall provide a
United States District Court
Northern District of California
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copy of any such complaint, a letter requesting that the complaint be filed, and a copy of this
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Order to the Clerk of this Court. The Clerk shall then forward the complaint, letter, and copy of
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this Order to the Duty Judge for a determination whether the complaint should be accepted for
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filing. Plaintiff is warned that any violation of this order will expose him to contempt proceedings
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and appropriate sanctions, and any action filed in violation of this Order will be subject to
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dismissal.
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The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Evidence Motion (Dkt. No. 32).
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The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Defendant and to close the case.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Dated:
8/15/2023
______________________________________
HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.
United States District Judge
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